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The 25th Annual Klutznick-Harris Symposium took place on October 28 and 
October 29, 2012, in Omaha, Nebraska. The title of the symposium, from 
which this volume takes its title, is “Who Is a Jew? Reflections on History, 
Religion, and Culture.”
 As it happened, several symposium participants did not submit 
papers for this volume. Although their absence is regrettable, three scholars— 
Annalise E. Glauz-Todrank, Judith Neulander, and Ori Soltes—contributed 
papers that we would otherwise not be able to include in this collection.
Among our honored guests was Menachem Mor, University of Haifa, 
the first holder of the Klutznick Chair. A number of friends from his days as 
Klutznick Chair attended a special luncheon for him on the Sunday of the 
symposium.
 This symposium attracted substantial, enthusiastic audiences con-
sisting of students, Creighton University faculty and staff, members of the 
Jewish community, and other scholars. To put it another way, we may never 
settle on an answer (if there is one) to the question, “Who Is a Jew,” but 
everyone in town knew where to go for the best discussion and analysis of 
this perennial issue. 
As in past years, the success of this symposium owed much to the gener-
osity, wisdom, and patience of two of my colleagues, Ronald Simkins, direc-
tor of the Kripke Center for the Study of Religion and Society at Creighton 
University; and Jean Cahan, director of the Harris Center for Judaic Studies 
at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. We were once again happy to have the 
knowledgeable support of Pam Yenko, who worked with both Ron and me. 
We did not know it at the time, but this was to be Pam’s last symposium; she 
was subsequently hired by our college’s dean. 
Colleen Hastings, whom we hired from among several strong candidates 
as our new administrative assistant, has been invaluable in the preparation of 
this volume. Were this not a volume of Jewish studies, I would be tempted 
to say that Colleen has acquitted herself well in this initial “baptism by fire.” 
Equally efficient was Mary Sue Grossman, who is affiliated with the Center 
for Jewish Life (part of the Jewish Federation of Omaha).
 This volume is the fifth in our ongoing collaboration with the Purdue 
University Press, the staff of which, under director Charles Watkinson, con-
tinues to make us feel welcome in every possible way.
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 In addition to the Harris Center, the Kripke Center, and the Jewish 
Federation of Omaha, this symposium is supported by the generosity of the 
following:  
 The Ike and Roz Friedman Foundation
 The Riekes Family
 The Center for Jewish Living
 The Henry Monsky Lodge of B’nai B’rith
 Creighton University Lectures, Films, and Concerts
 The Creighton College of Arts and Sciences
 Gary and Karen Javitch
 The Dr. Bruce S. Bloom Memorial Endowment
 and others.
Although we do not have a formal dedication page for this volume, it nonethe-
less seems appropriate—in celebration of our presenting a quarter century of 
Jewish studies at its best—to dedicate this volume to us, to everyone who has 







When, sometime in late 2011, we considered possible topics for the next 
Klutznick-Harris Symposium, we all knew that we were coming up on a 
milestone: 2012 would be the twenty-fifth year that Creighton University’s 
Klutznick Chair in Jewish Civilization sponsored the event. Menachem Mor, 
the first holder of the chair, devised and convened the initial symposium in 
1988. In accordance with Menachem’s vision, each subsequent meeting has 
centered on a different topic related to Jewish studies, speakers have been 
invited from all over the world, presentations in Omaha have been geared to 
a general as much as an academic audience, and a volume has followed in a 
timely manner. As this formula has worked well, there was no reason for sub-
stantial change—all of this, we agreed, should be celebrated.
Working within this positive context, our colleagues offered numer-
ous topic suggestions. We solicited ideas from the event’s academic sponsors, 
previous participants, and members of the Omaha community. I readily (if 
shamefacedly) admit it: when someone first suggested “Who Is a Jew,” I had 
many concerns. Who would respond to a call for papers on this topic? What 
kinds of presentations would be proposed? Would they be of sufficient interest 
to draw in the general public as well as other scholars?
These were, as I soon discovered, baseless grounds for my usual “sym-
posium anxiety.” We received more than three times as many proposals as we 
did in a typical year. Because of this, we increased the number of speakers as 
much as our budget and schedule would allow. At the symposium itself, the 
audiences were large, the interactions stimulating, and the resultant volume, 
here published, satisfyingly full. 
How could I have been so wrong? Why was I so slow to recognize what 
everyone else immediately grasped, namely, that issues related to Jewish iden-
tity are of perennial interest both for those who identify themselves as Jews 
and for those looking in from outside the Jewish community? There are few, if 
any, chronological eras or geographical locales where such questions have not 
arisen. The establishment of the State of Israel, where Jews uniquely occupy 
majority status, has led to the articulation and implementation of numerous 
stances and policies concerning Jewish identity. “Who Is a Jew” is a topic of 
litigation and controversy as well as a possible source for unity and continuity. 
Issues of personal identity have often involved conversion; entire groups who 
self-identify as Jews have had that status challenged.
x
And on it goes. In addition to all of these factors, how had I missed 
the rhetoric of race that often punctuates modern discussions? Or the related 
efforts to establish a genetic basis for Jews and Judaism—or Judaisms? By the 
time I got up to speed, we were well on our way to hosting one of our most 
successful and thought-provoking symposia.
I wish to raise another point about these articles. Most of them, I think, 
can correctly be described as advocating on behalf of a particular cultural, 
religious, or political stance, in addition to being broadly descriptive and 
analytic. For some people, a detectable level of advocacy is antithetical to a 
more scholarly and neutral exposition. I don’t agree. To be sure, advocating on 
behalf of (or in opposition to) selected ideas can lead to one-sided and biased 
presentations; however, a stance of neutrality is hardly the remedy. 
In the case of the papers collected here, it is my editorial and professional 
judgment that they all, taken individually and collectively, adhere to the stan-
dards we expect. Whether or not they agree with the positions taken by the 
authors, readers of this volume can be assured that we have done the best we 
can to present a range of opinions and options within a reasonable, respectful, 
and responsible framework. 
As I have written in the introduction to several earlier volumes in this 
series, I spend, or expend, a considerable amount of time and energy seeking 
out the best order in which to present symposium papers. Although I have 
had many arguments and counter-arguments with myself about whether or 
not the ordering of papers is decisively significant, I cannot slacken my ener-
gies in this regard.
 If I remember correctly, it was Claude Levi-Strauss (the anthropologist, 
not the jeans maker) who said that, when working on a research project, there 
is a point at which the material organizes itself. The papers in this collection 
seem to come together most effectively in these categories, grouped by the 
major emphasis of each: race/genetics, Israel, broad coverage (chronologically 
or geographically), Europe, and the United States.
The first chapter on race, “Traces of Race: Defining Jewishness in America,” 
is by Sarah Imhoff, Indiana University. As Jon Efron, Eric Goldstein, and others 
have demonstrated, many nineteenth century Jews used the language of race to 
describe their Jewishness. Since the Shoah, however, this language is no longer a 
socially acceptable way to conceive of Jewish identity, but the complex questions 
surrounding the definition of Jewishness have neither resolved nor dissipated. 
This chapter analyzes the ways that two contemporary American 
conversations about Jewishness recall aspects of racial discourse, even while 
they refuse the term “race.” First, it explores two types of genetic testing: 
xi
for genes related to diseases such as Tay-Sachs and men’s Y chromosomes 
for the Cohen Modal Haplotype, or “Cohen gene.” While the first seeks 
to be vigilant about genetic diseases and the second seeks to use scientific 
discourse to authorize identity claims, both reinforce links between physical 
bodies and Jewish identity. 
The chapter then turns to peripheral groups who make claims to Jewish 
identity. By analyzing the testimonies of Americans who identify as Jewish 
because of crypto-Jewish family roots and Hebrew Israelite groups who claim 
the Ten Lost Tribes as ancestors, it becomes clear that each of these groups uses 
biological and geographical discourse—both essential to the social construc-
tion of race—to claim Jewish identity. 
Leonard Levin, Academy for Jewish Religion, is the author of the next 
chapter, “It’s All in the Memes.” A “meme” may be described as a unit of cul-
tural memory (an analogy of “gene”). According to this understanding, a Jew 
is a person with a critical mass of Jewish memes (Jewish knowledge, values, 
religious commitments, cultural memories), together with the marker: “This 
applies to me.”
Historically, the biological and cultural criteria of Jewish identity nearly 
always coincided, so taking the biological criterion as primary usually sufficed. 
Being born Jewish led automatically to Jewish upbringing, namely, the trans-
mission of cultural memory. Conversion may be viewed on this model as an 
infusion and adoption of Jewish religious-cultural memory. Religious practice 
itself served as a transmitter of cultural memory and identity, as an important 
paragraph in the seder tells us.
The Talmud obliquely mentions a couple of cases where non-Jews 
slipped into the Jewish community by personal decision. The universal preva-
lence of the mikvah was used as an expedient to claim that these individuals 
were de facto converted without a formal court procedure (Yevamot 45b, 
47a). Today, with the increase of mixed biological heritage, the old patrilineal/
matrilineal markers are insufficient to predict where Jewish identity will take 
hold. This chapter suggests how Talmudic precedent can be invoked to render 
ritual more malleable to reflect the new social reality.
The third chapter, titled, “Judging and Protecting Jewish Identity in 
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb,” is by Annalise E. Glauz-Todrank, Wake 
Forest University. In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court granted race-based civil 
rights protection to Jewish Americans for the first time in Shaare Tefila Con-
gregation v. Cobb. The civil suit was filed by Shaare Tefila Congregation, a 
synagogue in Silver Spring, Maryland affiliated with the Conservative move-
ment, after the building, playground equipment, and a car were defaced with 
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Nazi and Ku Klux Klan images and slogans. Because “hate crime” laws did 
not exist at this time, the synagogue’s lawyer cited a Civil Rights Act from 
1866 that had been passed to protect the rights of freed slaves granted in the 
Thirteenth Amendment. 
But the sections of law from the act had been previously invoked only 
to protect the rights of groups commonly identified as racial minorities in 
the United States. Hence, the lawyer for the vandals argued that Jews are just 
members of a religious group and cannot claim race-based protection. At stake 
in the oral argument, then, was how to locate Jews in relation to the legal 
categories of religion and race.
This chapter’s analysis focuses on how the justices attempted to situate 
Jewish Americans in relation to these categories. Glauz-Todrank argues that 
the justices struggled to do so because Jewish identity did not completely fit 
into either category and because different discursive systems have informed the 
characterization of Jewish identity in European and American contexts, both 
of which apply to Jewish identity in the United States. The justices’ analyses 
highlight the constructed nature of these often intersecting social categories.
Steven J. Riekes, a lawyer in Omaha, Nebraska, wrote the fourth 
chapter,“Who Is a Jew? Reflections of an American Jewish Lawyer on the Brit-
ish Supreme Court Ruling Invalidating Jewish Religious Law.” For several mil-
lennia, Jewish religious law or halachah has determined Jewish identity by using 
a matrilineal test. Under this traditional Jewish practice, to be considered a Jew, 
one must be a child of a Jewish mother, unless one became a Jew by conversion.
However, the British Supreme Court ruled that this Jewish practice 
constituted unlawful racial discrimination under Britain’s Race Relations Act 
of 1976. In this case, a young man was denied admission to a prestigious and 
popular Jewish secondary school. The student’s father was born a Jew; his 
mother was born an Italian Catholic. She converted to Judaism under the 
auspices of a Masorti (Conservative) rabbinical court. Since the Chief Rabbi of 
the British Commonwealth did not recognize a non-Orthodox conversion, the 
boy’s mother was considered non-Jewish and the school refused to admit him.
The decision of the British Supreme Court was in favor of the father 
and against the school. The majority of the court reasoned that the student 
should be regarded as ethnically Jewish. On the other hand, the Jewish reli-
gious test was based on “genetics.” Hence, the school had practiced racial 
discrimination.
Riekes believes that the dissenting opinion, which left the school’s action 
intact, more appropriately framed the issue and arrived at a more correct 
result. Moreover, for the author, it is more than disturbing for a civil court in 
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a democratic state to have arrived at the conclusion embodied in the court’s 
majority decision. 
The next chapter, by Judith Neulander, Case Western Reserve University, 
is titled, “Inventing Jewish History, Culture, and Genetic Identity in Modern 
New Mexico.” In the 1980s, New Mexican Hispanic folkways were widely 
touted in the popular press and media as “secret-” or “crypto-Jewish” by a 
small group of local academics, none a trained folklorist. Neulander arrived in 
New Mexico in 1992 to create the first scholarly documentation of these folk-
ways. But upon investigation, she found that claims of a significant crypto-
Jewish heritage were not supported by the folkways in evidence.
An independent genetic study later refuted claims of a significant crypto-
Jewish component among New Mexican Hispanics, a scientific study that 
strongly supported the author’s ethnographic findings. But academics pro-
moting the crypto-Jewish discovery dominate the popular press and media. 
As a result, demonstrably unfounded claims are given as facts. Such claims 
warrant a response consistent with twenty-first century scholarship norms and 
fieldwork ethics, since the claims contribute no useful information but simply 
repatriate the most menacing cultural and scientific fictions of the nineteenth 
century. Neulander’s chapter constitutes such a response.
The last chapter in this section, “‘Jewish Genes’: Ancient Priests and 
Modern Jewish Identity,” is by Wesley K. Sutton, Queens College, City Uni-
versity of New York. Throughout history, Jewish identity has been perceived as 
more than accepting the tenets and observing the traditions of Jewish religion. 
Whether drawn from paternal or maternal lines, parentage has historically 
been used to determine identity as a Jew.
Our recent ability to determine the sequence of DNA in our genomes 
has given us access to a vast repository of information about our biological 
heritage. In 1998 researchers claimed to have found a genetic motif exclu-
sive to kohanim. Named the Cohen Modal Haplotype (CMH), later studies 
seemed to support this finding. The popularization of these findings has led 
individuals with no familial history of Judaism to claim Jewish identity. In 
2009, the original researchers published a study rejecting their original CMH 
and substituting the “Expanded CMH.”
This chapter examines the scientific validity of such claims, asking, (1) 
Are there genetic motifs unique to Jews or any subset of Jews, such as the 
CMH? (2) Can DNA be used to distinguish Jews from other Middle East-
ern populations? This study also presents the results of the Sutton’s doctoral 
research into the genetic history of Hispanics in New Mexico, some of whom, 
based on scientific misinformation, are claiming descent from crypto-Jews.
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The State of Israel figures prominently in the next five chapters. 
Naftali Rothenberg, the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, is the author of the first 
in this section, “Conversion in Transition: Practical, Conceptual, and Halachic 
Changes in Israel.” The “Who is a Jew” public debate in Israel of the fifties had 
constitutional ramifications but no influence on the situation of conversion 
applicants. Arguments in the newspapers and at the Knesset struggled with the 
legal definition of the law that allows automatic citizenship to every Jew in the 
entire world. At the same time the rabbinical courts [batei din] converted to 
Judaism thousands of applicants in a process that took no more than a year. 
The condition of the conversion applicants’ population in today’s Israel 
is entirely different. The process in rabbinical courts has become four to five 
times longer than in the past, and many applicants end up waiting an extended 
period of time, sometimes years, for authorization to begin with the process. 
All this has an effect on the large population in Israel. 
Rothenberg provides an introduction to the general picture of the 
conversion status in contemporary Israel and a brief summery of the bureau-
cratic factors in the current crisis. Views of different streams in Israeli society, 
among them the ultra-Orthodox, Religious Zionists, traditional, and secular, 
are presented. 
The main focus is on the radical halachic changes that have taken place 
in rabbinical courts regarding conversion. Halachic transformations and dif-
ferences between rabbinical courts that acted from the fifties to the seventies 
and rabbinical courts in the last thirty years generate a description of two 
entirely different systems. The essential understanding of this change is critical 
to the study of “Who Is a Jew” in today’s Israel.
The next chapter, titled, “Who Is a Jew in Israel?” is by Netanel Fisher, 
the Open University of Israel. This chapter presents a variety of answers pre-
vailing in Israel to the question, “Who Is a Jew?” In Israel of the twenty-first 
century, a Jew can be legally identified as such by his passport, but this is not 
sufficient to allow him to get married as a Jew. Another may be identified as a 
Jew based on his conversion by the rabbinate, but other Orthodox establish-
ments will not accept his Judaism. On the other hand, Israeli courts have in 
recent years asserted that in some cases, registration in the Ministry of Interior 
as a Jew does not require affiliation with the Jewish religion.
By illuminating the maze of categorizations, this paper argues that the 
establishment of a Jewish state has not supplied a universally accepted solu-
tion to the definition of what constitutes being a Jew. The dispute over this 
issue, whether Judaism is a religion, nationality, ethnicity, or social affilia-
tion, has been transformed into a struggle in Israel between various groups 
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who try to impose their diverse perceptions on the entire society. At a time 
when there is a demand for recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, Jewish 
society itself has not yet succeeded in reaching agreement on what “Jewish” 
means and on “Who Is a Jew.”
The co-authors of the following chapter, “Who Should Be a Jew? Conver-
sion in the Diaspora and in the Modern Nation-State,” are Michael J. Broyde 
and Mark Goldfeder, Emory University. Citizenship and religion are usually 
formally independent of one another. Since Israeli citizenship is a right “inher-
ent in being a Jew,” however, the conceptual question of how much religious 
“Jewishness” one needs in order to gain the secular benefits of citizenship has 
taken on new and important significance. The argument for a broader defi-
nition of Jewish status weighs the desire to foster a more pluralistic national 
perspective against finding a solution that will keep as many people as possible 
under one tent. 
Some have called for different definitions depending on the context: 
one for sociological, one for ethnic, and one for religious Jewry. Meanwhile, 
from an Orthodox Jewish perspective, keeping personal status determinations 
strictly halachic is vital because such determinations define and delimit proper 
marriage partners, giving the attendant legitimacy to children resulting from 
such unions. Any doubts or confusion about people’s unequivocal halachic 
Jewish status (likely to happen in the event of multiple Jewish definitions) 
could end up dividing the community into small endogamous groups. This 
paper presents a pathway toward balancing practical ideals within a strong 
halachic framework, focusing on conversion as a way of widening the tent 
while answering the question of “Who, Today, Is a Jew.”
Menachem Mor, University of Haifa, is the author of the next chapter, 
“Who Is a Samaritan?” At the end of Tractate Kutim, the anonymous editor 
asked a question concerning the Samaritans: “When shall we take them back?” 
From the patronizing tone of the question came the answer: “When they 
renounce mount Gerizim and confess Jerusalem and the resurrection of the 
dead. From this time forth he that robs a Samaritan shall be as he who robs an 
Israelite” (ch. 2, Halachah, 8).
It is very clear that this anonymous editor considered the Samaritans as 
Jews who in the past had relinquished Judaism. The conditions that he set for 
their return to Judaism also reflected his view that the Samaritans were a sect 
that stemmed from Judaism. The dilemma of “Who Is a Samaritan” was a major 
concern and was hotly disputed in ancient Jewish sources through the ages.
Surprisingly, the question has emerged once again in modern times. In 
1994, the question was raised before the Israeli Supreme Court as to the rights 
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of the Samaritans in regard to part of the Israeli Law of Return. The legal issue 
was about the rights of the Samaritans from Nablus (Shechem) who chose to 
“immigrate” to Israel and live as part of Israeli society. Could these Samaritans 
be considered Jews?
The first part of this chapter concentrates on the question, “Who Is a 
Samaritan,” according to a variety of ancient sources: the Bible, the Mishnah, 
the Talmud. The second part is devoted to a hearing before the Supreme 
Court, in which the author surveys what considerations derived from the 
ancient sources and how these influenced the court’s final decision.
Joseph R. Hodes, Old Dominion University, wrote the last chapter in 
this section, “The Bene Israel and the ‘Who Is a Jew’ Controversy in Israel.” 
This chapter focuses on the Bene Israel, a tiny Jewish population that accord-
ing to its own tradition has lived in India for over 2,000 years. It is the larg-
est of the three major Indian Jewish communities, the other two being the 
Cochin and Baghdadi Jews. The Bene Israel, numbering 20,000 at the height 
of their population in India, began to make aliyah in 1948; by 1960, there 
were approximately 8,000 community members in Israel. Today, there are 
75,000 Bene Israel in Israel and approximately 10,000 in India, living mostly 
in Mumbai. For centuries they lived in villages on the Konkan coast in the 
state of Maharashtra and self-identified as both Indian and Jewish.
In 1960, twelve years after Israel was born, Chief Sephardic Rabbi Nis-
sim decided that the Bene Israel could not marry other Jews in Israel. He stipu-
lated several reasons for this prohibition, which served to set the Bene Israel 
as a people apart. This set in motion a civil rights struggle between the Indian 
community and the State of Israel, from 1960 to 1964, that had far-reaching 
implications. The highest political bodies in Israel and influential members 
of the international Jewish community became involved. The international 
media picked up the story, and at one point Egypt even offered the Bene Israel 
asylum from Israel. After a drawn-out struggle and under pressure from both 
the Israeli government and the Israeli people, the rabbinate changed its stance 
and declared the Bene Israel acceptable for marriage. Their experience of being 
set apart in Israel, after never experiencing persecution in the Diaspora, repre-
sents a unique narrative of a Jewish community and raises important questions 
about Jewish identity, the State of Israel, and who is a Jew. 
Hodes discusses a chapter of Israeli history that has never been closely 
documented. Although most major works on Israeli history discuss the “Who 
Is a Jew” controversy, no one has ever written in any detail about the fallout of 
the controversy. The controversy has not been documented because the man 
at the center of the struggle for religious equality and the leader of the Bene 
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Israel community, Samson J. Samson, had negative experiences with reporters 
and academics during the struggle. Thus, he would not allow them access to 
his archives or experiences, despite many attempts by various leading academ-
ics over the decades. In 2008, however, Samson decided to grant access to his 
archives and experience to the author, resulting for the first time in a detailed 
description of the events. 
Two papers cover topics that range broadly over chronological or geo-
graphical expanses. The first is “Have We Ever Known What a Jew—or 
Judaean—Is?” by Ori Z. Soltes, Georgetown University. This chapter begins 
by considering the difficulty of defining “Judaean” in late pre-Christian antiq-
uity and the early Christian era, before the word evolved into what could even-
tually be recognized and defined as Judaism and Christianity. Next it reviews 
part of the rabbinic discussion of what a Jew is and how that discussion follows 
into the medieval era. The chapter then continues into the period of eman-
cipation and its aftermath—and with emancipation, the evolving question of 
whether Judaism is most appropriately defined as a religion, race, ethnicity, 
nationality, culture, or civilization. 
This multivalent matrix leads to the observation that, in the emerg-
ing arts of the modern and contemporary era, the question of what defines 
“Jewish” affects our understanding of phrases such as “Jewish art” or “Jewish 
music”—not only with regard to the question of whether it is the work itself or 
the identity of its creator that is at issue, but also whether, in the latter case, the 
artist must be Jewish by birth, conversion, or conviction and whether his or 
her intention must be to produce “Jewish” art or music. The chapter concludes 
by noting that the very act of asking questions that are difficult or impossible 
to answer constitutes a consummate Jewish art.
This chapter is followed by “Will the ‘Real’ Jew Please Stand Up! 
Karaites, Israelites, Kabbalists, Messianists, and the Politics of Identity” by 
Aaron J. Hahn Tapper, University of San Francisco. The author explores four 
case examples of Jewish boundary communities. Although these groups are 
linked to the normative Jewish community, many mainstream Jews, scholars, 
and others express doubt as to their Jewishness. The groups discussed here 
are the Karaites, African Hebrew Israelites (sometimes referred to as Black 
Hebrews), Kabbalah Centre devotees, and Messianic Jews. All four of these 
groups exist on the periphery of the current Jewish mainstream, albeit in 
very different ways. Looking at the margins of a community offers insight 
into the center, that is, how the group defines its norm. Thus this exercise 
deepens our understanding of the meaning of Jewishness in the twenty-first 
century, including the seemingly porous nature of the Jewish community’s 
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boundaries. Also explored is the question of whether or not there are any 
boundaries at all to being a Jew.
The first of two chapters that have a European emphasis is “German- 
Jewish Identity: Problematic Then, Problematic Now,” by Steven Leonard 
Jacobs, University of Alabama. The question of German-Jewish identity has 
resulted since the end of World War II in a plethora of texts examining this 
question since German-Jewish philosopher and religiously committed Jew 
Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786) first attempted to bridge the divide between 
these two communities. This chapter examines not only the theoretical frame-
works of such understandings, but also the lives of individual Jews (Heinrich 
Heine, Hannah Arendt, et al.) as well as the cultural productions of these and 
other Jews, primarily but not limited to the arts and literature. It is thus an 
attempt both to address the question of such a dual identity and to survey what 
has been previously written and thought. This question is relevant to today’s 
Germany, which houses the fastest growing Jewish community on the Euro-
pean continent. It also has relevance for the American Jewish community and 
its apparently successful integration into the larger society, though trends then 
and trends now raise equally uncomfortable questions waiting to be explored. 
The next chapter, by Katarzyna Person, the Jewish Historical Institute in 
Warsaw, is titled, “‘I Sometimes Think That I Grew Up on a Different Planet’: 
The Assimilated Jewish Community of the Warsaw Ghetto in the Letters of 
Wanda Lubelska and Hala Szwambaum.” Here Person discusses the story of 
one very small but particular group among the political, cultural, and national 
identities that formed the population of the Warsaw ghetto—the assimilated, 
acculturated, and baptized Jews. Unwilling to integrate into the Jewish com-
munity and unable to merge with the Polish one, they formed a group of their 
own, remaining in a state of suspension, on the border of national and cultural 
identities. In 1940, with the closure of what was officially called the Jewish 
Residential Quarter in Warsaw, their identity was chosen for them. 
When describing the assimilated and acculturated community of the 
Warsaw ghetto, Person shows how diverse this group was and how their 
prewar identity shaped their life choices and decisions in the ghetto as well 
as their relations with the rest of the ghetto inhabitants. Due attention is 
given to the problems they faced when establishing themselves in the pre-
dominantly Yiddish-speaking environment, their involvement in the ghetto 
administration, and their contribution to the cultural life of the ghetto. This 
chapter concludes with a short discussion of the place of the interwar assimi-
lated, acculturated, and baptized group in postwar Poland and in shaping the 
historiography of the Holocaust.
xix
The final section places particular emphasis on the American experience. 
Mara W. Cohen Ioannides, Missouri State University, is the author of the 
first chapter, “Creating a Community: Who Can Belong to the Reform Syna-
gogue?” The question of “Who Is a Jew” reflects on who can have membership 
in a Jewish community. Every Jewish movement argues about the question 
of membership; this chapter addresses the most liberal movement, Reform 
Judaism, and its response to membership. In an effort to be all-inclusive, 
Reform synagogues around the United States have opened their doors to those 
who practice Judaism in different ways and to those who are interested in 
practicing Judaism. The influence of these non-Jews on the Jewish community 
has led Jews to question the level at which non-Jews are allowed to participate 
in Judaism and congregation governance. Tied into this issue is the question 
of the act of conversion and how important it is in defining oneself as Jewish. 
This paper examines the role that non-Jews are allowed to have in Reform 
congregations and how both Jews and non-Jews feel about this. Small Talk, a 
message board for small Reform communities in North America, has at numer-
ous times hosted conversations on this topic. Here is a gathering of the feelings 
of these small communities who are regularly threatened with closure. 
Matthew Boxer and Leonard Saxe, Brandeis University, co-authored the 
last chapter in this section, “The Birthright Israel Generation: Being a Jew-
ish Young Adult in Contemporary America.” Taglit-Birthright Israel engages 
large numbers of young adults with their Jewish identity, with their history, 
and with the people and land of Israel. Since its launch in 1999, more than 
300,000 young adults (18-26 years old) have participated in Taglit’s educa-
tional tours of Israel (200,000 have been from North America). Birthright 
Israel trips are ten days in length, and participants visit sites relevant to ancient 
and modern Israel. A key element of the program is mifgash [encounter] with 
a group of Israeli age-peers who participate for at least half of the ten day trip. 
North American participants represent the diversity of American Jewry and 
include those with little or no prior exposure to Jewish education, those with 
day school backgrounds, those who emigrated from the Former Soviet Union, 
and those from families with only one Jewish parent. Birthright Israel receives 
twice the number of applicants than it can accommodate and uses a lottery-
like process to select participants.
Since its inception, a program of research has been conducted with 
North American applicants and participants, both to describe the population 
and understand its impact. This work has yielded a portrait of the Jewish iden-
tity of contemporary young adults and an understanding of their relationship 
with Israel and the Jewish community. It has also allowed us to understand 
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the impact of Jewish education and the trajectory of Jewish engagement of the 
current young adult generation. In contrast to claims made by some analysts 
that Jewishness is “melting away” and that American Jews are distancing them-
selves from the Jewish community and Israel, the present data suggest that 
there has been a resurgence of interest and engagement in Jewish life. At the 
heart of what it now means to be Jewish is a connection with Israel and being 
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Traces of Race: Defining Jewishness in America
Sarah Imhoff
When I did a recent Google search, the first advertisement in the sidebar read 
“Jews: Are You Jewish?” At first glance, this seems to be an absurd question. 
If the ad was going to address people it called “Jews,” shouldn’t it follow that 
those people would consider themselves Jewish? What does it suggest about 
Jewish identity if a Jew wonders if she is Jewish? But upon closer scrutiny, the 
ad represents much more than a linguistic infelicity. It turns out that desta-
bilizing searchers’ certainty about their Jewishness was exactly the website’s 
business strategy. The particular business, iGenea, is one of a growing number1 
of mail-order DNA analysis services that markets specific packages for tracing 
Jewishness.2 These services, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly, 
claim that a genetic map can determine Jewishness. This is, both biologi-
cally and halachically speaking, nonsense,3 and yet over the last ten years this 
gene-based mode of defining who is a Jew has become widespread in popular 
discourse. Where did this discourse originate? And why do people find this 
specious narrative so compelling?
We might anticipate that conversations about DNA would create a his-
torically novel way of thinking about Jewishness. Yet a brief historical foray 
will demonstrate that the use of DNA tests to determine Jewishness represents 
part of a larger discourse with a long history. In its current forms, this dis-
course recalls racial constructions of Jewishness even while refusing the term 
“race.” As historians Jon Efron, Eric Goldstein, and others have demonstrated, 
many nineteenth century Jews used the language of race to describe their 
Jewishness.4 Since the Shoah the language of race has been a problematic way 
to conceive of Jewish identity, but even if the language of race has fallen out of 
cultural use and favor, many of the ideas connected with it persist. 
In order to explore the history and compelling qualities of this specious 
narrative, critical race theory provides useful vocabulary. Theorist Kwame 
Anthony Appiah offers the term “racialism” to describe “heritable characteris-
tics, possessed by members of our species, which allow us to divide them into 
a small set of races, in such a way that all the members of these races share 
certain traits and tendencies with each other that they do not share with mem-
bers of any other race.”5 It is not a moral error, Appiah contends, to suggest 
that there are characteristic heritable traits and tendencies of races, because it 
does not necessarily follow that one race is superior to any other. That is, while 
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racialist thinking does rely on ideas about heritable characteristics and race, it 
need not be racist. 
Racialist ideas about Jewishness—heritable characteristics, traits, and 
tendencies—continue to be deeply embedded in discourse about who is a 
Jew. Ideas about physical appearance, aptitudes and capacities, and psycho-
logical tendencies remain part of Jewish and non-Jewish conceptions of Jew-
ishness. When dark-skinned Jews go to synagogue and are asked why they 
are there, when the neuroses of Woody Allen are seen as paradigmatically 
Jewish, even when Jews count Jewish Nobel Prize winners, these have ele-
ments of racialist thinking when they rely on ideas of heritable appearances 
and characteristics. 
While racialist ideas underlie many cultural constructions of Jewishness, 
this chapter focuses on two particular contemporary American conversations 
about Jewishness that disclose these traces of race. First, I discuss two types of 
genetic testing: testing men’s Y chromosomes for the Cohen Modal Haplotype, 
or “Cohen gene,” and testing for genes related to diseases such as Tay-Sachs. 
While the former seeks to use scientific discourse to authorize identity claims 
and the latter seeks to be vigilant about genetic diseases, both reinforce links 
between physical bodies, heritable characteristics, and Jewish identity. Second, 
I turn to peripheral groups who make claims to Jewish identity. When popular 
sources present stories of Americans who identify as Jewish because of crypto-
Jewish family roots, it becomes clear they use biological and geographical 
discourse—both essential to the social construction of race—to claim Jewish 
identity. Ultimately, I suggest that this appeal to biomedical criteria for Jew-
ishness may have such appeal precisely because it offers something that looks 
like objective criteria for “who is a Jew” in those communities where Jewish 
identity has become the most fluid and contested.
DNA
From daytime talk shows to forensic evidence, DNA has become an authorita-
tive means of confirming identity. In colloquial speech it has become a meta-
phor for essence: people may say that a characteristic is “in my DNA” when 
they mean that it is an unchangeable part of who they are. Like other com-
munities, Jews have displayed an interest in how DNA can illuminate their 
health, history, and identity. Because of the relative genetic similarity within 
populations—resulting from historical practices of endogamy—some Jewish 
cases (in particular, Ashkenazim) hold special interest not only for those who 
identify as Jewish but also for scientists studying populations. 
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Once scientists publish the results of their studies, they are out of scien-
tific hands and available to individual authors, community leaders, businesses, 
and individuals to interpret with less scientific precision and more interest 
in broad public access and appeal. In short, looking at accounts of scientific 
research aimed at a general audience can disclose broader cultural assumptions. 
While studying the scientific data can illuminate DNA, studying the ways 
people discuss the data can illuminate the concerns and presuppositions of the 
people telling these scientific stories and reveal how they think about identity. 
A number of recent genetic studies have focused on the discovery of 
the Cohen Modal Haplotype, a set of markers found on the Y chromosome 
of both Ashkenazim and Sephardim who claim to be Cohanim, or members 
of the priestly class. This set of studies has drawn attention for at least two 
reasons. First, it provides genetic evidence for the relationship of Sephardim 
and Ashkenazim despite centuries of separation between these communi-
ties. Second, it offers the opportunity to use genetic data to make claims 
about religious authority and the veracity of religious accounts of history. 
Religiously determined status as a Cohen depends on patrilineal lines: if a 
father is a Cohen, and he does not forfeit his Cohen status, his sons will also 
be Cohanim. Biologically, Y chromosomes are passed directly—barring any 
mutations—from father to son. Therefore, according to the theoretical ideal of 
one original priest who engendered all subsequent Cohanim, each male Cohen 
should have the same pattern of alleles on their Y chromosomes. 
Subsequently, people have used these findings to make claims as to 
whether or not men are legitimately Cohanim. On the level of populations, 
scientists have subsequently tested the Y chromosomes of mostly nonwhite 
groups who claim Jewish ancestry, such as the Bene Israel of India and the 
Lemba of South Africa. If some men within the community had the Cohen 
Modal Haplotype, as in the case of the Bene Israel and Lemba, observers saw 
it as support for claims to Jewishness.6 Although there are certainly other con-
tributing issues, the questioning of the legitimacy of these communities hints 
at social assumptions about the color of a Jew’s skin. 
But even as part of the discourse among Jews with uncontested Jewish 
identity, DNA research serves an authorizing function for religious identity. 
The official Chabad website, for instance, asks: “Are these tribal affiliations 
just a matter of folklore and tradition? Can such claims actually be proven?” 
and answers, “Today they can, and the key is DNA testing.”7 According to 
Chabad’s interpretation of this DNA evidence, men can scientifically “prove” 
their status as Cohanim (or Levites). Here valued above “just” tradition, DNA 
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offers certainty. In an example from the other end of the religious observance 
spectrum, the secular journalist Jon Entine writes in his 2007 book Abraham’s 
Children, “About 3 percent of Jewish males today claim to be Cohanim. But 
until the development of genetic genealogy, there was no way to validate those 
oral claims.”8 Entine likewise gives DNA evidence the power to “validate,” 
whereas religious tradition is merely a “claim.” Both Chabad and Entine take 
the relative frequency of a genetic marker within a population and create a 
narrative about the proof of Jewish religious history.
 These claims, in their simplicity, purport to provide certainty. The world 
we live in, however, is more complicated on two fronts: the social reality and 
the science itself. The socially contested nature of priestly identity dates back 
to ancient times.9 In the absence of a temple, identification as a Cohen has 
had to rely on family oral history. When one man does not pass on identifica-
tion to his male children, those descendants may not identify as Cohanim. 
Conversely, if someone were mistaken (or lied) about his status as a Cohen, 
his descendants would identify as Cohanim despite lacking the identical Y 
chromosome. Moreover, any expectation of homogeneity across present-day 
Cohanim also assumes that there was a single original male priest and that at 
no time was priesthood conferred upon anyone outside his hereditary line, 
be it through adoption into a family, as a political favor, or even by women 
procreating with men other than their own husbands. The likelihood of all of 
these assumptions holding true across centuries is quite small.
The science, too, is much messier than Chabad or Entine’s rhetoric 
would suggest. The word “modal” in Cohen Modal Haplotype means the sta-
tistical mode, which is the haplotype that occurs most frequently. So it is true 
that scientists discovered that one particular series of alleles occurs more com-
monly than others in men who say they are Cohanim. And it is also true that 
particular sequence is uncommon—although not entirely absent—outside of 
Jewish men. This particular DNA sequence occurred in 48 percent of Ash-
kenazi men and 58 percent of Sephardi men who claimed to be Cohanim.10 
While the particular scientific studies and new developments are meaningful 
and while they suggest significant genetic links between Ashkenazim and 
Sephardim, this simply cannot constitute proof that any individual person or 
family is a Cohen. No good scientist would claim such a thing. 
And yet plenty of other people do just that. In part because of this Y 
chromosome research, internet sites advertising DNA testing as a way to “help 
confirm Jewish heritage” or that ask “What’s your tribe?” abound. These all 
offer genetic testing for men that examines markers on their Y chromosomes 
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to determine their “ancient origins.” The error here is not simply one of inter-
pretation. This research can show genetic patterns among large proportions 
of people who identify as Jews, so it may help us consider a population-sized 
question such as “Who are Jews?” But it is simply not equipped to give us 
meaningful information on the individual level of “Who is a Jew?”
One website, which partners with a company offering DNA testing, 
says: “Many people from non-Jewish families ask themselves, ‘Am I Jewish?’ 
‘Am I Hebrew?’”11 The fascinating scenario this website narrates demonstrates 
a different, although related, sort of error. At base, it is one of logic: there are 
two different definitions of what it means to be a Jew here. As a DNA testing 
service, it claims a relationship between Jewish heredity and Jewish identity. 
If a person were “from a Jewish family,” she would therefore be Jewish. If she 
were “from a non-Jewish family” and had not converted, she would not. So 
how could she wonder if she were Jewish? Where would that “Jewish DNA” 
come from, if not her family? (The website does not market itself to people 
who were adopted, although adopted persons are a category that demands 
more attention and research in analyses of Jewish identity.) The website con-
flates a genetic definition of Jewishness (“Am I Jewish?”—take a DNA test 
to find out) and a religious or cultural one (“from a non-Jewish family”). In 
this way, Jewishness is being arbitrated by the very assumptions of heredity, 
which is tied to geographic origin, even while disavowing its dependence on 
racialist definitions. 
GENETIC-LINKED DISEASES
A similar medicalizing discourse about Jewishness and DNA exists around 
genetic diseases, such as Tay-Sachs, Gaucher’s, and breast cancer associated 
with BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations, all of which have higher incidences in 
Ashkenazi Jewish populations. In contrast to studies on the Cohen Modal 
Haplotype, research on these conditions with genetic factors has a direct 
application to the health of individuals and their potential offspring. As a 
result, the cultural conversation about these diseases has been quite beneficial. 
Therefore, the goal of this critical analysis is not to suggest that genetically 
linked disease research or its publicity is not desirable, but rather to point to 
the ways it is historically and discursively connected to racialist constructions 
of Jewish identity.
The organization Dor Yeshorim, which describes itself as the “Commit-
tee for the Prevention of Jewish Diseases,” implicitly constructs the meaning of 
Jewishness in its description of genetic diseases and Jewishness. When (mainly 
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Orthodox) Jewish couples consider dating, its service offers genetic screening, 
which seeks to prevent “Jewish diseases,” as if diseases themselves had cultural 
or religious affiliation. The Dor Yeshorim website lists genetic conditions that 
are more common in Ashkenazi populations, those “Jewish diseases,” but it 
also explains: “If an individual has a family history of a genetic disease, even 
a ‘non-Jewish’ one, Dor Yeshorim recommends that they be informed of this, 
as well.”12 The language of “Jewish diseases” is by no means limited to Dor 
Yeshorim; it is commonplace in media and even medical clinics. By naming 
genetic diseases “Jewish” and “non-Jewish,” this discourse effectively aligns 
particular kinds of genetic material, diseased bodies, and Jewishness. 
This discourse also conflates Jewishness and the possession of Ashkenazi 
heritage and therefore marginalizes non-Ashkenazi Jews. “The Dor Yeshorim 
screening program is most effective with those of entirely Ashkenazic descent. 
Anyone with even a small heritage other than Ashkenanic descent (even one 
grandparent) may experience reduced reliability. (This may be of special con-
cern to those with Sephardim or Geirim [Converts] in their background).”13 
Here, then, when “Jewish diseases” have become the focus, Jewishness 
becomes concentrated in the sectors of the Jewish community most associated 
with those diseases—here, Ashkenazim. This discourse has real effect beyond 
the text on websites. The Victor Center for the Prevention of Jewish Diseases 
likewise tests only for “Jewish Genetic Diseases (JGDs),” which it seamlessly 
equates with “Ashkenazi Jewish Genetic Diseases (JGDs).”14 Even the acronym 
introduced for each is identical: JGDs. The Victor Center does not test for 
genetic disorders found with greater frequency within Sephardi communi-
ties.15 Sephardi individuals and couples have reported going for genetic coun-
seling and being tested for being carriers of diseases prevalent in those with 
Ashkenazi ancestry simply because they were Jewish.16 Sephardim, converts, 
and their descendants are outliers; they seem to be special cases of Jewishness. 
When and how did medical discourse become a significant way to con-
struct the meaning and authenticity of Jewishness? Despite the newness of 
scientific procedures like DNA testing, determining Jewishness using “medical” 
or “scientific” means is by no means new. And, while the content and methodol-
ogy of what counts as legitimate science and medicine have undergone signifi-
cant changes, throughout American history medical discourse has contributed 
significantly to the social construction of individual and group identities. The 
influence and scope of medical discourse has waxed and waned and worked dif-
ferently during different eras. Today, medical discourse has a significant voice, 
but does not dominate the chorus of the construction of Jewishness. 
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In the early twentieth century, medical discourse played a pivotal role, 
one whose categories and associations—even if they are self-concealing— 
continue to operate in modern medicine. United under the heading of science, 
racial and medical claims sorted and categorized bodies and people in American 
society. The early twentieth century is neither the beginning nor the end of the 
story of the racial and medical construction of Jewishness, but it is the most 
salient for the understanding of contemporary Jewishness for two reasons: the 
prominence and the pervasiveness of scientific medical discourse.17 First, dur-
ing the early twentieth century, the science of medicine and race contributed 
to policy on immigration, education, social work, reform movements, and 
dozens of other arenas. Second, racial or medical classification was diffuse: it 
contributed much of the significant framework for popular discussions and 
assumptions about Americanization, nationalism, citizenship, gender, race, and 
even economics. The explicit presence of medical discourse on an intellectual 
and national policy level and its implicit presence on a popular level demon-
strates its importance for structuring the national imaginary. In fact, this early 
twentieth century medical-racial imaginary played such an important role in 
the construction of Jewishness that it has not all together disappeared. 
The term “race” here connotes more than antisemitic fantasies. The early 
twentieth century construction of race differed substantially from our contem-
porary notions. As Eric Goldstein and others have demonstrated, American 
Jews themselves used the language of race to articulate their individual and 
communal identities.18 Race, in its historical context, is more than just a four-
letter word: it stands for a concept that both Jews and non-Jews deployed to 
encompass everything from a dizzying combination of physical attributes like 
skull shape, nose size, and height to social attributes like language, degree of 
aggressiveness, and intelligence, to political attributes like nation of origin and 
ability to Americanize.19
 A longer argument would trace the historical genealogy of an array of 
nervous diseases, cancer, diabetes, and others, as Sander Gilman has shown 
in several essays.20 Here I will focus on Tay-Sachs for two reasons: first, it has 
continued to be constructed as a “Jewish disease,” and second, its history is 
easier to trace because, unlike other “nervous diseases,” Tay Sachs continues to 
be a scientifically operative medical category.21 In the early twentieth century, 
the idea of “Jewish diseases” was actually a constellation of mutually reinforc-
ing medical constructions: Tay-Sachs, neurasthenia, hysteria, other “nervous 
diseases,” weakness, smallness, and superior intelligence were all considered 
Jewish traits. It is the discourse of racialism and race science that constructed 
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this constellation, which still echoes today when Dor Yeshorim discusses “Jew-
ish diseases” and Jews who suffer from “non-Jewish diseases.”
Tay-Sachs, although a fatal childhood disease rather than a nonfatal dis-
ease affecting adults, was also caught up in the association of Jews and nervous 
diseases. Sometimes called “amaurotic familial idiocy” in the early twentieth 
century, Tay-Sachs was connected specifically with the Jewish race (which 
was, and sometimes continues to be, associated exclusively with Ashkenazim). 
One physician explained, typically: “We know that it is inherited, that it is a 
familial affection and that it occurs practically exclusively in the Hebrew race. 
I have on my records fifteen cases, and every one, without exception occurred 
in Russian Jews. But we do not know why.”22 According to one medical text, 
Dr. Sachs himself noted its “limitation to one race—the Hebrew.”23 The 
Jewish race and Tay-Sachs were so intimately connected in the medical com-
munity that when a physician described a case of a non-Jewish child who 
seemed to have all of the symptoms of Tay-Sachs, he called it “juvenile familial 
amaurotic idiocy,” which he differentiated from Tay-Sachs because of the “lack 
of Hebrew blood.”24 The coexistence of racial and historical reasoning resulted 
in a circular medical reasoning (wherein only Jews get Tay-Sachs, so it can’t be 
Tay-Sachs if they are not Jewish) that not only associated but also identified 
the Jewish body with Tay-Sachs. 
These medical constructions continue to shape popular discussions 
of Jewishness. When popular news articles—like a February 2010 article 
in the New York Times Health section—explain genetic testing, they com-
monly use three examples: Tay-Sachs in Jews, sickle-cell anemia in blacks, 
and cystic fibrosis in whites. Although these articles discuss the diseases in 
genetic terms, they still rely on the logic of race when they create a structure 
in which “blacks,” “whites,” and “Jews” occupy parallel positions.25 In 1998, 
when a Maryland boy became sick and began to regress developmentally, the 
diagnosis of Tay-Sachs was delayed because both his parents were of Irish, 
not Jewish, descent.26 Even though significant non-Jewish populations in 
New Orleans and Montreal have significant numbers of individuals carry-
ing Tay-Sachs mutations and although the number of children born with 
it annually is now in the single digits, it remains a “Jewish disease” in the 
cultural imagination. 
Some Ashkenazi Jews narrate their experience with genetic links to breast 
cancer in a similar way. “What’s Jewish about breast and ovarian cancer?” 
asks one slide at GeneSights: Jewish Genetics Online Series.27 In its online 
booklet “Your Jewish Genes,” the Jewish women’s cancer support organization 
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Sharsheret asks: “What’s Jewish about hereditary breast cancer and ovarian 
cancer?”28 In his 2008 Abraham’s Children: Race, Identity, and the DNA of 
the Chosen People, journalist and researcher Jon Entine wrote of the BRCA 
gene mutation in a personal vein: “The only thing that can be said with near 
certainty is that it’s a tragic marker of our family’s Jewish ancestry.”29 In what 
sense does this genetic mutation “mark” Jewishness? Only 2 percent to 3 per-
cent of Jews carry this gene. Non-Jews also carry it, although at lower rates 
than Ashkenazim. Sephardim carry it no more than their non-Jewish coun-
terparts. Genes, explains Entine, “catalog my extended family’s vulnerability 
to many diseases. And they mark me indelibly as a Jew.”30 What does it mean 
for Jewish identity if genes and diseases mark a person “indelibly” as a Jew? 
This language ties disease, harmful genetic variation, and Jewishness into a 
single definitive concept.
This history of medicalized identity demonstrates the social construc-
tion of both race and bodies. In Birth of a Clinic Michel Foucault situates 
modern medicine as part of a social discourse that does not merely describe 
bodies but constitutes their meaning. Since the nineteenth century, Foucault 
claims, “[The medical] gaze is no longer reductive, it is, rather, that which 
establishes the individual in his irreducible quality. And thus it becomes pos-
sible to organize a rational language around it.”31 The medical gaze, then, has 
become a way of instantiating and explaining the person’s essence and there-
fore identity. To clarify: this view of social construction does not insist that 
DNA is nothing more than a fantasy of social discourse. Nor does it, as David 
Goldstein supposes, support the claim that “we are all the same” because the 
social scientific interpretations of “race and ethnicity are biologically meaning-
less.”32 It does, however, claim that despite any objective claims and rational 
language of science or medicine, the social meaning of bodies is always con-
textual and historically contingent. That is, neither race nor ethnicity has any 
meaning outside of a social context. 
Is DNA the same thing as race? Must any correlation between DNA 
and Jewish ancestry necessarily lead to racialist constructions of Jewishness? 
Of course not. But current discourses rely on biomedical logic to determine 
who is Jewish. And, much of the contemporary discussion about Jewish DNA 
relies on (and sometimes reproduces) the history of the idea of a Jewish race 
and perpetuates one sort of racialist definition of Jewishness. Individual Jews 
or Jewish communities might distance themselves from claims that Jews con-
stitute a race; however, even as people consciously deny the category of race, 
they situate themselves within its history.33  
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CRYPTO-JEWS 
There is some research to suggest that people who identify as hidden Jews use a 
variety of ways of describing their experience: spiritual, mystical, and religious, 
and with richly narrated connections to history and culture. The accounts of 
other anthropologists studying various communities of anusim [individuals 
forced to abandon Judaism] provide similar accounts of spiritual identifica-
tion, family lore, and shared customs.34 When asked about their Jewishness, 
many people say they “just felt” Jewish or tell tales of their family’s customs 
such as avoiding pork and cooking only flat bread around Easter time. Much 
popular American media picks up on these facets of identity when it tells the 
stories of those who believe they are descendants of anusim, but the narrative 
frequently also emphasizes connections to DNA. 
For instance, a New Mexican Catholic priest who claims crypto-Jewish 
heritage has become something of a media darling.35 Father Bill Sanchez 
learned of his heritage by taking a DNA test, but he claims long term spiritual 
feelings of connection to Judaism. When Jon Entine wrote about Sanchez, he 
latched onto how genetic Jewishness fulfilled and confirmed more spiritual or 
ritual ties to Jewishness. Entine quotes Sanchez as saying: “I’m just acknowl-
edging that fact, that spiritual fact, within myself. But now it has a literal real-
ity as well. It’s embedded in my genes, my DNA.”36 However, when the LA 
Times ran a story about Father Sanchez and several other people who believed 
they had Sephardic ancestry, titled “Clearing the Fog over Latino Links to 
Judaism in New Mexico,” it cleared no fog about Jewish identity. It instead 
told a series of stories: one of a Catholic family that “spun tops on Christmas, 
shunned pork and whispered of a past in medieval Spain,” another of a man 
who says finding out the results of his DNA test “was like coming home for 
me”; and a third about a man who said, “When I found out about my roots, 
I went to the library and my world opened up. . . . I have reclaimed my life. I 
live a Jewish life now.” Father Sanchez explained, “I have always known I was 
Jewish; I can’t explain it, but it was woven into who I was.” He continues his 
role as priest and also wears a Star of David.37 Rather than “clearing the fog,” 
the storytelling reinforced the existence of competing narratives of Jewish-
ness—biological, historical, cultural, geographic, ethnic, and religious—all the 
while supposing they presented no conflict. 
Even those who do not claim crypto-Jewish status have begun to use 
narratives of anusim and DNA to help understand their own Jewish identity. 
In his Am I a Jew? Lost Tribes, Lapsed Jews, and One’s Man’s Search for Himself, 
Theodore Ross explores his own complicated relationship with Jewishness. 
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His mother decided to pretend that they were Episcopalian when she and 
nine-year-old Theodore moved to the Gulf Coast. When Ross tells the story 
of his “search for himself,” he credits stories about crypto-Jews with the initial 
spark: “My reckoning with the self began at my laptop when I came across an 
odd little children’s book. Abuelita’s Secret Matzahs,” the story of a family of 
anusim in the American Southwest.38 Ross narrates his subsequent journey to 
discover different ways of being Jewish, but he begins and ends with people 
who identify as crypto-Jews. His narrative journey dedicates an entire chapter 
to the academic-turned-popular debates about haplogroup research. 
One of Ross’s interviewees, Alan Tullio, explained that he had been raised 
Catholic but “suffered from ‘Jew envy’ for as long as he could remember.” He 
grew up with many Jewish friends, attended a largely Jewish school, and “felt a 
kinship . . . an attraction” to Jewish religious rites and practices.39 After many 
years of learning about Judaism, Tullio eventually converted with a Conserva-
tive rabbi. Tullio told Ross that “he had no doubt that the spark was inside 
him, although whether he understood it as DNA or as a metaphor for his 
lifelong attraction to the religion was unclear. He had tended to it, he said, 
in his own time and in his own way, and now finally, it had burst into flame. 
‘And the flame,’ he said, ‘is Judaism.’”40 Tullio describes his own relationship 
with Jewishness as a relationship with Judaism, as an interior disposition that 
needed tending. In Ross’s interpretive hands, however, an inner relationship 
with Judaism becomes connected to DNA, even when both Tullio and Ross 
know that the professional genealogist came up with no conclusive evidence 
of Jewish ancestry.
Dell Sanchez, an author who himself identifies as crypto-Jewish, like-
wise puts heavy narrative and evidential weight on DNA studies in his Out 
From Hiding: Evidence of Sephardic Roots among Latinos. He writes “While 
I am not a molecular scientist or DNA expert I must say that I do admin-
ister a DNA test project in direct conjunction with the Family Tree DNA 
laboratory in Houston, Texas. My role is to put into layman’s terms what 
Sephardic DNA experts are saying in scientific terms which are too compli-
cated for nonscientists to comprehend.” In his quest to prove the legitimacy 
of crypto-Jews in the American Southwest, Sanchez positions himself as a 
knowledgeable guide and interpreter. In order to do so, he interprets what 
select “Sephardic DNA experts” have found. Furthermore, he positions these 
DNA studies as uniquely authoritative when he explains that some Latinos 
have attempted “to find records, archives and reliable genealogies that might 
reveal their true Jewish heritage.”41 
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However,” Sanchez continued, “many have discovered that the inquisi-
tions and holocausts of histories past have greatly succeeded in destroying 
the majority of these documents. While records still exist, most people do 
not yet know how to access them and neither do they know how to decipher 
most of them in a proficient manner.”42 That is, for Sanchez, historical and 
genealogical documents are unavailable, unreliable, and too complicated for 
people to understand. DNA, on the other hand, is a “major breakthrough” 
because it offers what he considers truth instead of the hints or conjecture 
of documents. His selection of experts—especially his heavy reliance on data 
facilitated by Father Sanchez’s Santa Fe DNA Project and his own 4Sephardim 
Project and neglect of other studies—belies his intention to prove the truth of 
these crypto-Jewish claims. But his bias aside, his account reflects the language 
and assumptions that appear in many other popular accounts of crypto-Jews: 
DNA serves as the authorizing linchpin of identity.
WHY THIS NARRATIVE?
If DNA cannot define Jewishness—if, as Robert Pollack has succinctly 
explained, “Jews are not in fact a single biological family; there are no DNA 
sequences common to all Jews and present only in Jews”43—and if DNA 
markers are only useful at the level of populations, then why are these spuri-
ous uses of genetic research so pervasive and popular in telling the stories of 
families and individuals? Why are authors, publishers, and readers so invested 
in this narrative of Jewishness? Perhaps it is precisely because these claims are 
biomedical and therefore seem objective and authoritative. With all of the 
uncertainty surrounding what precisely constitutes Jewish identity, this kind of 
medical discourse provides claims that seem clear-cut and uncontested. People 
can interpret these scientific findings in ways that claim positive knowledge 
about Jewish identity, rather than continuing to float in a sea of halachic, 
political, and social complexity and contingency.
The theme of the 25th Annual Klutznick-Harris Symposium is a peren-
nial topic for both scholars and members of the Jewish community: “Who is 
a Jew?” The presenters—a group mainly comprised of scholars of the humani-
ties and social sciences—clearly have not come to a simple consensus on the 
question, and there is little warrant for thinking unanimity will come anytime 
soon. Historians note the changing definitions of Jewishness across time, 
political scientists show the contingencies of legal designations of Jewishness, 
and anthropologists and sociologists analyze the myriad ways people and com-
munities identify themselves and others as Jewish. With this scholarly work’s 
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attention to the complexity of social and religious definitions of Jewishness, 
the question of who is a Jew can seem unanswerable or hopelessly contingent.
In the face of this uncertainty, biomedical discourse and interpretations 
of scientific claims can function as a substitute for religion or even seem to 
trump religious claims. For those who do not assent to the supremacy of 
halachah, religious boundaries of Jew and non-Jew can be quite permeable, 
as Mara W. Cohen Ioannides suggests in her research on congregational rules 
and traditions about the position of non-Jews. And even for those who do 
hold halachic definitions above all others—as the rabbinate in Israel does, 
for instance—examples of disagreement about particular cases and policies 
abound. Racialist definitions in the guise of genetic language can seem to 
replace this complexity with the certainties of science. 
Instead of grappling with the meaning of the religious identity of a priest 
like Father Sanchez who wears a Star of David around his neck and claims his 
Jewishness and Catholicism simultaneously, popular interpretations of DNA 
can answer that he certainly is Jewish. The LA Times article referred to his 
Jewishness as if it were unequivocally determined: “After watching a program 
on genealogy, Sanchez sent for a DNA kit that could help track a person’s 
background through genetic footprinting. He soon got a call from Bennett 
Greenspan, owner of the Houston-based testing company. [Greenspan asked] 
‘Did you know you were Jewish?’”44 The article reproduces what seems to be 
a shared assumption of Greenspan and Sanchez: the results of a DNA kit can 
produce definitive knowledge about Jewishness. The formulation “Did you 
know you were Jewish?” posits the answer as an objective fact to be known 
and suggests that the truth about Jewishness resides not in religious practice or 
identity, but in a sequence of chemical bases. Here scientific claims supersede 
religious authority. 
What is more, some authors have rhetorically replaced theism with 
DNA. Jon Entine even uses language reminiscent of the biblical God when 
talks of “the tragedy that DNA has visited upon my family.”45 The complex-
ity of theology and ritual has been replaced by a scientific language of DNA, 
which promotes a sense of certainty and authority. In The Wandering Gene, 
Jeff Wheelwright refers to ATGC, abbreviations for the four chemical bases 
that comprise DNA, as “the body’s tetragrammaton.”46 Going beyond this 
metaphor, Wheelwright makes science’s supplanting of religion explicit: “By 
looking at a sufficient number of locations in people’s genomes, science would 
be able to tell the religious authorities who was a Jew and who was not. . . . 
Tests like this exist today and are starting to be used, and sharp tongued 
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prophets of genetics are being heard too.”47 Wheelwright personifies science, 
which can “tell” religious authorities who is and is not Jewish. Science would 
thereby overtake the authority and function of religious law. From another 
ideological standpoint, even for those authors who continue to be observant 
Jews, the science serves an authorizing function. Yaakov Kleiman uses DNA 
not to supplant religious narratives, but to corroborate them. “These genetic 
research findings support the Torah statements that the line of Aaron will last 
throughout history. The Kohanim have passed the test of time and tradition. 
And tradition has passed the test of science.”48 Even for Kleiman, who holds 
halachah as authoritative, tradition is still put to the “test” of scientific inquiry 
when it comes to understanding Jewishness. 
The impression of certainty and authority that accompanies biological 
research—in contrast to the complexity of religious, social, or ethnic defi-
nitions—arises clearly in recent popular scientific publications and media 
reporting. In 2012, geneticist Harry Ostrer published a book titled Legacy: A 
Genetic History of the Jewish People, which uses genetic research to discuss the 
idea that there is a “biological basis of Jewishness.” When Jon Entine reviewed 
Ostrer’s Legacy in The Jewish Daily Forward, it bore the title “Jews are a ‘Race,’ 
Genes Reveal.”49 In his preface, Ostrer privileges genetic research as the answer 
to the question of who is a Jew: “At last one could confront head-on the often 
debated question of whether Jews constituted a race, a people, or a genetic 
isolate.”50 In this formulation, scientific studies of DNA are the proper means 
to determine who Jews are; DNA meant that one could answer the question 
“head on,” whereas presumably other means of discussing Jewishness are 
oblique or incomplete. The Ha’aretz review touted the triumph of scientific 
methods over those other methodologies of imprecise reconstruction: “For-
tunately, re-creating history now depends not only on pottery shards, flaking 
manuscripts and faded coins, but on something far less ambiguous: DNA.”51 
For the reviewer, material culture and texts produce “ambiguous” knowledge, 
but DNA produces something much more certain. 
The opening sentence of Legacy declares: “In June 2010, I published an 
article that demonstrated a biological basis for Jewishness.”52 Ostrer’s scientific 
research is impeccable, but his interpretation here is misleading at best. A 
“basis” is a foundation and an essential component. DNA simply cannot be 
the foundation of Jewishness because there is no genetic sequence found in all 
Jews but in no non-Jews. Perhaps DNA could become the essence of Jewish-
ness, but not without radically changing who is and is not considered Jewish. 
Individuals who consider themselves Jewish but do not have whatever DNA 
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sequence would be used to adjudicate Jewishness (the Cohen Modal Haplo-
type? Tay-Sachs? A different marker common to the Mediterranean?) would 
suddenly find themselves missing the “basis” for Jewish identity. People who 
converted away from Judaism, or had the genetic marker but did not identify 
as Jewish, would suddenly find themselves labeled Jewish. 
Ostrer explained that Legacy sought to make the science accessible to 
the public and thereby make the conversation about DNA and Jewishness 
more informed: “This overheated discussion in the press without dispassion-
ate analysis of scientific observations proved to me that a popular book about 
Jewish population genetics might tone down the debate into a more thought-
ful realm.”53 If “dispassionate analysis” and toned-down rhetoric was the goal, 
why would Ostrer phrase his conclusion in such a provocative way? After the 
preface, Legacy becomes a clear and accessible text that carefully explains the 
current genetic research and how it can be interpreted.
Ostrer’s Legacy thereby demonstrates the appeal of a narrative of objec-
tive verification of Jewish identity. In order to interpret the complex scientific 
data, he makes declarations about “head-on confrontation” and “dispassion-
ate analysis” and the resulting “biological basis of Jewishness.” For American 
Jewish communities that witness and participate in continuing debates about 
who is a Jew, who can decide who is a Jew, and what criteria constitute Jew-
ishness, this biological language seems to offer objectivity and certainty. All of 
the discourse that hangs Jewishness on the peg of genetics, however, can and 
has subtly reinforced a racialist logic of Jewish identity.
AN AFTERTHOUGHT: THE FUTURE OF RACE AND RACIALISM
We think of race as an amalgam of traits: genetic, national origin, historical, 
cultural, even dispositional or related to capacity, as well as physical appear-
ance including height, facial features, and skin color. Here we see definitions 
of Jewishness related to genes; we can all come up with examples of Jewishness 
as dependent on each of the other categories: history, culture, innate capacity 
(there are even scientific studies “proving” connections of DNA, Jewish intel-
ligence, and Jewish disease), whether someone “looks Jewish.” So if people 
define Jewishness according to the same categories that people define “other” 
races, why not talk about the Jewish race? Several reasons: first, skin color 
continues to be a primary way of identifying race in America, and Jews are not 
associated with a distinctive skin color. Second, to many, discussion of Jews 
as a race smacks of antisemitism and evokes associations with genocide. As a 
term, then, “race” conjures up images of racism with devastating consequences. 
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Nevertheless, many racial assumptions and categories have continued to oper-
ate in the social meaning of Jewish bodies and identities. 
So would it be wise to return to using “race” as a category for identifying 
Jewishness? No. In fact, the example of Jewishness points to the imprecision 
surrounding the discourse of race in its wider cultural usage. If “race” connotes 
a combination of genetics, history, geographic origin, and physical traits, what 
information can it provide, apart from providing an easy hanger for stereo-
types? What I am suggesting is that we acknowledge that much of contempo-
rary American discourse about Jewishness relies on racialist definitions. And 
once we acknowledge that these definitions have no firm, objective, unchang-
ing reality apart from social context, we can see that these racialist discourses 
may be of limited utility when discussing Jewish identity.
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It’s All in the Memes
Leonard Levin
This paper compares two paradigms of Jewish identity.1 The first (“sacra-
mental”) paradigm is essentialist: there is a Jewish essence that can only be 
passed on in the ways prescribed by Jewish law. The second (“covenantal”) is 
functional: Jewish identity is group memory embodied in individuals. I will 
first delineate the two paradigms as ideal types. Next, I will examine a few 
borderline or anomalous cases where they lead us to pass different judgments 
on the Jewishness of certain individuals. I will examine certain difficult cases 
presented in the Talmudic and halachic literature to assess whether the Jewish 
legal tradition hews strictly to the one or the other paradigm or is a mixture 
of both. I will consider briefly how the conflation of the two paradigms may 
provide a satisfactory account of how Jewish identity functioned in premodern 
times. I will then suggest how the onset of modernity upset the traditional 
equilibrium, necessitating a reexamination of the question of Jewish identity, 
which helps account for the wide spectrum of competing positions one finds 
on this question in contemporary discourse. Finally, I will conclude with some 
brief recommendations on how to address these discrepancies.
SACRAMENTAL AND COVENANTAL APPROACHES
Let me start with some definitions. I will speak of the objective or external 
markers of Jewish identity, as contrasted with the subjective or internal 
markers (see table 1). The objective markers include lineage, circumcision, and 
immersion, whereas the subjective include personal identification with family, 
friends, the Jewish community, and the “living the Jewish narrative.”
More broadly, the objective markers are those facts about a person that 
can be observed by others and attested in a court of law; they include the per-
son’s family background, whether his father or mother were Jewish, whether 
if a male he was circumcised in a religious ceremony or a secular procedure, 
whether this individual underwent conversion to Judaism and if so, by whom. 
The subjective markers are those facts about a person that are experienced by 
the person him- or herself; they include whether this person believes in Jewish 
religious teachings, whether this person feels a part of the Jewish narrative, 
whether this person identifies positively or negatively, strongly or mildly, or 
not at all with his or her biological Jewish heritage, and whether this heritage 
consists of one or two Jewish parents of whatever gender.
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The sacramental-covenantal distinction builds on the objective-subjective 
distinction. Roughly speaking, the sacramental theory focuses on the external 
factors, as if these external factors by themselves automatically make a person 
a Jew and in their absence a person simply is not Jewish, no matter how many 
of the internal factors are present. The covenantal theory gives more weight to 
the internal factors, though it does not regard them as entirely sufficient with-
out at least some external factors present. My notion of covenantal here shares 
much with Eugene Borowitz’s usage in his book Renewing the Covenant.2 
There, he speaks of the “Jewish self ” as covenanted five ways—to God, to 
the people Israel, to the Jewish past, to the Jewish future, and to the self. The 
self ’s covenant to God, to the past and future, and to the self (especially the 
Table 1. Sacramental and covenantal approaches compared.
SACRAMENTAL COVENANTAL
Definition: A Jew is a person born 
of a Jewish mother, or converted to 
Judaism by a legitimate beit din.
Definition: A Jew is a person with a 
critical mass of Jewish memes (Jewish 
knowledge, values, religious commit-
ments, cultural memories), together 
with the marker: “This applies to me.”
Objective criteria: Lineage, cir-
cumcision, and immersion, con-
version by the right authorities.
Subjective criteria: Personal 
identification with family, friends, the 
Jewish community, “living the Jewish 
narrative.”
Matrilineal principle is irrevo-
cable; it determines Jewish status 
by definition.
Matrilineal principle is a historical 
criterion that has changed in the past 
and does not always correlate with the 
inner determinants of Jewish identity.
Conversion ceremony changes 
one’s status. Role of the beit din 
is sacramental: its action makes a 
person Jewish.
Conversion ceremony ratifies what has 
already taken place internally. Judg-
ment of beit din gives public confir-
mation to a person’s inner status, so a 
person will be accepted as Jewish by 
the larger community.
Tends to theocracy: one group’s 
claim to be the legitimate author-
ity supersedes all others.
Tends to pluralism: different groups’ 
claims to foster and recognize Jews in 
their midst are recognized.
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last) all have a strongly subjective slant. But the individual’s covenant to the 
Jewish people implies at least some degree of anchoring in objectivity, through 
ratification and acceptance by at least some significant segment of the Jewish 
people, that is not to be had by fiat of the private individual.
Finally, I will suggest that we can interpret the traditional body of law on 
“who is a Jew” by saying that it can be accounted for by a mix of the sacramental 
and covenantal approaches, while giving more weight to the covenantal approach 
than is typically supposed by traditionally oriented theories of Jewish identity.
When I recently discussed the sacramental-covenantal distinction with 
Rabbi Juan Mejia, he pointed out to me (citing the analysis of Avi Sagi and Zvi 
Zohar) that it can be correlated with a duality of approach in Maimonides’s 
treatment of conversion—“an ethnic stratum [sacramental/halachic] predicat-
ed collectively on the Jewish people and an axiological-religious [covenantal/
philosophical] stratum that applies exclusively to the individual.”3 Though in 
his philosophically oriented Thirteen Principles Maimonides makes accep-
tance of the content of faith the primary criterion of being Jewish, in his hala-
chic code addressing issues of conversion and marriageability he emphasizes 
the ritual aspect of the conversion process as decisive.
This paper is a sequel to my previous paper, “A Proposal for the Purifica-
tion of All Jews,” which was delivered at a symposium on patrilineal issues at 
the Academy for Jewish Studies in March, 2012 and published in their online 
journal Gevanim.4 The previous paper focused specifically on the more practical 
issue of whether and in what circumstances to accept patrilineal Jews as fully 
Jewish. This paper will address that practical question as well, but will focus 
more centrally on the theoretical question, what constitutes Jewish identity itself.
WHERE THE APPROACHES DIFFER IN PRACTICE
Let us elaborate a little more on the sacramental-covenantal dichotomy. The 
sacramental theory defines a Jew as someone who is either born of two Jewish 
parents, or of a Jewish mother and non-Jewish father, or has undergone the 
right kind of Jewish conversion. If these determinants are present, the person is 
Jewish. The external factors make the person sacred automatically (hence, the 
term “sacramental”). If these are absent, the person is not Jewish.
As opposed to the sacramental idea, the root of the covenantal idea is 
voluntary choice. Maybe we shouldn’t stress the voluntary aspect too abso-
lutely; even in the case of converts, there is often a sense of one’s course being 
directed by an overpowering destiny. But at any rate, the criterion of one’s 
Jewishness in this paradigm is an internal determinant. It operates through the 
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person’s consciousness, through one’s sense of oneself, of knowing the specifics 
of Jewishness and identifying with them, of participating in a historical Jewish 
narrative transcending oneself. This accords with the definition I have offered 
in table 1: “A Jew is a person with a critical mass of Jewish memes (Jewish 
knowledge, values, religious commitments, cultural memories), together with 
the marker: ‘This applies to me.’”
Now, in a healthy Jewish society in equilibrium, the external determi-
nants and the inner sense of being Jewish go hand in hand. One is born of 
Jewish parents, hence one is raised in a Jewish family, replete with family 
observances of Shabbat and holidays; one is educated in the specifics of the 
Jewish tradition. One acquires Jewish “memes” in the natural course of living 
one’s life. (The word “meme,” an analogy with “gene,” means “unit of cultural 
memory.” It was coined by Richard Dawkins, a thinker with whom I have a lot 
of disagreements, but this coinage was felicitous.5) One thus becomes a carrier 
of Jewish group memory.
So if the external markers of Jewishness and the internal markers are 
complementary, is it a chicken-and-egg question to ask which comes first? Is it 
perhaps an exaggeration to say “it’s all in the memes”? Perhaps. But I have two 
reasons for claiming this. The first is that we have perhaps lately been placing 
too much emphasis on the external criteria of Jewish identity, which leads to 
the kinds of anomalies that I will soon examine. The second is that if we were 
pushed to the extremity of choosing one or the other—either having a cor-
rect lineage but no perpetuation of Jewish group memory and narrative, or a 
somewhat incorrect lineage but a healthy flourishing of Jewish group memory 
and narrative—I would argue for the superiority of the second alternative as a 
more authentic representation of Jewish existence as it has existed historically 
and as it is defined and portrayed in the canonical sources of Judaism. 
If this is indeed the preferred answer to my admittedly extreme hypo-
thetical question, then I am led to conclude that even in the case of healthy 
equilibrium of both factors present and mutually supporting, it is really the 
perpetuation of Jewish group memory and narrative that is the primary thing 
of value. The details that make for correct lineage are a means to this end and 
serve as the outer casing to protect and maintain the inner living core.
I will leave for later a more detailed analysis of how the sacramental and 
covenantal principles complement each other and also differ from each other 
with respect to the principle of matrilineality and the dynamics of conver-
sion. Suffice it for now to say that in premodern traditional Jewish society 
they tended to go together. Form followed content. Generally, given the social 
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separation between Jewish and non-Jewish communities, if intermarriage 
occurred, either the Jewish partner left the community and the children were 
lost to Judaism, or the non-Jewish partner converted to Judaism. Also, there 
was only one kind of conversion to consider. In either case, group homogene-
ity was preserved. The problems that come up today in this connection are (I 
believe) rare. Maybe I am rosy-eyed and Pollyannish, but that is my impres-
sion. I will leave it to the historical sociologists to confirm or disconfirm it.
SOME ANOMALOUS CASES
Let us turn our attention now to some anomalous cases, where the sacramental 
and covenantal approaches yield substantively different answers to the ques-
tion, whether a particular person is to be regarded as Jewish or not.
Case #1: Jessica Fishman is an extreme test case of how Jewishly correct 
one can be in lifestyle and inner consciousness and still fall foul of the enforc-
ers of correct lineage. Her mother was a Reform convert whose conversion 
ceremony included mikvah immersion; her father was a born Jew. Jessica grew 
up in a Jewishly observant home, where the Sabbath and dietary laws were 
practiced, and she was educated in a Jewish day school. As a young adult, she 
made aliyah and served in the Israeli Defense Forces. Upon engagement to a 
young Jewish man in Israel, she discovered that from the standpoint of the 
religious legal authorities who are exclusively empowered to act on her case 
in matters of marital law in Israel, all the positive factors of her Jewish back-
ground, education, and observance were of no avail. She was declared categori-
cally not Jewish and therefore not eligible to marry a Jew in Israel. Jessica broke 
off her engagement and moved back to the United States after seven years as an 
Israeli. This is a case of the sacramental approach taken to its vicious extreme.6 
Case #2: I consider in this case the fairly numerous individuals who 
were raised in the Reform movement as Jewish under the 1983 Resolution 
on Patrilineal Descent and who wish to be recognized by the Conservative 
movement either for the purpose of marriage or communal affiliation. The 
standard Conservative demand in these cases is the same as what the Orthodox 
in Israel requested of Jessica Fishman: just convert, and you will be Jewish by 
our standards. Faced with this requirement, some comply and others do not. 
We are fortunate to have in David Wilensky one who did undergo conversion 
and who was then articulate in expressing the reasons why he felt in retrospect 
that this was inauthentic, because it failed to do justice to the fullness of the 
Jewish identity that he brought with him into the ceremony.7 We also have the 
reflections of Rabbi Harold Shulweis, who tells how he had similar misgivings 
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after a pseudonymous Lucy Cohen, when presented with a similar demand, 
slammed the door in his face.8 In today’s community, I think it is fair to guess 
that the Lucy Cohens outnumber the David Wilenskys.
Speaking personally, I will confess that the Jessica Fishman case was a 
significant factor in leading me to question the viability of the approach that 
Conservative Judaism has taken towards conversions and determinations of 
Jewish status that do not meet their halachic criteria. In effect, the traditional 
Conservative stance has amounted to the combination of two assertions: 
(1) that there is an objective standard of Jewish authenticity in matters of 
general religious practice and Jewish identity, namely, the received halachah; 
by this standard, some claims to Jewish status are valid and others invalid; 
(2) more particularly, the line between valid and invalid falls between Con-
servative (whose actions are valid) and Reform (whose actions are prima facie 
invalid unless proved valid). In the Jewish world as currently constituted, once 
the force of the general premise (1) is granted, it will be extremely difficult or 
impossible to gain consensus that the line between valid and invalid will fall 
precisely where Conservative Judaism wants it to fall. More forcefully put, it 
is almost inevitable that Conservative Judaism will lose to orthodoxy in the 
determination of this all-important red line vis-à-vis the Jessica Fishmans, 
while it loses to Reform in winning the hearts and minds of the Lucy Cohens. 
Conservative Jews will be left in a small minority—in agreement with neither 
Reform nor orthodoxy—protesting that the correct place to draw the line is 
where Conservatism wants to draw it. 
The Jessica Fishmans are suffering at the hands of orthodoxy precisely 
what the David Wilenskys and Lucy Cohens are suffering at the hands of 
Conservatism. From an objective outside perspective, there is no difference in 
principle between the two cases, except who is doing the excluding. The only 
consistent way out of this dilemma is to reject the first premise, in other words, 
to apply Beit Shammai-Beit Hillel parity to all the major branches of Judaism 
and to accept as Jewish whoever has been confirmed and raised as Jewish by 
any of them.9
Case #3: We can learn something different in considering the case of 
someone of minimal initial Jewish background, such as Julius Lester. His 
autobiography is available in his book: Lovesong: Becoming A Jew.10 He grew 
up the son of a black Methodist minister, but was aware as a boy that he 
had a Jewish great-grandfather on his mother’s side. It took forty years of life 
experience for this slim fragment of Jewish background to become activated 
to the point where it became a determinant component of his identity, but 
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when that happened, it put the seal on a long-term personal development in 
which other factors undoubtedly played an important part. Most crucially (it 
seems to me), when Julius Lester started to immerse himself in study of the 
Holocaust, the narrative of Jewish suffering fused and became integrated with 
the narrative of black suffering with which he was familiar, and this enabled 
him to integrate his sense of himself as simultaneously black and Jewish. The 
two ritual conversions that he underwent put the formal seal on his Jewish 
identity. From the sacramental viewpoint, it is a truism that he became Jew-
ish when he underwent the formal conversion ceremony. But that paradigm 
fails to explain what impelled him to seek conversion in the first place. Was 
he not-at-all Jewish until the ceremony? The covenantal perspective would 
answer otherwise and would argue that the real determinant of that Jewish 
identity came from within—the seed planted by the fact of descent from his 
Jewish great-grandfather led to a slowly growing sense of Jewish identity that 
eventually became dominant.
Case #4: The case of Lev Pesahov dramatizes the considerable social 
movement in Israel occasioned by hundreds of thousands of persons of mixed 
Jewish-Russian family heritage who were recognized as Jewish for purposes 
of the Israeli Law of Return but whose status is anomalous in the eyes of the 
Israeli Orthodox rabbinate. Lev Pesahov was the son of a Jewish father and a 
non-Jewish mother, who immigrated from Russia to Israel in 1990 under the 
Law of Return. In August 1993, wearing the IDF uniform, he was killed in a 
terrorist attack on an army checkpoint. He was refused Jewish burial but was 
buried on the edge of the military cemetery in Bet Shean. His case raised a 
considerable furor at the time; even the former Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren 
declared that it had been mishandled. But the number of cases in which simi-
lar pain and suffering are inflicted that arouse no similar publicity and protest 
are legion.
SUGGESTIVE TALMUDIC PRECEDENTS
Let me now turn to two anecdotal cases from the haggadah of the Talmud. 
Each of these shows that the sacramental standard that characterizes a good 
deal of Talmudic law on the subject of Jewish status is not always so black and 
white. For our first case, let us consider the following set of anecdotes:
A slave of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ammi immersed a gentile woman in 
order to make her his wife. Rav Joseph said: “I can rule that she and 
her daughter are both kosher (i.e., Jewish). Herself—following [the 
method of ] Rav Assi. For Rav Assi said (in a parallel case): ‘Did she 
not immerse for her menstrual impurity?’ Her daughter—[by the 
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rule that] if a gentile or a slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, 
the baby is Jewish.”
[What case of Rav Assi are we talking about? The following:] There 
was a man who was called “the son of the Aramean woman.” Rav Assi 
objected: “Did she not immerse for her menstrual impurity?” There 
was another man who was called “the son of the Aramean.” Rabbi 
Joshua ben Levi objected: “Did he not immerse [to be purified from] 
his seminal emission?” (b. Yebam. 45b)
This text tells of three different individuals who decided, without ben-
efit of rabbinic authorization, simply to blend in with the Jewish community 
and to live Jewish lives. Three different rabbis—Rav Joseph, Rav Assi, and 
Rabbi Joshua ben Levi (enough to constitute a beit din)—all agreed after the 
fact that these people should be treated as Jewish. As background, we should 
recognize that from the early rabbinic period onward there were three ritual 
elements—immersion, circumcision, and the act of a beit din—that in various 
combinations were considered important in signaling a person’s transition to 
Jewish status. Immersion figures positively as a factor in all three cases in the 
Rav Assi passage, but the beit din is notably absent, and this example doesn’t 
mention circumcision. (It is evident from another tradition cited in the same 
chapter of tractate Yebamot that as late as the generation of the early second 
century authorities Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua, there was debate as to 
whether all these elements were necessary for conversion or if only one was 
sufficient.11 But the standard Talmudic text on conversion procedure lists all 
of them.12 Consideration of all these texts together renders it likely that the 
consolidation of these requirements probably took place some time in the 
second or third century CE.)
Another anecdote from the same passage raises additional issues:
“And you shall judge justly between a man and his kinsman and 
his ger (understood as convert).” (Deut. 1:16) Rabbi Judah deduced 
from this that if a prospective convert was converted before a court, 
this is a valid conversion, but if he just converted himself, this is not 
a valid conversion.
[But] there was the case of one man who came before Rabbi Judah 
and said to him, “I converted myself [without witnesses or a rabbinic 
court].” Rabbi Judah said to him, “Do you have witnesses [to that 
effect]?” He replied: “No.” Rabbi Judah asked him, “Do you have 
children?” He replied: “Yes.” Rabbi Judah ruled: “Your testimony 
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would be reliable enough to disqualify just yourself, but it is not 
reliable to disqualify your children.” (b. Yebam. 47a)
Rabbi Judah is one of the authors of the sacramental view that the for-
mal validity of the conversion—its administration by a beit din—is a require-
ment of the conversion’s validity. But even he is willing to bend this criterion 
in the event that the subjective factor—the individual’s determination to be 
Jewish—is strong enough to lead to a persistence of Jewish commitment and 
observance into the next generation. In that case, though from a sacramental 
standpoint the doubtful status of the conversion should render the whole 
line of progeny illegitimate, it does not. There is a presumption that people 
who are leading Jewish lives imbued with a Jewish consciousness are to be 
deemed Jewish, and that presumption outweighs the doubts—however well-
founded—of the validity of the original conversion.
One may be tempted to dismiss both these anecdotes as expressing 
maverick positions that have been rendered irrelevant by the codification of 
the sacramental standard in the received texts of Jewish law. However, careful 
study of the codes shows that they have sought to integrate even such cases as 
these into the complex fabric of a legal synthesis that, though predominantly 
sacramental in its overall thrust, makes at least a nod in the direction of the 
validity of the subjective viewpoint. Note paragraph b in the following excerpt 
from the Shulḥan Arukh’s law of conversion:
a. All matters of conversion, whether informing the prospective 
convert of the mitzvot in order to receive them, whether circumci-
sion or immersion, should be in the presence of three qualified to 
judge, and in the daytime (see Tosafot and Rabbenu Asher on b. 
Yebam. 47b).
b. Nevertheless, this standard addresses what one should do in the 
first place. But after the fact, if one circumcised or immersed only in 
the presence of two (or if some of the judges were relatives—accord-
ing to Mordecai) or at night, or even if one immersed not for the 
purpose of conversion but (in the case of a man) to cleanse from 
seminal impurity or (in the case of a woman) for menstrual impu-
rity, the prospect is considered a valid convert and may marry a Jew. 
c. However, the acceptance of mitzvot is mandatory and must be 
done during the daytime with three.
d. Alfasi and Maimonides rule that if one immersed or was circum-
cised before only two, or at night, this is an impediment and such a 
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person would be forbidden to marry a Jewish woman; even so, if he 
went ahead and married a Jewish woman and had a child, one does 
not disqualify him retroactively. (SA YD 268:3)
The careful reader will note that the Shulḥan Arukh does not go all the 
way to say that a casual immersion suffices to infuse Jewish identity all by 
itself, in the absence of a beit din. The beit din is mandatory, according to the 
Shulḥan Arukh. But the lack of witnesses for immersion can be overridden 
after the fact by relying on the precedent of Rav Assi. And if children have 
ensued from a doubtful conversion, the existence of those children is grounds 
for treating the irregularities of the conversion process on the side of leniency, 
based on the precedent of Rabbi Judah. Thus, even though the sacramental 
approach dominates in the treatment of Jewish status in this canonical hala-
chic text, allowances are made for the subjective covenantal approach.
It can be argued that from a legal-historical perspective the approach 
of the contemporary Israeli authority Rabbi Haim Amsalem, the author of 
the treatise Zeraʿ Yisrael13—who argues for leniency based on these and simi-
lar precedents in applying the law of conversion, especially to recent Israeli 
immigrants of partial Jewish descent from the former Soviet Union—is more 
legitimately in accord with the long-term historical thrust of Jewish law, in 
combining aspects of the sacramental and covenantal conceptions of Jewish 
identity, than the uncompromising approach of the Israeli Chief Rabbinate.
 “LIVING THE NARRATIVE” IN COVENANTAL IDENTITY
Overall, from consideration of the legal traditions concerning conversion 
it would appear that the sacramental paradigm plays the dominant role in 
defining Jewish identity, with the covenantal paradigm in a subsidiary role. 
However, the picture is not complete unless we consider the emphasis placed 
on the cultivation of Jewish group memory in the fabric of traditional Jewish 
observance. A complete examination would take into account the thematizing 
of covenant in the observance of the Sabbath, the whole round of holidays, 
and daily observances such as prayer, tefillin, and the grace after meals. For 
conciseness, I will focus on what to me is the most dramatic and explicit case, 
namely, the invocation of the internalization of group memory and identity at 
the climax of the Passover Seder.
According to the biblical law, observance of the Passover was strictly 
coterminous with identification with the Israelite people. No stranger or 
uncircumcised person was to eat of the Passover. But if one wanted to observe 
the Passover, one could undergo circumcision, thereby becoming a member 
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of the Israelite people. (Exod. 12:43–44) On the other hand, an Israelite who 
failed to observe the Passover was considered to be cut off from his people. 
(Num. 9:13) A clear correlation is drawn here between cult observance and 
group identity: if you are a member of the group, you observe the cult, and 
vice versa; and if you are born outside the group, you must do what it takes 
to join the group, then you may observe the cult. So far, this agrees with the 
sacramental approach.
But what is the content of this cult observance? The original biblical law 
of the Passover goes on to command the Israelite who observes the festival: 
“And you shall explain to your son on that day, ‘It is because of what the Lord 
did for me when I went free from Egypt’” (Exod. 13:8). The rabbinic inter-
pretation of this verse is correct in seizing on the first person singular, which 
is generalized over all historical generations of Israelites who practiced the 
ritual. They concluded, naturally, that whoever practices this ritual identifies 
with the narrative of the Exodus from Egypt so thoroughly that it is as if they 
themselves went out personally from Egypt. The one-time event of the Exodus 
is perpetuated as eternally present throughout Jewish history. Group memory 
is incorporated into the individual’s memory. This is what it means to be a 
member of this group. Thus, though one must be sacramentally eligible to 
observe the Passover, the essence of the observance is the inculcation of Jewish 
memes—Jewish group memory—into one’s core identity. If this does not take 
place, then one has missed out on the essential core of the Passover observance.
The classic cultic statement of the Israelite narrative in the Torah is 
indeed to be found not in connection with the Passover ritual, but in connec-
tion with the ceremony of bringing the first fruits. I refer, of course, to the 
passage in Deuteronomy:
My father was a fugitive Aramean. He went down to Egypt with 
meager numbers and sojourned there; but there he became a great 
and very populous nation. The Egyptians dealt harshly with us 
and oppressed us; they imposed harsh labor upon us. We cried to 
the Lord, the God of our fathers, and the Lord heard our plea and 
saw our plight, our misery, and our oppression. The Lord freed us 
from Egypt by a mighty hand, by an outstretched arm and awesome 
power, and by signs and portents. He brought us to this place and 
gave us this land, a land flowing with milk and honey. Wherefore I 
now bring the first fruits of the soil which You, O Lord, have given 
me. (Deut. 26:5–10)
But even though this liturgy was not originally connected with the 
Passover festival, the rabbinic developers of Jewish ritual could not pass up 
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the opportunity to connect it with the festival that centrally commemorated 
the events described in it. They thus transferred this personal recitation of the 
remembered group experience to the Pesach Seder, where it forms the center-
piece of the Maggid, the recitation of the Exodus narrative. The experience is 
further heightened by enlisting all five senses in the experience of the Seder, 
which serve to imprint the experience from an impressionable age onward 
on all conscious and subconscious levels of the personality. To emphasize the 
point further, the text of the haggadah incorporates a key paragraph from the 
Mishnah: “In every generation a person should see himself as if he went forth 
from Egypt, as it says (Exod. 13:8): “And you shall explain to your son on that 
day, ‘It is because of what the Lord did for me when I went free from Egypt’” 
(m. Pesa. 10:5).
Though the Passover Seder is the most vivid and dramatic example, one 
must include the entire panoply of Jewish education and ritual observance 
among the tools that the Jewish tradition uses to implant Jewish group identi-
fication and group memory in all who are raised as Jews and participate in Jew-
ish life. Historically, there has generally been a strong overlap between those 
born of biological Jewish heritage and those who participated in the Jewish 
religious-cultural experience and thus internalized this sense of identification 
with Judaism. But there have been exceptions in both directions. On the posi-
tive side of the ledger, there have been those who move into the community, 
either through social involvement (including, but not limited to, marrying 
someone Jewish) or through intellectual and cultural encounter. On the nega-
tive side, there have always been some born of Jewish biological heritage who 
either rejected the education they received or never received such education in 
the first place, and who therefore drifted away from the Jewish people.
HYBRID MEMES BEHAVE LIKE HYBRID GENES
We are now in a position to address the mixed-type exception, increasingly 
common in our postmodern age, of families formed of the marriage of Jews 
and non-Jews where no clear decision is made of how to raise the children. 
Whoever has studied Mendelian genetics can use Mendel’s tables to character-
ize the outcomes of these matings: when you cross X and Y, the offspring will 
turn out as some assortment of XX, YY, and XY. As with genes, so also with 
memes—from any mixed mating, three outcomes are possible. Some of the 
offspring will imbibe a full set of Jewish memes, which translates into a full set 
of Jewish cultural memories, and will identify fully as Jews. Some will imbibe 
only a small sprinkling of Jewish memes, or none at all, and will identify not 
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at all as Jews or consider a trace of Jewish background to be a negligible, 
incidental part of their personal identity. And some will fully exemplify the 
hybrid syndrome and consider their personal identity to be a mosaic of differ-
ent characteristics, of which the Jewish part is a somewhat significant part but 
not dominant or definitive for them. 
Julius Lester’s reflections are a vivid example of a whole genre of the self-
reflections of Jews from mixed background that can give us a window into the 
complexities of this situation. Another striking example of this phenomenon 
is the case of the urban Marranos of Portugal. Common to Julius Lester and 
the urban Marranos is the possibility, from the slimmest of biological descent, 
for the idea of Jewishness to persist for generations in latent form, then sud-
denly to burst forth and dominate an individual’s sense of identity. When 
conditions are right and the individual is properly motivated, this slim thread 
of identity leads the individual to reconnect with the mainstream of Jewish 
memes, imbibe vast stores of Jewish knowledge that are integrated in the form 
of shared group memory, and thus achieve a rich, authentic Jewish identity 
from the most modest beginnings.
At the same time, one must be careful not to exaggerate the usual depth 
of Jewish memory in individuals who subjectively identify as Jewish on the 
basis of remote or fragmentary biological heritage. In the absence of serious 
Jewish education and communal integration, such individuals may be Jewish 
in their own self-definition but lack a common understanding of Jewishness 
with other Jews. “I identify as Jewish” is only one element of the covenantal 
paradigm. It may be the key defining meme, but in solitary isolation it is 
deficient. When in good working order and properly activated, it seeks to 
be expressed by assembling more and more positive content in the form of 
intersubjectively validated memories and behaviors of the historic and con-
temporary Jewish group.
From this perspective, the question “Who Is A Jew?” is an empirical 
question of the psychology of human personality. It can more adequately be 
broken down into questions like: How Jewish is this person? How much Jew-
ish knowledge and experience do they have and how central is it to their self-
concept as a person? Do they associate socially with Jews and do so because 
they identify as Jewish? Do they watch Jewish movies, read Jewish books? Do 
they go to Israel as a personal pilgrimage because they are Jewish? And (along 
more traditional lines) do they practice Jewish religious practices—Shabbat, 
holidays, Jewish dietary laws? There is a spectrum of Jewish feelings, knowl-
edge, cultural memory, and present practices that one can refer to in order to 
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characterize a person as more-or-less Jewish. But there is also a tipping point 
where a critical mass of all these together coalesces into a “yes”—this person is 
Jewish, without qualification. And the answer one gets from this approach is 
not always identical with the answer that the sacramental approach will yield. 
The anomalies we cited—Jessica Fishman, Julius Lester, and the rest—repre-
sent the tip of the iceberg of the tens of thousands who may score “yes” by the 
empirical approach but will not necessarily be accepted by the sacramentalists.
ACCOUNTING FOR HISTORICAL JEWISH IDENTITY
Let us now go back and analyze in greater depth how the sacramental and 
covenantal approaches interpret, in their various ways, the basic rules of Jew-
ish status: Jewish biological heritage, matrilineality, and conversion.
First, let us consider the largest group, the core of the Jewish people, 
those who have been born of Jewish ancestors for generations going far back 
into time, perhaps to the beginning of Jewish history. The sacramentalists 
will say that these individuals are Jewish because they have Jewish ancestors, 
from whom the Jewish essence—whatever it is—has been transmitted. The 
covenantalists will say that these same individuals are Jewish because the 
Jewish cultural memory—which until recent times was identical with Jewish 
religious group memory—has been successfully implanted in these people, so 
that they identify with the group memory and therefore identify as Jews. Both 
are right. The confluence of biological heritage and the transmission of group 
memory make it impossible to separate out these two phenomena, other than 
conceptually. In a healthy, stable Jewish people, biological heritage and group 
memory transmission go hand in hand.
There is one problem that might keep me up nights if I were a consis-
tent sacramentalist: what were the circumstances of the founding generation 
of each of the major world Jewish communities (let us say, around the tenth 
century), as we are trying to reconstruct them now on the basis of historical 
and comparative genetics? If, God forbid, the males of that generation who 
left their old comfortable homes, driven by the imperative of trade and explo-
ration, settled down with the women of the new locale and mated with them 
without proper conversion procedures (and who could find a beit din of three 
rabbis under those circumstances?), then not only their own children but the 
whole line of Jews from that point onward would be tainted with the stain of 
invalid lineage! Anyone bothered with this kind of worry would either have to 
claim that every one of the indigenous founding mothers of such communities 
underwent proper conversion (a claim for which there is no evidence except 
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one’s pious need to believe) or would necessarily have to turn to the Talmudic 
precedents that we have examined, of the Aramean woman who dunked in 
mikvah for her period and this was counted as conversion by Rav Assi, and of 
the man whom Rabbi Judah assured that as long as he had produced Jewish 
children, any doubt concerning his conversion would be overlooked. 
Next, let us consider the case of individuals who have one Jewish parent, 
from the father’s side or from the mother’s side. It is rather well established 
by now that the criterion of identity transmission changed from biblical to 
rabbinic times—it was patrilineal in biblical times and matrilineal in rabbinic 
times. Shaye Cohen and others have helped us to evaluate the possible reasons 
why this change took place.14 But relevant to our consideration here, I have 
two observations. One is that the determination of the child’s status based on 
the father’s or mother’s affiliation may have had an element of empirical prob-
ability. That is to say, at least in some cases—such as the single Jewish mother 
who brings home the child who is the product of a chance encounter or a 
severed relationship—the dominant parent would have been likely to live in 
the Jewish community and to raise the child in a Jewish context, thus fostering 
Jewish identity on the part of the child. But causality could work in the oppo-
site direction as well—whatever determination of status was promulgated by 
law would have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Especially in a traditional 
society, individuals were far more likely than they are today (though even in 
those days, not all) to accept whatever assignment of status was given them 
and to live in accord with it. And there was always the recourse of converting 
children to Judaism to correct any anomalies that the law did not properly 
cover (though regarding biblical times, we must understand conversion in a 
more informal sense). So here, too, one may say that in premodern Jewish 
society the sacramental and covenantal criteria did not lead to widely differing 
results in the determination of Jewish identity.
Finally, let us focus on the phenomenon of conversion itself. Here, 
halachah combines the objective and subjective elements of Jewish existence. 
The beit din, whose job it is to establish public determinations on legal issues, 
which then become legal facts, is called on to do so in this case based on 
the subjective state of the individual in question. The beit din must ask the 
prospective convert, “Do you, or do you not, accept this covenant as binding 
on yourself?” This is a call for a subjective piece of information; moreover, 
whatever the individual’s outward profession, the beit din is charged with 
evaluating its sincerity—another subjective factor (though betraying outward 
manifestations). Based on that subjective state, certain objective acts are to 
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ensue: the individual must be circumcised if male and immersed whether male 
or female, and the action must be witnessed by the beit din, who then issue 
the determination that this person is Jewish in the eyes of all. Under ideal 
conditions, the objective and subjective determinations are present together. 
We saw that the Shulḥan Arukh even allows that if there is a slight shortfall 
from the objective criteria, one may rely on the subjective intention; there 
is implicit reference here to the Talmudic anecdotes of Rav Assi and Rabbi 
Judah, where the subjective intention had much greater power to determine 
the outcome.
It is still not out of place to ask: if one had to decide which was more 
predominant in the case of conversion, was it the subjective or the objective 
criterion? And the answer is elusive and paradoxical. There are cases where the 
objective approach has clear priority. For instance, in cases where it was later 
found out that the convert was insincere, their Jewish status is nevertheless 
irrevocable. Any marriage they have entered is still binding and needs a Jew-
ish divorce to terminate it. This is because the individual’s subjective Jewish 
identity has become an objective social fact, on which other objective social 
facts (such as marriages and families) are based. Once this fact has become 
part of public reality, annulling it would have disruptive consequences; there-
fore, it presumptively should stand, unless the grounds for annulling it are 
overwhelming.
From the other side, the consummation of covenantal affiliation between 
a convert and the broad Jewish community with which they wish to affili-
ate is possible only by virtue of public recognition of their Jewish status. The 
desire to be part of the Jewish community is, from the convert’s perspective, 
a subjective desire and is associated with their inner feeling of “I am Jewish.” 
But this subjective desire can be fulfilled only through the broader acceptance 
that ensues from public ratification of their Jewish self-affirmation, and this is 
achieved through the objective legal fact created by the decision of the beit din. 
Nevertheless, I think it is important to make a sharp distinction between 
this objective, confirming role of the beit din’s determination in the conver-
sion process and a full-blown sacramentalist position. The full-blown sacra-
mentalists on this issue are spiritual heirs of the medieval Jewish philosopher 
Judah Halevi, who in his Kuzari posited a difference of essence between Jews 
and non-Jews. This difference of essence necessitates an absolutely firm divid-
ing line between one who is fully a Jew and someone else who is not at all 
a Jew, with no possibility of any intermediate status. In the covenantal view, 
the beit din ratifies the convert’s will to be Jewish, which is primary. In the 
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sacramental view, it is the beit din’s action that by virtue of an occult power 
vested in them brings about a change of essence and actually makes the non-
Jew Jewish. On this view, only the right beit din, which has this power, can 
make this change. Someone who goes to the wrong beit din achieves nothing. 
Some Jews will accept the result as valid, but they are the deluded, who lead 
a major portion of the Jewish people into sin.
HOW THE ENLIGHTENMENT HAS CHANGED THE PICTURE
All these questions become transformed with the onset of the Enlightenment 
and its acceptance by the larger part of the Jewish people over the past two 
centuries. This has had the following results:
1. Individuals have become autonomous. Even in the case where 
the fact of a Jewish individual’s Jewish status is itself unprob-
lematic, the individual feels free to follow his or her own desires 
rather than the directives of the group. Decisions that fall under 
this rubric include whether to practice Judaism, whether to 
marry a Jewish partner, and whether to bring up one’s children 
as Jews with Jewish education and the practices that inculcate 
Jewish group memory.
2. Judaism has become pluralistic. Different Jewish denomi-
nations have arisen, with different standards of belief and 
practice. Conversion to Judaism becomes conversion to a par-
ticular denomination’s definition of Judaism, which may not be 
accepted by another denomination. (Paradoxically, the power 
vested in the Israeli rabbinate to determine who is a Jew is 
wielded by the heirs of those ultra-Orthodox who opposed the 
Enlightenment from the outset, but their decisions are imposed 
on the whole of Israeli Jewish society, including the majority 
who took the other turn at that fork in the historical road.)
3. In an open society, intermarriage is rampant. Personal identity 
becomes hyphenated and polymorphous. In such a society, it 
is more the rule than the exception for an individual to claim 
descent from several ancestral groups, with the resulting per-
plexity: which is primary in my identity? Who am I? These 
complexities of lineage cannot be dictated by the ancestral 
groups’ preconceived definitions, nor do they follow patrilineal or 
matrilineal criteria, but they are random and idiosyncratic. The 
representatives of traditional Judaism can say: this one should be 
declared “Jewish” and that one should be declared “non-Jewish” 
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by the traditional rules of lineage. But today’s individuals march 
to the beat of their inner drummer, with unpredictable results.
CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS
Under these conditions, I believe the covenantal criterion, rather than the 
sacramental, is a better guide for identifying those Jews who can be counted 
on to advance the fortunes of the Jewish group. My own application of that 
criterion to today’s reality yields the following tentative guidelines:
1. The rubric of conversion is appropriate for the embracing 
of Judaism by someone who starts out from an entirely non-
Jewish starting point. In such a case, it marks the culmination 
of a change of identity definition that has occurred over time, 
accompanied by a process of cognitive learning and behavioral 
and emotional transformation. It is of questionable propriety 
when raised as a demand of someone who already has a stable 
Jewish identity, especially when this Jewish status is already 
recognized by a major community or denomination in mod-
ern Judaism. The notion that there is a species of conversion 
by which one changes affiliation from one party to another 
party within the Jewish people is a peculiar modern invention, 
one that is unknown in premodern Judaism. Moreover, it is 
based on an individual’s denying their understanding of who 
they have been up until now. I am inclined here to agree with 
the critical considerations advanced by Harold Shulweis and 
David Wilensky.15
2. There are intermediate cases—especially in cases such as the Julius 
Lesters and those returning to full-fledged Jewish identity after 
long periods of persecution, suppression, and denial. Rabbi Juan 
Mejia points out that in the fifteenth century Rabbi Solomon 
ben Simeon Duran composed a formula for marking the return 
of crypto-Jews, one that formally recognized the status of their 
act as returning to full affirmation of the Jewishness that they had 
never fully relinquished.16 This can serve as a precedent for rituals 
that recognize and honestly articulate the nuances of the objective 
and subjective realities of these intermediate cases rather than sub-
suming them to the conversion rubric, which implies a complete 
transformation from non-Jewish to Jewish status.
3. It would not be a bad idea for Jews to reinstitute a form of ritual 
immersion on a regular basis, so that we can all be at least as 
deserving as the girlfriend of Rabbi Ḥiyya’s slave. In connection 
with my earlier paper on patrilineality, I offered an experimental 
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liturgy to point the way to what such an immersion ceremony 
might look like if developed in practice. It was my deliberate 
intention in composing this ritual to include affirmation of 
Jewishness as part of the ritual without implying the previous 
non-Jewishness of the participant, so that it could be engaged 
in equally by all Jews of whatever background of personal and 
family history.17
4. Each subgroup of Jewry should respect the determinations of 
other subgroups that such-and-such an individual meets the 
standards of Jewish identity and should be accorded the rights 
and privileges of Jewish status. (“Even though the School of Hil-
lel and the School of Shammai differed—the one would forbid 
what the other permitted, the one would disqualify what the 
other qualified—the School of Shammai did not refrain from 
marrying women from the School of Hillel, or the School of 
Hillel from the School of Shammai.”18) As I proposed in my 
patrilineal paper, if a Reform congregation confers an education 
together with Bar or Bat Mitzvah on a patrilineal Jew, other 
denominations should respect this, from their perspectives, as 
receiving the yoke of mitzvot, which is the prime requirement 
of conversion.
There is another consideration that I raised in my patrilineal paper, 
which I call “Avinoam’s Paradox.” It is the inverse of David Wilensky’s position 
but agrees with it in their common suspicion of touch-up conversions. It was 
articulated by Rabbi Avinoam Sharon, an Israeli Masorti rabbi, who gave me 
permission to cite it in his name. In Rabbi Sharon’s words: 
According to this view, a person who regards him/herself as  
Jewish by virtue of patrilineal lineage may not be able to ever 
become halakhically Jewish. The reason for this is that the only 
means of doing so is to undergo conversion. If, in order for conver-
sion to be valid, it must be performed with the sincere intention to 
become Jewish, then a candidate who declares him/herself to be Jew-
ish already would not be sincere in that intention, from an objective 
perspective. Moreover, such a candidate, believing him/herself to be 
Jewish already, would not subjectively recognize the validity of his/
her own conversion. As a result, arguably, such a person can never 
become halakhically Jewish.19
The same logic could apply to the person who had been converted to 
Judaism in a Reform ceremony, of whom Orthodox conversion was subse-
quently demanded. In the best of cases it is logic like this that induces the Jessica 
Fishmans to refuse an Orthodox conversion and the Lucy Cohens to refuse a 
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Conservative conversion because they cannot accept the premise implied by such 
a demand that they are not Jewish in the first place, and they cannot in good 
conscience enter into such a procedure based on what to them are false premises.
I cite this paradox for two reasons. First, it should cause us to question 
whether, in the case of the sincere patrilineal Jew, conversion is indeed the 
optimal course of action to be recommended. Second, the existence of this 
view on the table illustrates that it is not possible, at least in this case, to be 
yotzei yedei kol ha-de’ot [to pursue a course that will be acceptable in the eyes of 
everyone]. Once we realize this impossibility, two alternatives open up. One is 
that, in a given case, no matter what action we take, some people will be dis-
satisfied—that there will therefore be people who are regarded as kosher Jews 
by this authority’s criterion but not by that authority’s criterion. In that case, 
the Jewish people must be forever split, and the split is irremediable. The other 
alternative—to avoid this undesirable outcome—is to adopt the position of 
the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel as cited in Mishnah Yebamot 
1:4, that even though they subscribed to different rules in the minutiae gov-
erning marriage and divorce (and by implication, of personal status), they 
agreed to accept the actions of the other party performed by the other party’s 
criteria. This is the way of elu ve’elu divrei elohim ḥayyim [these and those are 
the words of the living God]. This is the path that if followed by all, can lead 
to a healing of the Jewish people.
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Judging and Protecting Jewish Identity in  
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb
Annalise E. Glauz-Todrank
INTRODUCTION: THE VANDALISM INCIDENT
On November 1, 1982, eight young adult males, most of them teenagers, sat 
drinking in a drugstore parking lot in Silver Spring, Maryland. Not far away 
at Shaare Tefila, a synagogue affiliated with the Conservative movement, the 
board of trustees was meeting. The parking lot outside was full of cars. After 
a few drinks, several of the young adults walked over the to the wall of Drug 
Fair, one among a local chain of drugstores, and spray-painted a burning cross, 
the slogans “White Power” and “Arian [sic] Brotherhood,” the initials KKK, 
an eagle with a swastika, a Star of David with an arrow through it, and their 
initials.1 One of them suggested, “Somebody should do that on a synagogue.”2 
Because they all lived in town or in the surrounding area, they knew where to 
find Shaare Tefila, and they walked over to it. As the board meeting proceeded 
inside, the young men started spray-painting one of the outside walls, before 
ranging over the property and painting a car, playground equipment, and 
several of the other walls. Among their ominous creations were a six-foot tall 
Nazi eagle, the words “Toten Kamf Raband” [sic], a burning cross in red and 
black, the words “Dead Jew” and “Death to the Jude,” and the outline of a 
door, upon which they wrote “In, Take a Shower, Jew.”3 
 When the members of the board exited the building, the young men were 
gone, and at first the board members did not notice anything amiss. The presi-
dent, Maurice Potosky, and the executive director, Marshall Levin, had remained 
inside to discuss some matters a bit further. Jack Teller reached his car and found a 
swastika painted on it. Shocked, he drove home, and, from there, called Marshall 
and Maurice back at the synagogue. The board members still at the synagogue 
walked around the building, discovering one disturbing image after another. After 
registering their surprise and serious concern about the defacement, Maurice and 
Marshall telephoned the rabbi at home—he had not been present for the board 
meeting. After the other board members returned to their homes, the three of 
them went into the synagogue and considered what should be done.4
According to Marshall Levin, in the early 1980s in the Washington, DC 
area, the prevalent sentiment within the Jewish community was that instances 
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of antisemitic vandalism should be immediately cleaned up and quietly 
removed. Better if the surrounding community and the press did not find out. 
Better to keep it quiet so that “copycat” crimes did not occur. These instances 
of defacement were viewed as an embarrassment to the Jewish community.5 As 
the Washington Post reported three days after the incident, “Jewish leaders say 
that statistics do not accurately reflect the true extent of such incidents, since 
there is a great reluctance on the part of many victims to report such acts for 
fear of encouraging their repetition.”6
On that night, however, a shift in thinking occurred that would there-
after alter the way that local Jewish communities responded to these crimes. 
As Levin, Potosky, and Shaare Tefila’s rabbi, Martin Halpern z”l, stood in the 
synagogue puzzling over what they should do, they considered the practicality 
of removing the paint.7 They would need to hire someone with a sand-blaster, 
who could effectively blast the paint off of the walls. The following day the 
synagogue would be filled with voters, arriving at their local polling place to 
submit their ballots. When the voters arrived, they would not miss the six-foot 
Nazi eagle or the words painted on the walls if these images remained there. 
Eventually, Levin convinced Potosky and Rabbi Halpern that if the congrega-
tion left the graffiti on the building, the larger community would respond by 
uniting with them against the act. As he predicted, in the week that followed, 
parents took their children to see the images and explained to them what had 
happened, and on the following Sunday, Jewish and non-Jewish members of 
the local community arrived in the hundreds to clean the building. In the years 
to come, the publicity of this incident resulted in criminal trials and then the 
civil suit, Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, which eventually landed in the 
Supreme Court.8 
THE ARGUMENT: SITUATING JEWISH IDENTITY IN  
SHAARE TEFILA CONGREGATION V. COBB 
In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court heard and decided Shaare Tefila Congrega-
tion v. Cobb, the first case to provide race-based civil rights protection to Jews. 
Very little has been written about the case, but the legal process that culmi-
nated in the Supreme Court hearing and the contents of the oral argument 
contain a wealth of material that is compelling to anyone with even a passing 
interest in how the state defines Jewish identity. 
The problem of defining terms such as “religion” and “race” in the Shaare 
Tefila case forms the main focus of this chapter, but with the larger aim of 
delineating how the Supreme Court determined civil rights protection for 
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Jews. To this end, I examine the legal process and decision in Shaare Tefila 
for what it reveals about legal constructions of Jewish identity. I address the 
question of how the justices evaluated Jewish identity, and I consider how 
they determined what discrimination against Jews has entailed. I posit that 
the problem of how to legally define Jews, or, in other words, how to socially 
locate Jews in relation to religion and race, highlights at least two related and 
noteworthy issues. One is that Jewish identity does not neatly fit into either 
category, which reveals the socially constructed character of the categories 
themselves. The other is that by analyzing this lack of fit as it relates to relevant 
discursive systems, it is possible to identify some ways in which these systems 
intersect. For instance, in both European and American discourses, the two 
categories are bound up with each other, both genealogically and substantively. 
In my analysis of the oral argument for Shaare Tefila Congregation v. 
Cobb, I will highlight moments when these discursive differences arose and 
address the necessity of recognizing both their distinct histories and how these 
discourses have come to intersect. They intersect in the specific incident that 
led to this case but also in contemporary American culture more generally.
At stake in both issues mentioned above is the question of legal protec-
tion and the justices’ attempts to navigate discursive systems without necessari-
ly recognizing them as such. In this case, to convince the justices that the syna-
gogue members had experienced a racist incident, the lawyer had to respond to 
hypothetical situations that invoked conceptions of race drawn from different 
times and places. The justices, however, did not necessarily acknowledge the 
different origins of these conceptions or the impact that the differences had on 
their interpretations of what occurred in the defacement incident.
Central to the Supreme Court decision was the question of whether Jews 
can claim race-based protection or whether “Jewish” is a religious designation 
only. This question was so difficult for the court to answer, in part, because 
none of the categories involved—“religion,” “race,” or “Jewish”—are clearly 
legally defined. The U.S. legal system has a long history of grappling with both 
race and religion. Historically, it has defined race in a variety of ways, using 
scientific narratives and the “common knowledge” test, among others. These 
definitions were employed to legitimate and to clarify the operation of political 
institutions, like slavery and immigration. 
No legal definition for religion exists, however. Unlike race in the United 
States, religion is not a category that has been used to explicitly justify a 
structural hierarchy. In other words, typically, the category of religion has not 
been imposed on a group of people and then cited as a reason to justify their 
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subjugation. Rather, due to the American myth of religious pluralism, the 
category “religion” has been claimed by immigrant and indigenous American 
communities to legitimate practices and beliefs meaningful to them. Addi-
tionally, neither the United States judicial system nor the legislature has ever 
defined what it means to be Jewish. Jewish Americans had never successfully 
claimed civil rights protection on the basis of race before, so no immedi-
ately obvious precedent existed. Therefore, the Supreme Court justices faced 
a conundrum regarding how to decide the case. To do so, it was necessary to 
situate Jewish identity in relation to the legal categories “religion” and “race.”
The court’s attempt to socially locate Jewish identity necessitated the 
engagement of multiple discourses that developed in different contexts, 
including Europe and the United States. The social and legal status of Jews as 
a minority group in both contexts has always been informed by the prevailing 
conceptions of religion and race in respective times and places. Both Euro-
pean and American histories of race, in particular, were significant to this case 
because the defacement of Shaare Tefila included images and phrases drawing 
on Nazi and Ku Klux Klan racial ideologies. To understand historically evolv-
ing conceptions of what “Jewish” entails, the role of Jewish racial status in each 
ideology must be contextualized. In other words, it must be considered in rela-
tion to the social and legal discourses through which these ideologies emerged. 
DISCOURSES ABOUT RELIGION, RACE, AND JEWISH 
IDENTITY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN 
In order to contextualize the questions pertaining to Jewish identity that arose 
in Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, it is important to briefly examine Europe-
an and American discourses about religion, race, and Jews. The vandals’ deface-
ment of the synagogue included references to Nazi and Ku Klux Klan racial 
ideologies. Although these two ideologies are distinct, anti-Jewish claims in the 
American context that construe Jews as an inferior race often draw on both 
of them. Since the construction of race as a category of human difference is 
directly tied to the history of imperialism and colonial conquest, European and 
American conceptions of race are bound together. Nevertheless, the American 
institution of slavery instantiated an American racial history tied to its legiti-
mation. In the European context, in contrast, Jews had long been construed 
as the “internal other” and had become racialized at the same time as peoples 
indigenous to the New World, who were construed as the “external other.”9 
European racialization of Jews had gradually merged religiously ground-
ed “anti-Jewish” sentiments related to Jews’ rejection of Jesus with racially 
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grounded “antisemitic” characterizations of Jews associated with assumptions 
about Jewish bodies and their supposed inherent qualities. One key moment 
in this process was the limpieza de sangre [purity of blood] statute of fifteenth 
century Toledo, Spain, which implied that conversos retained Jewish character-
istics and that their conversions to Catholicism did not absolve them of their 
Jewishness.10 Preceding and undergirding this development in “race thinking” 
was the Catholic Church’s ideological shift regarding the role of Jews in Chris-
tian Europe. In the thirteenth century, Franciscan and Dominican friars began 
extensively engaging rabbinic literature and determined that Jews were not the 
witnesses to the “old” covenant of the Old Testament as Augustine had claimed. 
Rather, they were “heretics” who followed the laws of the Talmud. Jews were 
therefore theologically and physically expendable and could be expelled.11 
The genealogical evolution of modern race theory, which classified Jew-
ish bodies according to physical features, formed another important part of 
the racialization process and influenced Nazi ideologies about Jews.12 Early 
scientific studies of race continue to inform contemporary American concep-
tions about “race thinking,” even though most scholars deem them outdated. 
In these studies, “races” could be determined on the basis of physical character-
istics, but scientists also often assumed that these physical characteristics corre-
lated with mental, physical, and moral abilities and qualities. Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel, for example, introduces his analysis of race in Encyclopedia of 
the Physical Sciences, by writing: “We shall now characterize the racial diversi-
ties of humanity together with their physical and mental or spiritual bearings 
which go together with these differences.”13 
Some race scholars also made aesthetic judgments about races based on 
particular ideals of beauty.14 For example, in his essay “On the Natural Variety 
of Mankind,” Johann Friedrich Blumenbach writes about what he deems the 
“Caucasian variety” of people, stating: “I have taken the name of this variety from 
Mount Caucasus, both because its neighborhood, and especially its southern slope, 
produces the most beautiful race of men, I mean the Georgian.”15 Nazi German 
nationalist ideology also differentiated between “races” on the basis of aesthet-
ics. Furthermore, the Nuremberg Laws codified racial distinction on the basis of 
“blood,” in a way that was reminiscent of the Spanish limpieza de sangre statutes.16
The merging of religious and scientific and later nationalist narratives 
that classified Jews in Europe has impacted Jewish American history since the 
first Jews arrived in the New World, fleeing the Spanish Inquisition. In U.S. 
history, however, dominant discourse situates religion and race separately and 
generally neglects the continued intersections between them. In the American 
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context, the prevailing narratives about race and religion have changed over 
time but have consistently impacted conceptions of Jewish identity both inside 
and outside of Jewish communities. 
Dominant discourses about religion and race reveal the influence of 
early formative events in U.S. history. Such events include the arrival of early 
European settlers in the seventeenth century and the role of their religious 
identities, the elimination of Native American tribes, the institution of slavery, 
and the waves of immigrants from Europe and Asia. Early usages of the term 
“race” referred to country of origin and nationality, language group, ancestry 
from a general region, and the link between geographic areas and physical 
features, such as “skin color.”17 “Religion” referred to the divisions relevant to 
the European context, such as Catholics, different types of Protestants, and 
“Hebrews” or Jews.18 Currently, Americans tend to think that religion includes 
a set of beliefs, regular religious practice, and sacred texts; and that it involves 
a choice, rather than an identity accorded at birth. In contrast, the dominant 
conception of race includes an ascription of difference based on bodies and a 
belief that race is determined by birth. 
In the United States, many myths about Jews derive from European con-
texts and remain active but do not coincide with formulations of the American 
social landscape. Whereas Jews remained the perpetual other for much of Euro-
pean history, they have mostly evaded this position in the United States, where 
the major marker of racial difference became the “color line.”19 European myths 
about Jews did not disappear when European immigrants arrived in the United 
States, however. Rather, these tropes continued even as Jews gradually accrued 
further legal rights and social privileges. Whereas dominant discourse regarding 
Jews and race has shifted over the years, such that most Jews who “look white” 
have been able to assimilate into the white racial category, gaining many of the 
privileges associated with whiteness, myths about Jews as racially inferior per-
sist, resulting in attacks on synagogues, homes, and people. 
Contemporary attempts to situate Jewish identity in relation to the U.S. 
categories of religion and race typically result in confusion. The source of this 
confusion is two-fold. It exists because these categories are socially constructed 
rather than naturally occurring and because multiple discourses inform Jewish 
social location. Conceptions of what these categories mean have developed 
uniquely in the U.S. context, imbedded in social discourse, legal decisions, 
and historical events. Narratives about Jewish identity that developed in 
Europe, however, continue to inform American conceptions of what Jewish-
ness entails, even though they do not predominate in the United States. 
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Formulations of Jewish identity from within Jewish communities have 
evolved and shifted over the course of Jewish history, as Jews in various times 
and places have reflected on the past and engaged with their larger societies. 
In the contemporary United States, the assumptions that Jews are white and 
that Judaism is a religion prevail, but confusion about how to categorize Jewish 
identity remains because racist attacks on Jews continue and because Jewish 
identity is typically conferred by birth. 
JEWISH IDENTITY IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE CASE OF 
SHAARE TEFILA CONGREGATION V. COBB 
In two lower court rulings, the Federal District Court and the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, Shaare Tefila’s case had been dismissed on the basis that 
Jews are white and therefore cannot claim race-based protection by citing an 
act that protects “all citizens” to the same extent as “whites.” The Supreme 
Court decided to hear the case in conjunction with another case, St. Francis 
College v. Al-Khazraji, because both cases had cited the same law but with 
different outcomes.20 Al-Khazraji had claimed that he was denied tenure at 
St. Francis College because of his Iraqi descent. His lawyer had constructed 
a well-documented argument claiming that Iraqis would have been deemed a 
distinct race in 1866, and, therefore, that he could claim protection under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866. He had won in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The Supreme Court heard the cases together because of their disparate rulings 
and the need to determine a consistent precedent.
On Wednesday, February 25, 1987, the Supreme Court heard the oral 
argument for Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb. In it, the justices’ questions 
and responses to the lawyers indicated what the justices thought about the 
legal parameters of “religion” and “race” as civil rights categories. The justices 
engaged religion and race in relation to how these topics have been previously 
addressed in legal contexts. Pervasive legal discourses included these points: 
the idea that religion mainly has to do with belief and is a choice, as opposed 
to race, which is fixed and permanent; the concept that race can be determined 
based on skin color and by common knowledge; and the implication that one 
definition of race has the capacity to account for all types of racism. 
At stake in the oral argument was the question of where race is located, in 
bodies or in perceptions of bodies. The lawyers presented different approaches 
to this question: Is the “race” at stake in the quest for legal protection embod-
ied or is it discursively constructed? Thus, must the synagogue members prove 
that they are part of a Jewish race or only that the vandals perceived them to 
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be members of a race? This issue becomes complicated by a history of judicial 
reliance on common knowledge conceptions of race to legitimate race-based 
claims.21 Jews were not commonly perceived to be members of their own race 
in the 1980s, which meant that Shaare Tefila had to make a different type of 
claim to race-based protection to succeed in convincing the court. 
The proceedings began with Chief Justice Rehnquist asking Shaare 
Tefila’s lawyer, Patricia Brannan, to state her argument. She commenced by 
presenting the central issue: whether a “complaint that alleges racially moti-
vated discrimination and harassment against Jews may state a claim under 
Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1982.”22 Brannan’s overarching 
contention is that because the vandals committed a racist act, the congregation 
can claim protection under Section 1982. As the oral argument began, Bran-
nan explained the racial significance of the Nazi and Ku Klux Klan ideologies, 
which the words and images spray-painted on the synagogue represented.23 
She asserted that the act was racist based on the racist ideologies evident in the 
symbols and phrases that the vandals wrote and on their perceptions that Jews 
are members of an inferior race.24 
In contrast, the vandals’ lawyer, Deborah Garren, claimed that Jews can-
not claim protection on the basis of the act because Jews are not “in fact” a 
race. Brannan countered that courts should not be deciding or defining the 
boundaries between races at all. Rather, race and racism should be determined 
by examining cultural practices and histories of racial discourses. Brannan 
emphasized that not only are Jews not a race but also that the court should not 
engage in determining the boundaries or definitions of racial subcategories. In 
explaining her approach, she asserted: “at all costs we would want the courts 
to avoid the issue of defining race in order to determine coverage.”25 
In Brannan’s argument, civil rights protection on the basis of race equates 
with protection against racism. In other words, the congregation did not need 
to prove that Jews are a racial group, only that they had been targeted on the 
basis of racial bias. In response to a question about whether people who voted 
for the statute thought that Jews were racially distinct, she explained: “For our 
purposes, we don’t believe that that even would matter. That what really matters, 
if persons who discriminate against Jews, Arabs, or other minorities now, who 
do that because they view them as racially distinct, that that conduct should be 
covered.”26 The “factual” qualifications of race, for Brannan, were immaterial. 
Brannan rejected the common knowledge test, based on the evidence 
from this vandalism incident that not all racist actions follow dominant views 
of race and racial divisions and that other discourses about race continue to 
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inform identity-based crimes. In direct contrast to what Garren would later 
state, she asserted: “We think perhaps it goes without saying that it would be 
a completely inappropriate exercise for the district courts to undertake trying 
to figure out who is white and non-white in some objective, anthropological, 
or scientific test; that that simply would not be an appropriate approach for 
the courts to take.”27 
Brannan requested that the court define racism in terms of the mental 
approach or intention that informs how an individual operates when he or 
she commits a crime. In effect, Brannan aimed to move the court away from 
the common knowledge test toward a test still based on perception but one 
that would allow for other narratives and perceptions of racial differences 
besides the socially dominant view. In regard to the vandalism, she pointed 
out: “Given the content of the message that they put up on the walls of Shaare 
Tefila, it really evokes a racist history.”28 In her argument, historical move-
ments that espoused racism and subversive racial discourses form a notewor-
thy component of how the court should define racism.
The strength of Brannan’s argument is her emphasis on racism rather 
than on proven racial characteristics or factual racial distinction. This rea-
soning accounts for and requires legal coverage for the variety of discourses 
that depict Jews as essentially inferior. Whereas Garren’s argument reified a 
particular myth prevalent in the 1980s—that Jews are white and a religious 
group—Brannan’s argument allowed for protection against a wide variety of 
identity-based attacks on Jews.29 Following her reasoning, the statute would 
cover anyone who commits a crime against Jews on the basis of any supposed 
quality that Americans might associate with the category of race. This reason-
ing implicitly deconstructs the normative assumptions associated with the 
category. Rather than assuming either that a factual definition of race and its 
subcategories exists or that Americans necessarily share the very same concep-
tions of race, Brannan’s approach accounted for the diversity of discourses 
about Jews that could inform crimes committed against Jews.
Deborah Garren asserted that the congregation cannot claim protection 
under Section 1982, originating in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, because 
the statute provides the same rights to “all citizens” as to “whites.” Because 
the congregation members are white and members of a religious group, she 
claimed, this law does not cover them. Garren’s argument regarding Jewish 
identity relied on the dominant conception in the 1980s that Jews are white. 
This conception was also evident in the perspectives of the lower court judges 
who dismissed the case on the basis that Jews are white. For instance, she 
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stated that, in contrast to Jews, “there are certain groups in our society that are 
commonly defined as non-white. Those groups would be entitled to protec-
tion, and if an individual is subjected to discrimination because he is perceived 
to be a member of such a group, then he would be covered.”30 
And later in the oral argument, she elaborated on how the distinction 
between whites and non-whites would be made: “Well, I think one obvious 
way in which he would be identified as a non-white person would be by refer-
ence to immutable physical characteristics such as skin color.”31 In her argu-
ment, Garren also assumed that one narrative—the idea that Jews are white 
and are defined as a religious group—fully encompasses the different types 
of marginalization that Jewish Americans have faced. Justice Scalia reminded 
Garren that “years ago, and of course it’s still prevalent in some areas, there 
was prejudice against Jews. That was known in our society. There was a lot of 
antisemitism.” He asked: “How would you characterize that prejudice?” She 
replied: “Prejudice that was based on their religion . . . that is what in fact 
defines the group.”32
Garren insisted that racial discrimination is nonexistent in the deface-
ment. She urged that race should be determined on the basis of com-
mon perception and on the basis of observation, which she implied that 
any court could capably do. She explained: “One evaluates whether these 
individuals—you look at the individual, first of all, and you evaluate whether 
that individual is identified as white or is identified as non-white in our soci-
ety, in some sense.”33 This opinion, theoretically, should be the same opinion 
that any “common person” would have; in other words, the justices are not 
expected to be experts on race. The argument relied on dominant discourse 
because the common person knows what race is by living in U.S. society, in 
which certain understandings of race predominate. Garren’s argument further 
necessitated that this common person could distinguish between someone who 
is “white” versus someone who is “not white.” This premise implies that white 
is something common people can “see,” and we can see it correctly because we 
know what physical characteristics make someone white or not white.34 
Garren’s argument required that Jews seeking legal protection prove that 
dominant discourse about Jewish identity is factually wrong. According to 
Garren, a judge could look at a person and determine her whiteness, which 
would then prove her ability to claim that the defendant targeted her on the 
basis of her not-whiteness. Garren based this argument on the premise that 
everyone “sees” race in the same way or that some universal code exists that 
allows a person to know immediately how to categorize another person.
Judging and Protecting Jewish Identity in Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb             53                
Garren asserted that Jews can be identified only as a religious group 
and, correspondingly, that Jews are not, in fact, a race. She did not provide 
reasoning for what specifically makes Jews religious; in other words, she 
did not define religion and demonstrate how Jews fit that category. Instead 
she simply noted: “that is the category that defines them.”35 Furthermore, 
Garren pointed to the synagogue, a religious building, as evidence that the 
vandalism attacked Jews for being members of a religious group and not for 
any other reason. The synagogue, in this case, stands for religion, since it 
serves a religious function. In her argument, the larger legal category at stake 
is religion, and the subcategory in question is Judaism. Like the lower court 
judges, she examined not the content of the graffiti or the historical associa-
tions between it and Ku Klux Klan or Nazi ideologies of Jewish inferiority 
but the dominant discourse of the 1980s that defined Jews as members of a 
religious group. 
Brannan’s argument regarding Jewish identity precluded any need to cat-
egorize Jews according to either religion or race. Rather, her approach focused 
on the incident itself and the narratives that informed the vandals’ actions. 
This approach drew on the legal history of civil rights cases that address the 
harm committed and the use of the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate the 
“badges and incidents of slavery.”36 The categorization of Shaare Tefila mem-
bers as religious is immaterial to Brannan’s argument.
The Supreme Court justices queried Brannan repeatedly about whether 
she thought that Jews would have been considered a separate race at the time 
that the Civil Rights Act was passed. These questions might have seemed par-
ticularly odd, had not the Shaare Tefila case been heard in conjunction with St. 
Francis College v. Al-Khazraji. Brannan rejected the application of Al-Khazraji’s 
argument, that Iraqis were considered a race in 1866, to Shaare Tefila, how-
ever, in accordance with the congregation’s desire not to be legally categorized 
as members of a particular race. 
Significant for the purposes of considering how the case situates Jewish 
identity in terms of race were exchanges between the justices and the lawyers on 
the topics of skin color, a Harlem synagogue, and a country club. In these inter-
actions, longstanding discourses about race emerged. As a side note, a number of 
the issues that the justices raised have not yet been addressed in American gov-
ernment policy, including the problematic relationship between ethnic catego-
ries, such as Japanese or Latino, and racial categories, such as Asian and white.37 
The skin color discussion involved multiple discourses and mixed legal defini-
tions of race, such as the association of race with color and the “one-drop” rule. 
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When Justice Thurgood Marshall asked Deborah Garren how she would 
classify his father after describing his skin color and features, she stated that 
he would be considered white and would have no cause of action under the 
statute. In response, he retorted: “Oh, but he did. He was a Negro.”38 Such a 
classificatory conundrum recalls Plessy v. Ferguson, in which a man who looked 
white but was legally black revealed his black identity and had to move to the 
“Negro” car on the train.39 These conflicting narratives about whether race 
refers to color or to ancestry or to both demonstrate the shifting boundaries 
of race as a continually reinvented and redefined category. Justice Marshall’s 
point implied that although the Shaare Tefila congregation members looked 
white, they nevertheless could be the victims of race-based discrimination. 
Later in the oral argument, Justice Marshall posed a hypothetical example 
in which vandals deface a synagogue in Harlem and asked Brannan what argu-
ment she would make in that situation. When she explained that she would 
construct it in the same way, he replies, “Well, you couldn’t do it on race, could 
you?”40 He then noted that “there are no Jews in that synagogue” before real-
izing that he had made a mistake, based on the assumption that Jews are white. 
He corrected himself and stated: “There are no white Jews, I would say.”41 
His response clearly revealed his initial assumption that the white/black racial 
distinction trumped or negated the argument that antisemitism is racism. This 
assumption reflects the dominant discourse of race in the 1980s United States, 
in which race referred specifically to blacks and whites and to the relationship 
between them. Justice Marshall’s query about the Harlem synagogue conveys 
the complexity of contemporary narratives about race and the predominance 
of the black-white distinction as the salient form of race. 
The myth of the “Jewish race” never gained the same rhetorical or imagina-
tive power in the United States as it did in Nazi Germany and in other parts of 
Europe, even though the racialization of Jews was significant enough to result 
in incidents such as the Leo Frank affair and in a widespread but now largely 
defunct perception of Jews as racially distinct.42 In other words, although Jews 
did not “become white,” a significant shift in the dominant discourse did occur 
after World War II, such that Jewish “difference” continually receded.43 
In the 1980s, the dominant discourse did not support the idea of a Jewish 
race. Hence, in the Harlem synagogue example, the confusing intermingling of 
discourses is evident: is race about blacks and whites, in which race can refer only 
to color, or is race also about an attack on a synagogue, regardless of the color of the 
Jewish congregants, that highlights historical discourses of Jewish racial inferiority? 
The former discourse prevails to the extent that the latter one becomes silenced. 
Judging and Protecting Jewish Identity in Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb             55                
Jews as raced becomes salient again at the level of popular discourse only in seem-
ingly random incidents, such as the defacement of Shaare Tefila, even though 
many congregation members had experienced other instances of antisemitism. In 
effect, discourse depicting Jews as a race or as essentially different from other white 
people remained submerged as a type of subversive discourse that emerged only 
in interpersonal interactions or in instances of violence against Jews that specifi-
cally targeted Jewish identity. In dominant discourse, however, as reflected by the 
rulings in the lower court cases, Jews were white and no racial problem existed.
Toward the end of the oral argument, Justice Antonin Scalia interrogated 
Deborah Garren regarding her claim that Jews are a religion only and, there-
fore, cannot claim race-based protection. He noted that over the years, and 
“it’s still prevalent in some areas, there was prejudice against Jews. That was 
known in our society. There was a lot of antisemitism. How would you char-
acterize that prejudice?”44 He interrupted her response to say: “You wouldn’t 
call it racial prejudice?” Garren stated: “Prejudice that is based on their reli-
gion.” He asked: “Do you think it was based entirely on their religion?” To 
which Garren answered: “That is the characteristic that defines them. There 
is no racial characteristic that in fact defines people of the Jewish faith. It is 
a religion.” He then asked: “Do you think that would be the proper charac-
terization in Germany when it was so virulent?” Garren responded: “No, sir. 
But again that was the deviant perception of a couple of organizations in the 
society that had run rampant. It wasn’t a common perception in the society. 
They weren’t commonly identified.” 
Then Justice Scalia inquired whether Garren thought that the origin of 
the prejudice in this country was “entirely religious.” Garren stated: “I have 
every reason to believe that religion in part motivated the prejudice, because 
that is what in fact defines the group.” Justice Scalia asked: “It didn’t extend to 
Jews who were atheists, nonbelievers? Do you really think that was the case?” 
When Garren expressed uncertainty, he continued: “I mean, do you think 
that the prejudice that existed against Jews in this country was only against 
believing Jews, and so long as the Jew said, I really no longer believe in the 
religious tenets of Judaism, the prejudice no longer existed and that person 
would have been able to get into all sort of country clubs and whatnot?” Gar-
ren answered: “No, sir, but I do think that the discriminators define the group 
by their religious beliefs. They may not know in each individual instance 
whether that Jewish person follows his faith or not.”
In Scalia’s interrogation, Garren recognized his affront to her argument 
and agreed that nonbelieving Jews did not gain access to discriminatory 
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country clubs otherwise prohibited to them, but she maintained that the dis-
crimination in question pertained to belief. She noted: “They [the discrimina-
tors] may not know in each individual instance whether that Jewish person 
follows his faith or not.” Her response acknowledged that someone could be 
a Jewish person without “follow[ing] his faith,” which, in effect, undermined 
her argument and supported Scalia’s point that Jewish identity need not rely 
on belief. Scalia’s questioning, however, also highlighted the association of 
religion with belief as well as the problem of how to categorize nonbelieving 
Jews in relation to religion. It raised the issue of what religious discrimina-
tion entails. According to Scalia’s logic, discrimination not based on belief 
must not be religious discrimination. A nonbeliever is not religious, therefore, 
how should the court categorize nonbelieving Jews? Scalia implied that Jews 
who reject the tenets of Jewish faith remain Jewish but that Jewish identity, 
then, did not remain within the bounds of the legal category of religion. This 
example illustrates both that Scalia assumed that religion is primarily defined 
in terms of belief and that Jews faced discrimination for other reasons. 
In these examples from the oral argument, it is evident that Jewish iden-
tity does not neatly fit the available categories of legal protection—religion 
and race—as the court understands them. Belief is central to the category of 
religion, and because Jews have experienced discrimination whether or not 
they were religious, the court could conclude that religion does not encom-
pass all of the facets of Jewish identity. Neither, for a number of reasons, did 
the court find that Jews fit the category of race. For one thing, the dominant 
discourse describes race in terms of color, particularly in terms of colors other 
than white. The Shaare Tefila members, however, look white. Furthermore, 
neither lawyer argued that Jews are a race. Patricia Brannan carefully empha-
sized, in contrast, the racism rather than the “actuality” of race apparent in 
the incident; in other words, she located the violation of rights in the racism 
rather than in the identity of the members themselves. 
The Supreme Court’s conceptions of religion and race drew on the 
dominant discourse of the 1980s but also engaged more nuanced views of his-
torical narratives that have shaped Jewish identity. The lower court rulings had 
relied on the discourse that describes Jews as a religious group and as white 
and had neglected the racial content of the vandalism and its historical refer-
ences. In contrast, the Supreme Court acknowledged the marginalization that 
Jewish Americans have experienced that is not based in belief as well as the 
racist ideologies that informed the vandalism itself. Nevertheless, the court did 
not base its unanimous decision on Patricia Brannan’s argument, but instead 
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grounded its reasoning in the perceptions of race presumably held by the 39th 
Congress when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The court thus avoided 
the tricky prospect of defining Jewish identity in relation to religion or race in 
contemporary times and set a precedent that widened the scope of the statutes 
at stake to apply them to groups typically deemed “ethnicities” in the 1980s. 
The judicial proceedings of the case reconstructed Jewish identity by 
reaffirming particular discourses about Jewish identity and discounting other 
ones. The new version of Jewish identity upheld in Shaare Tefila accounted 
for the historical marginalization of Jews and rejected the legitimacy of anti-
semitic vandalism but neglected to construct a picture of Jewish identity in 
the present. Notably, Shaare Tefila did not define Jewish legal identity in a 
general or conclusive way. The Shaare Tefila decision reaches into the past to 
determine the intentions behind a law passed in 1866. In applying that law to 
the present via the legislators’ intentions, the court acknowledged that racism 
against Jews still occurs today; however, it did not conclude, as a result, that 
Jews are a race. 
The U.S. system of mapping race, as expressed in the census categories, 
does not include a particular social location for Jews. Rather, according to 
dominant U.S. views, Jews are associated with the racial categories that they 
appear to occupy: white, Asian, black, American Indian, Native Hawaiian 
or other Pacific Islander, or with the “ethnic” category Latino or Hispanic. 
Hence, Justice Marshall’s confusion about how Brannan’s argument would 
apply to a synagogue on Lenox Avenue in Harlem: he wonders, how could 
race-based protection apply to Jews who are black in the same way that it 
applies to Jews who are white?45 That the current categories of race, listed 
above, do not include “Jewish” provides only one example of the fact that 
Jewish is today not considered a race in the United States; however, generally 
suppressed myths associated with KKK and Nazi ideologies remain salient in 
U.S. culture to the extent that antisemitic and racist incidents, such as the 
defacement of Shaare Tefila, continue to occur. For these and other reasons, 
Jewish social location(s) in relation to race remain difficult to situate.
 Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaare Tefila did not 
explicitly reframe contemporary Jewish identity, in that it did not situate con-
temporary Jews in relation to the categories of religion and race, it did grant 
protection due to the conclusion that Jews were not considered white in 1866 
when the Civil Rights Act in question was passed. Thus, in effect, the deci-
sion reframed the contemporary myth of Jews as white in a larger historical 
context, highlighting a historical moment in which Jews were not white.
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In my examination of the Shaare Tefila case, I have focused on the sig-
nificance of defining religion and race as legal categories used to situate Jew-
ish social location. I have argued that the Supreme Court justices grappled 
with how to situate Jews and with whether or not to grant Jews race-based 
civil rights protection because Jewish identity does not neatly fit into either 
category as it is conceptualized in legal terms or in dominant American dis-
course. Reviewing the historical development of the relationship between 
the evolving conceptions of race and Jewish identity reveals why the justices 
struggled: intersecting religious, scientific, and nationalist narratives on these 
topics developed in both American and European contexts. In my analysis of 
the Supreme Court oral argument, the evolving character of these conceptions 
in American and European discursive systems is central to my assessment of 
the lawyers’ arguments and the justices’ questions. 
Ultimately, determining the legality of race-based civil rights protection 
for Jews involved attention to historically and geographically informed nar-
ratives about what “Jewish” means and entails. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
justices unanimously decided in favor of the synagogue at least in part because 
of their recognition that Jews’ racial status has shifted depending on time 
and place. Even if passably white in the 1980s, Jews had not only suffered 
discrimination, marginalization, and genocide in recent history, but also have 
continued to be targets of race-based crimes. In 1987, the U.S. Supreme 
Court finally acknowledged that “who is a Jew” is a racialized issue as well 
as a religious one and that, as a result, Jews can claim race-based protection.
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Who Is a Jew? Reflections of an American  
Jewish Lawyer on the British Supreme Court  
Ruling Invalidating Jewish Religious Law 
Steven J. Riekes 
For several millennia, Jewish religious law, halachah, has determined Jewish 
identity (that is, who is a Jew) by using a matrilineal test. Under traditional 
Jewish practice, to be considered a Jew, one must be a child of a Jewish mother, 
unless one became a Jew by conversion.
However, the British Supreme Court ruled that this Jewish practice con-
stituted unlawful racial discrimination under Britain’s Race Relations Act of 
1976 in R (on the application of E) v. Governing Body of the Jewish Free School 
and others (2009) UKSC 15.
In this case, a young man (identified only by his initial, “M”) was denied 
admission to a very prestigious and popular Jewish secondary school, known as 
the Jewish Free School (JFS), founded in 1732. The school’s admissions policy 
was governed by the Chief Rabbi of the British Commonwealth, who was 
then Lord Jonathan Sacks. The student’s father was born a Jew. His mother 
was born an Italian Catholic. She converted to Judaism under the auspices of 
a Masorti (Conservative) rabbinical court. Masorti Jews constituted only 1.5 
percent of the British Jewish population. On the other hand, 60.7 percent 
were identified as Orthodox and constituted the primary constituency of the 
office of the Chief Rabbi.1 Since the Chief Rabbi did not recognize a non-
Orthodox conversion, the boy’s mother was considered non-Jewish; therefore, 
the school refused to admit him.
As a result, the boy’s father sued the school and others, arguing that this 
was unlawful racial discrimination. The term “racial” is seen here as embracing 
ethnicity as that term is defined under the Race Relations Act.2
The initial judicial ruling was in favor of the school. The father appealed, 
and the Court of Appeals reversed. Further appeal to the newly constituted 
British Supreme Court (formerly the House of Lords) resulted in a 5 to 4 deci-
sion sustaining the ruling in favor of the father and against the school.
All nine Law Lords wrote separate opinions. With some differences, the 
majority held there was discrimination based upon ethnic origin. The major-
ity view was expressed by Lord Phillips, President of the Court. He reasoned 
that the student was to be regarded as ethnically Jewish, even if Orthodox Jews 
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would not regard him as religiously Jewish. On the other hand, the Jewish 
religious test was based upon “genetics,” having nothing to do with religious 
beliefs. Combining these two points, Lord Phillips held that there was racial 
discrimination. 
To hold a Jewish religious school guilty of ethnic discrimination by 
denying admission to a Jewish student is, by its very proposition, something 
that sounds like it belongs in an Alice in Wonderland other worldly dimension. 
Indeed, Lord Phillips was not entirely comfortable with his own holding. He 
stated, “there may well be a defect in our law of discrimination.”3 Further, he 
apologized by saying, “Nothing that I say in this judgment should be read as 
giving rise to criticism on moral grounds of the admissions policy of JFS in 
particular or the policies of Jewish faith schools in general, let alone as sug-
gesting that these policies are ‘racist’ as that word is generally understood.”4
Other justices expressed the same sentiments. Lady Hale, also in the 
majority, reasoned as follows:
Is the criterion adopted by the Chief Rabbi, and thus without ques-
tion by the school, based upon the child’s ethnic origins? In my view, 
it clearly is. M was rejected because of his mother’s ethnic origins, 
which were Italian and Roman Catholic. The fact that the Office of 
the Chief Rabbi would have over-looked his mother’s Italian origins, 
had she converted to Judaism in a procedure which they would rec-
ognise, makes no difference to this fundamental fact. M was rejected, 
not because of who he is, but because of who his mother is. . . . 
Because his mother was not descended in the matrilineal line from 
the original Jewish people . . . he was rejected. This was because of his 
lack of descent from a particular ethnic group. In this respect, there 
can be no doubt that his ethnic origins were different from those 
of the pupils who were admitted. It was not because of his religious 
beliefs. The school was completely indifferent to these. They admit 
pupils who practise all denominations of Judaism, or none at all, or 
even other religions entirely, as long as they are halachically Jewish, 
descended from the original Jewish people in the matrilineal line.5
Lord Rodger, who wrote a dissenting opinion, rejected Lady Hale’s rea-
soning. He said that the only thing that mattered was that the mother:
had not converted to Judaism under Orthodox auspices. It was her 
resulting non-Jewish religious status in the Chief Rabbi’s eyes, not 
the fact that her ethnic origins were Italian and Roman Catho-
lic, which meant that M was not considered for admission. The 
[school] automatically rejected M because he was descended from 
a woman whose religious status as a Jew was not recognised by the 
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Orthodox Chief Rabbi; [the school] did not reject him because he 
was descended from a woman whose ethnic origins were Italian and 
Roman Catholic.6
Let us assume, Lord Rodger said, there were two boys, both of whose moth-
ers were Italian and Catholic origins, but one mother converted under Orthodox 
supervision and the other converted under non-Orthodox supervision:
The question then is: did the governors [of the school] treat M, 
whose mother was an Italian Catholic who had converted under 
non-Orthodox auspices, less favourably than they would have treat-
ed a boy, whose mother was an Italian Catholic who had converted 
under Orthodox auspices, on grounds of his ethnic origins? Plainly, 
the answer is: No. The ethnic origins of the two boys are exactly the 
same, but the stance of the governors varies, depending on the aus-
pices under which the mother’s conversion took place. . . . In other 
words, the only ground for treating M less favourably than the com-
parator is the difference in their respective mothers’ conversions—a 
religious, not a racial, ground.7
In my opinion, the dissenter, Lord Rodger, more correctly framed the 
issue and arrived at a more correct result. Essentially, a majority of the British 
justices has characterized Jewish religious law, at least on this issue, as being 
racially discriminatory in their interpretation of the Race Relations Act. How-
ever, for a civil court in a democratic state to have arrived at such a conclusion 
is more than disturbing.
It has also been observed that the majority imposed Christian concepts 
of religion upon Judaism. Professor J. H. H. Weiler observed that the opinion
is underwritten by a profoundly Christian understanding of reli-
gion and religious membership. It is shaped by the fundamental 
Christian idea of the New Covenant in which the “old” covenantal 
boundaries of Israelite peoplehood were dissolved, and a universal 
salvific message was extended to any individuals regardless of the 
people to whom they belonged. To quote Paul, “There is neither 
Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male 
nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.” On this view, you are 
Christian if and only if you believe in Christ. This idea of religion as 
a matter of doctrinal conviction has shaped the Western sensibility 
as to what religious membership means. It is to be respected. But 
it is not the Jewish understanding of religious belonging. In fact it 
originated in a rejection of Judaism. (Paul also spoke of being cir-
cumcised in the heart rather than the flesh.) One can, as a Jewish 
religious proposition, belong to the Jewish people even if you have 
lost your faith.
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What is troubling about the Majority is its sheer incomprehension 
and consequent intolerance of a religion whose self-understanding 
is different than that of Christianity. Their anthropological read-
ing of ethnicity is suitable in the circumstances for which the Race 
Relations Act was intended. But when the law makes an exception 
for religion and the religion in question is Judaism, it should be 
understood on its own terms, not on Christian (or, more precisely, 
Protestant) terms.8
Thus, for the sake of combatting discrimination, the British Court has dis-
criminated.
While some non-Orthodox Jews may feel vindicated by the majority’s 
opinion in abolishing the matrilineal test, victory may come at a terrible price. 
If civil courts can intrude in the internal affairs of the Orthodox Jewish com-
munity, then those courts may also intrude in the affairs of the non-Orthodox 
community and the internal affairs of those of other faiths as well. The right of 
a religious community to define membership for itself is crucial to that com-
munity’s religious existence. If a civil court can determine who may or may 
not attend a religious school, it may also have the right to determine who can 
belong to a synagogue, whether Orthodox or non-Orthodox, or a church, a 
community center, a men’s club, or a burial society.
This leads me to a renewed appreciation of the First Amendment to 
our Constitution that provides Congress should make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. In Jefferson’s 
famous aphorism, the amendment builds “a wall of separation between church 
and state.” Had these concepts been embedded in the fundamental laws of 
England, I believe its courts would never have interfered with who may or may 
not attend a religious school or attempted to make a determination as to who 
is and who is not a Jew.
Lord Hope stated: “It has long been understood that it is not the busi-
ness of the courts to intervene in matters of religion.” Notwithstanding that 
remark, however, that is exactly what the majority opinion has done. Lord 
Hope placed the public policy issue on the law as laid down by Parliament: 
“However distasteful or offensive this may appear to be to some, it is an issue 
in an area regulated by a statute that must be faced up to. It must be resolved 
by applying the law laid down by Parliament according the principles that 
have been developed by civil court.”9 In my opinion, Lord Hope’s reasoning 
would never succeed in American courts. The separation between religion and 
state in America is so fundamental that the courts could simply not cross this 
gulf by blaming the legislature.
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While there may be no wall of separation between religion and state 
in Britain, nevertheless, the recognition that interference by civil courts on 
religious matters is bad public policy should have been more than sufficient 
for the majority of the British judges to think more than twice about what 
they were doing. The right of self-definition of a religious group is basic to 
religious liberty.
As an example of the reasoning of American courts, the Court of Appeals 
of North Carolina recognized that “membership in a church is a core ecclesias-
tical matter. The power to control church membership is ultimately the power 
to control the church. It is an area where the courts of this State should not 
become involved.” Tubiolo v. Abundant Life Church, Inc., 605 S.E.2d 161, 164 
(N.C. App. 2004). The Court further recognized that this principle is based 
on the separation of church and state: “A church’s criteria for membership . . . 
are core ecclesiastical matters protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution.”10 This principle can be found 
throughout American jurisprudence.
Yet, there are those on the right of American politics who deny that there 
should be a separation between church and state. Indeed, the Republican Party 
of Texas adopted as part of its platform the notion that we are a Christian 
nation. While most American Jews would abhor such concepts, there are some 
who are willing to either tolerate such notions or actually accept them. An 
Orthodox rabbi told me that Jews were safer with America being a Christian 
nation because Christians respect Jews.
While many Christians do indeed respect Jews, that is not the point. The 
majority of the British Supreme Court did not act out of disrespect for Jews. 
Rather, they felt empowered to interfere with Jewish religious affairs because 
there is no legal barrier, such as our First Amendment, in so acting.
In addition, as a Jew, I feel safer with the power of the Constitution pro-
tecting my rights than relying on someone else’s good will. The rabbi’s position 
reminds me of the woman in the play, A Streetcar Named Desire, who must 
“depend upon the kindness of strangers.” It is only the Constitution that pro-
tects the rabbi’s right to determine who may belong to his congregation from 
interference either by the legislature or the courts or both, not the tolerance of 
our Christian neighbors.
It is bad public policy to have civil courts deciding religious matters 
because they are not equipped to do so and these are not matters suitable for 
a public forum. For example, members of the Jews for Jesus movement regard 
themselves as not only being Jews, but “fulfilled” Jews at that. What if they were 
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to claim that they have a right to use a Jewish community center as much as any 
other Jewish organization? They would love to make their arguments before a 
court. On the other hand, most Jews would feel very uncomfortable having a 
civil court entertain such an argument. It would be a circus, not a lawsuit.
While I believe that the majority opinion of the British Supreme Court 
was wrong and that it is very bad public policy for a civil court to intrude upon 
Jewish religious affairs, nevertheless the Jewish community does have serious 
problems regarding who is a Jew. The British Law Lords noticed what to them 
appeared to be an anomalous situation. Under the matrilineal test of who is 
a Jew, the Jewish school could grant admission to students who might have 
been raised as Lutherans, Muslims, or nothing at all, so long as their mothers 
were Jewish under the Chief Rabbi’s definition. On the other hand, M, who 
was raised in a Jewish home and very concerned about his Jewish identity, was 
denied admission because his mother was converted by Conservative rabbis 
rather than by Orthodox ones. Such a result also partakes of an Alice in Won-
derland dimension.
It is odd that a Catholic priest with a Jewish mother can be counted as 
part of a minyan, at least in some Orthodox circles, but a man converted by 
Reform, Conservative, or Reconstructionist rabbis, no matter how pious or 
Jewishly involved, cannot be counted as a member of an Orthodox minyan. 
A Jew for Jesus with a Jewish mother could be counted as part of a minyan, 
but a pious Jewish woman, no matter how Orthodox, can never be counted.
Maybe the question is not “Who is a Jew?” but “Who is a rabbi?” As the 
Israeli rabbinate moves ever to the right, even some Orthodox rabbis in the 
Diaspora have not been recognized by them as authorized to perform conver-
sions.11 As the standards for conversion by the Orthodox become ever stricter, 
the result may be to fracture the Jewish people into demographic oblivion.
While the definition of who is a Jew should not be one for civil courts, the 
Jewish people, leaders, and rabbis ought to be asking some very serious questions 
about how we define who we are and the possible consequences of that defini-
tion. How we define who we are will determine what we will become.
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Inventing Jewish History, Culture, and  
Genetic Identity in Modern New Mexico 
Judith Neulander
In the 1980s, New Mexican Hispanic folkways were widely touted in the 
popular press and media as “secret” or “crypto-Jewish” folkways by a small 
group of local academics, none a trained folklorist. I arrived in New Mexico 
in 1992 to create the first scholarly documentation of these folkways for a 
doctoral dissertation at The Folklore Institute at Indiana University. But upon 
investigation, claims of a significant crypto-Jewish heritage were not supported 
by the folkways placed in evidence.1 Of necessity, that anomaly became the 
focus of the dissertation; the doctorate was awarded in 2001. 
In 2004 I learned that an independent genetic study conducted at Stanford 
and New York Universities had refuted academic claims of a significant crypto-
Jewish component among New Mexican Hispanics;2 this doctoral dissertation 
strongly supported my ethnographic findings.  But the ethnographic sophists 
who promote the crypto-Jewish discovery have historically dominated the popular 
press and media, while snail-paced publication in peer reviewed journals cannot 
compete for equal recognition.  When this happens; which is to say, when naïve 
ethnographic sources become the public face of ethnographic authority, and their 
demonstrably unfounded claims are given as facts, their claims will be accepted 
as facts at the popular level.  Because regional crypto-Jewish claims are still given 
and taken as factual, it is newly troublesome that the same academics have 
now fortified pseudo-ethnography with pseudo-science, inventing demonstrably 
unfounded, malignant genetic signatures for global Jewry, the better to ferret out 
“hidden Jews” among unsuspecting Hispanics.  Such claims warrant a response 
consistent with twenty-first century scholarship norms and fieldwork ethics, since 
the claims have never contributed useful information, but are now repatriating the 
most menacing cultural and scientific fictions of the nineteenth century.
Because regional crypto-Jewish claims are still given and taken as factual, 
it is newly troublesome that the same academics have now married pseudo-
ethnography to pseudo-science, inventing demonstrably unfounded, malig-
nant genetic signatures for global Jewry, the better to ferret out “hidden Jews” 
among unsuspecting Hispanics. Such claims warrant a response consistent 
with twenty-first century scholarship norms and fieldwork ethics, since the 
claims contribute no useful information, but simply reiterate the most menac-
ing cultural and scientific fictions of the nineteenth century.
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NINETEENTH CENTURY ADVENTURISM  
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
In 1878 Sir Francis Galton, cousin of Charles Darwin and father of eugenics, 
devised a means of sweeping together photographic images of Jewish adoles-
cents to create a singular, composite image of the Jewish racial “type.” Daniel 
A. Novak, Director of Jewish Studies at Louisiana State University, notes that 
“Galton would make photographic fiction into photographic science—a non-
existent body into a type derived with scientific accuracy—a photographic 
science fiction.”3 Twelve years later, Sir James Frazer would also produce as aca-
demic scholarship the first in twelve volumes of The Golden Bough; 500,000 
words of little current value, given his conflation of superficial cultural simi-
larities into false cultural composites—an ethnographic cultural fiction. 
More than a century later, a handful of New Mexican academics would 
follow Frazer, sweeping together ambiguous Hispanic and Jewish folkways into 
a false secret- or crypto-Jewish composite. Promoting this as academic scholar-
ship, and following Galton’s notion that he could register types of the racial 
and diseased—or more precisely, that disease could be used as a Jewish ethnic 
marker—New Mexican academics performed a truly remarkable feat: they resur-
rected nineteenth century race science in the age of the human genome.
As part of this project, the lead proponent of crypto-Jewish claims pub-
lished a book in 2005, titled To the End of the Earth.4 The book is useful to 
the extent that it collates items already documented in the history of secret- or 
crypto-Jews in colonial Spanish America. But when it focuses on the subject of 
its subtitle: A History of the Crypto-Jews of New Mexico, it regresses to a time of 
ethnographic and genetic sophistry, when untested assumptions could be sup-
ported by sweeping into one, overgeneralized “Jewish” category select instances 
that upon investigation have no such connection and when disease could go 
unchallenged as a Jewish ethnic marker. Not surprisingly, the book’s highest 
praises are found in reviews written by fellow crypto-Jewish claims-makers, 
not in reviews written by specialists in the academic disciplines required for 
knowledgeable critique. This may reflect the fact that such specialists are small 
in number, but happily, they are not impossible to find and they include Aviva 
Ben-Ur, Associate Professor of Judaic and Near Eastern Studies at Amherst, a 
recognized specialist and respected author on Spanish Jews in the Americas. 
Ben-Ur reviewed the book’s crypto-Jewish assertions, as follows:
The real problem is not historical plausibility but rather methodol-
ogy. . . . It is specifically in this sense that To the End of the Earth is 
unsettling. This is a book that often places the horse behind the cart: 
the evidence is tailored to the interpretation. Moreover, the bulk 
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of the author’s arguments represent leaps of logic, circular reason-
ing, conjectures built upon conjectures, and conclusions based on 
unverifiable oral testimony and material culture.5 
The major downfall of New Mexican crypto-Jewish claims seems to 
be a lack of specific training in the theories, methods, and techniques that 
developed over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries century 
in ethnographic and genetic studies, as suggested by a consistent mismatch of 
research backgrounds to research topics among New Mexican investigators; 
for example, a sociologist without folkloristic training paired with a historian 
without folkloristic training and someone from women’s studies without folk-
loristic training, all attempting to do the work of a trained folklore specialist. 
Others cited in the book as co-investigators include a high school Spanish 
literature teacher to do the work of an ethnomusicologist6 and a medical inter-
nist to conduct research in population genetics.7 
Other recurrent problems in crypto-Jewish reporting include attempts to 
discredit critics personally, rather than address criticism, and the use of liter-
ary devices like pseudepigraphy: falsely ascribing self-supporting statements 
to others who never made them. In the aforementioned book, for example, I 
appear as “folklorist Judith S. Neulander, who has dismissed any crypto-Jewish 
presence in New Mexico, either historical or contemporary.”8 Ascribing to me 
an indefensible (and therefore discrediting) position can be corrected by read-
ing anything I’ve ever written, but most notably by reading my best known 
essay on this topic, which the book itself references. That essay opens and 
closes with these statements: 
It is significant that I have never disputed the existence of historical 
crypto-Judaism in other parts of the world. Nor have I ever stated 
anywhere that New Mexican crypto-Judaism cannot exist. I have 
simply pointed out that the evidence given to justify claims of a 
New Mexican crypto-Jewish past is unfounded.9 I have consciously 
avoided suggesting that a crypto-Jewish presence never existed in 
New Mexico.10
The general public is not held to academic standards in the strategic and 
creative ways it may choose to reconstruct the past, interpret the present, or 
otherwise make sense of the world. Moreover, anyone can make a mistake, and 
since humans are imperfect beings, we may all do so from time to time. But 
when academics consistently fail to test their assumptions in any valid or reli-
able context, when they consistently adjust facts to support their assumptions, 
and when they consistently misrepresent others to promote their own credibility, 
they are producing something other than scholarship. At best, they are at risk of 
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doing what Galton and Frazer did in the 
nineteenth century: inventing what they 
want to find, rather than discovering it. 
INVENTING A CRYPTO-JEWISH 
PAST IN NEW MEXICO 
Documented history not only pro-
vides a critical frame of reference for 
trained ethnographic investigation—
particularly with regard to objects in 
material culture—but it also provides 
the best example of how easily unre-
lated cultural items can be swept into 
false cultural relatedness with no frame 
of reference to prevent it. For example, 
assuming a complete lack of any his-
torical context, one could plausibly con-
clude that swastikas woven into nine-
teenth century Navaho blankets were 
woven by “Navaho Nazis” [Fig. 1]. The 
absurdity is apparent for one reason 
only: we already possess a well-docu-
mented historical context  that clearly 
refutes it. Conversely, far fewer people 
have any frame of reference for symbols 
like the hexagram, or six-pointed star, a 
representative example among copious 
New Mexican artifacts naively mislabeled “crypto-Jewish” in New Mexico. 
Because hexagrams are widely recognized as Jewish and perhaps because 
Judaism is older than Christianity, it was apparently assumed that hexagrams 
found in Christian context must have been borrowed from Judaism and 
placed in New Mexico by hidden Jews. But if the hexagram is instead placed 
in historical context, we learn that the history of the symbol is the other way 
around: the hexagram was prolific in Christian décor,11 appearing in Chris-
tian contexts across the vast expanse of Europe and throughout the lands of 
European conquest for centuries before it gained any Jewish religiosity.
According to renowned Judaicist, Gershom Scholem, the hexagram is 
not a historically Jewish symbol, much less “the” symbol of Judaism, and he 
Fig. 1. The absurdity of the notion 
that swastikas in this nineteenth 
century Navaho blanket were woven 
by “Navaho Nazis” is apparent only 
because we already possess a his-
torical context that clearly refutes it. 
Photo by author.
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adds that until the years flanking the turn of the twentieth century “no one 
even dreamt of such meaning”; he identifies naïfs who see “signs” of Judaism 
in Christian hexagrams as “members of the far-flung clan of Interpretobold 
Symbolizetti Allegoriovitch Mystificinski.”12 Clearly, the appearance of hexa-
grams in New Mexico’s Christian mainstream—as in the seventeenth century 
Church of San Felipe de Neri, in Santa Fe [Fig. 2]—is no evidence of a sig-
nificant component of colonial crypto-Jews among New Mexico’s first (and 
doomed) seventeenth-century settlers, nor among the eighteenth-century 
founders of today’s Hispanic community. In addition, a wide variety of Chris-
tian congregations have historically made prolific use of hexagrams in both 
Catholic and Protestant church décor, as well as on gravestones. 
At least one other item in gravestone iconography, prolific in the south-
west and across the nation (a three-pronged stamen in the center of flowers 
ubiquitous in tombstone design), is similarly touted as a “secret crypto-Jewish” 
grave-marker because it looks like a Hebrew letter. But the Christian hexagram 
can be swept into overgeneralized crypto-Jewish identification only if one 
remains innocent of the history of the symbol, while the three-pronged stamen 
can be identified as a Hebrew letter only by selective attention to a superficial 
likeness, completely overlooking the obvious: any symbol in widespread use 
among all religions is useless as a means to distinguish one from any other. 
Fig. 2. Claims that the six-pointed stars in this seventeenth century church were 
carved by colonial crypto-Jews are a less recognized absurdity, since few know the 
star was for centuries a Christian icon, lacking any Jewish specificity until the mid-
nineteenth century. Photo by author.
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Nevertheless, an equally naïve media and popular press can spread highly 
sensationalized mis- and disinformation faster, farther, and wider than good 
information could hope to do in professionally vetted, peer-reviewed publi-
cations. Thus, as early as 1994, as far away as Gibraltar, a participant at an 
international conference written up in a Turkish newsletter suggested that “vis-
iting Albuquerque could be considered a pilgrimage for Jews, since the early 
crypto-Jewish settlers of the city left indications of their Jewish roots in their 
churches and cemeteries.”13 
Because accuracy is the only goal in normative academic research, one’s 
assumptions are first tested and are then adjusted to fit the facts. Conversely, 
when trained academics violate scholarship norms by adjusting facts to fit their 
assumptions, it suggests either an ignorance of academic scholarly norms or an 
undisclosed agenda more valued than accuracy. 
AGENDA-DRIVEN RESEARCH IN NEW MEXICO
One of the first academics to assert a crypto-Jewish presence in New Mexico 
provides us with a textbook example of agenda-driven research, stating: 
“Rather than seeking information to verify [a] crypto-Jewish presence, I 
assumed that crypto-Jews or their heirs had settled in New Mexico”; then, in 
order to support an assumption never-to-be-tested, he sets out “to determine 
whether cultural elements exist which can most plausibly be interpreted as 
remnants of crypto-Jewish strands within New Mexican Indohispano cul-
ture.”14 But as folklorist Henry Glassie writes: “It is no test of the scholar or 
his craft to invent a theory and pop bits of information into it. . . . There 
must be, then a strategy . . . that moves vigorously, not by means of hypothesis 
about particular cultures or things, but by means of theories of inquiry not 
tied to particular cultures or things.”15 In this case, the New Mexican inves-
tigator follows no theory of inquiry. Instead of testing his assumption for 
accuracy, he simply cherry-picks select instances to support it. The agenda-
driven strategy is the only way to ensure discovery of what he wants to find, 
whether it be Navahos, Nazis, or descendants of crypto-Jews. From a trained 
folkloristic point of view, such dilettantism is extremely serious, not only 
because it defeats the purpose of folkloristic scholarship, but because it falsi-
fies the raw data of folklore; such falsification contaminates the field beyond 
recovery, denying access to the culture rather than providing it and erasing 
the documented past.
Documented history is an essential research context, or frame of ref-
erence, for testing what can, and can’t, be logically concluded about New 
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Mexico’s ethnic past. It confirms, for a start, that the State of New Mexico 
was once part of the Spanish Empire and became an American territory 
in 1846; statehood followed in 1912, and the modern state is now located 
on the American side of the border with Mexico. But before assuming that 
New Mexico’s founding fathers included a significant component of secretly 
professing Spanish Jews, it is important to note that New Mexico’s Hispanic 
ancestors left Spain after the Jews had already been expelled; they were an 
identical slice of the Spanish population that remained there after the Jews 
were gone. This is a critical piece of information. Certainly, an indeterminate 
number of Jews converted in order to remain in Spain after the expulsion, and 
by 1492, an equally indeterminate number of Spanish Christians were long 
unaware of having past Jewish ancestry. But the notion that descendants of 
Jews who remained in Spain after 1492 comprised a secretly professing, sig-
nificant component of the mainstream Spanish population is inconsistent with 
documented history. Moreover, according to documented history, the Iberian 
population that generated, modified, and maintained crypto-Judaism on the 
Peninsula was not Spanish.
HISTORICAL CRYPTO-JEWS ON THE IBERIAN PENINSULA
Regardless of religious commitment, or lack thereof, all peninsular Spaniards 
were officially Christian by August of 1492, and the Holy Office of the Span-
ish Inquisition, according to its charter, was charged with bringing strays back 
into the fold. Although its persecutory travesties are chilling, it was not a Jew-
baiting organization; it wielded unwelcome persecution against any (and only) 
transgressing Christians, including heretics of all stripes and other assorted 
miscreants. It is generally accepted that not all who admitted to heresy under 
torture, or who named others under torture, can be believed. 
But more importantly, Spanish converts were neither the primary source 
nor the primary carriers of crypto-Judaism on the Iberian Peninsula. Rather, the 
folk religion known as crypto-Judaism emerged independently in Portugal. The 
historical record has similarly confirmed that New Mexican heritage is proudly 
Spanish,16 while it is well documented that crypto-Judaism in Spain was pre-
dictably sparse, idiosyncratic, and short-lived. The work of the eminent Spanish 
historian and anthropologist Julio Caro Baroja confirms that across postexilic 
Spain, crypto-Judaism was both shallow and fleeting.17 David Gitlitz, emeritus 
professor of Hispanic Studies and a recognized authority on Iberian crypto- 
Judaism, concurs that by 1540, Spanish converts “had been absorbed into 
the culture of Spanish Catholicism”18; the time frame is confirmed yet again 
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by Judeo-Spanish specialist Miriam Bodian, who describes Castile by 1540 
as a place where “Crypto-judaizing lived on as a reality—with fateful conse-
quences—mostly in the Spanish Catholic imagination.”19 There are exceptions 
to every rule, but without an overarching rule to depart from, exceptions could 
not exist. By definition, directing attention only to exceptions overlooks the 
rule and distorts the historical record. 
The first Spanish conquest of New Mexico did not occur until 1599, 
more than fifty years after Spanish crypto-Judaism had effectively disappeared 
from the parent population. Almost all of these original settlers were slaugh-
tered in the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, after which all Europeans were expelled 
from the territory for more than a decade. Little scholarly credence is given to 
accusations of crypto-judaizing that were hurled with political and personal 
animus in that early, doomed settlement. Such accusations forced the Holy 
Office in Salinas to invest much time and energy there, but to no avail; they 
found no crypto-judaizing in that community.20 The accuracy of respected 
scholar France V. Scholes, the primary investigator of these events, is contested 
in To the End of the Earth—but even if that assertion is correct, the issue is a 
distraction not worth pursuing, since none of the accused in that early settle-
ment, nor any of their relatives, were among the founding fathers of today’s 
Hispanic community. But a different episode in American history might 
have contributed the significant component of crypto-Jews that purportedly 
entered the region among the eighteenth-century Spanish founders of today’s 
New Mexico. Being pertinent, this does warrant investigation. 
There is ample documentation that during the Portuguese expulsion of 
1497, Jewish children were seized by authorities; parents were forced to con-
vert to recover their children and were then forbidden to leave the realm.21 
Unlike converts in Spain, the forced Portuguese converts would face no Inqui-
sition for forty years, allowing them to cohere as a community, to worship 
underground, and to identify as secretly Jewish. Thus, on the Iberian Penin-
sula, the Portuguese—and the Portuguese alone—developed a crypto-Jewish 
folk religion of historic and ethnographic significance, one that was to leave its 
mark across the Spanish Americas, although not in New Mexico. 
Portugal routinely expelled its judaizing heretics to Brazil, some of 
whom found their way to Chile and Peru, but in 1580, Spain overthrew Por-
tugal and opened the Spanish Americas to all Portuguese nationals. Seymour 
Liebman, perhaps the foremost authority on crypto-Jews in the Americas, 
notes that so many crypto-Jews left Portugal to flee the incoming Spanish 
Inquisition that “in the seventeenth century, especially in the New World, 
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the word ‘Portuguese’ was synonymous with ‘Jew.’”22 In colonial Mexico, 
where the Spanish Inquisition was uninterested in Portuguese newcomers, 
Portuguese crypto-Jews professed quietly but openly, even maintaining a 
free-standing synagogue in Mexico City.23 But when Portugal regained its 
sovereignty, all Portuguese nationals were rounded up for deportation, and 
Portuguese crypto-Jews were processed by the Holy Office in Mexico City, 
culminating in the grand auto da fé of 1649. Survivors were expelled to 
Spain, but “only two of the 100 sentenced to prison in Spain ever arrived, 
and these two never served jail terms.”24 
Rather, members of this population turn up where one would logically 
anticipate them: some in the British Caribbean, a stopping place for water 
before crossing the Atlantic, where all passengers were allowed to disembark 
and where Great Britain gave sanctuary; others show up again in Europe, in 
Leghorn and Salonika, for example, and in Amsterdam, some dispatched from 
Amsterdam to investigate trade with Sephardi communities in America’s Brit-
ish colonies.25 The pattern is clearly one of seeking personal security and mer-
cantile opportunity—important because Portuguese crypto-Jews of the 1640s 
onward would have been well aware of Spanish New Mexico as a sparsely 
populated backwater with no economic prospects; a hotbed of vicious juda-
izing accusations routinely investigated by the same Inquisition responsible 
for their own persecution and expulsion. 
Not surprisingly, when New Mexico’s new state historian announced 
that a significant number of New Mexican Hispanics descend from eighteenth 
century crypto-Jews, no one pointed to potential remnants of the expelled 
Portuguese crypto-Jews so well documented in the seventeenth century. 
Instead—since Hispanics in New Mexico are indisputably of Spanish, not of 
Portuguese descent—they pointed to a significant component of eighteenth 
century purportedly “Spanish” crypto-Jews, on which history and culture are 
mutually silent. The notion of a historically and culturally significant crypto-
Jewish settlement, as purportedly indicated by ubiquitous statewide folkways, 
is not only inconsistent with ubiquitous statewide folkways, but also with the 
history of modern New Mexico’s founding fathers. Predictably, it also contra-
dicts New Mexico’s Hispanic DNA profile.
HISPANIC NEW MEXICO’S GENETIC HERITAGE
Historically, migration to the new world was predominantly male, and colonial 
males built families with women already there; DNA data confirms, and it is gen-
erally accepted that maternal heritage in the Spanish Americas is predominantly 
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Native American. In New Mexico, male descendants of the Spanish founding 
fathers specifically self-identify as either Hispanics or Spanish Americans, as dis-
tinct from Mexicans and other populations in the region. An independent genetic 
study published in 200626 found the DNA profile of males in modern Spain 
to be identical to that of males who identify as Hispanic or Spanish American 
in modern New Mexico; both modern communities perfectly representing the 
genetic makeup of Spain after the Jews were expelled. Percentages of all other fac-
tions of the modern Spanish male population (5 percent Berber, for example) are 
also identical in both populations; the only difference between New Mexico and 
Spain is a 2.2 percent Native American admixture in New Mexico. 
Human beings carry no genes for religious affiliation, but ancestral origins 
and migrations can be traced according to genetic mutations, or markers, that 
are distinct to certain geographical areas. On this basis, Wesley Sutton found the 
frequency of Middle Eastern ancestry at 10 percent among males in both modern 
Spain and modern New Mexico. But this 10 percent will necessarily represent 
all Middle Eastern populations that left a significant genetic imprint in Spain—
Phoenicians and Arabs, for example, as well as Jews—complicated by the fact 
that we can rarely distinguish Arabs from Jews using DNA. Because the region 
has a Middle Eastern component at 10 percent, and because this population is 
not entirely Jewish, that means more than 90 percent of males in modern Spain 
and in Hispanic New Mexico have no Jewish ancestry whatsoever. Moreover, it is 
impossible to say if any actual instance of Sephardi descent in New Mexico is also 
crypto-Jewish. That determination would require historical and cultural evidence 
of a crypto-Jewish tradition, neither of which has been found in New Mexico.
Knowing the profile of postexilic males with Middle Eastern ancestry is identi-
cal in both Spain and New Mexico, Sutton concluded that if the purportedly “signifi-
cant” component of professing crypto-Jews had been added to the Spanish founding 
fathers of modern New Mexico, there would be a higher percentage of Middle East-
ern ancestry in New Mexico than in Spain. But the percentage is identical in both 
populations, refuting the claim that any additional (let alone significant) component 
of Spanish crypto-Jews entered the territory with the founding fathers, or for that 
matter, at any time afterward. Descent from a significant settlement of eighteenth 
century crypto-Jews appears to be an origin myth imposed upon New Mexico’s His-
panic community, without evidence, and by sheer power of academic fiat.
NEW MEXICO: MULTIPLE PEOPLES, MULTIPLE ORIGIN MYTHS
Folklorists, like other academic researchers, are also reliant on accurate his-
torical frames of reference. But oral history, as given by a people in their own 
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words, is constructed in an entirely different way and for different purposes 
than academic scholarship. That is, a people’s own reconstruction of the past 
is sacrosanct in folklore studies because it is the substance of their self-made 
collective identity. A community’s own reconstruction of the past, includ-
ing ideas it may choose to adopt and adapt from outside influences, will 
always serve its own best interest, expressed according to its own values and 
aesthetics, aspirations and animosities; that is, supporting its own distinct 
worldview. The historical accuracy of a peoples’ reconstruction of the past 
is of no consequence whatsoever to folklorists, since (historically accurate or 
not) the narrative will always give us access to the community’s values and 
aesthetics, aspirations and animosities, the entire worldview of those who 
hold it in tradition, and it will do so with unrivaled accuracy. New Mexico 
is no exception.  
Fig. 3. Spanish colonials were divided into 22 color-coded castas, or castes, in 
descending order from Iberian-born Spaniards through increasingly mixed degrees of 
color-coded heritage. 
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By the turn of the eighteenth century, Spanish Americans already had a 
richly mixed ancestral heritage, but they bore it under the burden of Spanish 
colonial racism. Regional ancestry was configured in New Mexico according to 
twenty-two caste divisions, lavishly illustrated in descending order from “pure” 
(white) Spaniards, along a downward spiral of increasingly mixed heritage and 
color-coded devaluation.27 [Fig. 3] Spanish Jews were conspicuously absent 
from the painfully ostracizing New Mexican caste system, a strong indicator 
that they were, in fact, absent from New Mexico. But to best avoid social mar-
ginalization in what was visibly a population of mixed heritage, New Mexico’s 
internal origin myth generated belief in communal descent from “pure” 
Spanish conquistadors.28 The aristocratic prestige lineage, like all internally 
generated origin myths, served the best interests of the (physically and visually 
diverse) community that held it in tradition. That is, regardless of appear-
ances, everyone’s purported aristocratic descent lay beyond proof or disproof 
by anyone else, so no one could discriminate against anyone else with absolute 
certainty—at least not on the basis of appearance alone—an ingenious strategy 
for limiting the negative effects of the colonial caste system. 
But when people are stripped of the right to self-identify, they are forced 
to sublimate their own best interests to those of supposedly “better” authori-
ties and to express their new, superimposed identity (along with its new social 
status, or lack thereof ) in terms consistent with those wielding the power to 
redefine them. It is never in the best interest of any community to lose its 
autonomous power of self-definition; this is something Jews have learned at 
an exorbitant cost. Under certain conditions, as Jews well know, the nature of 
a subjugated peoples’ positive or negative definition, particularly by a hostile 
dominant culture, can too easily become a matter of life and death. Spanish 
and Anglo-Europeans who colonized the Americas certainly made that clear 
according to the “savage” identity they imposed upon native peoples, thereby 
justifying European savagery in the name of civilization.
NEW MEXICO AND THE LOST TRIBES ORIGIN MYTH
There is no record of modern New Mexico’s founding fathers defining them-
selves as Jews or as descendants of Jews. But, like most European colonials, they 
clearly defined Native Americans as Jews, or “lost tribes of Israel,” an origin myth 
for which there is a wealth of documentation.29 The imposition of that identity, 
and the status assimilated to it, was typically imperialist and self-serving. For 
example, Alejandro Mora, a resident of Bernalillo, New Mexico in 1751, gave 
what was then a socially acceptable explanation for beating an Indian slave: 
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“God has given me life,” said Mora, “so 
that I might do to these Jews what they 
did to our Holiest Lord.”30 
In the 1800s, Anglo-Americans 
arrived sharing the same beliefs about 
Native American origins. By the time 
railroads and motor cars were bringing 
tourists to New Mexico’s strikingly bibli-
cal wilderness, the habitual association of 
lost, exotic Jews with New Mexico’s wil-
derness landscape and its tribal peoples 
was prolific in local rhetoric as well as 
travel literature.31 In 1896, a contestant 
won ten dollars from the Eastman Kodak 
Company for a photo of an Indian 
woman carrying a traditional water jug 
[called an olla], titled “A New Mexican 
Rebecca” [Fig. 4], clearly a reference to 
the biblical Rebecca at the well. Travel 
writing reflects the same habitual “orien-
talizing” or association of New Mexico’s 
tribal peoples with ancient Israelites, describing Indian farmers using “dig-
ging sticks of Moses” and Indian women as “Maids of Palestine.”32 Writing in 
2002, Michael P. Carroll, then chair of Sociology at the University of Western 
Ontario, a respected author with a specialty in religious cultures of New Mex-
ico, notes that New Mexican crypto-Jewish claims have gained tremendous 
appeal “independent of evidence”; he attributes this phenomenon, at least in 
part, to a well-documented history of “orientalizing” in Anglo discourse about 
New Mexico.33 With the establishment of the State of Israel in the 1940s, the 
orientalized “Maids of Palestine” would become “Olla Maidens,” but unset-
tling social shifts, and a subsequent bout of newly racialized identity-switching, 
would come to orientalize New Mexican Hispanics, in their place. 
The stage was probably set in 1932, when Cecil Roth’s bestseller, A His-
tory of the Marranos, ignited wild speculation on modern survivals of lost, 
hidden Jews in the Spanish Americas. Naïve ethnographic amateurs on the 
Mexican side of the border were quick to “discover” that Protestant Sabbatar-
ian, self-termed “Mexican Indians” were descendants of purportedly Spanish 
crypto-Jews. Lauded folklorist and ethnologist, Raphael Patai, refuted these 
Fig. 4. Photo of a San Juan Pueb-
lo woman titled “A New Mexican 
Rebecca” by Philip E. Haroun, Nov. 
1896. Courtesy Palace of Governors 
Photo Archives (NMHM/DCA), 
neg. no. 12422.
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claims in the 1940s, and again in the 1960s, noting that to relieve marginaliza-
tion by the Spanish-American caste system, “It is a frequent phenomenon for 
an Indian to claim to be a mestizo [of mixed race], and for a mestizo to claim 
pure Spanish descent,” adding, “Spanish descent, even Jewish-Spanish descent, 
means a step up on the social scale.”34 
Patai may have reached the scholarly community, but rumor and gossip 
prevailed at the popular level, where Judeo-Spanish ancestry had long been 
dogma in the Spanish-speaking branches of Saturday-worshipping Anglo-
Israelist churches that first attracted followers in Mexico, and later in the Span-
ish-speaking southwest. As Patai noted, these are congregations that define 
themselves as lost tribes of Israel, redeemed by accepting Christ and therefore 
comprising the “true” spiritual Jews (unlike the “fleshy” traditional Jews of Israelist 
imagination). Native Mexican congregations claim to have long preceded 
Cortéz to America and to have become the “Mexican Indians.” Similar origin 
myths, foregoing association with Indians, persist in southwestern Spanish-
speaking variants of Israelist churches, judging by an extant congregation in 
Texas. This congregation is periodically “discovered” to descend from crypto-
Fig. 5. Amateurs still mistake Spanish-speaking variants of Anglo-Israelist congrega-
tions as “descendants of crypto-Jews,” although the claim was long ago refuted by 
lauded ethnologist Raphael Patai. Photo, “Iglesia de Dios Israelita” by Janice Rubin. 
Courtesy Jewish Folklore and Ethnology Review 15:2 (1993): 141. 
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Jews by succeeding generations of ethnographic amateurs, recycling the same 
naïve views that surfaced in the 1930s regarding the original Mexican-Israelist 
congregations.35 [Fig. 5].
Unsettling shifts in self-definition among New Mexico’s Hispanics of 
mixed heritage first began in the 1970s, when Father Angelico Chavez, a well-
respected New Mexican priest, published a detailed genealogy of the founding 
fathers that refuted the people’s ingenious, racially neutralizing “conquistador” 
myth.36 At roughly the same time, buoyed by the strong egalitarian move-
ments of the 1960s to 1970s, New Mexican Native Americans asserted their 
civil rights, throwing off the yoke of Spanish and Anglo imperialism that 
had long disenfranchised them and taking back the power of their own self-
definition. To their successful art markets they would add a cultural center 
and museum in the major city of Albuquerque, taking authorship of their 
own history, identity, and public display. 
But in the process, they left the land empty of long lost Israelites, a tradi-
tion likely to be missed in association with a biblical wilderness that had histori-
cally defined its natives as exotic, lost tribes. If not missed for that alone, the lost, 
hidden Jews would almost certainly be missed as lost tourist revenue. Thus, in 
1980, shortly after the traditional Hispanic prestige lineage was disconfirmed, 
New Mexico hired a state historian whose doctoral dissertation had focused on 
crypto-Jews in colonial Spanish America (although not in New Mexico). He 
reported a spate of the same rumors and gossip addressed by Raphael Patai, still 
circulating at the popular level on both sides of the border. 
Hearing the same information as Patai, but lacking Patai’s ethnographic 
training, he naïvely concluded that ubiquitous statewide folkways (e.g., six-
pointed stars and gravestone stamens) indicated a significant crypto-Jewish 
settlement in New Mexico, and gave this unexamined conjecture to the 
popular press and media as a scholarly research finding. Since no ordinary 
journalist or journalistic fact-checker knew enough to challenge the “break-
ing news,” it was almost globally celebrated. Back in New Mexico, however, 
this pseudo-ethnographic, academically imposed prestige lineage was striat-
ing a formerly cohesive Hispanic community along old colonial fault lines 
of color-coded prejudice,—but this time, reinforced through the imperial 
eyes of an Anglo ruling class that classified Jews with overvalued whites, and 
New Mexicans with peoples of color. The most vulnerable (or perhaps the 
most opportunistic) New Mexicans soon began “whitening” their ancestral 
heritage, substituting ersatz Jewish-Spanish descent for the old, protective 
conquistador origin myth. 
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By the 1980s, the Anglo-American population had come to out-
number Hispanics in New Mexico, and the new minority was redefined 
accordingly. Reduced to “ethnics” on their own turf, New Mexican Hispan-
ics became the newly orientalized replacement Jews. Uprooted from their 
land, their cultural heritage, and now from the power of autonomous self-
definition, the vast majority of Spanish Americans elected to move on, at 
least unburdened by resurgent colonial racism. But the media ignored them. 
Instead, a tiny but vocal minority was almost hysterically celebrated in the 
international press and media, having suddenly “recovered” memories of 
an ennobling and martyred Jewish past, a past that allowed subscribers to 
deflect outrage at historical Anglo abuses onto a safe inquisitional villain, to 
ingratiate themselves to an ascendant Anglo hegemony, and to gain protec-
tive status according to their new, religiously empty but racially redefining 
prestige lineage. 
At first, the tiny number of Hispanics sufficiently traumatized to assert 
crypto-Jewish descent, or sufficiently opportunistic to try and benefit from 
the assertion, backed their claims with memories of purported crypto-Jewish 
practices that contradicted history, culture, and each other so transparently 
that one could claim credibility only by attempting to malign the other. It 
took years of academic interviews conducted as wholesale tutelage, and years 
of media massaging, for purported crypto-Jewish memories to gain any stabil-
ity, let alone credibility. The process clearly demonstrates what Mary Louise 
Pratt called “instances in which colonized subjects undertake to represent 
themselves in ways that engage with the colonizer’s own terms.” This was 
hardly an unusual circumstance, she wrote, but rather “a widespread phenom-
enon . . . important in unraveling the histories of imperial subjugation and 
resistance as seen from the site of their occurrence.”37 New Mexican Hispanics 
had no shortage of help to represent themselves in the same terms used by 
those who would redefine them as lost, hidden Jews.
HELP TO RECOVER CRYPTO-JEWISH MEMORIES
To maintain the effectiveness of the interview process, as well as prevent 
abuses of academic power, the directional flow of information in ethnographic 
fieldwork moves primarily one way: from the expert to the non-expert; that 
is, from the well-informed, expert insider, to the uninformed, ethnographic 
outsider. According to the conduct of trained fieldwork, the ethnographer’s 
obligation is to learn about the peoples’ worldview from the people who hold 
that worldview (thus, the experts), taking great care to respect their worldview 
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in exactly the same way one would respect a religious affiliation, similarly 
taking great care to do no harm in the process of interacting, and to avoid 
threatening the peoples’ self-defining understandings in any way, (whether 
one shares those understandings or not). Of necessity, reversing the role of 
“expert” in fieldwork is to reverse the direction of information-flow; an abuse 
of hegemonic power, and a strict violation of scholarship norms, as well as 
fieldwork ethics. Above all, one’s primary goal in ethnographic fieldwork is 
to leave the research site unchanged—or as unchanged as possible—by one’s 
presence there. 
Reversing the role of expert, and the direction of authoritative informa-
tion flow, could not be more socially disruptive, or more evident, than in 
the self-appointed role stated by a leading proponent of the crypto-Jewish 
canon:  to “help New Mexicans today understand the complexity and rich 
diversity of their Hispanic and Jewish past.”38 But it is the ethnographer who 
is supposed to be helped to understand the complexity and rich diversity of 
the community’s past, according to its indigenous expressive behaviors and 
its own, autonomous self-definition. As already noted, a people’s oral history 
can be accurate or not; it makes no difference to an ethnographer. A people’s 
own narrative of “the way things are” gives us direct access to the spirit and 
mentality of the community that generates, modifies, and maintains it. But, 
the academic imposition of an erroneous reconstruction of the ethnic past, 
imposed upon a people unequipped to refute such hegemonic power, can only 
give access to the spirit and mentality of the academics doing the erroneous 
reconstructing—not the people whom they seek to redefine. 
In the exchange below, the process of “helping” a New Mexican today 
“understand . . . [her] Hispanic and Jewish past” is laid bare. Here we see the 
interview process diverted from its academic purpose, used instead to strip 
the expert of her better knowledge and to massage her memory into confor-
mity with the interviewer’s agenda-driven reconstruction of the same events. 
The interview was conducted in a low-income area of Albuquerque by a 
leading proponent of the crypto-Jewish canon, who had invited me to sit in 
and tape the interview.39 I did try to intervene once in this exchange; thus, 
“A” stands for the academic who conducted the interview, “P” stands for 
the person being interviewed, and “N” appears once, for me (Neulander). 
Notably, the interviewer opened the topic of local butchering traditions by 
violating one of the first principles of fieldwork inquiry: he set her up with 
what “everybody else” was supposedly doing or saying, a classic means of 
eliciting complicity:
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A: Since I talked to you last I talked to many, many other people. 
And they also talked about slaughtering the lambs—the sheep. And 
they also would say a prayer.
P: Yes, my Dad always did.
A: But they remembered what the prayer was. And it ran something 
like [Instructs her on the prayer]: Te pido la vida para sostener la 
nuestra [I ask for your life to sustain ours]. 
P: I don’t know what my Dad used to say. He used to say things, you 
know, and he did—
A: [interrupts her, and again instructs] He said it in a different lan-
guage.
P: [repeats, as instructed] In a different language.
A: Would you recognize the language if someone said it?
P: I probably would. You know, some words, yeah.
N: What words? [I tried to learn if she had any independent recall 
before he instructed her] 
A: [interrupts before she could answer, and instructs]: 
Like: [he recited a portion of the kaddish, the mourner’s prayer, in 
Hebrew]
P: I remember that.
A: [continues instructing, reciting the kaddish in Hebrew]
P: Yes, some of the words. Yeah, some of the words.
A: Yeah . . . Did he have a name for God besides Jesus? Do you know 
a name for God that wasn’t Jesus?
P: Yeah. No. He didn’t pray to Jesus, my Dad. He prayed to God.
A: Do you remember what word he used?
P: He used to call Him Señor [Lord], and then he used to call Him 
Padre [Father]. Father, he used to call Him. Hmmm. He used to 
call Him other names. He used to call Him “the lamb.” The borrego 
[lamb], he used to call Him—no! That was Jesus. But he used to say 
something borrego sometimes. I can’t remember.
A: [instructs her] Adonai?
P: Huh?
A: [repeats instruction] Adonai?
P: [no response, waits for further instruction]
A: [instructs again] Yahweh?
P: [repeats the instruction] Yahweh, yeah! He used to call Him Yah-
weh. Uh huh. In fact, a lot, he used to call Him that.
A: [instructs her] Porque es el nombre en hebreo para dios [Because it 
is the name in Hebrew for God].
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Except for the informant’s con-
tribution on the God names her father 
used in prayer (all consistent with Chris-
tian prayer, but not all consistent with 
Jewish prayer), the entire exchange is a 
one-sided academic tutorial. It is impor-
tant to note, as seen here, that at the 
lower end of the region’s socioeconomic 
and ethnic hierarchies, reconstruction 
of an informant’s racially redefining 
crypto-Jewish past was often a coopera-
tive effort. As Patai noted, even Jewish-
Spanish descent can be a step up on 
the social scale, especially since the new 
Jewish prestige lineage (unlike the old 
conquistador heritage) is not inclusive; 
it striates the formerly cohesive society 
into old colonial, color-coded divisions according to who accepts the crypto-
Jewish fiction, and who does not, or who thinks they can or can’t be counted 
in according to physical appearance, or skin color. As one darker-skinned 
sister of a lighter-skinned brother stated, “He can get away with it, but not 
me. I don’t think I look the part.” 
Yet for many Hispanics—let alone those who are socially marginalized in 
New Mexico—there are numerous encouragements to comply; it can be excit-
ing to be interviewed by journalists (if not academics), to have your picture 
appear in The New York Times, in local magazines, and on TV. For the suffi-
ciently entrepreneurial, Hispanic or not, it can also be a business opportunity. 
Academic proponents of the crypto-Jewish canon, for example, were among 
the first to promote crypto-Jewish tourism, charging tourists to “meet descen-
dants of the ‘Hidden Jews’” [Fig. 6], “descendants” like the woman we just saw 
being “helped to understand . . . [her] Hispanic and Jewish past.” 
Massaging of Hispanic memory was so endemic on the street, in the 
media, and in quasi-academic contexts like documentary films, speaking 
engagements, and as well as local conferences preaching to an ever-growing 
choir, I quickly learned that when someone informed me of crypto-Jewish 
descent, I could not assume the information was privileged Hispanic knowl-
edge. Rather, upon investigation, knowledge of crypto-Jewish ancestry was 
categorically absent from everyone’s family history narrative. 
Fig. 6. Academics promoting the 
crypto-Jewish canon were among 
the first to promote crypto-Jewish 
tourism in the Southwest. Courtesy 
of the New Mexico Jewish Historical 
Society.
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 Hispanics were most often con-
vinced of their Jewish descent by aca-
demic conflations of perceived Jewish 
symbols, or “motifs” with familiar, but 
ambiguous folkways, for example, by 
conflating a Hebrew letter with a superfi-
cially related design on tombstones across 
all faiths, by pointing to hexagrams in 
local church décor, or by pointing to the 
ubiquitous New Mexican gambling top, 
although this Roman-Iberian artifact is 
historically and culturally unrelated to 
the Yiddish dreydl—an Ashkenazi toy 
never used in Sephardi (Iberian Jew-
ish) tradition, that was borrowed from a 
pagan winter solstice top, spun in Eng-
land and Germany.40 
In this connection, a retired school 
teacher proudly shared with me a child’s 
assignment that dates back more than 30 
years. In 1981, pupils in her largely His-
panic fourth grade class had been asked 
to illustrate a family tradition and to describe it in Spanish and English. One 
child described her grandfather’s use of the local “trompo,” the traditional 
Roman-Iberian gambling top, which according to the child, was taught to 
her grandfather by a friend of his father’s. The teacher—convinced by the 
crypto-Jewish canon that the child must belong to a secretly Jewish family—
“corrected” the child’s paper by following the local academic lead, sweeping 
into one overgeneralized category of false Jewish relatedness, the Iberian top 
and the Yiddish dreydl, and having the child conflate the two by giving her a 
dreydl template, instructing her to add the image of a dreydl to her descrip-
tion of her grandfather’s tradition, and to add Hebrew letters, as well as rewrite 
the word “trompo” as “dreydl” [Fig. 7]. It is hard to say how influential this 
type of instruction is, or is not, but it is probably safe to say that for more 
than 30 years, countless New Mexican Hispanics have undergone continuous 
sabotage of their own rich heritage by crypto-Jewish identity-tweaking, almost 
always from an authority figure like a teacher, a doctor, or someone important 
enough to be given a public forum in print or in the media. 
Fig. 7. A teacher “corrects” a His-
panic child, instructing her to add an 
Ashkenazi dreydl to her drawing of 
New Mexico’s ubiquitous (Roman-
Iberian) gambling top, misrepresent-
ing the toy (and the child) as having 
crypto-Jewish origins. 
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One woman’s experience reflects the impact of identity-tweaking infor-
mation that she—like most people—was in no position to judge as anything 
but “informative and well documented,” given the lofty academic source. 
Notably, she is also typical in having “contemplated being of Jewish back-
ground” for some time before her final revelation, confirming that like all 
purported descendants in the 1990s, no such information was handed down 
to her by her family. Notably, her construction of Hispanic heritage is so 
self-consciously color-coded, that Spanish Jews in her narrative (considered 
white) cannot also be Hispanic (considered non-white); thus, in her narra-
tive, she herself becomes “a non-Hispanic entity” because of an alleged Jewish 
pattern or (white) “paradigm” in ubiquitous local traditions. Once the quest 
for (racially meaningful and religiously empty) Jewish descent begins in New 
Mexico, family history narratives are adjusted as part of the process, which 
we’ll see shortly. But in the 1990s, revelation of Jewish ancestry was still uni-
formly reported as coming from a handful of academics, outside the family. 
In her account, the academic “evidence” she is given consists of nothing more 
than superficial, unexamined, cultural similarities, between “specific [Jewish] 
indicators” and local [Hispanic] traditions41 (my italics): 
I heard Stan Hordes speak for the first time about four years ago. 
He was speaking in Colorado Springs about Crypto-Jews of the 
Southwest. I saw the notice in the newspaper and decided to attend 
the session. His talk was informative and well documented. After 
his presentation I was reflecting on the extent and magnitude of 
my own personal ruminations. . . . The result of the quest is that the 
individual identifies specific indicators relative to traditions . . . that 
culminate in a non-Hispanic entity that reflects a Jewish paradigm. 
(emphasis added)
By the 1990s, purportedly Jewish “indicators” relative to Hispanic 
“traditions” were in wide circulation and had become habitually associated 
with crypto-Jewish ancestry in New Mexico. Thus, crypto-Jewish reporting 
is often formulaic, using these same “motifs” over and over to indicate Jew-
ish heritage. There were two Jewish motifs frequently assimilated to home 
butchering, for example; one was the humane use of a sharp knife for slaugh-
ter. But like institutionalized graveyard art, use of a sharp knife is not Jew-
ish private property and is too widely practiced to serve as a crypto-Jewish 
marker. Nevertheless, like the hexagram, tombstone stamens, and everything 
else purportedly crypto-Jewish, the sharp knife serves as a crypto-Jewish 
motif in New Mexico. Thus, with local academic support it is popularly used 
as an indicator of the crypto-Jewish ethnicity it does not actually indicate. 
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The second butchering motif is the distinctly Jewish, and therefore ethno-
graphically useful, practice of draining and discarding the animal’s blood 
rather than consuming it. 
It is important to note that in her study of crime reporting in the late 
nineteenth century, Anne B. Cohen found that ballad formulae—specifically 
the habitual repetition of oral motifs in different murdered sweetheart bal-
lads—were used to mold different narratives into teaching the same moral 
lessons. According to Cohen, these literary motifs proved powerful enough to 
shape newspaper reports of real crimes involving young women murdered by 
their boyfriends.42 Cohen’s research found that these motifs affected journal-
istic memory of crimes to the point where “there was a tendency to interpret 
events in terms of [them] . . . even when distortion was required to accomplish 
it.”43 Cohen attributes this narrative tendency to “tension between fact and 
formulae,” or what Albert Lord first called a “tension of essences,”44 whereby 
narrative motifs, like sharp knives and spilled blood, “go with” crypto-Jewish 
butchering to such a habitual extent that memories of New Mexican butcher-
ing will be adjusted, or as Cohen writes, “distorted” to accommodate them.
We can see this process  at work in a butchering account by two differ-
ent generations of the same family. First we hear from the informant whose 
interview on butchering we read above, elaborating further on the subject of 
her father’s butchering ritual, which included bleeding the animal and using 
the blood for family consumption. As occurred earlier in the interview, she 
contradicts herself if and when she realizes her recall is in conflict with Jew-
ish motifs, as when she stated of her dad: “He didn’t pray to Jesus, my Dad” 
except, it seems, when he prayed to Jesus as the borrego, or lamb of God (see 
also, “It tasted good . . . but I didn’t like it” below). But a year later, her son 
would describe his grandfather’s butchering techniques for Palacio Magazine, 
incorporating the region’s two formulaic crypto-Jewish motifs: humane use of 
a sharp knife and draining the blood to avoid consumption.
The original informant described the family’s collection and consump-
tion of blood, as follows:
Well my Dad used to kill animals, and you know, he used to like 
sheep a lot. He would always bleed the animal . . . and so my Mom 
would keep the blood and clean intestines and you know, make gua-
jada [blood sausage] with la sangre [the blood] . . . like jello . . . and 
then cook it with the intestine, oh, a bit of meat. It tasted good . . . 
but I didn’t like it! . . . it’s a great sin, you know.45
It is not clear that the informant’s son ever witnessed his grand-
father’s butchering, but the grandfather’s recitation of a prayer survived 
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in the young man’s memory, either as observed by him or as recalled 
from his mother’s accounts of family history. Yet, in his adjusted fam-
ily narrative, all memory of using blood for consumption is deleted. In 
its place are the two popular crypto-Jewish butchering motifs: a sharp 
knife (which may have been an accurate memory, but is not the crypto-
Jewish marker it is taken for) and the distinctly Jewish motif of blood- 
spilling. But his grandfather’s butchering process, as we know from his moth-
er’s firsthand account, included collecting the blood for consumption. The 
young man’s memory (whether he witnessed his grandfather butcher animals 
or not), has been adjusted, or distorted, to accommodate crypto-Jewish motifs 
(my italics): “He said a prayer and cut the throat with an un-nicked knife. He 
drained the blood to the ground.”46
This is the memory the young man will pass on to his children, and 
they to theirs. In this same manner, a favorite pot used exclusively by some-
one’s aunt for a special stew would eventually become “evidence” of a secretly 
kosher kitchen. Similarly, place-name and surname mythologies, transparently 
inconsistent with history, culture and academic etymology, have become the 
substance of countless, demonstrably unfounded, crypto-Jewish genealogies.47 
Whether susceptible individuals assume they descend from crypto-Jews because 
they have been told as much by supposedly “better” authorities, or whether they 
are complicit in reconstructing a racially protective prestige lineage (or both), 
local history and culture are equally subsumed to the power of misguided (and 
misguiding) academic authority. This disenfranchises all non-compliant mem-
bers of what was formerly a cohesive society, distorting local memory and mak-
ing it impossible for subsequent generations, or future researchers, to recover 
the history and culture being destroyed—some of which might have revealed 
crypto-Jewish traditions, if indeed they were there. The loss is incalculable; it is 
precisely what “contamination of the field” is named after. 
In 1996, my one detailed publication on this topic was published. But 
rather than adjusting their assumptions to fit the facts, New Mexican academ-
ics redoubled their efforts to legitimate crypto-Jewish claims, incorporating 
nineteenth century race-science into crypto-Jewish reporting. 
RACE SCIENCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY:  
THE JEW AS A SITE OF ULTIMATE PROJECTION
The idea that Jews comprise a distinct biological subspecies of humanity, or 
“Jewish race,” first gained traction in the nineteenth century, when science 
asserted that Jews comprised an isolated, historically monogamous, people. 
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Christians agreed on the basis that Jews were an anti-Christian people that had 
historically excluded themselves from the Christian mainstream; Jews agreed 
on the basis that Christians were an anti-Semitic people that had historically 
excluded Jews from the mainstream. The supposed isolation of the “Jewish 
race” never came into dispute—not because it was indisputable—but largely 
because the purportedly isolated “race” was a handy basis on which conflicting 
ideological groups could justify their own self-serving points of view.48  In this 
sense, race-science in the nineteenth century reduced the Jew to a blank screen; 
what Lyotard called an “ultimate site of projection.”49 A century later, the same 
nineteenth century dilettantism would enable naïve, agenda-driven academics 
to project seriously ill Hispanics onto the same tabula rasa, identifying them 
as “Jewish-by-disease.” 
After the racist genocide of WW II, after science of the mid-20th century 
exposed race as a biologically irrational concept, and after the media exposed 
the ignorant, hate-twisted face of southern racism during the civil rights move-
ments of the 1960s-70s, understanding of human differences began to change, 
but that understanding remains unevenly distributed. Today, few college stu-
dents could seriously entertain the notion that biological races exist, except as 
ill-conceived social categories constructed less well-educated persons, or even 
by highly-degreed, but earlier-educated academics. Hence, at this time, it is 
not clear that scientific understanding prevails across all Americans, regardless 
of how far they went in school. With the completion of the Human Genome 
Project in 2004—given the great gap between old racialized and new genomic 
constructs of human difference—America was once again caught in an infor-
mation-gap typical of the late nineteenth century; that is, caught between 
ground-breaking discoveries (e.g., photography in the 1800s; the human 
genome in the 2000s) and the ability to make good sense, let alone good use 
of them. In times of such widespread sophistry, not enough can be known fast 
enough to counter, anticipate, or prevent forays into academic adventurism, 
providing the best possible environment for agenda-driven research to prolifer-
ate. Not surprisingly, this was the time when academics in New Mexico began 
legitimating crypto-Jewish claims by inventing genetically “Jewish diseases” 
and—with no training in ethnography or genetics—began using disease as a 
Jewish ethnic marker.
THE FALLACY OF DISEASE-BASED JUDAISM 
The first disease cited as Jewish in New Mexico—that I know of—was Niemann-
Pick, which I learned of in 1992. The term Niemann-Pick refers to a group of 
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“storage” disorders in which waste materials accumulate in human tissue and 
cause it to deteriorate. Since these disorders are found among Jews and Hispanics 
(as well as in other populations overlooked by selective inattention), proponents 
of the crypto-Jewish canon assumed they could identify Hispanics who suf-
fer from these storage disorders as descendants of Jews. As it turned out, even 
the most rudimentary investigation shows that Jews carry only Niemann-Pick 
types A and B, while Hispanics carry only type C, different disorders at both 
the biological and chemical levels.50 More importantly, if Hispanics and Jews 
were biologically related, a strict division between the two biological types of 
Niemann-Pick could not occur between them. Rather, the fact that they inherit 
only biologically unrelated forms of this heritable disease indicates that the two 
populations are themselves biologically unrelated. After that revelation, use of dis-
ease as a crypto-Jewish marker should have come to an end in New Mexico. But 
cherry-picking of diseases found at high frequency in both populations (the same 
or higher frequency in other populations selectively overlooked), would continue 
in an unabated effort to conjure up “scientific” evidence of significant Hispanic 
descent from Spanish crypto-Jews; a variant of Galton’s Jewish science fiction.
 In winter of 1992, in an Albuquerque coffee house, a young man con-
vinced of his crypto-Jewish past recounted for me a Jewish-by-disease narrative 
in which an unidentified Hispanic woman was told by an unidentified rabbi in 
Colorado that her mother was Jewish, because she had a “Jewish” disease.” Ten 
years later, the narrative would gain academic legitimacy according to Janet 
Liebman Jacobs, a specialist in Women’s Studies, who heard the tale and pub-
lished it as a medically sound historical account. But apparently inspired by 
a sensationalized outbreak of Mad Cow disease—a form of Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
Disease (CJD)—the illness used in the Liebman Jacobs variant was a heritable 
form of CJD; one with an unusually high frequency in Libyan Jews. Failing 
to establish a link between descendants of Spanish Jews and CJD, and lack-
ing specific training in folk narratives, Liebman Jacobs missed that fact that 
there is no such link, and also missed the earmarks of what was unmistakably 
a legend. Instead, she framed the tale as an accurate crypto-Jewish discovery, 
further legitimating the fiction as fact by publication in a university press. 
A detailed discussion of the CJD narrative and its treatment in her book 
appears in an article I published in 2006.51 What matters here is that no case 
of CJD had ever been recorded in the region, either among Hispanics or 
anyone else, and the mother—both alive and suffering during the daughter’s 
purported encounter with the rabbi—was proclaimed “Jewish” on the basis of 
a disease that, at the time, could only be diagnosed after death. 
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 Much more disturbing, however, was Liebman Jacobs’s conformity to 
pseudo-ethnographic and pseudo-scientific reporting, typical of her colleagues 
in her consistent presentation of conjectures as academic research findings, 
and her use of pseudepigraphy to legitimate demonstrably unfounded claims. 
For example, she referred to her informant as a “descendant” although she 
never secured or verified the evidence given for that claim, while her preamble 
both mis- and disinformed her readers instead of educating them: “In this case 
the descendant’s mother suffered from Creutzfeldt-Jacob [sic] disease, a degen-
erative disease of the central nervous system that has been linked specifically 
to Sephardic ancestry.”52 But high incidence of CJD is linked only to Libyan 
Jews, who have no Sephardi or any Iberian connection whatsoever. In addi-
tion, she gave a publication by Richard M. Goodman53 as the source of the 
“specific link” to Sephardic ancestry. But Goodman—a recognized expert on 
genetic diseases found among Jews—discussed heritable CJD under the chap-
ter heading Misconceptions, stating that CJD is not heritable; this is exactly the 
opposite of what Liebman Jacobs ascribed to him. He attributed the Libyan 
outbreak to consumption of infected sheep’s eyes, a culinary delicacy in Libya. 
Neither CJD’s heritability nor any link to “specifically Sephardic ancestry” was 
ever mentioned or even considered by Goodman. 
The academic of greatest note in promoting disease-based claims of 
crypto-Jewish descent is the author of To the End of the Earth. In 2009, when 
I happened to be in New Mexico, he was using local TV news to promote the 
idea that Hispanics can be Jewish-by-disease.54 In addition, he is coauthor with 
a local New Mexican internist of a paper using a heritable blister rash called 
Pemphigus Vulgaris (PV) to show that Hispanics descend from crypto-Jews;55 
their their entire paper is reprinted in the appendix of To the End of the Earth. 
Notably, a year before the book was published, Ron Loewenthal, Director of the 
Tissue Typing Lab at Chaim Sheba Medical Center in Israel (cum laude 1985, 
M.D. 1987 Hebrew University; Ph.D., Cambridge University 1993, a specialist 
and prolific author on medical biochemistry, molecular biology and genetic tis-
sue typing), found that disease haplotypes for PV are neither of ancient, nor of 
Middle Eastern origin. Loewenthal et al. found that PV haplotypes, or markers, 
are relatively recent and originate with a Mediterranean forebear.56 
Regarding Spaniards and Jews, the study found “the distance between the 
two PV cohorts is relatively short, but the distance between Jewish patients and 
Jewish controls is greater compared to the distance between Spanish patients and 
Spanish controls.”57 Hence, the ancestral condition appears to have occurred first 
in Spaniards and then spread to Jewish populations. Moreover, as Sutton showed 
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in 2006, the paternal profile of the vast majority of New Mexican Hispanics is 
significantly different from that of all Jews, including Iberian Jews, and at the 
same time is indistinguishable from Mediterranean Spaniards.58 Therefore, the 
more logical conclusion is that high incidence of PV among New Mexican His-
panics does not indicate descent from Jews, but reflects instead descent from the 
same Mediterranean forebears who spread PV to Jews.
In 2009 I was in New Mexico doing IRB-approved research, funded 
by the National Institutes of Health and The Center for Genetic Research 
Ethics and Law. I was concerned that New Mexican Jewish-by-disease claims 
would breathe new life into the old saw that Jews are a contaminated and 
contaminating “race.” On the way to the research site I shared my interest in 
“Jewish” diseases with a fellow traveler in the Chicago airport. She referred 
me to a Hispanic co-worker in New Mexico who was told her family car-
ries a Jewish disease. During my subsequent interview with the co-worker, 
I was informed that one parent belonged to a large group of siblings with a 
high rate of mental illness. The mental health professional handling the case 
first informed the family they descend from crypto-Jews because Jews have a 
Fig. 8. Mystery Rock, Los Lunas, New Mexico, is a flawed rendition of the Ten Com-
mandments using letters from many different ancient alphabets, from many conflict-
ing time periods, naively touted as an ancestral “Hebrew” text. Photo by author.
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higher rate of mental illness than other people, a common and unsubstantiated 
antisemitic refrain. The doctor also told the family their descent from Spanish 
crypto-Jews is confirmed by coming from the general area of northern New 
Mexico and southern Colorado—a crypto-Jewish demographic fiction wholly 
attributed to the crypto-Jewish canon. The doctor further explained that the 
first mental institution in New Mexico had to be built in that region, because 
“that’s where the Jews were.” Antisemitic rhetoric like this, built upon local 
Jewish-by-disease claims, was not hard to find in New Mexico. This instance 
is an important example, in part because it comes from the highest tier of New 
Mexican society, and in part because it has become so prolific, I was directed 
to it before I even got there. 
PUTTING AN END TO JEWISH-BY-DISEASE CLAIMS
Almost coincidental with that interview, “Jewish” cancer claims were featured 
on an Albuquerque news program, endorsed by the author of the erroneous 
Jewish-by-disease paper reprinted in the appendix of his book, which as we 
have seen, is similarly error-riddled on the topic of crypto-Jews. The TV news 
chose to first establish local crypto-Jewish ancestry by using a local geological 
landmark. We may recall (although the program did not), that Native Ameri-
cans were the original purported Jews and they left a legacy of inscriptions 
in the form of copious cryptic petroglyphs. Perhaps it was inevitable that a 
purported “sign” of the ancestral Hispanic replacement Jews would similarly 
be discovered in New Mexico, also as a cryptic petroglyph. That purpose is 
currently served by a stone known as “Mystery Rock,” located in the desert 
west of Los Lunas, New Mexico [Fig. 8]. 
 First noticed in the 1930s (when the inscriptions were probably created), 
the rock was originally said to be a rendition of the Ten Commandments in 
Phoenician. Since almost no one in New Mexico knows what Hebrew looks 
like, let alone Phoenician, the stone was later assimilated to the crypto-Jewish 
canon as a “Hebrew” text carved by ancestral crypto-Jews. Perhaps because 
there is more mileage to be gained by mystifying than clarifying, academic 
promoters of the canon have spent more than thirty years maintaining silence 
or shrugging unknowingly when approached for scholarly clarification of the 
rock’s inscriptions. Thus, the news program was able to cite Mystery Rock as a 
crypto-Jewish landmark, the better to reinforce a spate of pseudoscientific can-
cer babble, mislabeling catastrophically ill Hispanics as “Jewish by disease.”59 
My investigation began with the rock. A five-minute Internet query led 
me to Jo Ann Hackett, well-known Hebrew epigrapher and linguistic scholar, 
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then at Harvard on her way to the University of Texas at Austin, to revise the 
Brown-Driver-Briggs lexicon. “I wish things were always so easy,” she respond-
ed, explaining, “This isn’t ancient Phoenician or Hebrew or anything else.”60 
Rather, it is a concoction of unrelated letters taken from ancient alphabets of 
many different languages in conflicting historical periods, as are sometimes 
found in cheap printouts of ancient alphabets, but are never found written 
together in legitimate historical texts. In addition, according to Hackett, the 
rock’s text is partially incomplete, some letters are written backwards or upside 
down, and some words are misspelled. Thus, it appears that whoever made 
this effort was an amateur, making no pretense whatsoever at either Hebrew, 
or Phoenician, but clearly involved in a fanciful linguistic lark. 
That same summer, similarly based on misdirection by local academics, 
museums in both Albuquerque and Santa Fe were planning crypto-Jewish exhibi-
tions, and a major crypto-Jewish festival was planned in Albuquerque, promoted 
by Father Bill Sanchez, a Catholic priest featured on the Jewish-by-disease news 
program—a priest either deliberately misled or himself deliberately misleading.
The news segment opened with the statement: “Secrets are being revealed!” 
and moved from there to Mystery Rock. “Some people think this is just a hoax,” 
the journalist stated, “But . . .”; having titled his piece “Hidden Heritage Exposes 
Cancer Risk,” he used Mystery Rock to firmly establish New Mexico’s crypto-
Jewish heritage, ignoring (as did Father Bill) any qualified source on Hebrew 
epigraphy. Having himself misrepresented the text as Hebrew, Father Bill is seen 
shrouded in the sacred trappings of Jewish worship, laying his hands on the ama-
teur alphabetical concoction and chanting Hebrew prayers. “Just like the prayer, 
the words are written in Hebrew,” the TV journalist reiterated, after which Father 
Bill added the biologically impossible statement: “Eighty percent of my DNA is 
Sephardic Jewish.” Following a number of similarly invalid and unreliable state-
ments, he is seen in church, establishing the same knowledge base for members 
of his flock, exploiting their naiveté (as his was possibly exploited) and effectively 
leaving them no choice but to redefine themselves as descendants of crypto-Jews.
The program then moved on to use disease as a crypto-Jewish marker. 
The disease in current vogue is breast cancer, based on mutations in BRCA 
1/2; “BRCA” stands for “breast cancer” and 1/2 stands for two genes that 
normally produce tumor-suppressing proteins in the human body. Because 
BRCA 1/2 mutations inhibit these proteins, individuals with these muta-
tions are at greater risk of developing certain cancers. Among the many 
hundreds of mutations in BRCA 1/2, three have been associated with Ash-
kenazi (Germanic, east European) Jews. In New Mexico, the discovery of 
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one or more Ashkenazi mutations in the local Hispanic population is now 
given as evidence of Sephardi descent by asserting that these mutations 
emerged before the Ashkenazi-Sephardi split; a way to claim that frequency 
in one group applies equally to the other. But estimates for the origins of 
these mutations vary greatly among equally respected geneticists. Some lean 
toward emergence as late as the twelfth to fourteenth century, long after 
the Ashkenazi-Sephardi split.61 More importantly, confidence intervals for 
the origin of these mutations are so uncertain that no scholar can assert 
anything conclusive at this time at this time. Thus, the New Mexican asser-
tion—stated as a fact—is only a conjecture. At the same time it ignores the 
fact that Ashkenazi Jews and Hispanics have been living side by side in New 
Mexico for roughly 175 years, which means we should expect to find Ash-
kenazi admixture in the Hispanic gene pool; a modern admixture that does 
not indicate premodern Sephardi descent.
Estimates vary slightly, but the mutations in question occur among Ash-
kenazi Jews at roughly 2.5 percent, using the two most recent studies.62 In the 
popular view, these mutations are attractive as a Jewish ethnic marker because 
their frequency in non-Jews is significantly lower, at roughly 0.5 percent. But 
even though these mutations have a higher frequency among Jews, the non-
Jewish population is so enormous, and the Jewish population so tiny, the vast 
majority of people with these mutations will always be non-Jews. This should 
not suggest to anyone that these mutations are therefore “Christian” disease 
markers—such labeling employs the same skewed logic as “Jewish” disease 
labeling. Rather, these numbers teach us that simply having BRCA 1/2 muta-
tions can tell us nothing—absolute zero—about which population an affected 
person belongs to, with one exception: given the disproportionate ratio of Jews 
to non-Jews, there is a roughly 90 percent chance that any American walking 
into a doctor’s office with BRCA 1/2 mutations is not descended from Jews.
We can see that New Mexico’s naïve, agenda-driven research has labeled 
“Jewish” three mutations of unknown frequency among Sephardi Jews that 
do not occur in approximately 98 percent of Ashkenazi Jews. But even more 
importantly, it overlooks the fact that wherever Jews constitute a minority, no 
disease shared with non-Jews can ever be used as a Jewish ethnic marker. Since 
the non-Jewish population will always be so significantly larger in size, the vast 
majority of affected people will always be non-Jews, even when frequency of 
the disorder is higher in the Jewish minority. 
The Albuquerque news program moved quickly from Father Bill to very 
briefly quote a geneticist—but just enough to suggest that BRCA 1/2 can be 
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used as a Jewish ethnic marker, instead of making it clear that it cannot be. This 
was followed by testimony from a Hispanic woman whose family is riddled 
with disease, her response both reflecting and reinforcing the belief being incul-
cated in the audience: “That confirmed that we really were Sephardic Jews!” 
The focus then turned to the former state historian, spearhead of the 
crypto-Jewish canon, introduced according to his role as a university professor 
and author of To the End of the Earth. But rather than contribute academic 
enlightenment on Mystery Rock or, better yet, on BRCA 1/2, he emphasized 
with hand gestures what he called “intersecting” claims made on the program 
that supposedly “coalesce” into evidence of a significant crypto-Jewish settle-
ment in New Mexico: “It’s absolutely fascinating to see the intersection of the 
historical, and the cultural, and the genetic, and the genealogical that all seem 
to coalesce”; this, despite the fact that claims of a significant crypto-Jewish 
settlement are categorically refuted by the historical, cultural, genetic, and gene-
alogical records. “We have an opportunity to save some lives here,” he added, 
“and that to me is the most exciting part of the whole research.” 
But no one explained the excitement or health benefit of inventing 
demonstrably unfounded, malignant genetic signatures for global Jewry or 
of convincing non-Jews they descend from Jews based on disease frequencies 
that show just the opposite. Rather, while this imperial gaze appears inno-
cent—even benevolent in its accompanying rhetoric—it actually redefines all 
it surveys according to its own agenda, an agenda imposed upon the cultural 
landscape by sheer power of academic authority and in consistent violation 
of academic scholarship norms. It is a gaze described by Mary Louise Pratt 
as that of “he whose imperial eyes look out and possess”; of one who seeks 
to secure his innocence in the same moment as asserting hegemony;63 a gaze 
well-documented in every colonial reconstruction of the history and heritage 
of subjugated peoples, over time and across space. 
It is impossible to estimate the power of media to support demonstrably 
unfounded and socially menacing assertions that implode identities of whole 
populations for the benefit of unstated, agenda-driven interests more valued 
than accuracy. In the news program described—one in a barrage of such pro-
gramming for more than thirty years—the authority of Church (through the 
agent of a priest), the authority of Science (through the agent of a geneticist), 
the authority of State and Academy (through the agency of a state historian 
and university professor), are all endorsed by the most powerful information-
generating institution in the modern world: the news media. The ordinary 
person—in New Mexico or anywhere else—has no recourse whatsoever 
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against such hegemonic authority or its power to redefine an entire people’s 
“historical, and cultural, and genetic, and genealogical” identity—all of these 
assertions demonstrably unfounded as well as uninvited by the vast majority 
of the population being redefined.
As we have seen, New Mexico’s crypto-Jewish claims comprise a demon-
strably unfounded canon; a reckless foray into ethnographic and genomic 
sophistry that discredits academe, deals a punishing blow to critical thought, 
and has contaminated a valuable research site beyond recovery. It snobs mul-
tidisciplinary research by assuming anyone trained in the specialties required 
for specific types of investigation can be replaced by academics unqualified in 
those areas of specialty. Its social consequences are entirely negative, estranging 
Hispanic family members and imploding friendships, fraying trust between 
communities and their supporting institutions (e.g., public schools and 
mental health facilities), and usurping the Hispanic community’s far superior 
ability to define itself in its own best interest. It has eroded the history and 
cultural boundaries of Jews and New Mexican Hispanics alike, reviving colo-
nial color-coded racism in the region, and contributing to anti-Semitism. At 
the same time, it has dealt a daunting blow to Jewish education by diverting 
much needed Jewish philanthropy from legitimate Jewish causes.
CONCLUSION
What if the twentieth century never happened? What level of academic 
sophistication would prevail and how would that play out in our best attempts 
to make genetic and ethnographic sense of the world? If we were to rely on 
nineteenth century scholars displaced into modern academe—the place where 
everyone must inevitably turn for accurate information—my best guess is that 
we would not get accurate information. If the twentieth century never hap-
pened, we’d get both Frazer’s cultural fiction, and Galton’s science fiction. In 
short, we’d get the crypto-Jewish canon.
We now live in a world of increasingly well-informed, multidisciplinary 
twenty-first-century specialists, where a nineteenth-century construct like 
New Mexico’s crypto-Jewish canon can only survive at a disturbing level of 
academic and social dysfunction. No one has ever taken issue with the fact 
that some small percentage of Hispanics in Spain—as in the American south-
west—are likely to have Jewish ancestry. But that is very different from the 
existence of a significant eighteenth century community of Spanish crypto-
Jews, as purportedly evidenced in statewide New Mexican folkways, and in 
being “Jewish-by-disease.” Thus, it should raise concern that a new Sephardic/
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Crypto-Jewish program at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs 
(UCCS) recently issued the mission statement quoted below. It was emailed to 
me in 2013 at my request, by the Program Director. The original text included 
definitions of Sephardic Jews and crypto-Jews in parentheses, which I’ve edited 
out for clarity (my italics): “In particular, this endeavor aims to foster col-
laborative scholarly research on Sephardic Jews and crypto-Jews in the greater 
Southwest United States and the world.” 
Like the global academic community, I would welcome any new Program 
that generates research according to academic scholarship norms and fieldwork 
ethics. But a mission statement that explicitly validates a historically and cultur-
ally significant settlement of secretly-professing Spanish Jews, for which there 
is no historical or cultural evidence, and which is refuted by the same genetic 
evidence given to support it, promises to legitimate pseudo-ethnography, bad 
science and quack medicine as modern academic scholarship; the legacy of 
nineteenth century sophistry as exemplified in the crypto-Jewish canon. 
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“Jewish Genes”: Ancient Priests  
and Modern Jewish Identity
Wesley K. Sutton
In most of the world’s religions, changing or abandoning one’s religion means 
that one is no longer a member of that faith group. Contrary to the norm of 
other religions, if a person leaves the Jewish religion, one is still usually per-
ceived as being Jewish, especially by the non-Jewish community. Throughout 
history, Jewish identity has been understood as more than accepting the tenets 
and observing the traditions of the Jewish religion.
Historically and today, paternal and maternal parentage (one or both) 
has been used to determine identity as a member of the Jewish people. For 
this reason, among others, the Jewish people have often been considered a 
“race,” with the explicit biological meaning of that term. Notions of Jews as a 
biologically distinct group, or a race, have variously been used to establish legal 
parameters for Jewish identity both by elements in the Jewish community and 
by non-Jews. The use of the word “tribe” in the context of the Jewish people 
also has an implicit connotation of relatedness, setting the Jewish people apart 
from other populations.
In addition, both Jewish and non-Jewish populations have developed, 
and continue to generate, a multiplicity of folk traditions on “Who is a Jew?” 
On a more formal basis, scholars have been considering oral traditions, arche-
ology, and historical records in order to answer the same question. Inevitably, 
these data are often incomplete, unstable over time, and are not always con-
gruent. The recent addition of genetic data to the question of Jewish identity 
is important and exciting and can add new insights as well as supplement and 
clarify our understanding.1
A critical aspect of these new data, however, is that criteria need to be 
established for dealing with the inevitable discrepancies between genetic data 
and previous research based on those oral traditions, archeology, and historical 
records. The question then arises as to what, or if, genetic data can contribute 
to questions of Jewish identity.
When genomic science does not support traditional, and often cher-
ished, assumptions, problems may occur in integrating and interpreting these 
data.2 Scientists, in the interest of accuracy, strive to gain congruent, scien-
tifically accurate information. But particularly in the larger community, when 
traditional concepts of Self and Other are challenged by new information from 
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the genome, the impetus can shift—even inadvertently—by adjusting facts to 
fit assumptions, inevitably resulting in incongruent, scientifically inaccurate 
information (scientists, of course, are also liable to misinterpreting new data.). 
The worst atrocities in human history have been driven, at least in part, by 
such misuse of scientific data, and much tragedy might have been prevented 
with better and more widely accepted information. 
One such assumption, supposedly verified by genetic research, is that 
Jewish identity is expressed in “Jewish genes,” and more specifically, that there 
is a “Jewish Priest gene” that traces to the biblical Aaron, the founder of a 
priestly lineage. Following the etymology of the name Cohen from the Hebrew 
word for “priest” [kohen], this purported lineage marker was originally termed 
the “Cohen Modal Haplotype” (CMH), and it caused great excitement at the 
popular level. Much of the excitement regarding the genetic data came from 
its seeming to support biblical accounts of the origin of the kohanim. This 
popular reconstruction of the genomic past—although scientifically intriguing 
in a number of ways, and not to be dismissed entirely—lacks validity and will 
be challenged here. 
THe COHeN MOdAl HAPlOTyPe
Our recent ability to determine the sequence of dNA in human genomes has given 
us access to a vast repository of new information about our biological heritage. 
In our genome, the y chromosome is unique, as it is inherited by males 
only, directly from their fathers. For genealogical purposes, therefore, it can 
be used for (and is limited to) identifying paternal lineages. In a well-known 
story, in 1997 Karl Skorecki recognized the implication of the mode of inheri-
tance of the y chromosome for the paternally inherited Kohen status among 
Jewish populations. Working with a team of geneticists, dNA samples were 
collected from self-identified kohanim, and data from the y chromosome were 
analyzed.3 One result of this study was the claim to have found a genetic motif 
(a defined set of genetic markers) on the y chromosome that was exclusive 
to kohanim. Named the Cohen Modal Haplotype, later studies seemed to 
support this finding.4 The popularization of these findings has even led some 
males with no familial history of Judaism to claim Jewish identity, basing their 
claim on their having this genetic motif on their y chromosome. 
Here we examine the scientific validity of such claims, asking: (1) Are 
there genetic motifs unique to the Jewish people or any subset of the Jewish 
population (for example, the CMH); and (2) can dNA be used to distinguish 
Jewish populations from other Middle eastern populations? 
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 In order to evaluate the validity of the CMH and the claims made for 
it, we need to understand the genetic basis of the CMH.
THe GeNeTICS OF THe COHeN MOdAl HAPlOTyPe
Contrary to popular understanding, the CMH is not actually a gene. By far the 
largest portion, approximately 98 percent, of the human genome is noncoding; 
that is, most dNA does not determine the production of proteins. Formerly 
called “junk dNA,” recent research has shown that much of this noncoding 
dNA serves some function, although we still have much to learn about it. For 
several reasons having to do with the ability to accurately reconstruct genetic his-
tory, we preferentially look for markers of ancestry in the noncoding dNA, not 
in the genes.
Our dNA accumulates mutations naturally over time, and if a mutation 
occurs on the y chromosome of an individual male, all of his male descendants 
will carry that mutation. Therefore all males who have a particular mutation, 
called a “marker,” can be identified as descended from a single male ancestor. 
By looking at different markers, relationships between males can be identified. 
Another way to think of it is that a particular marker, or set of markers, found 
on the y chromosome identifies a specific male lineage in the same way that a 
surname does in a traditional Western culture. 
HAPlOGROUPS
Genetic mutations to our dNA occur at different rates. One type of rare muta-
tion identifies older (and therefore usually larger) groups of related individuals, 
or lineages.5 These are called “haplogroups” and they determine the groups we 
are becoming familiar with, such as J, its subgroups J1 and J2, and literally 
hundreds of others (for example, e3b and R1b). Haplogroup J1c3 (formerly 
J1e), defined by a mutation known as P-58, is the focus of a recent major study 
by Michael F. Hammer and colleagues.6 This haplogroup is the basis for what 
they describe as the “extended Cohen Modal Haplotype” (described below). 
Methods have been developed for determining the approximate time of 
origin of a lineage, and researchers assigned letters to the major y chromo-
some haplogroups, with the oldest known given the letter A, the next oldest 
B, and so on.7 For example, the P-58 mutation defining haplogroup J1c3 
has an estimated date of origin that varies widely, both because of the differ-
ent methodologies used and because of the large margins of error inherent in 
these estimates; Hammer et al. (2009) published a date range from 13,400 
to 24,600 years ago, centering around 19,000 years ago.8 The J, incidentally, 
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has nothing to do with “Jewish,” it was simply the letter assigned to the hap-
logroup after I and before K.9
Haplogroup J1c3 cannot be used by itself to determine Jewish identity, 
for two obvious reasons. First, although the dates for the origin of this lineage 
vary widely, they are all well before the origin of the groups we call Jewish, or 
Arab, or even Semitic. Second, because the lineage is so large and widespread, 
it does not distinguish between the modern groups of interest. For example, 
Hammer et al. (2009) found this haplogroup in 21.2 percent of their Jewish 
subjects (46.1 percent in kohanim), but at even higher frequencies in other 
Middle eastern populations; as high as 67 percent in Bedouins and yemenis.10 
It is important to note that this haplogroup does not identify Jewish popula-
tions specifically; rather, it identifies a probable Middle eastern paternal ancestor. 
HAPlOTyPeS
Another type of mutation occurs much more frequently, and these often vary 
between individuals. Therefore they can be used to identify smaller, more 
closely related lineages. They are called “haplotypes.” A haplotype is usually 
defined by several of these mutations. By using several of these markers, we 
can even distinguish between individuals, as is done in “dNA fingerprinting.” 
Haplotypes can then be used to further subdivide the larger haplogroups 
into smaller, more limited, lineages. Unlike haplogroups, they are not nec-
essarily unique. In other words, although membership in two haplogroups 
simultaneously is not possible unless one is a subgroup of a more inclusive 
haplogroup, many people, not necessarily closely related, can have the same 
haplotype. For example, one may belong to haplogroups J and J1 (but not 
both J1 and J2), and J1c3. An important aspect of this methodology is that 
two individuals may have the same haplotype, but unless they belong to the 
same haplogroup, they are not closely related for the markers in question.
Individuals sharing a haplotype are likely to share an ancestor, provided 
that they also belong to the same haplogroup. An analogy is that of two indi-
viduals having the same first name but different last names. In other words, 
two individuals, one belonging to haplogroup J1 and the other to haplogroup 
J2, are not in the same lineage (in terms of their y chromosomes), even if they 
share the same haplotype.
THe vAlIdITy OF THe COHeN MOdAl HAPlOTyPe
With this background in genetics, let’s review the well-known Cohen Modal 
Haplotype and some of its less well-known aspects, as it relates to Jewish iden-
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tity. As described above, in the mid-1990s, several researchers in Canada, the 
United States, and england began collecting dNA samples from Jewish popu-
lations in order to test whether the paternally inherited kohen status would be 
matched by the paternally inherited y chromosome. 
Their first results, published in 1997, supported this relationship.11 Con-
tinuing to collect and test dNA samples, and adding to the markers identified, 
several of the same researchers and colleagues published a paper showing that 
a set of six (fast-evolving) markers was identical for most of the self-identified 
kohens in their sample, and this became known as the Cohen Modal Haplo-
type.12 The proposed CMH became the basis for identifying Jewish ancestry in 
several populations, under the assumption that if the CMH was found in sig-
nificant numbers in a population, that population included Jewish ancestors.13 
The work was excellent for the time, but the research results had some weak-
nesses. even as the concept (usually misnamed in popular accounts as the “Jewish 
Gene” or “Jewish Priestly Gene”) achieved widespread influence and became fixed 
in the popular literature, criticisms appeared in the scientific literature.14 
As more populations were tested, the proposed CMH was found in sig-
nificant frequencies in non-Jewish populations, especially in the Middle east 
among Arabs and Kurds. Recognizing this, several members of the original 
research group, working with additional researchers, published a new study, 
rejecting the validity of their original CMH. As they stated, “A survey of our 
database confirms that [y] chromosomes carrying the original CMH are not 
specific to either Cohanim or Jewish populations.”15
Adding substantially to their database and incorporating studies from 
other researchers, they proposed an “extended Cohen Modal Haplotype,” 
based on the much larger sample and including non-Jewish populations and 
many more markers.16 The extended CMH is a motif of twelve fast-evolving 
markers in the lineage defined by haplogroup J1c3–P58. In other words, males 
carrying the haplotype defined by sharing those twelve markers can be consid-
ered part of the same lineage only if they also share the haplogroup J1c3–P58.
The extended CMH demonstrates greater specificity then the original 
CMH, being more limited in its distribution. As the researchers state,
The extended CMH and its two related haplotypes are observed 
only among Cohanim (29.8%) and Israelites (1.5%) (i.e., it is com-
pletely absent from the levites and non-Jews surveyed here). We 
also performed a search of the current literature . . . and found a 
similar pattern: the original CMH is present in several Near eastern 
populations, while the extended CMH is extremely rare outside of 
Jewish populations.17
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After noting that the J1c3/P–58 lineage is by far the largest lineage 
in their sample, they note that twenty other haplogroups are represented, 
although most of them are quite rare, and conclude, “evidence [from our 
study] supports the formulation that males from other remote lineages also 
contributed to the Jewish priesthood, both before and after the separation of 
Jewish populations in the diaspora.”18 
INTeRPReTATION BIASeS
Genetic data are reality based, but are not always easy to interpret, and inter-
pretations may differ, even among highly qualified researchers, for completely 
valid reasons. The Hammer et al. (2009) study shows that approximately 
30 percent (with a 95 percent confidence interval of between 23 percent and 
36 percent) of the tested self-identified kohanim carry an identical chromo-
some (the extended CMH),19 and some researchers may focus on that result 
to argue that the kohanim lineage is descended from one paternal ancestor and 
may even relate that ancestor to the biblical Aaron. 
Other researchers may argue that because 70 percent of the tested 
kohanim do not have that chromosome, and in fact kohanim in this sample 
carry twenty-one different haplogroups, kohanim cannot be considered as a 
single lineage, and so kohen status should be treated simply as tradition, with 
no true basis in ancestry. 
THe COHeN MOdAl HAPlOTyPe  
IN THe PUBlIC UNdeRSTANdING
The excitement and widespread popularization of the original CMH mean 
that there have been many articles, websites, and books including it in their 
discussions. Many of the authors of this material, understandably unfamiliar 
with the science, tended to emphasize the story, often perpetuating misin-
formation in the process. As with many concepts based on science, when 
the original research is superseded and the earlier research results are no 
longer valid, public understanding often lags behind that of the scientific 
community. 
Scientists are used to, and embrace, new research and new understand-
ing. So when research showed that the original CMH was flawed and new 
research supplanted it, scientists typically accepted the new results immedi-
ately. A search of the public literature reveals, however, that most of it is still 
based on the original CMH; even new articles and websites continue to use 
the now discredited original CMH.
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OTHeR ISSUeS OF IdeNTITy
The question, then, is what can the CMH contribute to our understanding 
of Jewish identity? If we accept that approximately 30 percent of modern self-
identified kohanim are descended from a single paternal ancestor who lived 
between 2,100 and 4,280 years ago,20 does this mean that only those kohanim 
carrying this particular y chromosome should be considered “true” kohanim? 
david Goldstein and colleagues estimated that 4–5 percent of male Jews 
today are kohanim,21 and that (using an estimated worldwide Jewish popula-
tion of 13 million, half of them males) there are perhaps 260 to 325 thousand 
kohanim. Testing all of them would show, based on the figures given, that 70 
percent (180 to 225 thousand) will not possess the CMH. Should they lose 
their status? Who decides? 
Conversely, using a dNA-based criterion, should we now consider the 
significant number of Israelites (1.5 percent in Hammer et al. 2009, equaling 
perhaps 100,000 males)22 who have this chromosome to be kohanim, even 
though they have no tradition of that status? 
The main thrust of this paper has been to argue that it is inevitable and 
necessary that the increasing amount of genetic data be taken into account 
concerning Jewish identity, but it would be unwise to rely on it exclusively, and 
the ramifications must be considered carefully and thoughtfully. 
Clearly, the CMH is neither sufficient nor necessary to establish kohen 
status in the Jewish community. Possession or nonpossession of the CMH in 
one’s genome may be of interest, but incorporating it into the definition of 
a kohen carries a very real danger, that of a hierarchy. If a Jewish male has a 
family tradition of kohen status and the CMH, does that make him more of a 
kohen, or a better kohen? Conversely, does possession of the CMH automati-
cally confer kohen status, or even Jewish identity, on a male? Should everyone 
possessing the CMH be granted the Right of Return, whether or not they have 
any knowledge of Jewish ancestry? 
THe ORIGIN OF THe COHeN MOdAl HAPlOTyPe
As described above, haplogroup J1c3 has been estimated to have originated 
between 13,400 and 24,600 years ago, with a date centering around 19,000 
years ago.23 Clearly, this date is well before the origin of the Jewish people. 
This haplogroup probably originated in either Anatolia or the Middle east, 
most likely in eastern Anatolia.24
But what about the CMH? Because the markers used to define it are of 
the fast-evolving type, the origin of this haplotype could be much more recent, 
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and analyses support a more recent origin. All analyses require some prior 
assumptions (for example, generation time and mutation rate) and changing 
these parameters will affect the results. For example, various studies have used 
generation times of 25, 30, and 33 years; changing them will have a significant 
effect on the time we assign for the origin of a lineage. 
Hammer and colleagues, using calculated mutation rates for this type of 
mutation,25 estimated that this lineage arose between 2,100 and 4,280 years 
ago, with a date centering around 3,190 years ago, excitingly near the esti-
mates for the date of the First Temple.26 
THe KOHeN lINeAGe ANd MOdeRN KOHeN STATUS
Kohen status today is generally based on tradition, passed down from gen-
eration to generation. Because it is, as a practical matter, impossible to prove 
direct lineal descent, kohen status is usually accepted if one claims to be a 
kohen. As stated by yaakov HaKohen Kleiman, codirector of the Center For 
Kohanim, Jerusalem:
A Kohen Muchzak is one who has a family tradition that he is a 
Kohen, with no known reason to suspect otherwise. If one claims 
to be a Kohen, his claim is generally accepted, unless there is reason 
to suspect otherwise. . . . Presently, being unable to establish who 
is a Kohen of pure descent, all Kohanim have the status of Kohen 
Muchzak. . . . Halakha—Jewish religious law—sanctions modern-
day Kohen status without proof of patrilineal heritage through the 
use of the halakhic concept of Chezkath Kehuna. This means that a 
person’s claim to be a Kohen is enough to give one the halakhaic sta-
tus of a Kohen if the claim cannot be disputed. There are dissenting 
views in halakhic sources as to the status of modern-day Kohanim. 
Some insisted that we should consider a modern-day Kohen a Safek 
Kohen, or Kohen of doubtful status, because no proof exists as to 
his lineage. Others insisted that because of Chezkath Kehuna, we are 
able to consider a Kohen a Vadai Kohen, or Kohen of certain status, 
in all respects.27 
THe COHeN MOdAl HAPlOTyPe ANd THe BIBle
We also need to consider the kohen lineage as described in the Bible. In mod-
ern terms, what would the genetic consequences be and what would we find 
in the dNA of modern self-identified kohanim? According to the account 
in exodus, Jacob had twelve sons, giving rise to the twelve traditional Jewish 
tribes. Moses and his brother Aaron were levites, direct paternal descen-
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dants of levi, third son of Jacob. Aaron the levite and his descendants were 
appointed to their priestly duties, becoming the kohanim of tradition. 
Based on our modern understanding of genetics and inheritance, all 
levites would therefore share the identical y chromosome, whether kohanim 
descended from Aaron or not. In addition, all descendants of Abraham (via 
Isaac and Jacob) should have the identical y chromosome. 
Therefore, if we accept the evidence from studies of the y chromosome, 
showing the extended CMH in kohanim but not in levites and in only a 
small percentage of Israelites, the biblical account of descent and relationships 
cannot be a true account. 
This result does not invalidate kohen status because kohen status, much 
less Jewish identity, does not depend exclusively on genetic makeup. Two 
respected geneticists, david Goldstein and Harry Ostrer, have each written 
books on the topic of Jewish identity in the dNA era. While recognizing 
distinctive patterns of genetic markers in Jewish populations, they concur on 
this. Goldstein states: “All I can do is echo what Tudor Parfitt has written: 
‘Jewishness is not a matter of dNA.’”28 Oster has written that “there is no rig-
orous genetic test for Jewishness. . . . Moreover, such a test would not replace 
the religious definition of who is a Jew.”29 
BeyONd THe COHeN MOdAl HAPlOTyPe
Since the CMH was first described, new genetic data have been accumulating 
rapidly. In addition to more y chromosome data (more than 600 y chromo-
some markers have been published), data from mitochondrial dNA (mtdNA) 
have been studied. Mitochondrial dNA, being inherited maternally, gives 
information about maternal lineages corresponding to, and complementing, 
data from the y chromosome. 
even more striking, with the technology developed for the Human 
Genome Project, it has become possible to analyze the much larger amount 
of dNA in the rest of the human genome. Thus, rather than identifying a 
maternal lineage (accounting for .0005 percent) of our genome or the paternal 
lineage (accounting for 2 percent of a male’s genome), something approaching 
the entirety of our ancestors’ contribution to our personal genome is becom-
ing known.30 
Clearly, although vast amounts of data have been collected and analyzed, 
the research, and our understanding of the genetics of human populations, are 
still in their early stages. We will certainly learn more about the history of the 
Jewish people and will coordinate it with our traditional historical methods. It 
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is also clear that the distribution of the CMH cannot be explained by simple 
chance; however, in my view, the explanations so far advanced, although 
appealing, are not correct.
Research into Jewish dNA has contributed greatly to our understanding 
of Jewish history and relationships, and new studies will surely continue to add 
to our knowledge. Further research and analysis will probably provide better 
explanations for the origin of the CMH, and one thing we can expect for sure 
is to be surprised at some of the future findings. 
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Conversion in Transition: Practical, Conceptual, 
and Halachic Changes in Israel 
Naftali Rothenberg 
The “Who is A Jew?” public debate in Israel of the fifties has had constitu-
tional ramifications but no influence on the situation of conversion appli-
cants.1 Arguments in the newspapers and at the Knesset struggled with the 
legal definition of the law that allows automatic citizenship to every Jew in the 
entire world. At the same time the rabbinical courts [batei din], converted to 
Judaism thousands of applicants in a process that took no more then a year. 
The condition of the conversion applicants’ population in today’s Israel 
is entirely different. The process in rabbinical courts has become four to five 
times longer than in the past; and many applicants are waiting an extended 
period of time, sometimes years, for authorization to begin with the process. 
All this has an effect on a large population in Israel. 
In this article I will introduce a general picture of the conversion status 
in contemporary Israel and a brief summery of the bureaucratic factors in the 
current crisis. Views of different streams in Israeli society, like ultra-Orthodox 
and religious Zionists, will be briefly referred to. 
My main focus will be on the radical halachic changes regarding conver-
sion that took place in rabbinical courts. I will deal with questions flowing 
from and related to these changes through meta-halachic discourse. 
Halachic transformations and differences between rabbinical courts that 
acted from the fifties to the seventies and rabbinical court activity in the last 
thirty years generate a description of two entirely different systems. The essen-
tial understanding of this change is critical to the study of “Who is a Jew?” in 
contemporary Israel. 
IN beTWeeN: THe INdIVIduAl ANd THe COlleCTIVe 
In France at the beginning of the 1940s, Madeleine Ferraille, a young French 
woman of about twenty, married with a son, felt a strong attraction to Juda-
ism—an attraction that led her on an extraordinary life’s journey. Not long 
after she married, she separated from her husband, became active in the French 
Resistance, and helped save Jews. later she studied literature, history, and 
philosophy at the university of Toulouse and at the Sorbonne. When she was 
in her thirties, she and her son converted to Judaism and began living as fully 
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observant religious Jews. She made aliyah [immigrated to Israel] and found her 
place in an ultra-Orthodox community; her son enrolled in a yeshivah.
In the summer of 1965, when she was in her forties, Madeleine, by then 
going by her Jewish name of Ruth ben-david, was at the center of a major 
uproar within the Eda Haredit [the separatist non-Zionist ultra-Orthodox 
community] in Jerusalem. This fierce debate, which triggered a countrywide 
media festival, erupted when she became engaged to the venerable leader of 
the anti-Zionist Neturei Karta movement, Rabbi Amram blau, a 71-year-old 
widower.2 The religious court of the Eda Haredit summoned Rabbi blau to 
appear before it and instructed him to call off the engagement and not to 
marry the convert. The court’s ruling was quite exceptional and, what is more, 
was not couched in standard halachic language: “This court decrees that no 
one among the heads of the eda Haredit and its leadership, and certainly not 
an exalted person like Rabbi Amram, may marry a convert, because of the dis-
solute ways of the generation and for a number of other reasons that we keep 
to ourselves.”3
Stringent attitudes or reservations about the acceptance of converts can 
be found in the halachic literature from the Talmudic era to the present and 
have been amply described by scholars.4 An interesting meta-halachic ques-
tion related to this issue, one that has been discussed at length, is whether 
conversion is primarily an acceptance of the obligation to observe the precepts 
or admission to the Jewish collective. The conversion process itself has three 
halachic elements: circumcision (for males), immersion in a ritual bath, and 
becoming acquainted with or taking on the precepts. The last of these stands 
at the center of a halachic and exegetical debate that has raged for generations 
and that has intensified in the modern age, especially in the last three decades. 
The meta-halachic question about the essence of conversion is linked to this 
dispute. In practice, the standards for the acceptance of converts were set by 
each local community for itself; some were more stringent and other more 
lenient. In general, though, and except for extraordinary cases, converts and 
their descendants have always been accepted not only in their own communi-
ties but throughout the Jewish world, even by communities that had reserva-
tions about accepting converts.5
Is the approach described in the meta-halachic literature, which sees 
conversion as the assumption of the obligation to observe the precepts, nec-
essarily more stringent than that which sees conversion as joining the Jewish 
collective? The position taken by the rabbinical court of the Eda Haredit, in 
view of the possibility that one of its leaders might marry a convert, removed 
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the acceptance of a convert from the standard halachic envelope. The court’s 
ruling stemmed from a desire to preserve the boundaries of the collective 
by imposing restrictions on a leader. Rabbi blau was perfectly aware of this, 
of course. He announced that he was determined to marry his fiancée and 
would disregard the rabbinical court’s ruling. The man who had never gone 
outside the Jerusalem city limits since he was a child left the jurisdiction of 
the rabbinical court and moved to bene beraq, where he married the convert 
Ruth ben-david.
Thus the idea that conversion is an act of joining the Jewish collec-
tive depends on the collective community interest or on what the rabbinical 
court deems to be the interests of the entire Jewish people. The court in one 
community may adopt a lenient stance toward the acceptance of a particular 
convert, whereas in a similar case the court in another town may reject the 
applicant. The differences between these two attitudes have to do primarily 
with the perceived role of the rabbinical court in the conversion process. If 
the essence of conversion is joining the Jewish collective, the court has broad 
discretion that goes far beyond the bounds of halachic formulas. What is 
more, the rabbinical court, as a central institution that represents the entire 
community, must decide in accordance with the norms, limits, and interests 
of the community, even before it tries to determine the candidate’s inten-
tions. The obligation to observe the commandments and the willingness to 
do so become secondary matters or are merely instrumental to preserving and 
strengthening the collective. by contrast, if the essence of conversion is accep-
tance of the obligation to observe the precepts, the religious court has only 
limited discretion. As the halachic literature states explicitly, if a candidate 
stubbornly insists on converting, despite repeated rejections by the rabbinical 
court, the court no longer has the right to turn him away and must accept 
him. All other considerations are irrelevant.
The differences also relate to the community’s involvement in the con-
version process. The idea that conversion means joining the collective expands 
the rabbinical court’s discretion but at the same time gives the community 
a standing in the proceedings, starting with the selection of judges who are 
committed to the collective interests and running to the actual participation 
of community institutions, in various ways, in the process itself (teaching 
the candidates, attempting to influence the judges to accept them after the 
completion of their studies, and so on). The halachic literature hardly rec-
ognizes such community participation. It describes the conversion process as 
a dialogue between the candidate and the rabbinical court, with no outside 
120                                                   Who Is a Jew? Reflections on History, Religion, and Culture
involvement. Today, in fact, the bulk of the conversion process takes place 
outside of the courtroom and candidates are fully prepared for the actual act 
of conversion before they face the judges.
THe CONVeRSION TRANSFeRRAl 
In the second half of the twentieth century, we have witnessed a drastic 
and rapid change in the conversion process.6 From the end of World War 
II through the 1970s, thousands of converts, most of them women,7 were 
accepted in Israel and in Orthodox communities throughout the world. The 
process included the court’s interrogation of candidates, as described in the 
sources: the court told them that they would be better off not converting;8 that 
one can be a righteous gentile and observe only the seven Noahide precepts. 
If the candidate insisted and returned to the court a second or third time, he 
or she was converted. The entire process was completed in three sessions and 
lasted an average of ten months. This was the traditional route, the same as 
had been followed in Jewish communities from time immemorial. Many of 
the new converts came from secular communities like kibbutzim and returned 
there. No one imposed any conditions on them. All the judges on these courts, 
without exception, were haredim [ultra-Orthodox].
Starting in the mid-1970s, however, the conversion process became more 
complicated and protracted.9 Candidates were required to attend a lengthy 
conversion course—at first six months, later a year or two or even more. They 
had to persuade the rabbinical court that they were planning to live in a com-
munity where it would be possible to observe the Sabbath and other precepts. 
They were also required to have an observant foster family to help them 
through the process. None of this was motivated by an intention to make the 
candidates miserable; the reasons were bureaucratic. The rise in immigration 
to Israel, chiefly from the Soviet union, placed a great burden on the limited 
number of rabbinical courts that served the entire population in all matters of 
personal status: marriage, divorce, inheritance, and so on. 
To cope with the problem, Rabbi Shlomo Goren, the then Ashkenazi 
Chief Rabbi of Israel, established conversion preparatory seminars to assist 
in the process. Representatives of these seminars began to appear in the court 
to testify about their graduates’ bona fides. The rabbinical courts fell into the 
habit of going beyond the questions of principle mandated by the Shulhan 
Arukh and quizzing candidates on the material they had studied at the conver-
sion preparatory seminar. As a result, programs that were intended to facilitate 
the acceptance of converts actually made things much more difficult for them 
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and swiftly altered the standard halachic procedure for the acceptance of con-
verts. It bears note that these seminars were institutions of National Religious 
Zionism, which generally favors the acceptance of converts for nationalist and 
ideological motives.
The mass immigration from the former Soviet union in the 1990s made 
it necessary to add a new bureaucratic element to the conversion process. The 
Conversion Administration was set up to carry out most conversions in special 
courts with panels consisting of national-religious Zionist dayanim [judges] 
because the regular rabbinical courts collapsed under the load. The administra-
tion coordinated between the conversion academy system and the special courts. 
but this system, founded with the best of intentions, turned into a depressing 
trap for most conversion candidates. The stipulations for the acceptance of 
converts, starting with their preparatory education, continuing with the topics 
on which they were examined by the rabbinical courts, and culminating in the 
added demands, created something new and totally different, a model of con-
version that had never previously existed among the Jewish people.
It is necessary to look carefully at one interesting fact: the outcome of 
national-religious rabbis’ involvement and participation in conversion processes 
as initiators of the preparatory seminars and as dayanim in the rabbinical courts 
did not simplify the process for the candidates but complicated it. We can of 
course blame the bureaucracy described above, but it is only part of the story. 
To achieve a comprehensive understanding, we need to look profoundly at 
what is standing beyond bureaucracy: ideology and national-religious identity. 
To the analysis of the national-religious ideology we need to anticipate 
a note on the haredi position. The haredi view toward converts is nonideo-
logical and a very simple one. In principle, it based on the classical halachic 
way of conversion in the rabbinical court with no special preparations and 
of course without conversion preparatory seminars. The haredi communities 
themselves are not inclusive to converts as we have seen from the extreme 
case of Ruth ben-david. These two components, a simple, nonideological, 
and nonbureaucratic haredi approach to conversion on the one hand, and an 
exclusive communal policy on the other, have made the haredi dayanim easy 
for the candidates. As noted above, this has allowed them to receive in a simple 
traditional process thousands of converts to Judaism from after the Holocaust 
until the 1970s. 
Contrary to the haredi view, the national-religious spiritual leadership 
supports conversion because of religious and political ideology and as an out-
come of the concept of the modern return to Zion as a religious process.10 The 
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change from a communal conversion to a state conversion is problematic and 
basically unacceptable from the haredi point of view. For national-religious 
rabbis it is an important and even essential implementation of their ideology.
but precisely in the halachic-practical field the national-religious posi-
tion is more detailed then the haredi view, more comprehensive, and less flex-
ible. In most cases, the ideological national viewpoint doesn’t allow more easy 
expression of the conversion process for the individual candidate. There are 
those who explain that the national-religious rabbis feel that they have to prove 
to themselves and others that they are acting in accordance to halachah, while 
the haredi rabbis don’t have to prove anything to anyone. 
I tend to believe that the strictness is authentic, and it flows and 
strengthens from the religious-national ideological approach. It is precisely the 
religious stream that is interested in principle in the acceptance of converts, 
mainly those who immigrated to Israel, that has shown many times practi-
cally less openness and flexibility in the conversion process. This argument 
presents the question of convert acceptance in Israel in a different way than 
it appears in public discourse. The common way of understanding it is as a 
haredi-Zionist religious dispute. It looks like the problem originates from the 
religious Zionist position or at least from the view of a few streams and rabbis 
within religious Zionism. 
We need to look a little more carefully at the way described above of 
Rabbi Goren’s actions on conversions. On the one hand, he came from a 
haredi background that allows him to see the conversion process in its tra-
ditional halachic simplicity. On the other hand, he adapted and developed 
national-religious ideology.11 unlike the national-religious dayanim after his 
time, he converted in a simple and short process; for example, the acceler-
ated and simple conversion process in the IdF rabbinical court under Rabbi 
Goren’s leadership (and his followers Rabbis Piron and Navon who continue 
his conversion method) is incomparable to the process conducted by the 
Zionist-religious IdF chief rabbis in the past seven years. 
RedeFINING CONVeRSION:  
FROM COMMuNITy PROCeSS TO GOVeRNMeNT ACT
The conversion authority, this vast apparatus, is a government agency—and 
not just one more government agency, but a department in the Prime Min-
ister’s Office.12 ever since david ben-Gurion, and especially in the last two 
decades, Israeli prime ministers have viewed the conversion of tens (and if 
possible hundreds) of thousands of non-Jewish immigrants as a national chal-
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lenge. In their eyes, conversion is an important tool for absorbing immigrants 
in Israel, for their socialization and acculturation, and makes a direct contri-
bution to bolstering the Jewish majority in the nation-state.13 They could not 
leave such an important matter in the hands of the religious affairs ministry. 
but the political decisions by secular prime ministers also had far- 
reaching halachic implications. They did not carry out their policy through a 
secular conversion apparatus in the spirit of a proposal floated by former min-
ister dr. yossi beilin;14 instead, they established a religious system to serve this 
policy. (Note that the major secular parties in Israel have never been interested 
in the separation of religion and state. Quite the contrary, religion has always 
been an instrument in the service of their policy and remains so today.) This 
system, as noted, comprises observant Jews, most of them rabbis affiliated with 
the National Religious stream, who as a matter of principle want to complete 
the immigrants’ naturalization by their conversion to Judaism. In fact, the 
Conversion Administration was unable to handle the burden and became an 
obstacle to the conversion of thousands of persons.15
About ten years ago, the government shut down the original Conver-
sion Administration and replaced it with a new version. The second avatar, 
headed by Rabbi Haim druckman, was staffed by National Religious rabbis 
who were graduates of the same yeshivas as the rabbis of the first Conversion 
Administration. This Conversion Administration Mark II endeavored to speed 
up the conversion process and simplify the requirements, but with no great 
success. The reaction was not long in coming, in the form of a challenge to 
the authority of the rabbis of the second Conversion Administration and the 
rejection of their converts by a panel of the Supreme Rabbinical Court. The 
general media in Israel presented the conversion controversy as an ideological 
clash between the ultra-Orthodox and the religious Zionists. The sad truth, 
however, is much simpler. This is not an ideological debate at all, but a battle 
for power and money and rabbinic authority, mainly within the National Reli-
gious rabbinic camp. However, ultra-Orthodox rabbis see themselves as the 
defenders of the ramparts and take part in the public debate, expressing views 
that totally ignore the past rulings of their own predecessors.
In a theocracy, the state establishments vacuum the religious commu-
nities from different religious authorities. Sometimes they delegate part of 
these authorities back to the communities. but Israel is not a theocracy but 
a nation state and a secular democracy. As a result of its constitutional his-
tory, the State of Israel does not practice a total separation between state and 
religious establishments. The rabbinate is part of the government system, and 
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rabbinical tribunals are part of the courts system. The outcome of this situation 
is a creation of a complicated reality in issues related to citizens’ personal status. 
As noted above, rabbis disagree along generational lines whether conver-
sion is primarily an acceptance of the obligation to observe the precepts or 
admission to the Jewish collective. The first is an individual move; the second 
is considered to be a communal act in the public arena. We also noted the fact 
that the requirements were different from one community to the other. The 
requirements weren’t equal for all conversion candidates sometimes in the very 
same community. 
As observed earlier, the basic halachic requirement is simple: circumci-
sion (for males), immersion in a ritual bath, and becoming acquainted with 
or taking on the precepts. In other words, there are not unified, clear, and 
explicit halachic standards for the acceptance of converts. This situation is very 
problematic from the state law point of view, which requires clear and explicit 
definitions. What kind of conversion process does the secular legislator intend? 
The fact is that the Knesset definition for who is a Jew for the purposes of 
the law of Return—”who was born to a Jewish mother or converted”—leaves 
the process, the standard, undefined from the state point of view. The simple 
significance of the law is that every conversion should be recognized by the 
state for the implementation of the law of Return. As a result of this, everyone 
converted by any Jewish community in the diaspora is recognized as a Jew 
and will enjoy an automatic citizenship by the law of Return. Inside the State 
of Israel, the law practically granted this authority of the definition of the per-
sonal status only to the official rabbinate, as it does in marriage and divorce. 
The result of the transition from a communal conversion to a state con-
version is that every particular case tends to be a common and general one. 
every conversion becomes “a solution” given to a private citizen by the state. 
One might expect that the position that sees conversion as an admission 
to the Jewish collective will prevail over the position that sees conversion as a 
personal obligation by the convert to observe the precepts. In the first decades 
of statehood the former was the dominant direction. Thus, identification with 
the state-like service in the IdF influenced the rabbis’ conceptual approach to 
acceptance of converts, both in Israel (Rabbi Goren16 and others17) and in the 
diaspora (Rabbi louis bernstein18 and others19). during the last thirty years, 
demands that the candidates for conversion in Israel convert into an Orthodox 
community and be fully observant upon completion of conversion grew more 
unexpectedly. Not only this, but the transition to state conversion opened the 
gate to conversions abolitions20 or nonrecognition of conversions such as those 
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conducted by the IdF rabbinate. These phenomena were almost unknown in 
the history of communal conversions. 
The conversion process occurred through generations within commu-
nities who were different from one another in their culture, traditions, and 
norms. Common standards between these communities was limited to the 
acceptance of converts converted in one community in all or most others. 
This was also true for those communities that avoid all conversions. The 
significance of the transition from communal conversion to state conversion 
is standardization of the conversion process as a whole. by itself, this is a far-
reaching change. This change was not only an internal issue of the state but 
also generated an alteration in communal conversions throughout Orthodox 
communities in the diaspora that were required to adopt the standards of the 
state conversion. 
In a situation of no separation between religion and state on issues of 
personal status related directly to the legal situation of the individual, we usu-
ally hear an argument that in a democracy it is appropriate to limit individual 
freedom to freedom from religion. but a no less serious question requires 
consideration: does the dependence of a religious law on secular law not dam-
age its religious status? does the implementation of Torah law rely on the 
foundation of Knesset legislation? Aren’t we witnessing the phenomenon of 
secularization of the religious community? 
As described above, the traditional conversion process included the 
court’s interrogation of candidates, as it written in the halachic canonical lit-
erature:21 As noted earlier, the court told them that they would be better off 
not converting; that one can be a righteous gentile and observe only the seven 
Noahide precepts. If the candidate insisted and returned to the court a second 
or third time, he or she was accepted.
In the dialogue with the candidate in the traditional conversion the 
community court used to note Shabbat observant, Kashrut, and for woman 
candidates, Shabbat candle lighting. The assumption was that the convert 
would more or less fit himself or herself to the standards and the norms of the 
relevant community. Sometimes it happened. Many times converts became 
very strictly observant and in other cases partly observant or not at all. As 
noted, the state conversion during the past thirty years has become based on a 
comprehensive preparation of the candidates by special seminaries. The prior 
halachic knowledge required from the candidates became more and more 
extensive and detailed. Not only the details of the laws of Shabbat and holy 
days, Kashrut, and purity but also details of rules and of prayer customs. Not 
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only did the preparatory process become more complicated but it also devel-
oped a selective method that allows only those with learning skills and enough 
free time to study to be included. 
Conflict provides an inexhaustible source of creative inspiration. The 
short-term processes described here have generated a halachic and pseudo-
halachic literature that endeavors to buttress the many different positions and 
reinforce them against their rivals. Several volumes on the nullification of con-
versions have been published in the last three years, some supporting the concept 
and some totally opposed to it. It is not important whether the dominant posi-
tion in the new halachic literature tends to leniency or stringency. What matters 
is that the relatively simple halachic and community domain of the acceptance 
of converts, which prevailed for generations and especially during the past two 
hundred years as part of the autonomous community framework, has morphed 
into a complicated process carried out exclusively by the state authorities. 
SuMMARy ANd CONCluSIONS
This article presents some of the far-reaching changes in the contemporary 
conversion process in Israel during the past thirty years. Initially, conversion 
was a simple internal process that occurred within a community and was limit-
ed to a few meetings with the participation of the candidate and the members 
of the local rabbinical court. This transformed into a long process of learning 
and social and cultural training with the involvement of the state establish-
ments. The alteration was expressed with a whole new standardization of the 
process in Israel as well as the engagement of most Orthodox communities in 
the diaspora with the new normative framework.
 The essential transition includes two principal changes:
• The process of learning and prerequisite of knowledge in Judaism 
in general and in halachah and customs in particular change the 
conversion into a test of knowledge. This excludes candidates who 
for various reasons can’t engage themselves in a learning process. 
• A practice of almost full observance in accordance with Orthodox 
standards and norms prior to the conversion itself. 
Somewhat surprisingly the national-religious spiritual leadership that 
supports conversion because of religious and political ideology contributes to 
these changes by being sometimes even more detailed, more comprehensive, 
and less flexible in the halachic-practical field. At the same time they become 
a factor in the development of a new halachic system for conversion. 
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The dependence of the rabbinate and the rabbinic tribunals system on 
the secular state law develops many paradoxes and difficulties and raises a few 
unsolved inquiries for both the state and the rabbinic authorities. This article 
addressed only a few of these complexities and raised a few questions:
Can the state be the conversion service provider as a bureaucracy 
and as a democracy? 
What are the halachic significances of dependence on the secular 
law? Can we see here a secularization of the halachic authorities? 
The second question may open meta-halachic inquiry on the subject. 
It is an attempt at meta-halachic clarification that stands at the center of this 
paper. I logically assumed that the conversion change from a communal act to 
a state service will clarify the old meta-halachic dispute whether conversion is 
primarily an acceptance of the obligation to observe the precepts or admission 
to the Jewish collective. I was wrong. 
It is possible that the government will streamline the process and make 
things easier for candidates. There is no doubt that in Israel in 2014, converts 
have to satisfy demands that are quite different from those made of converts 
in the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s. These demands represent a significant change 
in the conversion process and in converts’ identities.
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Who Is a Jew in Israel? 
Netanel Fisher 
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this article is to examine if and how the State of Israel has influ-
enced the shaping of the Jewish identity. The main claim I will present here 
is that the leaders of the state attempted, at the time of its establishment, to 
shape a specific Jewish status that would be valid in a variety of contexts in 
order to ensure the existence of a broad Jewish common denominator. This 
identity was based on defining Jewishness according to formal religious crite-
ria of Jewish status and not on subjective feelings that remained under debate. 
The Israeli attempt to establish a broad common Jewish status proved 
to be successful for the early decades; however, in recent years we have 
witnessed its decline. This is due to the changes in social reality and law. 
My claim is that as long as the legal platform of the Jewish status suited 
the social and demographic state of the Jewish People in Israel and in the 
Diaspora, it held out. However, once the social picture had changed, even 
the high-level institutionalization of the Jewish identity was not able to 
stop the social processes, forcing the legal definitions of Jewish identity to 
change accordingly. The article concludes with the assumption that this 
trend will increase in the coming years.
“MINIMal JeWISH COMMON DeNOMINaTOR”— 
JeWISH IDeNTITy aS a FORMal STaTUS
according to halachah and the Jewish tradition, a Jew is whoever was born 
to a Jewish mother or has converted. This halachah actually formed the idea 
that Judaism is not a matter of subjective self-identification but rather con-
ditional on objective criteria. In this context, following Peter Berger, David 
ellenson and David Gordis justly distinguish between two important 
concepts: identity and status.1 as opposed to identity, which is based on 
psychological-emotional feelings of affiliation with a certain group, status 
is the definition of a person’s state by law. Status, being a formal factor, may 
possibly change depending on statements of solidarity or a sense of belong-
ing to a certain community, but once statutorial status has been decided, it 
stands on its own, detached from subjective feelings and emotions, sincere 
and powerful as they may be. 
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Traditionally, Judaism has been determined by a statutorial defini-
tion. The religious criteria determining Judaism are indifferent to anyone’s 
subjective Jewish identity, Jew and non-Jew alike. Jewish status is granted 
to whoever has a Jewish mother or has converted, and it is an absolute and 
unchangeable status. In this sense Jewish identity is minimalistic, since it 
relies on a number of basic tenets that depend neither on developed per-
sonal consciousness or on an agreement regarding any ideological or edu-
cational principles. Thus, for example, it has been determined that “a Jew, 
even if he has sinned, is a Jew.” In other words, personal identification with 
the principles of the Jewish religion and practical observance of its laws are 
irrelevant to Jewish status. So much so that even a Jew who has actively 
converted to a different religion, who totally identifies with another reli-
gion, and has even taken the active step of proselytization for that religion, 
cannot change his Jewish status as far as halachah is concerned; he remains 
a member of the Jewish community. at the same time, a person who was 
not born to a Jewish mother or did not convert in accordance with the for-
mal procedures will not be considered a Jew even if he feels Jewish, believes 
in God, and observes Judaism’s religious commandments. 
For most of history, there was an overlap between Jewish identity and 
subjective halachic status. The main role of religion in the general society as 
in Jewish society in the premodern era was to promise that Jews who had 
a Jewish identity were indeed Jewish also according to their formal status. 
Jews lived within closed and homogeneous communities, and religious 
norms dictated their lifestyle and created a safety net of sorts, promising 
Jewish continuity. The prohibition on the marriage of a Jew to a non-Jew 
ensured that both parents would always be Jewish; as a result, their offspring 
were spared the dilemma of choosing the identity of one of the parents. In 
order to avoid the possibility of marriage to a non-Jew, many halachic rules 
were designed so as to minimize social contact between Jews and non-Jews. 
In the positive sense, the family system that was established kedat Mosheh 
ve’yisrael [according to the law of Moses and of Israel] was considered to 
be sacred, and all other sorts of coupledom were rejected. anyone who 
deviated from these norms was harshly punished, and in certain cases the 
offspring were even considered bastards. 
This set of rules created what I call “the minimal Jewish common 
denominator.” This minimum, based on objective status definitions and 
on the safety net that ensured the persistence of this status, created a basic 
common denominator for all Jews anywhere on the globe. Different Jews 
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from all over the world could establish communities, create social ties, and 
marry among themselves, regardless of their personal and subjective views 
about the definition of Jewish identity. They were all Jewish since they were 
born of Jewish mothers or converted. This definition of Judaism based on 
“minimal Jewishness” was extremely important. The fact that formal Jew-
ish status allowed for belonging to the Jewish religion and to the Jewish 
community, at one and the same time, promised Judaism’s continuity over 
hundreds and thousands of years. The Jewish community and Jewish reli-
gion were two sides of the same coin, and both were based on an objective 
Jewish status. 
Modernity unraveled this unique Jewish linkage. For the first time in 
history the enlightened countries opened new possibilities before the Jews, 
including civil and social affiliation with the non-Jewish community. at the 
same time, the rise of enlightenment, Bundism, Zionism, and reform move-
ments, side by side with the loosening ties within the Jewish religious and 
communal settings, allowed the Jews new definitions of identity. However, as 
long as Jews met the criteria of Jewish status in terms of the minimal Jewish 
common denominator, not much importance was attached to their subjec-
tive choices. Bundist Jews, enlightened Jews, Reform and ultra-Orthodox 
Jews could continue living together and marrying each other, despite the 
gulf that opened up between them. It was not in vain that preserving that 
Jewish common denominator was considered to be a supreme interest of all 
Jewish denominations, since it ensured Jewish solidarity. and indeed only 
after many years did various Jewish groups, headed by the Reform move-
ment, dare to suggest new criteria for determining Jewish status. 
NaTIONalISM aND THe ZIONIST IDea  
aS aN alTeRNaTIve TO THe DeFINITION  
OF RelIGIOUS IDeNTITy
Right from the start, the Zionist leadership pondered the possibility of 
changing the rules of Jewish status and redrawing the boundaries of the 
national collectivity. Seemingly there was no place for debate. according to 
the common national definition, religion no longer had a role in determin-
ing the rules of national affiliation. Nationality, classically interpreted as the 
“new modern religion,” defined itself on principle by using civil definitions 
based on ethnic origin and shared culture.2 In most Western nation-states, 
religious affiliation became separated from national affiliation despite reli-
gion’s important role in the cultural heritage. as far as determining civil 
132                                                   Who Is a Jew? Reflections on History, Religion, and Culture
status for emigration purposes, naturalization, registration, and personal 
status, religion became a private issue. 
In the Zionist national movement, though, it was difficult to adopt 
the separation between religion and state. The deep historic connection 
between the Jewish religion and Jewish ethnicity, and the overlap between 
belonging to the Jewish religion and membership in the Jewish community, 
made it difficult for the founders of the state to accept the national model 
that was common in other nations. The religious narrative, also needed in 
order to drum up the masses, had to receive a respectable place in the public 
arena. as a result, even prior to the establishment of the state, some legal 
arrangements were made with the explicit purpose of anchoring religion’s 
unique status in its Orthodox sense as a means of preserving the minimal 
Jewish common denominator.3
THe STaTe OF ISRael: THe FeaR OF THe JeWISH  
NaTION’S POSSIBle DIvISION INTO TWO PaRTS
This trend was apparent in the famous letter from the Jewish agency’s 
directorate to agudath Israel, the ultra-Orthodox party, just before the 
establishment of the state in 1947. Known as the “status quo” letter, David 
Ben Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, wrote in it concerning the question 
of marriage: “all the members of the directorate comprehend the serious-
ness of the problem and the great hardships it entails, and on the part of 
all the entities represented by the Jewish agency, everything possible will be 
done to prevent the division of the House of Israel in two.”4 The fear of the 
Jewish nation splitting in two and branching off into separate communi-
ties was one of the guiding principles in the emerging agreement. The idea 
that a minimal Jewish common denominator must be preserved in order 
to ensure Jewish cohesion and solidarity was the basis for the agreement 
of the secular majority to subordinate part of the state’s laws to those of 
halachah. and indeed until the end of the 1950s a formal legal framework 
was established, aimed at ensuring that the status of Israel’s Jewish citizens 
be determined by Orthodox norms. In addition, the legal framework also 
included halachic rules to serve as safety nets to strengthen this Jewish 
orthodox minimum. 
First, the State of Israel decided to register its citizens’ religious status 
according to halachic rules. In other words, anyone born to a Jewish mother 
or converted was registered as Jewish in religion and nationality, regardless 
of his or her religious observance. This registration, done at the time of 
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birth, was extremely important beyond statistical issues or the state’s wish to 
fulfill the religious needs of its citizens. This religious registration dictated 
in advance the religious format with which the personal status of its holder 
would be dealt. National registration, defined by the religious criterion as 
well, also entailed obligations (army service) and rights (land leasing, for 
example) endowed to Jews in Israel. 
Second, immigration and naturalization in the state of Israel accord-
ing to the law of Return were limited to Jews only. The entrance of non-
Jews and their options of naturalization were limited. Contrary to other 
states, no emigration law was enacted in Israel to ensure the possibility for 
entrance of mixed families and other people, even if they were interested in 
joining the Jewish people and could have strengthened the Jewish major-
ity in the State of Israel.5 Indeed, at the time the law of Return avoided 
defining the term “Jew,” it is known that also quite a few interreligious 
families also entered Israel under its auspices. However, since interreligious 
marriages were not common in the Diaspora and the law stated explicitly 
that only Jews could immigrate to Israel, the great majority of immigrants 
were Jewish also according to their religious status. 
Third, personal status issues were subordinated to the religious rules 
and all Israel’s citizens ( Jews and non-Jews alike) were required to marry 
and divorce within the religious framework to which they were automati-
cally assigned. This situation preserved Jewish endogamy by preventing the 
performance of mixed marriages. In addition, the possibility of civil mar-
riage, the halachic status of which was in question, was blocked out. In this 
context the religious Jewish framework was Orthodox, and non-Orthodox 
religious marriages were not recognized. 
These rules opposed the accepted national model prevailing in other 
states and severely impaired basic civil rights, first and foremost the freedom 
from religion. In order to justify this, the government heads claimed it was 
essential for the sake of preserving the minimal Jewish common denomina-
tor. For example, Ben Gurion explained why the government determined 
that the rules of marriage be subordinated to the religious establishment:
Why did we accept the law of marriage and divorce? Do we 
believe that a divorce may be given only in aramaic? We accepted 
this law so as not to cause a schism in the nation of Israel, so a 
religious Jew will be able to marry the daughter of a non-religious 
Jew. We accepted this with love. We did not do it as a favor to the 
religious, but rather, we did what the leaders of the Jewish nation 
must do.6
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One may doubt the sincerity of Ben Gurion’s words. He himself married 
civilly outside of Israel (in the United States), but the fact that Ben Gurion 
the politician used these arguments publicly reflects his understanding that 
they lean on broad public consensus. 
To summarize, we might say that during the first decades of Israel’s 
statehood, a framework preserving a Jewish common denominator was 
formed based on religious boundaries. This system not only preserved the 
minimal Jewish common denominator but also worked to protect it. as a 
rule, only Jews entered Israel and were naturalized in it. Jews married only 
Jews in religious marriage. The procedure of civil registration was done 
according to the rules of halachah. Whoever was registered as a Jew in his 
or her identity card was indeed Jewish also according to the rules of the 
religious establishment. Needless to reiterate, this Jewish minimum existed 
side by side with ongoing fierce ideological debates that went on splitting 
Jewish society, but this was its charm. Despite the ideological and social 
schisms, in Israel of the 1950s and on, it was possible to assume that “all are 
Jewish”—besides of course the arab citizens, who were kept out by clear-
cut boundaries. 
Despite various cracks in this policy (such as, for instance, the practi-
cal permit for mixed families’ entrance), the secret of this move’s success 
leaned not only on legislative acts but also on a clear social and demo-
graphic reality. In those years the ratio of mixed marriages in the entire 
Jewish world was quite low, and many Jews, including those who did not 
observe the religious way of life, considered it important to marry within 
a religious framework. as a result, the ratio of mixed families requesting 
permission to enter Israel was quite low. In this sense, the unique set of 
laws formed in Israel actually reflected the face of Israeli Jewish society, 
as well as that of the Diaspora.
The question arises: could the state have continued to base its collec-
tive identity on religious-Orthodox definitions after they lost their social 
legitimacy? This paper’s main claim is that the answer to this question is 
negative. In the absence of a social foothold and with no anchorage in the 
Jewish demography, the legal framework began to crumble and the rules 
of affiliation with the Jewish collectivity began to change gradually. The 
high religious institutionalization that the State of Israel established with 
regard to the preservation of the minimal common Jewish denominator 
did not withstand the social, religious, and secular trends that evolved over 
the years. 
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THe 1980S: THe TURNING POINT
Cracks in the system became apparent from the 1960s on, although the 
breaking point came only at the end of the 1980s, when Jewish status defi-
nitions began diverging to the extent that the continuity of the common 
Jewish minimum was put into question. What brought about this change? 
First, in the late twentieth century the ratio of mixed marriages 
between Jews and non-Jews increased significantly, rising above 50 per-
cent in the majority of communities in the Diaspora. as a state absorbing 
Jewish immigration, Israel was of course affected by these demographic 
changes. and indeed when the Iron Curtain was raised and immigrants 
from the former Soviet Union entered Israel en masse, it was only natural 
for mixed families to immigrate to Israel as well. This group, consisting of 
hundreds of thousands of people, brought about a decisive change in Israeli 
Jewish society. These immigrants and their children who were born in 
Israel actually formed a new Jewish status: “non-Jewish Jews.”7 This group, 
which immigrated to Israel on the basis of immediate familial relations to 
a Jew (usually a father or grandfather), integrated into the general Jewish 
society, the IDF, the work force, and all other realms of life, creating for 
the first time in modern Jewish history a large non-Jewish group within 
the Jewish collectivity. 
It must be stressed that the definition of this group as “non-Jewish” is 
based on the religious status adopted in the context of the law of Return, 
which determined that “a Jew is one whose mother is Jewish or who has 
converted.” However, from the viewpoint of many non-Jewish immigrants, 
their Jewish ethnic origin and identification with the Jewish people and 
the State of Israel, and not the religious definition, are the criteria that 
should determine their national Jewish status. The expansion of this group, 
which is also typified by high levels of secularization, has deepened the rift 
between religious status and national Jewish status. 
another factor contributing to this change was the secular and non-
Orthodox majority’s opposition to the religious definitions. after decades 
of acceptance on the part of the secular majority, the 1990s brought about 
a broad resistance to the Orthodox monopoly. This resistance originated 
in secular activist circles that wished to come up with liberal alterna-
tives to collective Jewish identity definitions, as well as in non-Orthodox 
circles, especially from the Reform movement, which attempted to pro-
mote religious pluralism in Israel similar to that prevailing in american 
Jewish communities. These groups began promoting alternatives to the 
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Orthodox monopoly by broadening possibilities in the realms of marriage 
and coupledom as well as recognition of non-Orthodox conversion. In 
addition to these ideological trends, the intensification of the “practical” 
and a “day-to-day” secularization, which was based on the growth of the 
consumerist and capitalist society in Israel, contributed to the acceleration 
of these trends.8
Changes within religious society also influenced this trend significant-
ly. For many years the religious-Zionist community enjoyed hegemonic sta-
tus within the religious camp. The ultra-Orthodox camp, which tradition-
ally held more strict positions, was relatively small and lacking in significant 
political power. With time, the ultra-Orthodox camp grew demographically 
as well as in its self-confidence, gaining considerable political power. as a 
result, ultra-Orthodox rabbis serving within the Israeli religious establish-
ment began applying stricter religious approaches, which would have been 
unthinkable during the state’s earlier years.9 For our purposes, we note that 
these rabbis gradually began doubting the conversion certificates issued 
by the ministry of the interior, although they were based on the religious 
definition of the term “Jew.” Since the 1990s, a procedure had been formed 
by which the rabbinate itself examined the validity of the Jewishness of any 
person who arrived from abroad, even if he or she has immigrated under 
the law of Return as a Jew—for fear of forgeries and in face of claims that 
the state issued certificates that were not duly substantiated. In this process, 
termed “clarification of Jewishness,” the rabbinate began invalidating the 
Jewishness of many people who were registered as Jews in the citizens’ cen-
sus, although this registration was done, as we have mentioned, according 
to the rules of halachah. 
This process did not stop with concerns about certificates issued by the 
state’s secular entities; it seeped into the rabbinical system itself. During the 
2000s, many rabbis began refusing to recognize conversions performed by 
their rabbi colleagues, some even invalidating them entirely.10 In addition, 
the Israeli rabbinate began to doubt certificates issued by Orthodox rabbis 
in the United States, claiming that these rabbis were too liberal and could 
not be trusted. The overall meaning of this process was that the religious 
establishment began designing an alternative definition to the term “Jew.” 
The common Jewish minimum, it appeared, was too low for these rabbis, 
and they wished to create higher religious standards. These standards were 
higher not only than those of the secular state entities but also than those 
of part of the religious establishment itself. 
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THe JUDICIal-leGal CHaNGeS
These social changes could not have occurred without parallel changes tak-
ing place in the legal and judicial systems. 
as for marriage, back in the early 1960s the court had already ruled 
that even couples civilly married outside of Israel were to be registered as 
married. This trend accelerated from the 1980s on, with the high court of 
justice beginning to adopt a clearly activist secular liberal stance. In a series 
of rulings the court deepened its recognition of civil marriage and gave its 
civil registration a status close to that of recognition as actual marriage. at 
the same time, the court employed a radical interpretation for the term 
“common law marriage,” endowing this form of coupledom a far-reaching 
status, practically equating it with full recognition as a married couple. Of 
course, these rulings weakened the need for religious marriage and enabled 
the existence of interreligious cohabitation and marriage.11
a similar step was taken by the court with regard to civil registra-
tion. already in the late 1960s the court ruled that even people who had 
only a Jewish father be registered as Jewish. Responding to this verdict, the 
Knesset amended the law and obliged registration according to the rules 
of halachah. However, the court continued exercising its influence over the 
registration policy in additional ways. In a series of rulings from the late 
1980s, the court ruled that those who underwent non-Orthodox conver-
sions be registered as Jews. From this point on, whoever converted abroad 
or in Israel through Reform, Conservative, or other denominations was 
registered as Jewish. The registration of Jewishness based on a common 
denominator was gradually being eroded.12
The essential change pertaining to immigration and naturalization 
was made through primary legislation in the Knesset in 1970. as noted 
above, the original law of Return (1950) stated that only Jews could immi-
grate to Israel. However, the law abstained from defining the term “Jew.” 
This situation changed dramatically in 1970 when the laws of Return and 
Naturalization were altered as a reaction to the high court’s ruling. The new 
law stated that Jewish status is to be determined only according to religious 
parameters (“one whose mother is Jewish or who has converted”). How-
ever, in order not to hinder the unification of families (many families from 
behind the former Iron Curtain were expected to come), the Knesset deter-
mined that relatives of Jews, including their children and grandchildren, 
may also immigrate under the law of Return. This amendment put Israel 
in line with other nation-states who had set their emigration laws based on 
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“blood law,” that is, repatriation on national-ethnic basis.13 Interestingly, at 
the time, the amendment to the law of Return, which coupled the defini-
tion of Jewish identity with that of halachic status, was actually considered 
to be an achievement for the religious parties, which initiated it as a reply to 
the court ruling. But this apparent pinnacle for the religious establishment 
later turned out to have been the start of its fall. 
First, since the introduction of the conversion issue into the law, a 
powerful struggle ensued regarding the question of the validity of non-
Orthodox conversions. The Reform and Conservative movements, origi-
nating in the United States, demanded that the State of Israel recognize 
their conversions. Their demand was finally accepted by means of the high 
court ruling, which, as stated above, ruled that those converted through 
non-Orthodox conversion were also authorized to immigrate to Israel, 
where they would be registered as Jews according to the law of Return. 
From here on, the status of “Jew” in the context of the law of Return, which 
is not defined according to the rules of Orthodoxy, was separated from Jew-
ish status in the context of personal status issues, entrusted to the rabbinate. 
Second, and this is the crucial point: the amended law of Return 
opened the way for the mass immigration of people of Jewish origin who 
are not considered Jewish according to the rules of the state that, as men-
tioned above, followed the halachic criterion. Indeed, in order to cope with 
this situation Israel launched a state conversion project aimed at helping 
and encouraging these immigrants to convert, thus preserving uniformity 
between the religious definition and the national-secular definition, but 
up until the present this project has failed and the vast majority of these 
immigrants and their descendents have not converted.14
SUMMaRy: WHO IS a JeW IN  
TWeNTy-FIRST CeNTURy ISRael?
The State of Israel has failed in its attempt to establish a uniform Jewish sta-
tus, on the statutorial level as well as in the social sense. anyone attempting 
to find an answer to the question “Who is a Jew” in the laws of the State of 
Israel and in its authorities’ conduct is bound to be disappointed.
as far as personal status matters, the law did indeed recognize reli-
gious marriage as the sole option for marriage, but the high court opened 
up a variety of options for recognition of civil marriages and other forms of 
coupledom, and these are indeed proliferating, as is the rate of interreligious 
marriages. In matters pertaining to immigration and naturalization, the 
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state adopted a national-ethnic definition and opened its gates to hundreds 
of thousands of (halachically) non-Jewish immigrants and their children. 
On the other hand, the state has refused to register them as Jews, since 
registration was determined according to the halachic rules. at the same 
time, the rabbinical establishment has stopped recognizing the validity of 
this registration and carries out a “Jewishness examination” and a parallel 
registration, according to stricter religious parameters.
Demographically, among most of Israel’s Jewish citizens the overlap 
between national status and religious-Orthodox status still remains intact, 
but the minimal Jewish common denominator is gradually dissolving. In 
the 1940s Ben Gurion warned of the “division into two of the House of 
Israel,” and today this fear is becoming a reality as the common denomina-
tor sought by the founders of the state is slowly dissipating. 
These are gradual processes that are often hidden from view, but they will 
undoubtedly have a dramatic impact on Israel’s Jewish character. Will there be 
bold rabbis who will step forth and suggest halachic solutions to enable the 
continued overlap between the religious definition and the national one? Will 
the State of Israel stop being a “Jewish state” in the religious-Orthodox sense 
and adopt a secular definition? Will the national solidarity hoped for by the 
founders of the state dissolve, so that in Israel, as in the Diaspora, there will exist 
a multitude of Jewish communities, each defining its Jewishness differently? 
It is difficult to answer these questions conclusively, but the question 
“Who Is a Jew” will surely continue to accompany the State of Israel for 
many years to come. 
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Who Should Be a Jew? Conversion in the  
Diaspora and in the Modern Nation-State  
Michael J. Broyde and Mark Goldfeder
The problem of how to define a Jewish person is, from a historical perspective, 
a relatively new one, but there is a tremendous amount at stake for a variety of 
communities and considerations.1
Until the modern era, both Jews and gentiles alike considered someone 
Jewish as long as the person fit into categories defined by religious criteria and 
religious criteria alone. A halachic definition of membership in the Jewish people 
is and always has been available: according to Jewish law, a Jewish person is some-
one who is born of a Jewish mother or who converts according to a halachically 
sanctioned conversion process.2 In modern nation-states, citizenship and religion 
are usually formally independent of one another: one can be a British, French, 
or American citizen and still be Jewish with no inherent contradiction. With the 
founding of the modern state of Israel, however, and Ben-Gurion’s famous asser-
tion that Israeli citizenship is a right “inherent in being a Jew,” the conceptual 
question of how much religious “Jewishness” one needs in order to gain the secu-
lar benefits of citizenship has taken on new and important significance. 
The argument to create a broader definition for Jewish status turns on 
the desire to foster a more pluralistic national perspective, weighted against 
finding a solution that will keep as many people as possible under one tent. 
Because Israel is a Jewish and a democratic state, what is at stake here is not 
only the purity of lineage but the practicality of laws; since the 1950 Law of 
Return states that every Jew has the right to immigrate to Israel and become 
a citizen, Jewish nationality is one way of determining Israeli citizenship, with 
all of its associated rights, duties, and privileges. In addition, because Israel fol-
lows the Millet or confessional community system for matrimonial and family 
law, with each community coming under the jurisdiction of its own religious 
authorities, the question of who is a Jew makes a difference for all kinds of 
important daily life questions. This has led to the desire to have different defi-
nitions depending on the context; one for sociological Jewry, one for ethnic 
Jewry, and one for religious Jewry. 
Meanwhile, from an Orthodox Jewish perspective, keeping nationality 
and personal status determinations strictly halachic for the secular state of 
Israel has historically been viewed as important because such determinations 
define and delimit proper marriage partners, giving the attendant legitimacy 
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to children resulting from such unions. Any doubts or confusion in people’s 
unequivocal halachic Jewish status (likely to happen in the event of multiple 
Jewish definitions) could end up dividing the community into small endoga-
mous groups.3 All of the above concerns reflect the need for a well-grounded 
and accepted definition of who is a Jew.4
As Orthodox Jews, we believe that halachah is both divine and eternal. 
While the practical applications of halachic norms sometimes change, both in 
response to social needs5 and in recognition of new realities,6 the fundamental 
principles very rarely change.7 As such, although we recognize the pressing 
needs for an inclusive definition, if a workable solution to the question of 
who is a Jew can be found, it must conform to accepted normative halachic 
standards or the State of Israel will have to separate the secular definition 
from the Jewish law one—an unprecedented task, although one that has been 
considered before.8 Since matrilineal descent as a phenomenon does not really 
present any factors that can be reexamined, the discussion of necessity turns 
to one of conversion as a means for widening the tent.
There are three options that immediately present themselves. The first is 
to change the secular law and indeed separate the state and the religious defi-
nitions of conversion. Under such a system, just as a halachically non-Jewish 
spouse married to a Jewish person receives Israeli benefits under the Law of 
Return (benefits ostensibly reserved for Jewish people), halachically non-
Jewish converts could have their conversion secularly recognized and receive 
those same state benefits. This is already the case to a certain extent, in that a 
non-Orthodox convert from America is treated as fully Jewish for citizenship 
purposes. The reason this has not caused unrest is that those numbers are in 
fact quite trivial. We believe that such an approach is a poor choice for the 
majority of the state because when applied to the much larger numbers of 
halachically non-Jewish but Jewishly identified citizens already living in the 
country,9 it will undoubtedly generate unrest and angst in Israeli civil society. 
The second option is to change the Jewish law standard and adopt the 
minimum halachic criterion for conversion, relying in places on controversial 
minority opinions to craft a system that is more amicable to more people, 
while still maintaining some claim of fidelity to the religious tradition. We 
do not advocate this proposal either because the watering down of halachic 
norms for political opportunism does not do justice to the dignity of either 
the halachic process or the civil society. 
The third option is to craft a middle ground; that is, to find a precedent-
ed, normative solution that effects the maximum amount of change in society 
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with the minimum amount of change to the status quo. While such a solution 
may not be able to solve every problem, an answer that stays within the system 
escapes the harsh bite-back that any proposed radical change would inevitably 
face. We believe that the benefit of maintaining a status quo that has, for better 
or for worse, managed to last for sixty-five years is quite a substantial gain in a 
country as delicately balanced as Israel. We believe that such a middle ground 
exists, in the doctrine of the “minor convert.”
There are two central Talmudic sources that address the process of con-
version, one a Tosefta in Demai10 and the other a discussion in Yevamot.11 The 
two are somewhat different in character, with Demai focusing on substance 
and Yevamot focusing on form. While Demai requires the convert’s substan-
tive acceptance of the commandments [kabbalat hamitzvot],12 Yevamot, with 
its intricate procedural discussion of circumcision and immersion, does not 
mention this aspect of the conversion process at all. The Shulhan Arukh,13 
following the Tur, sews these two Talmudic paradigms together, promoting 
the well-known and accepted tripartite standard for conversion in our times; 
circumcision (for men), immersion, and acceptance of the commandments.14 
While there is a dispute (based on the two above-mentioned sources) amongst 
the early commentators regarding which stages of conversion must be done 
before the rabbinic court, most if not all agree that all three components are at 
least required in some form for a conversion to be considered valid.
The problem with conversion in modern-day Israel is not about immer-
sion. In fact, it’s not even about circumcision; for the half of the population 
that would even need to undergo the procedure, a one-time surgical proceed-
ing with deep cultural significance and possible health benefits is not a terrible 
amount to ask as a price for long-term national and religious acceptance. The 
struggle lies in the third component, the requirement that a convert accept the 
commandments and the corresponding commitments of Jewish law. Practically 
speaking, if we tried to convert everyone according to halachah, which could in 
theory solve the problem, what exactly is the relationship between the accep-
tance of commandments required of a convert and his or her subsequent lack 
of actual mitzvah observance? How much acceptance does one need, and does 
violative ex post facto behavior retroactively annul or undo the conversion?
The answer to these questions is a complex, nuanced dispute amongst 
the Rishonim and Acharonim. Particularly important to us are the views of 
several modern-day poskim, who, like us, lived and operated in a world where 
fidelity to Jewish law was neither necessarily culturally normative nor the pop-
ular sine qua non of Jewish identity. While in the past these questions were not 
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examined in as much depth, as it would have been unthinkable for a member 
of the Jewish community (especially a newly opted-in one) not to follow the 
commandments, mostly because following the commandments was part and 
parcel of the definition of being a member of the community, the reality on 
the ground has led some to examine the possibility that the traditional under-
standing of “acceptance of mitzvot” required of a convert; that is, complete 
halachic observance, might not be the minimum requirement.
Our quest begins with Maimonides’s understanding of the process of 
conversion. In “The Laws of Forbidden Relationships,” Maimonides describes 
it as follows:
And so in [all] future generations, when a non-Jew wishes to enter 
the covenant and to come under the wings of the Shechinah [Divine 
Presence], and will accept upon himself the yoke of Torah, he must 
then go through the process of milah [circumcision] and tevilah 
[immersion].15 
And he continues a few paragraphs later:
A convert whose motives were not investigated or was not informed 
of the commandments but was circumcised and immersed in the 
presence of three laymen, is a proselyte. Even if it becomes known 
that he became a convert for some ulterior motive, he has exited from 
the Gentile collective, because he was circumcised and immersed.16
While the first description clearly represents the ideal conversion and includes 
an acceptance of the commandments, some have argued that the subsequent 
halachah waives the requirement for commitment, at least after the fact.17 
The Magid Mishna writes that it is simply not essential, while Rabbi 
Shlomo Kluger notes that accepting the commandments “is only a means 
[machshir] . . . if he [the convert] was circumcised and immersed for the sake 
of conversion, even if he didn’t first accept the commandments, he is a con-
vert according to Torah law with certainty; accepting the commandments first 
is only rabbinical.”18 Ben-Zion Meir Hai Uziel, who was the Sephardi Chief 
Rabbi of the British Mandate from 1939 to 1948, and of Israel from 1948 to 
1954, goes even further. He writes:
From here it explicitly follows that we do not require of him to observe 
the commandments and the court need not even know that he will 
observe them. For were this not true, converts would never be accepted, 
for who can guarantee that this non-Jew will be faithful to all the com-
mandments of the Torah? We inform him about some of the command-
ments so that he may abandon [the conversion], if he so desires, and so 
that he not be able to say later that had he known, he would never have 
converted. This is the ideal, but after the fact, the failure to inform him 
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does not invalidate [the conversion]. We learn from all that has been 
stated that accepting the observance of the commandments is not an 
indispensable requirement for conversion, even in the ideal.19 
While it is true that this is a minority opinion—and the vast majority of 
Jewish law authorities rule that Jewish law requires acceptance of command-
ment—and it is also true that at first glance the idea of conversion without 
accepting the commandments seems somewhat radical, it is quite possible that 
instead of a dispute in the laws of conversion, what we are seeing reflected 
in this discussion is a debate about the duality of Jewish identity; that is, 
is Judaism a nation based upon community or covenant? For Maimonides, 
whose nationalistic tendencies lead him to envision and codify the rules for 
a rebuilt Israel and a resurgent autonomous Jewish nation, the idea of Jewish 
peoplehood turning on national identity is not so farfetched. For the Tur and 
Shulhan Arukh, writing in a Diaspora setting and mindset for Diaspora Jewry, 
no such vision was readily available. They choose not to codify laws for an 
imagined future state. 
Following the Baalei Tosafot,20 and Nachmanides,21 who insist on an 
acceptance of the commandments, the only Judaism they know is one that does 
not have a homeland; as such, the only thing that makes people Jewish is their 
acceptance of Jewish law. The conversion process by necessity is less a citizen-
ship ritual than it is a theological initiation. To use an American immigration 
analogy, in the melting pot that is our country, with no real distinctive national-
ity other than the laws we have created, what completes the naturalization for 
a new member is passing a test on the legal fundamentals and taking the Oath 
of Allegiance in front of a judge. Accepting the commandments (in front of a 
court) is just that: a basic measure of fidelity to the greater Jewish mission.
For the Baalei Tosafot, living in a world where the Jew is not allowed 
nationalistic expression, conversion can consist only of one coming tachas kan-
fei haShechina [under the wings of the Divine Presence], and affiliating with 
the likeminded observant community—it is a religion and not a nationality.22 
Until today normative halachic practice has generally followed this view (as 
described in the Shulhan Arukh), requiring the religious commitment. Still, 
if this approach were true and the difference between the two opinions is a 
question of how one affiliates as Jewish, then the only time in history it might 
make sense to rely on Maimonides would be in the modern state of Israel, 
where the dream and vision of a restored Kahal Yisrael [community of Israel] 
has been fulfilled. Unlike anywhere else in the world, one can be nationalisti-
cally Jewish, identifiably part of the am hanivchar [chosen nation], without 
accepting the commandments. 
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An opinion along this line of thinking can be found in the writing (and 
indeed in the actions) of former Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren. In accordance 
with the statement in Mesekhet Geirim 4:3, “Beloved is the Land of Israel, for 
it is receptive to converts,” Rabbi Goren felt that the changed historic reality 
in the refounding of the state led to a change in the way prospective converts 
should be dealt with in the land of Israel. Rabbi Goren believed that in Israel, 
where conversion entails national as well as religious identification, even if 
converts do not have the proper intentions at the time of their conversion, 
nevertheless they automatically fall into the category of those for whom it can 
be said, “their end will be for the sake of heaven.”23 
Residence in the state of Israel was a decisive factor in allowing pro-
spective converts to be accepted into the Jewish fold, even when it appeared 
unlikely that they would observe the commandments, because the decision 
to live in the Jewish state was the decision to be part of Jewish destiny. It was 
a decision in which Jewish identity would be reinforced for the convert and 
their descendants not by Jewish practice but by Jewish surroundings. The 
strength of his conviction on this matter, and on the difference between Israel 
and everywhere else, was borne out in the fact that during his tenure as chief 
rabbi, certificates of conversion stated that these conversions were valid only 
in the state of Israel, and not in the Diaspora.24
Even if we do not take this radical approach—that Jewish national iden-
tity can entirely take the place of Jewish observance—at the very least, Rabbi 
Uziel25 and Rabbi Goren can be understood as saying that even when we know 
that actual observance will generally be lacking, the requirement of acceptance 
is minimally acceptable so long as there is an acknowledgement and acceptance 
by the convert of the theoretical obligation to observe mitzvot and the recog-
nition that the nonobservance of mitzvot is sinful. In fact, some in this group 
might even be making a more complex claim; namely, that a clear and direct 
articulated acceptance of commandments in front of the beit din is sufficient 
after the fact, even if the rabbinical court knows that this acceptance of com-
mandments is insincere.26 In our immigration analogy, an oath or a contract 
can be binding even if the person taking it was actually insincere or ignorant.
Moving even further back from the radical edge toward the more gener-
ally accepted opinion that we do need a real kabbalat hamitzot, there is still 
some room to talk about what exactly that looks like in practice. Rabbi Hayy-
im Ozer Grodzinski, for one,27 was of the opinion that kabbalat hamitzvot 
need not be accompanied by full and complete observance, but instead needs 
to be accompanied by observance of significant cultural features of Orthodox 
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Jewish life (such as Shabbat, kashrut, and family purity [taharat ha-mishpaha]). 
It seems R. Grodzinski could well imagine converting a person to Judaism whose 
intellectual fidelity to Jewish law is complete but whose observance is not.28
The Chazon Ish29 understands the “acceptance of the commandments” 
in its theological rather than its practical sense; a convert must accept the 
chosen uniqueness of the Jewish people as it relates to our role in this world. 
Actions, however, are still very important even if not determinative, since con-
duct consistent with Jewish law is an external measure of an internal religious 
orientation, while refusal to obey the mitzvot is an indication of a lack of 
acceptance of the nature of the Jewish people as a whole.
The most widely accepted view is still that of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein,30 
who conservatively argues that kabbalat hamitsvot has to be understood as 
requiring a genuine desire for full and complete observance. Anything short of 
that level of commitment is indicative of a fraudulent acceptance. Of course, 
this view recognizes that converts, no different from anyone else, will most 
likely end up sinning—sometimes out of ignorance and sometimes from 
temptation. But, R. Feinstein asserts, a conversion cannot be valid unless at 
the time of the conversion the convert sincerely intends to obey Jewish law in 
all of its facets, as the convert understands it at that moment.
While it is possible that many of the people living in Israel, where holi-
days like Passover, Sukkot, and even Shabbat are part of the cultural milieu and 
where Judaism is the underlying state religion, could fall into the categories 
proposed by Rabbi Grodzinski, and certainly by Rabbi Goren, one would be 
hard pressed to persuade the general Orthodox community that for sake of 
national unity we should adopt a nontraditional standard. The above-men-
tioned opinions therefore, while nice in theory, have not proven to be effective 
in the difficult struggle to find a uniting way through the complex problem of 
establishing a broader Jewish identity.
But maybe there is another entry point, accepting of all and that all 
can accept.
Unlike the conversion of an adult (which certainly does require at least 
some level of kabbalat hamitzvot by the convert according to normative views 
of Jewish law), the conversion of a minor certainly does not require acceptance 
of mitzvot, but may be done with the consent of the rabbinical court—al 
da’at beit din.31 While the exact parameters of what this means is subject to 
significant dispute, Rav Moshe Feinstein—the very same almost universally 
accepted decisor whose view of adult conversion is the strictest—actually 
posits the most liberal view of the requirement in this area. He maintains 
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that since from a theological perspective it is always better for the child to be 
Jewish, the beit din is allowed to act for the unknowing child for his or her 
benefit at the time of the conversion and accept the yoke of Judaism for them 
on their behalf. Thus, all children, when brought before the beit din at a young 
age, are eligible for conversion, even if they will not be religious when they 
become adults.
The idea behind Rabbi Feinstein’s view—the conceptual difference 
regarding children and the reason why the beit din cannot just convert even 
fully grown adults for their own good—can be understood as follows. While it 
is true that every person is theologically better off being Jewish, conversion to 
Judaism generally does require acceptance of mitzvot, and most people, even if 
they wanted to be Jewish at some level, are not in fact prepared to accept that 
level of commitment. The vast majority of people, therefore, are not eligible 
for conversion, and indeed the sinning associated with violating Jewish law 
that would inevitably occur if such a person were to become Jewish would in 
fact make conversion impossible for the majority of society, since they can not 
fulfill the basic requirements of observance. Minors, however, cannot sin so 
long as they are minors, and so at the time of their conversion they only stand 
to benefit from being Jewish. 
There are several assumptions underlining Rabbi Feinstein’s position. 
Obviously, the first is the supposition that the rabbinical court need only 
determine whether the conversion is of benefit to this child at this very 
moment in time, without pondering into the uncertainties or even probabili-
ties of the child’s religious future. This view, which does seems to be consistent 
with the general parameters of the rules of zakhin le-adam she-lo be-fanav,32 is 
not particularly problematic.
As we noted above, despite the fact that in general there is a three-step 
process for conversion, when one of the factors cannot occur the procedure 
is allowed to go forward with only the remaining and applicable parts. Since 
a minor child is not considered to have the intellectual capacity to make life-
altering decisions on his or her own behalf, the requirement for acceptance of 
commandments is of necessity waived during their conversion and the beit din 
can do it for them. This, too, is at first glance uncontroversial, and yet no less 
than four views have emerged on whether and when a rabbinical court ought 
to consent to act for the minor.
The first is the view of former Chief Rabbi Rav Kook.33 He explains that 
a beit din ought not to convert a child to Judaism unless it is fairly certain that 
the child will grow up to be religious; the consent of the rabbinical court to 
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allow a conversion to go through is, in this view, a direct place-filler or substi-
tute for the assumed consent of the child, and no rational person would ever 
consent to be converted and become subject to the law unless they actually 
expected to be observant. The second school of thought is that of R. Hayyim 
Ozer Grodzinski, who also advises not to perform such conversions unless the 
child will grow up to be religious, but recognizes that there will be situations 
where a conversion can still be validly done even if the children will not grow 
up observant.34 
The third view is the initial stance taken by Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, which 
permits conversions for minors al daat beit din when the child will attend an 
Orthodox day school, since in such a case, and with such exposure, it is at 
least likely that the child will be somewhat religious.35 The final view is the 
concluding view of Rabbi Feinstein, which we quoted, in which he avers that it 
is always better for a person who is not obligated in mitzvot to be Jewish, and 
thus the conversion of any minor child would be valid.36 It should be noted 
that Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik adopted a view that reaches the same conclu-
sion as the more liberal view of R. Feinstein, albeit with a completely different 
mechanism. Rabbi Soloveitchik is of the belief that the authoritarian principle 
of kibush would allow for parents (and the beit din acting on their request) to 
convert a child without asking and rear him or her in their own faith.37 
What is fascinating about the ger katan is the fact that it also represents 
an in-between point in regard to the dispute mentioned above; that is, the dual 
nature of Jewish identity. It is generally assumed that when the minor attains 
majority and the accompanying capacity, he must be told of his conversion 
and has the ability to renounce his Judaism completely. This is the opinion of 
the Rashba, citing the Baalei Tosafot.38 However, when Maimonides records 
the law of a minor convert, he makes no mention of telling him.39 Perhaps 
this is because for Tosafot, the conversion cannot really be complete until 
the new adult accepts his religious responsibility and ensuing affiliation. For 
Maimonides, however, even a child can be part of a nation, with or without 
capacity. The Kahal includes all men, women, and children, the righteous 
and the sinners alike.40 For both though, at least during the period before 
majority, the theory is the same: the children are Jewish because they are part 
of something greater than themselves, and childhood is all about being swept 
along for the ride.
Despite the fact that there are many who feel differently, as mentioned, 
the weighty view of Rabbi Feinstein, combined with the other above-
mentioned viewpoints that require a lower threshold for acceptance of the 
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commandments in general, as well as the view that in Israel national identity 
is at least a mitigating factor, all lead us to recommend the practice of convert-
ing minors as a method for balancing practical ideals in Israeli society within 
a strong halachic framework. If we were to accept and follow Rabbi Feinstein’s 
more permissive stance on child conversion, a large aspect of the problem of 
“who is a Jew” would quickly fall away. The regular conversion of minors into 
Judaism would create, after the passage of but one or two generations, a society 
in which all those who think they are Jewish, actually are.41 All children of 
parents who identify as Jewish and who wish to have their children raised as 
Jewish (even if the parents themselves are not halachically Jewish) would sim-
ply have their children converted to Judaism by a ger katan program. Perhaps, 
if we wanted to be extra strict and follow the first opinion of Rabbi Feinstein, 
these parents would be expected to send their children to the mamlakhti dati 
[religious public] day school system. Of course, even if the children did not 
attend a Jewish school, we would have the later opinion of Rabbi Feinstein 
and the opinion of Rabbis Uziel and Goren to rely on. Over the course of a 
generation, this type of program could potentially solve the identity crisis in 
Israel, resulting in a more unified, while still halachic, Jewish family. 
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Who Is a Samaritan?
Menachem Mor 
On January 25, 1988, on the occasion of the inauguration of the newly cre-
ated Philip M. and Ethel Klutznick Chair in Jewish Civilization at Creighton 
University in Omaha, I gave a lecture as the first holder of the chair. The title 
of the inauguration lecture was “Why Study Ancient History?”1 The lecture 
was an answer to one of the many questions I was asked during my interview 
for the position: “Can you teach History 105: Introduction to Western Civi-
lization, or other courses in modern history?” 
In the lecture I argued that Israel is a paradise for historians. What makes 
this country so special to an historian? On the one hand, the past is nearly 
3000 years old and permeates the atmosphere with antiquity. On the other 
hand, Israel is a young state that was, at the time of the lecture, only forty years 
old, and according to Bernard Lewis, “increasingly anxious about its quest for 
roots, for an historical background to the Jewish identity as a territorial nation, 
to statehood, and at a lower level, anxious also, for military heroes. But above 
all, for political, national and territorial continuity.”2 
For Israelis, the past is related to many aspects of everyday life such as the 
Jewish calendar year and festival days, education, the written and electronic 
media, and even political and military decisions. The national passion for archae-
ology in Israel is symbolic of the need for linking the past with the present day 
as an essential element in the national myth-making.3 At that lecture I affirmed: 
“Today I will briefly examine how past and present are interwoven in Israel.” At 
that time I did not realize that a few years later I would be personally involved in 
an affair that demonstrates how past and present are interrelated in Israel.
My lecture today closes a full circle of twenty-five years. As an historian 
who is interested in the ancient world, I was supposed to lecture on the history 
of the Samaritans in the Second Temple period. Today, however, I will devote 
only a few minutes to the ancient Samaritans; the lecture itself will be assigned 
to the Samaritans in modern times. 
In antiquity the dilemma of who was a Samaritan and the question 
of the origin of the Samaritans were issues of major interest; they were pas-
sionately disputed in ancient Jewish sources throughout the ages. And for 
the last twenty-five years they have also been a foremost issue on the agenda 
of modern scholarship on Samaritanism. Recently a few major works were 
published in different places. 
154                                                   Who Is a Jew? Reflections on History, Religion, and Culture
In the year 2000 a Danish scholar Ingrid Hjlem published a book on the 
relations between the Samaritans and the Jews.4 Benjamin Tsedaka, the head of 
the A. B. Institute for the study of Samaritanism in Holon, Israel, published a 
Samaritan version of their origins and history.5 Robert T. Anderson and Terry 
Giles wrote on the history of the Samaritans, using the name that the Samari-
tans use to call themselves: Myrm#, Keepers.6
In 2003, I published a book in Hebrew, titled From Samaria to Shechem, 
concentrating on the history of the Samaritans in antiquity.7 In 2009, Magnar 
Kartveit, a Norwegian scholar, published a book of 405 pages that focused on 
the question of the origin of the Samaritans.8 The same year Reinhard Pummer, 
an Austrian-Canadian scholar, published a book on Josephus and the Samaritans 
and an article about the character of Samaritanism.9 Most recently, Gary Knop-
pers once again brought up the question regarding the origin of the Samaritans.10
The word Mynwrmw# (Samaritans) is a hapax legomenon, occurring only 
once within the Bible, at 2 Kings 17:29; however, the reference here is to the 
autochthonous inhabitants of Samaria, and not the Samaritans of our interest. 
In biblical literature there are two key sources that are used by scholars in an 
attempt to understand the origins of the Samaritans and the biblical approach 
towards them. 
1. 2 KINGS 17: 24–41
This source describes the destruction of the Northern Kingdom by the Assyr-
ians in 721 BCE. From the description given there, the impression is that 
the Assyrians left behind an empty land through a total exile of the northern 
Israelite population to various places, which generated the myth of the “Ten 
Lost Tribes.”11 As part of their two-sided deportation policy, they brought 
people from various cities in the Assyrian Empire and settled them in the 
empty land.12 
The new settlers continued worshiping the idols they brought with them. 
The local god punished them and sent lions against them. At this troubled time 
they asked for help, and an exiled Jewish priest returned to instruct them how to 
worship the local god in order to stop the plague of lions. However the author 
of the chapter says that though the settlers worshipped the local god, at the same 
time they continued worshiping the idols that they had brought with them. 
The chapter raises many questions, but time does not allow me to deal 
with all of them. However, we cannot avoid the issue of the empty land. Assyr-
ian sources mention large numbers of exiles, which prevents us from accepting 
the empty land interpretation. 
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Were the new settlers in the former Northern Kingdom of Israel the Samari-
tans?13 Josephus, who associated this chapter with the origins of the Samaritans, 
picked up the name of one of the cities, Cutah, and used it as the term for the Samar-
itans: “Kutim.”14 This approach attributes their origins to non-Israelite settlers.15
2. EzRA 4:1–5 AND 6–23
This source is dated to the sixth century BCE, immediately after the Cyrus 
declaration of 539 BCE and the beginning of the return to zion. 
According to chapter 4, two groups, named Am Haaretz (Cr)h M() and 
the adversaries of Judaea and Benjamin (Nymynbw hdwhy yrc), approached zerub-
babel the Jewish leader, requesting permission to participate in the building of 
the Temple. They do not conceal their origins; on the contrary, they inform 
him that they were exiled from their homeland by the Assyrian king Esarhad-
don (681–669 BCE). However, since then, they have been worshipping God 
as the Jews, and therefore they want to take part in building the Temple. 
zerubbabel rejected their wishes, although he did not associate the rejec-
tion with a religious reason. He answered them: “You have no part with us in 
building a temple to our God. We alone (dxy) will build it for the Lord, the 
God of Israel, as King Cyrus, the king of Persia, commanded us.”16
The outcome of the refusal was: “Then the people of the land weakened 
the hands of the people of Judah, and troubled them in building. And hired 
counselors against them, to frustrate their purpose, all the days of Cyrus king 
of Persia, even until the reign of Darius king of Persia.” The building of the 
temple was thus delayed until 521 BCE. 
Can we identify these groups as the Samaritans?17 The vagueness of the 
above sources directed the scholars to a variety of interpretations regarding the 
origins and definition of who and what a Samaritan is. Recently, Reinhard Pum-
mer summarized the different possibilities for the definition of Samaritanism:
1. Are the Samaritans a Jewish sect?
2. Is Samaritanism an independent form of Yahwism?
3. Or is it Northern Yahwism versus the Yahwism in the South?18
Again time limitation does not allow me to discuss major developments 
in Samaritan history on issues such as Alexander the Great and the Samari-
tans,19 the Samaritan temple that existed over 200 years,20 or the many refer-
ences to the Samaritans in the Talmud.21
I shall now turn to the end of Tractate Kutim, in which the anonymous editor 
asked a question concerning the Samaritans: “When shall we take them back?” From 
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the patronizing tone of the question came the answer: “When they renounce Mount 
Gerizim and confess Jerusalem and the resurrection of the dead. From this time forth 
he that robs a Samaritan shall be as he who robs an Israelite” (ch. 2, Halakhah 8). 
According to this saying, in order to return to Judaism the Samaritans 
need to fulfill three prerequisites: 
1. Deny the holiness of Mount Gerizim. 
2. Accept the sanctity and centrality of Jerusalem.
3. Accept the belief in the resurrection of the dead.
However, these preconditions were challenging. The Jews of Elephantine, 
and later of Leontopolis in Egypt, had their own temples; nevertheless, their 
Judaism was never questioned.22 Even though the Sadducees never accepted the 
resurrection of the dead, they were never removed from Judaism.23 It is very clear 
that the editor considered the Samaritans as Jews who in the past had relinquished 
Judaism. The conditions that he set for their return to Judaism also reflect his view 
that the Samaritans were a sect that stems from Judaism—a Jewish sect. 
I now turn to the modern Samaritans and the questions about their sta-
tus in the State of Israel. 
The Israeli Declaration of Independence stated that its aims were:
1. The establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz Israel.
2. The State of Israel will be open to immigration (hyl( = Aliyah) and to the 
ingathering of the exiles. 
These statements represent two basic constitutional principles of the 
State of Israel:
1. Israel is a Jewish State.
2. The right of Jews from all over the world to immigrate to the State of Israel. 
Therefore, Jews all over the world are potential citizens of the State of Israel. And 
it pronounces the natural right of every Jew to live in his State.
To implement the above principles the Knesset (tsnk), or Israeli parlia-
ment, legislated on July 5, 1950, the Law of Return (twb#h qwx) saying:
1. Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an Oleh (hlw(= = new immigrant).
a. Aliyah (hyl( = immigration) shall be by an Oleh immigration permit. 
b. An Oleh immigration permit shall be granted to every Jew who has 
expressed his desire to settle in Israel.
Lack of time does not allow me to deal intensively with the issues raised by the 
Law of Return. The major problem raised by the Law of Return is the question 
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of our symposium, the definition of “Who is a Jew.” The second problem is 
the preference of Jews over non-Jews.24 
HOW DO THE SAMARITANS RELATE TO THE LAW OF RETURN?
In 1948 the Samaritans resided in two centers: In Israel in Holon near Tel Aviv and 
in Nablus (Shechem) in Jordan. Yitzhak Ben-zvi, the second president of Israel 
(1952–1963), was a historian who investigated the remnant of the Lost Tribes25 
and published a book in 1935 on the Samaritans.26 Ben-zvi’s interest in the Samar-
itans led him into a very close friendship with the Samaritan community. He took 
the opportunity, as a member of the first Knesset, to ask the following question: 
Is it known to the Government that a number of Samaritans liv-
ing in Shechem, who according to their tradition are related to the 
seed of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and believe in the Torah of Moses 
according to the unique Samaritan Version, would like to return to 
the borders of the State of Israel? What will be the legal status of 
those Samaritans who want to return to the borders of Israel?
During a meeting of the Knesset on September 12, 1949, Moshe Sharett, 
the first Israeli foreign minister (1949–1956),27 responded as follows: 
In answer to the question about the Samaritans who reach the bor-
ders of Israel, I declare that their status is the same as the status of 
every Jewish immigrant from any Arab country.28 
This reprieve announced by the foreign minister was no doubt influenced by 
the involvement of Ben zvi, a lifelong friend of Sharett and the Samaritans.
The legal consequence was that Samaritans who had emigrated from Nab-
lus and settled in Israel were given the status of an Oleh. Later on, according to 
the Law of Return of 1950, they received all the rights of an Oleh and were listed 
in the Registration of Inhabitants [Myb#wt M#rm] as Jewish Samaritans.
Let us review some statistics about the Samaritans:
On January 1, 2012, the total number of Samaritans was 751 members: 391 were 
living in Holon, Israel, and 360 in Kiryat Luza on Mount Gerizim, in the West Bank.29
Gender Division
Males: 396 ( 190in Kiryat Luza, 206 in Holon).
Females: 355 ( 170in Kiryat Luza, 185 in Holon).
Married person:s350 (160 in Kiryat Luza, 190 in Holon).
Single Males: 215 (104 in Kiryat Luza, 111 in Holon).
Single Female:153 (70 in Kiryat Luza, 83 in Holon).
Widowers: 7 (4 in Kiryat Luza, 3 in Holon).
Widows: 23 (15 in Kiryat Luza, 8 in Holon).
158                                                   Who Is a Jew? Reflections on History, Religion, and Culture
Divorced Men: 2 in Holon.
Divorced Women: 1 in Holon.
Marriages between Samaritans and Non-Samaritans
1. 21 Women in Holon:
17 Jewish/Israeli Women. 
2 Muslim women from Azerbaijan. 
2 Nonreligious from Ukraine. 
2. 5 Women in Kiryat Luza: 
All Nonreligious from Ukraine.
How many left the Samaritan sect?
32: 10 Males, 22 Females.
Since 1948, how many Samaritans crossed the borders from Nablus/
Kiryat Luza to Holon, Israel, for permanent residence?
1948–1967: 52 for family unification. 
1967–1970: 77 for economic reasons. 
1970–2012: 12 marriages.30
Since 1949, the Samaritans from Nablus/Luza continued to immigrate to the 
State of Israel according to the Law of Return and actually received all the rights 
of a new immigrant. In the population registry they were listed under the article 
of nationality as Jews or Samaritan Jews and in a few cases as Samaritan. 
We look again at the Law of Return. The Law of Return was amended 
a few times:
1. 1st Amendment in 1955 to deny the Oleh status to a person with a 
criminal past or someone likely to endanger public welfare.
2. 2nd Amendment in 1970. 
(4A) The rights of a Jew under the Law of Return and the rights of an Oleh 
under the Nationality Law, 5710–1950, as well as the rights of an Oleh under any 
other enactment, are also vested in a child and grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a 
Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew and the spouse of a grandchild of a Jew, except 
for a person who has been a Jew and has voluntarily changed his religion.
(4B) For the purposes of this Law, “Jew” means: 
A person who was born of a Jewish mother.  
Or has become converted to Judaism.  
And who is not a member of another religion.
Amendment 4b was added in reaction to two decisions of the Supreme Court, 
referred to in Hebrew as BAGATz (the acronym of Beth Mishpat Gavoah 
LeTzedek), in which the Supreme Court ruled as a court of first instance, pri-
marily in matters regarding the legality of decisions of the State authorities. 
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1. BAGATz RUFEISEN 
Samuel Oswald Rufeisen was a Polish Jew who converted to Catholicism dur-
ing the Holocaust and became a Carmelite brother named Brother Daniel. 
He immigrated to Israel in 1958 and applied to be recognized as an Oleh 
according to the Law of Return. Although his religion was Christianity, he 
still considered himself a son of the Jewish nation. In addition he argued that 
according to Halakah and his feelings he is a Jew, since he was born a Jew. 
His petition was rejected since he converted to Christianity and had become a 
member of a different religion. 
In 1962 he petitioned BAGATz (No. 72/62): Rufeisen against the Min-
ister of Interior Affairs. His petition was denied by a majority of 4 against 1. 
He was naturalized through a different process and was granted citizenship 
and an Israeli identification card without registering the item of nationality. 
The preliminary verdict gave a new interpretation to the Law of Return. A 
Jew is defined as a son of the Jewish nation, not according to Jewish Orthodox 
interpretation.31
2. BAGATz SHALIT
In the late 1960s Benjamin Shalit, a major in the Israel Navy, married a Scot-
tish woman, Ann Gedes, who was a Christian by birth, did not convert to 
Judaism, and declared herself as nonreligious. Shalit requested that his two 
children, Oren and Galia, who were born in Israel, be registered as having 
no religion, but with the right to obtain Jewish nationality. His request was 
rejected by the clerks of the Interior Ministry. 
In 1968 he petitioned BAGATz (No. 58/68) in his name and in the 
name of his children, Oren and Galia Shalit, against the Minister of Interior 
Affairs and the registration clerk of the Haifa Region. He justified his petition 
by arguing that he planned to live in Israel and to raise his children as Jews. 
BAGATz accepted Shalit’s petition with a majority of 5 against 4 and 
decided that the Interior Ministry should register the children as Jews. The 
reasoning of the Supreme Court ruling was that the term Jew in the item 
Nationality is in its nature secular, and therefore there is no need for a reli-
gious interpretation. Whoever declares that he is Jewish and is not a member 
of another religion should be registered as a Jew.
However in 1972, Shalit again petitioned BAGATz (No. 18/72), 
requesting the registration of his third son as a Jew in the nationality category. 
This petition was rejected in light of the changes in the Law of Return and in 
the Law of Population Registration of 1970.32 
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These two BAGATz decisions were the background for the 2nd Amend-
ment in 1970 (4B): 
For the purposes of this law, “Jew” means: 
1. A person who was born of a Jewish mother. 
2. Or has become converted to Judaism. 
3. And who is not a member of another religion.
Surprisingly, the question, “Who is a Samaritan,” emerged once again in modern times. 
Though there were not many Samaritans from Shechem and Kiryat Luza 
who moved from Jordan until 1967, and later from the West Bank to Israel, 
they had utilized their right of the Law of Return; during the year 1992, with-
out giving advanced warning to the Samaritan community, the population 
registry began rejecting requests of Samaritans who emigrated from Nablus to 
Israel and denied them the right to obtain the Oleh Hadash (new immigrant) 
status. Their reasoning was that the Law of Return does not apply to the 
Samaritans. On the basis of the amendments of 1970, the Samaritans were not 
considered as Jews, but as being of a different religion. 
The Samaritans met with Mr. David Efrati, director of the popula-
tion registry, who explained that the change was at the direct instruction of 
Mr. Aryeh Deri, the Minister of Interior. In 1984, Deri together with Rabbi 
Ovadiah Joseph, the former Israeli Sephardic chief rabbi, had founded the 
Sephardic ultra-orthodox party called Shas.33 
Taking advantage of the Israeli political system, Shas grew from a small 
ethnic political group to a major factor in Israeli politics by joining several 
coalition governments with both major parties, Labor and Likud. For example, 
they typically held multiple cabinet posts and were considered as “the unchal-
lenged kingmakers of Israeli politics.”34
From December 22, 1988, until September 14, 1993, Deri served as the 
minister of internal affairs in the Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin govern-
ments. One of his last resolutions before his resignation as a result of standing 
trial was on the Samaritan matter.35
The Samaritans continued trying “to remove the evil command.” Their 
last attempt was a letter to Prime Minister Rabin, in which they asked him 
to continue to acknowledge Samaritans who immigrate to Israel as olim 
hadashim with the rights that were granted to them since 1949.
The answer was written by Eitan Haber, Rabin’s advisor and cabinet direc-
tor. He affirmed that the considerations of the minister were explained to the 
pime minister. However, since the issue was the responsibility of the minister of 
internal affairs, the prime minister did not plan to intervene in this matter. 
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This response led to a Samaritan petition to BAGATz (4200/93). 
The petitioners were: 
1. The committee of the Samaritan community in Holon.
2. Mr. Ron Sassoni, the chairman of the committee of the Samaritan community in Holon.
Both were represented by Professor Michael Corinaldi, Attorney. The petition 
was addressed to:
1. Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister.
2. Rabbi Aryeh Deri. 
3. Mr. David Efrati.
All three were represented by the State Attorney-General. The petition:
A petition for a conditional order (order nisi) directed to the 
responders asking them to present themselves and to justify why an 
Oleh visa is not given according to the Law of Return of 1950 to 
the people of the Samaritan community who are coming to Israel.
In the petition, Corinaldi’s main argument was to reject the claim that the Samar-
itans are considered as belonging to a different religion. The Samaritans, from 1950 
until 1992, were considered as Jews according to the Law of Return. And, Corinaldi 
asked, what had occurred in 1992 that suddenly brought about this change?
Various religious sects and parties in Israel who reject the rabbinic tradition, such 
as the reform movement and the Karaites, are included within the framework of the 
Law of Return of 1950 and its amendments. Since the Samaritan tradition follows 
the Torah of Moses, therefore they should not be excluded from the Jewish people. 
In the State of Israel, those who were part of the Jewish nation, including the 
Samaritans, were recognized as Jews without considering their religious traditions.
The petitioners emphasized that the term “Jew” in the Law of Return 
is not interpreted according to rabbinic standards, but through other criteria, 
as presented in general in legal rulings, particularly those in BAGATz No. 
265/1987—Gary and Shirli Nersford against the Ministry of Interior. The 
couple were part of the community of Jews for Jesus; because of their belief in 
Jesus Christ, they were considered as people who believed in another religion. 
The decisive examination of this issue should be the one used by Justice Aharon 
Barak: the Secular, Liberal, and Dynamic. By examining the claim that the Samari-
tans are members of a different religion through these criteria, the judges should 
dismiss the argument since the Samaritan religious tradition is based on the Torah of 
Moses which is the common denominator for all the Jews, but is not related to the 
Law of Return.36 Following the petition in August 1993, Justice Barak published a 
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conditional order against the three responders, asking them to explain their refusal to 
grant Oleh Hadash status to the Samaritans who immigrate from Shechem.37
In addition to the detailed petition, the petitioners asked for two written 
accounts about the origins and the history of the Samaritans. One was given 
by the late Shemaryahu Talmon, a world-renowned biblical scholar from the 
Department of Biblical Studies at the Hebrew University.38 The second one 
was given by me as chairman of the Department of Jewish History at the 
University of Haifa. At that point in time I was involved in research about the 
Samaritans in ancient times, which later led to the publication of a book, From 
Samaria to Shechem: The Samaritans in Ancient History.39
Talmon, in the conclusion of his statement, wrote: 
The Sages never considered the Samaritan as a different religion. 
They approached them as a branch of Am Israel that, for historical 
reasons, had developed differently. This development established 
their traditions, which led to a total separation from Knesset Israel. 
Although the differences were listed at the end of Tractate Kutim, 
the Sages were ready to accept the return of the Samaritans to the 
bosom of Judaism.40
In my statement, I argued that the Samaritans should be considered as Jewish 
Samaritans in every aspect, particularly in regard to the Law of Return: 
The Samaritans are a small community (comprising about 600 
people in March 1993). They are the remnant of a group that never 
left the land and continued to live in their traditional sites; a rem-
nant that in the fourth and fifth centuries included around a million 
people who had been persecuted throughout history by Christians 
and Muslims, until a much smaller number of survivors were left. 
Some of those living in Holon are married to Jewish women, their 
children are circumcised by Jews, and they serve in the IDF. And I 
do not see any changes in Samaritan behavior in 1992/3 that could 
have been the reason for any change in their status regarding the 
Law of Return.41
Our two statements were the topic of an article written by Yaira Amit of the 
Department of Biblical Studies at Tel Aviv University. She wrote:
The Samaritans’ attorney, Michael Corinaldi, sought the advice 
of two academic experts: Professor Shemaryahu Talmon . . . and 
Professor Menachem Mor . . . But since the experts were chosen by 
the Samaritans’ representative, it is quite clear that they sought for 
experts who were known for their pro-Samaritan approach.
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She blames Talmon in particular:
There is no doubt that Talmon’s choice of sources from the Bible 
and from the Sages’ literature and his interpretation in the response 
he submitted led to a political rather than a scholarly opinion. . . .
In this, Talmon was following the approach of Yitzhak Ben-zvi and 
the Israeli government of the early days of the State, who applied to the 
Samaritans the Law of Return and categorized them as Jews. In so doing 
he opposed the political motivation of an extremist political group which 
suddenly, in 1992, tried to take away these rights from the Samaritans.42 
In March 1994, the representative of the Samaritan community and Uzi 
Fugelman, an attorney for the state attorney’s office, reached an agreement 
that is considered as a court ruling.
The new arrangement was that:
A Samaritan, who comes to settle in the State of Israel will be enti-
tled to receive an Oleh Hadash immigration permit according to the 
Law of Return dated to 1950. 
He will be treated in the same way as the members of the Samaritan 
Community were treated when they immigrated to Israel from the 
establishment of the State till the year 1992. 
I feel a great deal of personal satisfaction for my small contribution to the 
Samaritan community in being reinstated to their previous civilian status and receiv-
ing the rights they had enjoyed since 1949. My involvement in this affair, which I 
have described above, exemplifies for me in a personal manner how our past consti-
tutes part of our present existence. If in my inaugural address for the Chair described 
above my lecture was academic and theoretical, dealing with the interweaving of the 
past with our daily life, in the case under discussion, which concerns the status of the 
Samaritans, I was given the opportunity to link the past with the present. This is an 
opportunity that historians dealing with ancient times are not often granted.
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To:
Professor Michael Corinaldi, J.D.
36 Keren Hayesod Street
Jerusalem 92149
Dear Professor Corinaldi, 
I read with great interest the legal petition (File No. 4200/93) submitted by 
you to the Supreme Court at one of its sittings. 
The petition was presented by:
1. The Samaritan Community
2. Ron Sassoni
Responders to the petition were:
1. Mr. Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel
2. Rabbi Aryeh Deri, Minister of the Interior
3. Mr. David Efrati, Director of Population Administration
Subject of the petition:
Why should an immigration permit not be given in accordance with the Law 
of Return, 1950 to members of the Samaritan Community arriving in Israel.
I am a senior lecturer and chairman of the Department of Jewish His-
tory at the University of Haifa. Since 1971 my research has been focused on 
the history of the Jewish-Samaritan community and their way of life. I have 
already published a series of studies on the history of the Samaritan Jews and 
my articles have appeared in:
Alan Crown, ed., The Samaritans, Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1989. I am also 
at the final stages of writing a comprehensive work entitled: “The History of the 
Samaritans in the Ancient World” to be published by Yad Yitzhak Ben zvi. The 
book sheds much light on the central events in the history of the Samaritan Jews. In 
addition, I maintain friendly ties with some of the Samaritan Jews living in Holon.
My academic background, my knowledge, and my relations with the 
Samaritan Jews grant me the authority to express my views that those people 
who are called Samaritans are Jews. We have here a small community of about 
six hundred persons, half of which lives in Shechem and the other half in Holon. 
This community is a minority still remaining in the country and that have 
never left the site of their traditional settlement. They represent a remnant of a 
people that had numbered about a million inhabitants during the fourth and 
fifth centuries, a minority sect persecuted for many long years by Christians and 
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Muslims for being Samaritan Jews. The historical continuity of this community 
since the time of conquest of the country by Joshua should be emphasized. The 
community at present marry Jewish women, their sons are circumcised by Jew-
ish mohels, and those living in Holon serve in the Israel Defense Forces. 
However, before giving a reasoned and detailed opinion, I am in accord 
with your comments on the issue under discussion that the status of the Samari-
tan Jews at the end of 1993 does not differ from their status determined at the 
opening session of the First Knesset on the 18th of Elul, September 12, 1949. At 
this session, responding to a question by MK Yitzhak Ben zvi, the Foreign Min-
ister, Moshe Sharett said: “In response to the question regarding the Samaritans 
who arrive at the borders of Israel, I hereby announce that they are to be legally 
accepted in the same way as any Jew who arrives in Israel from one of the Arab 
countries.” As a result, members of the community coming from Shechem to 
Israel were recognized as immigrants according to the Law of Return.
From my familiarity with the Samaritan Jewish community, I am sure 
that since the decision made in 1949 regarding the status of Samaritan Jews 
who wish to return to Israel, no cause has been given, at least on their part, 
for any change in their status on this issue during the year 1992. I do not 
recall any incident that might have impugned the above-mentioned decision. 
Moreover, even after the amendment of Paragraph 4b of the Law of Return in 
1970, no change has occurred in the status of the Samaritan Jews. 
As I noted above, during the years that have passed since 1949, the 
Samaritan Jews living in Holon have the same rights and duties as all the other 
Jews living in Israel. Also, since 1967, the ties have tightened between the 
Samaritan Jews living in Shechem and their brethren residing in Holon. In my 
opinion, the community which is split between Shechem and Holon should 
be considered as Samaritan Jews in all respects, and should therefore continue 
to be recognized as Jews with regard to the Law of Return.
As you requested, I shall soon send you my detailed and reasoned opin-




I kept the paper in the lecture style and added endnotes to it. I would like to 
thank Leonard J. Greenspoon, the current holder of the Klutznick Chair, who 
invited me to the 25th annual symposium, a series that I established in 1988.
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The Bene Israel and the “Who Is a Jew” 
 Controversy in Israel 
Joseph R. Hodes 
On May 14, 1948, Israel became a sovereign nation and opened its borders to 
Jews from across the globe. Between May 1948 and December 1951, approxi-
mately 684,000 immigrants poured into the new country. Never before had so 
many diverse cultures, languages, and ethnicities come together in such a tiny 
geographical area over such a short period to form a new collective. While the 
new nation opened its borders to Jews from across the globe, it never specified, 
until almost a decade later, what a Jew was. 
One of the smallest communities to become part of the new nation was the 
Bene Israel, from India. Unlike virtually any other community that became part of 
the state, they had lived under neither Christian nor Islamic hegemony, and they 
had never been persecuted as Jews during the Diaspora. Yet they were subject, upon 
entering Israel, to a unique form of bias and prejudice. The chief rabbinate created 
prohibitions making it extremely difficult for them to marry other Jews in Israel. 
The Bene Israel, a tiny Jewish population that according to its own tra-
dition has lived in India for over 2,000 years, is the largest of the three major 
Indian Jewish communities, the other two being the Cochin and Baghdadi 
Jews. The Bene Israel, numbering 20,000 at the height of their population in 
India, began to make aliyah in 1948, and by 1960, there were approximately 
8,000 community members in Israel. Today, there are 75,000 Bene Israel in 
Israel and approximately 10,000 in India, living mostly in Mumbai. For cen-
turies they lived in India and self-identified as both Indian and Jewish.
THE “WHO IS A JEW” CONTROVERSY
Although Israel was created as a state for Jews, but not as a Jewish state, reli-
gious Zionism envisioned a theocratic state where Jews could live complete 
religious lives, guided by religious leaders who had the political power to 
ensure the theocratic integrity of society and the state.1 Immediately after 
Israel’s creation, the religious parties, such as Mizrachi, HaPoel Ha Mizrachi, 
Agudat Israel, and Polei Agudat Israel, worked to secure a stronghold in the 
government and to establish a firm halachic basis for life in the state. 
The first task for these religious bodies was, therefore, to widen the power 
and authority of the rabbis.2 In 1949, the four above-mentioned religious parties 
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formed a temporary coalition for the first Knesset election, receiving 12 percent of 
the vote. The religious parties in the coalition were soon given such ministries as 
Religious Affairs, the Interior, and Welfare, where they began to impose religious 
rules on nonreligious citizens. The religious camp began to move in the direction 
of religious coercion of the broad secular public. Initially this occurred very slowly 
without arousing suspicion or opposition. They first quietly expanded the juris-
diction of the rabbinical courts. As the first Supreme Court was being created in 
1948, the religious parties demanded that at least one of the five judges be a rabbi. 
This was accepted without opposition. Rabbi Simhah Assaf was named and then 
confirmed by the provisional State Council. Judge Isaac Olshan, another Supreme 
Court judge, said of Assaf: “We had to guide him along in connection with the 
application of various laws in cases brought before us. Cases that had a bearing 
upon questions of personal status, falling under the purview of religious rules, were 
decided in religious courts; the instances in which we in the Supreme Court had 
anything to do with them were few. With respect to the majority of the cases, we 
had to explain to Rabbi Assaf the secular law.”3 Therefore, Israel’s first Supreme 
Court had a judge with little understanding of nonhalachic law. 
Judge Assaf had resigned by 1953, and the religious parties demanded 
that another rabbi be appointed in his place, lobbying for the appointment of 
the Sephardic judge, Eliyahue Elyashar. The members of the Supreme Court, 
however, fed up with the burden of explaining secular law to a Supreme Court 
judge, insisted that nominations be based solely on the qualifications of the 
candidate without religious considerations. Although members of the Supreme 
Court were thereafter elected on merit, the religious parties had learned that 
they could infiltrate powerful positions in the new state, and they succeeded in 
influencing numerous areas of Israel’s day-to-day life. Municipal Sabbath laws 
were passed to close shops, theaters, offices, and public transportation for the 
day. Nonkosher meat was banned, followed by a ban on pig breeding and the 
sale of pork products in 1954. Soon the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the chief 
rabbinate, and the religious councils and courts had wide-ranging powers. 
The divide between the religious parties and the government came to 
a head on March 10, 1958, when the minister of the Interior, Israel Bar- 
Yehudah, instructed marriage registrars countrywide that a declaration of 
being Jewish was enough, and no additional proof was required. This instruc-
tion went against halachah, which states that if the mother is not Jewish (in 
a mixed marriage) the child is not Jewish. This seemingly small act had enor-
mous implications, as Bar-Yehudah felt that an administrative order issued by 
the government had authority over religious law. 
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In 1950, however, the chief rabbinate had issued directives that to per-
form marriages and execute divorces, rabbis had to investigate the couple’s 
background thoroughly. On March 12, 1958, two days after Bar-Yehudah’s 
instruction was issued, the minister of Religious Affairs, Zerach Wahrhaftig, 
gave the first indication of the impending crisis, stating that a Jew cannot be 
defined in a haphazard, free-for-all fashion. Jewish law had long determined 
who was a Jew and who was not, and he made it clear that this task could not 
be performed by a secular Jew. Soon religious elements complained that “the 
antireligious attitude of the Ministry of the Interior [had] treated religion and 
the religious councils with contempt.”4
The problem connected to Jewish identity was the overlapping of three 
jurisdictional issues. The first was that of citizenship, the second of national-
ity, and the third of personal status. The problems concerning citizenship 
were complex in that Israeli citizens included Jews, Christians, and Muslims, 
all of whom had equality under the law with some exceptions, such as the 
Arab exemption from the army. The second issue of nationality influenced 
the way in which citizenship was acquired. Israel was a Jewish state in prac-
tice, which meant that the doors were open to all Jews, yet the Law of Return 
had failed to define the term Jew in its national sense. Without clarification, 
people suspected of being non-Jews could be denied citizenship. The crucial 
concern, however, was connected to personal status in regards to marriage and 
burial, as both were controlled by the religious authorities. There was no civil 
marriage in Israel: those not married by a state-approved rabbi according to 
halachah were not legally married. If they lived together without a ceremony 
in a common law marriage, their children had no Jewish status and could face 
considerable difficulties when their turn came to get married. 
Although the Mapai party still had a majority government, Ben-Gurion 
attempted to placate the National Religious Party (NRP): 
The government has no intention of laying down Religious law and 
it does not consider itself authorised to do so. . . . In the declaration 
of independence however, we announced freedom of religion and 
conscience and we did not decide that the Jewish state would be gov-
erned by Religious Law, and that the rabbis should rule it. On the 
contrary, we proclaimed that it would not be a theocratic state. . . . 
The government did not consider itself authorised to decide who is 
a religious Jew. The question it had to consider was “who is a Jew 
by nationality”?5 
The religious parties were unimpressed, however, and called upon Jews across 
the globe to protest the government’s action. They alleged that the state may 
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declare who is a citizen, but not who is a Jew. Israel had to face the issue of 
whether Jewish nationality could be separated from Jewish religion. Many felt 
that Israel was a secular state and that if the government could not determine 
who was to be regarded as of Jewish nationality for purely secular and secu-
rity purposes and if the criteria of Orthodox law were to apply, then Zionism 
would have failed to disengage Jewish nationhood from the traditional bonds 
of religion.6 The question really became not who was a Jew but who would 
govern Israel. Ben-Gurion introduced a resolution to appoint a special com-
mittee that would invite the opinions of Jewish sages both in Israel and abroad 
on this question.7 Until the opinions of the sages had been obtained, Bar-
Yehudah’s instructions would be put on hold, and the religious parties accept-
ed the compromise. When the results were received, the majority of the sages 
had indicated that they felt the state could not infringe on the traditional hala-
chic interpretation of Jewish nationality. The NRP rejoined the government 
and, feeling obliged to accept the opinion of the sages, Ben-Gurion allowed 
new regulations to be issued in 1960. Those issues would be disastrous for the 
Bene Israel. According to the new regulations, a person could be registered as 
a Jew by nationality or religion only if the criteria of halachah were fulfilled. 
This gave the religious parties the right to tell the marriage registrars what the 
criteria for marriage were. The religionists had won an unequivocal triumph.8
In 1960, the new minister redirected the Bureau of the Registration of 
Inhabitants to define a Jew by administrative fiat as “a person born of a Jewish 
mother who does not belong to another religion, or one who has converted 
in accordance with religious law.”9 While this did not initially change the life 
of most Israelis, it would have enormous ramifications for the Bene Israel. 
The Bene Israel community was specifically and officially targeted by Chief 
Sephardic Rabbi Yitzhak Nissim, who questioned the authenticity of their 
Judaism on the grounds that they did not practice chalitzah [ceremonies to 
be performed before the remarriage of childless widows] in India. In October 
1960, Nissim refused to declare that the Bene Israel were acceptable for the 
purpose of marrying Jews outside of their own community in Israel.10 
The following description of events is based on Samson J. Samson’s rec-
ollections from interviews conducted in 2008, as well as primary documents 
found in various archives throughout Israel.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Long before the Bene Israel community began to immigrate to Israel, a num-
ber of outsiders investigated and commented on whether or not the commu-
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nity came from authentic Jewish ancestry and tradition. One of the dignitaries 
in the congregation of Cochin, Rabbi Ezekiel Rehavi, investigated and found 
in 1767: “According to the ritual and customs which they observed that they 
were Jews and that they do not mix with the non-Jews. When a Jewish visitor 
comes into view they greet him and receive him with great affection and are 
philanthropic both to him and the Holy Land.”11 In 1843, the Baghdadi Jew-
ish community in Calcutta, having recently arrived in India, turned to their 
sages in Baghdad and asked about marrying their sons and daughters into the 
Bene Israel community. One of the leaders of the Calcutta congregation, Eze-
kiel Judah, wrote: “They give birth to sons and circumcise them as we do and 
when they grow up, they teach them Talmud-Torah with our children. They 
are exactly as we, without any difference, and we always call them to the Sefer 
Torah in accordance with the custom of the Jewish people. May we give them 
our daughters and may we take their daughters?”12 Unfortunately, there is no 
record of the response by the rabbis in Baghdad. 
In 1883, Rabbi Solomon David Sassoon wrote that “because the Hebrew 
and religious education is so neglected and has become almost unknown in 
the Bene Israel community, and because of the abysmal ignorance and lack 
of caution concerning essential religious observances, Jews who come from 
other places, under an erroneous assumption, conclude that the Bene Israel 
have assimilated with the native Indians.”13 While in India in 1859, Rabbi 
Shmuel Abe of Safed wrote that: “the Bene Israel observe all the mitzvoth of 
the written law and the oral law and all of the halachic ordinances of the Jew-
ish people.”14 In 1870, rabbis in Tiberias wrote that “it is a great mitzvah to 
be close to them [the Bene Israel]” and cautioned against those who sought to 
keep them apart.15 When the establishment of the State of Israel drew near, 
the issue was raised once again, this time by the Jewish Agency, which wanted 
to establish offices in India. In 1938, the Mandate rabbinate, in reply to an 
inquiry about the community, said that “not only were they Jews and to be 
brought close to the community but it was permitted for Jewish women to 
marry them.”16 In 1944, Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi Isaac Herzog discussed and 
clarified the matter for all, unequivocally coming to the judgement that the 
Bene Israel were halachically Jewish in every respect.
Despite all the inquiries and evidence supporting the Jewish authenticity 
of the Bene Israel community, in 1960, Rabbi Itzhak Nissim, then the Chief 
Sephardic Rabbi of Israel, prohibited their marrying other Israelis. At the time 
this prohibition was made, Rabbi Nissim had uncontested rabbinical author-
ity in the state, as the position of chief Ashkenazi rabbi remained vacant from 
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Rabbi Isaac Herzog’s death in 1959 until 1964, when Isser Yehuda Unterman 
became chief rabbi. 
Rabbi Nissim gave several explanations for his ruling and thus set the 
Bene Israel as a people apart. His report stated:
1. There is a concern that they intermarried with non-Jews.
2. There is a concern that their divorces were not in accord with 
the law.
3. There is a concern that there were among them forbidden mar-
riages between close relatives.17
These assertions are problematic, in that India’s caste system is so strict 
that it would be very difficult for an Indian to marry into the Bene Israel com-
munity. Furthermore, divorce is relatively unheard of in India, certainly in the 
villages on the Konkan coast, where women, traditionally, had few civil rights 
and sometimes could not even leave their villages unaccompanied by a man.18 
In fact, Rabbi Nissim’s own written work, Bene Israel: Halachic Decisions and 
the Sources for the Investigation of Their Laws and the Question of Their Origins, 
indicates that even when a marriage was not amicable, instead of divorce the 
woman would be sent back to her father’s house where she would remain and 
live like a widow.19
 Because the Bene Israel, however, had been cut off from world Juda-
ism for so many centuries, Nissim was unsure that they practiced their faith 
in accordance with Jewish law and assumed that they had either married 
non-Jews, producing non-Jewish offspring, or had practiced divorce with-
out a proper rabbinical get.20 According to halachah, a Jewish couple can be 
divorced only if the husband writes a bill of divorce, a get, which he hands to 
his wife, saying, “This is thy get, thou art divorced and permitted to marry 
whomsoever thou wilt.” If there is no get and the woman remarries and has 
children, those children are considered illegitimate [mamzerim]. According to 
Jewish law a mamzer is the child of a married woman and a man to whom she 
is not married, including the child of a woman whose previous marriage had 
not been ended according to Jewish law. For the Bene Israel community, this 
assumption called into question the legitimacy of their Jewish identity. This 
community, which had lived as Jews in India for almost two millennia without 
prejudice, was now being told that they were not Jewish, or not Jewish enough 
to marry other Jews according to Jewish law. 
The question that remains is, why was the Bene Israel community 
singled out as the community of mamzerim? Almost every community that 
had existed in the Diaspora had faced incredibly difficult times as a persecuted 
minority. The concerns regarding the Bene Israel would hold true for many 
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communities in the Jewish Diaspora. Did no Jew outside of India have sexual 
relations with the wife of his brother or the wife of his neighbor? The idea 
that there were no children born of adulterous or incestuous unions in other 
Diaspora communities is difficult to accept. One does not need to look to 
India to find a Jewish community that might be deemed problematic and one 
does not need to look to the Bene Israel to find mamzerim. They might be 
found in every community. (It is much more likely that the Ashkenazi com-
munities in eastern Europe, which suffered countless pogroms where women 
were undoubtedly raped, produced “misbegotten” offspring.) Therefore, why 
single out the Bene Israel? 
THE BENE ISRAEL COMBAT THE RABBINATE
Whatever his reasons, Rabbi Nissim refused to declare the Bene Israel accept-
able for marriage to the non-Bene Israel. Immediately, the community sprang 
into action to combat this gesture of oppression. The highly educated Bene 
Israel were not yet organized or united in Israel. To organize themselves and 
combat Nissim’s ruling, they had first to create a body from which to act. The 
community then contacted one of their own, a man named Samson J. Samson, 
who would go on to fight and win their battle for religious equality (although 
he would never admit that he played such an important role, maintaining that 
the community fought together). Samson’s relative, Isaiah Samson, had been 
a judge in India, and his uncle, David Samson, had been a land owner and 
active in public service within his community.21 Nevertheless, Samson, who 
had arrived from India with his family in 1954, had no special status, political 
clout, or access to anyone in a position of power in Israel.
In December 1960, Samson agreed to become involved with the strug-
gle. Along with other members of the community, he then began to contact 
community leaders of the synagogues in India to gain as much information 
as possible to build a case.22 News of this inquiry reached Dr. Michael Neer 
in the Israeli government’s Office for Religious Affairs, who became the first 
government member to make contact with the Bene Israel community about 
the issue.23 
On May 6, 1961, a weekend-long meeting of the Bene Israel community 
was held in Haifa, bringing together two or three representatives from every 
Bene Israel community in Israel.24From here they formed an action commit-
tee. This committee included Asher Kollett, as chairman, Haim Reuben from 
Haifa, Sassoon Ashton from Be’er Sheva, Ezekiel Ashtamkar from Rishon 
LeTsiyon, and Samson J. Samson from Jerusalem as both honorary secretary 
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and treasurer.25 It was decided that only Samson could make statements to the 
press, the public, and the government, in agreement with the rest of the com-
mittee. This put Samson at the heart of the issue, making him a leader in the 
community. Samson, a shrewd and clever man, did not like the spotlight and 
had no interest in personal accolades. He did not desire the position of leader, 
nor was he interested in cutting deals to make his own life easier. He proved 
an ideal candidate for the job and a fierce opponent of the rabbinate. 
That same month, the Indian press printed a series of articles highlight-
ing the discrimination against Indian Jews in Israel. They were printed in 
The Indian Express, The Times of India, The Free Press Journal, The Hindustan 
Times, and The Maratha.26 An editorial in The Hindustan Times stated: “It is 
intriguing to find the Rabbis of Israel set upon social ostracism of the Indian 
Jews after all these years. Their policy amounts to the establishment of a new 
kind of ghetto in Israel. Now the proverb is truly borne out, that he who 
would cheat a Jew must be a Jew.”27 
Among the Bene Israel community, the feeling of being othered had far-
reaching emotional, political, and religious repercussions. Community member 
Daniel Ezekiel commented that “the community felt isolated from the rest of 
the population. The rabbinate said that it had reached its initial decision [not 
to sanctify marriages] after laborious research. Thus by the stroke of a quixotic 
pen, the reputation of a whole community of harmless, peace-loving citizens 
was irreparably damaged. Whole ties of blood and ancestry were bastardized.”28 
Another community member interviewed in 2008 said that he had attended 
synagogue all his life, but stopped attending after the directives were issued. He 
added: “I go back to visit family in India when I can and always attend syna-
gogue there. But in Israel it seems like big business, and I don’t feel welcome.”29
In response to the government’s inaction, the action committee implicat-
ed the Israeli government and the Jewish Agency in the affair. In an article in 
the community organ, Truth, the Voice of the Bene Israel Action Committee, they 
wrote: “We accuse the Jewish Agency. The question we ask now is, why did the 
Jewish Agency uproot hundreds of families and bring them to the Holy Land 
to face religious discrimination by the so called ‘pure Jews’? Does it think that 
this small and politically unimportant eastern community can be suppressed 
and repressed?”30 In the absence of any government effort to intervene on their 
behalf, the community decided, under Samson’s leadership, that it was under 
no obligation to cooperate with the government.31 
The action committee began meeting regularly, and the government 
wanted a representative of its own to attend the meetings, but was refused 
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entry. By the end of 1961, the issue was receiving growing attention among 
the press and the international Jewish community, and the Bene Israel began 
receiving support from all corners of the Jewish world. Nahum Goldman, 
president of the World Jewish Congress (WJC), an international organization 
whose mission is to address the interests and needs of Jews and Jewish com-
munities throughout the world,32 sent a telegram to Arieh Tartakower, chair-
man of the Israel Executive of the WJC, urging that something be done about 
all the bad publicity.33 Tartakower duly arranged a meeting34 with Nissim and 
Zerach Warhaftig, minister of Religious Affairs, the ministry responsible for all 
matters related to the provision of religious services, including the allocation 
of funding for yeshivas and all Torah study institutions.
Subsequently, a meeting was arranged between Tartakower, Samson, 
and Kollette in an attempt to resolve the issue. According to Samson, at the 
meeting, Tartakower told them that Nissim complicated the issue by giving 
an explanation that had no bearing on what the community understood the 
problem to be. Nissim had explained to Tartakower that the problem was 
that the Bene Israel in Bombay had Reform rabbis. If these were replaced 
with Orthodox rabbis, he would endorse the community in Israel and not 
stand in the way of marriage outside of their own community.35 Samson 
and Kollette were shocked. Their community had been ostracized by the 
rabbis in Israel, and now a power struggle in India was being recommended 
to redeem it. Nissim’s words seemed to add insult to injury. But at the 
meeting, despite no intention of agreeing to the proposal, Samson told 
Tartakower that “if we agree we need written confirmation from you.”36 
Tartakower then made Kollette and Samson swear secrecy and promise to 
say nothing about what had transpired in the meeting, nor any proposi-
tions he had made.37 Samson asked him to put his request in writing. To 
Samson’s great surprise, he agreed. Samson duly promised to remain silent 
himself, knowing full well that the Jewish communities in India would 
make the document public. When Tartakower sent the letter, which was 
duly forwarded to India, the community there was outraged and the issue 
became public knowledge. To Tartakower’s accusation that he had broken 
his promise, Samson replied: “I did remain quiet but I can’t keep an entire 
community quiet.”38 It seemed that this incident cemented a relationship of 
mistrust between the two men who would have to deal with each other fre-
quently in the following years. The Bene Israel community in India, upon 
receiving this news, decided to support the action committee and refuse the 
demands of the rabbinate.
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When Nissim’s request became public, the Jerusalem Post published the 
following condemnation: “According to the spokesman of the rabbinate, even 
if an Orthodox rabbi were appointed for the community in India, it would not 
affect the members already in Israel. At the same time, so long as no ruling is 
made in regards to the community now here, Bene Israel immigrants arriving 
even after an Orthodox rabbi is appointed would be in the same position as 
those already here.”39 If this is truly the case, then even adherence to Nissim’s 
suggestion would have accomplished nothing.
As a result, no change was made to the rabbinical structure in India. No 
Reform rabbi was asked to leave his post, and no Orthodox rabbis brought 
in, nor were any positions created for them. On the ground in Israel, nothing 
had changed, and Rabbi Nissim did not grant endorsement to the community. 
The only change was the public awareness of the meeting and its outcome, 
casting Nissim in a negative light and providing further support for the Bene 
Israel community among sectors of the Israeli and international public.
THE GOVERNMENT BECOMES INVOLVED
The failed attempt by Warhaftig, the Religious Affairs minister, to resolve the 
issue and the ensuing bad press received by the rabbinate now brought the 
issue to the attention of the highest offices in Israel. The entire action com-
mittee was asked to meet with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion on July 2, 1961.40 
Ben-Gurion immediately put them at ease. He was, in Samson’s words, “the 
quintessential politician. He made us feel comfortable and said that the situ-
ation was a shame, and that it was shameful for the entire Yishuv that the 
rabbinate behaved as they did.”41 Ben-Gurion inquired about the history of 
the Bene Israel, and they recommended he read Samuel Kehimkar’s book.42 
Despite the Prime Minister’s charm, however, the action committee sensed 
that the meeting was very much business as usual and straight-up politics. 
According to Samson, the prime minister made all kinds of promises, assur-
ing the group that all would be resolved in the near future. Samson felt that 
he was delivering the empty promises of a master politician.43 For the entire 
time that Ben-Gurion spoke, the copy of Tartakower’s controversial letter, 
placed in front of him by the action committee, lay untouched and unac-
knowledged. By the end of the meeting, however, Samson noticed that the 
prime minister, whom he referred to as the “cunning old fox,” had slipped the 
letter into the desk.44 Although Samson had other copies, he suspected that 
the prime minister, hoping it was the only copy, sought to silence the uproar 
through sleight of hand.
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Nothing came of this meeting, and further meetings were arranged. 
Samson and the community were becoming increasingly frustrated, as they 
felt they were getting nowhere. Dealing with this had become a full-time job 
for Samson on top of his full-time job in the library at the Hebrew Univer-
sity of Jerusalem. The next important meeting between Nissim and Samson 
was arranged by Moshe Sharett for September 17, 1961. Samson said he 
would appear without a kippah [skull cap] to reciprocate the rabbi’s show of 
disrespect, but Sharett asked Samson to soft peddle it, in other words, to be 
respectful and civil. Sharett’s exact words were “C’mon, play cricket,”45 reflect-
ing his awareness of India’s passion for the sport, and he reassured Samson that 
Nissim considered the Bene Israel to be pure Jews and was keen to solve the 
problem.46 In the end Samson wore a kippah to the meeting.
 When Samson arrived for the meeting, Nissim was alone and waiting 
for him. According to Samson, Nissim quickly launched into an argument. He 
demanded to know why the Baghdadi Jews in India refused to marry the Bene 
Israel. Samson, however, maintained that it was in fact the Bene Israel who 
refused to marry the Baghdadis. This confrontation went on for some time. At 
the end of the meeting, Nissim acquiesced, saying, “You are 100% Jewish.”47
 Why Nissim changed his stance at this point is unclear. Did he come 
to this conclusion on his own or in response to pressure from politicians such 
as Ben-Gurion and Sharett? Or could he no longer face Samson’s opposition, 
since it was by now obvious that Samson would not be intimidated or bul-
lied? When discussing the meeting years later, Samson described Nissim as a 
“lovable bastard,” who seemed “more like a merchant than a religious man.” 
Others had this impression, too, and the action committee referred to Nissim 
behind his back as the Soheir Rashi [chief merchant].48
On October 4, 1961, Nissim suggested that Samson meet the Rabbinical 
Council. The following day, the five members of the action committee met 
with the council, which was comprised of Rabbis Y. M. Aaronberg, A. Gold-
shmidt, S. Tana, and A. Koshlovsky.49 These rabbis examined the concerns 
regarding the origins and customs of the Bene Israel community. After con-
sidering all aspects of the issue, they concluded that marriage with the Bene 
Israel was permissible. They came to this conclusion in accordance with the 
decisions, responsa, and historical sources that had been presented to them. 
Rabbi Nissim and the Rabbinical Council promised to authorize marriages 
and to send the directive to do so to rabbis all over the country. Rabbi Aaron-
berg ended the meeting saying, “May it be that we will merit the good fortune 
to witness in the near future those scattered among the nations, those far flung 
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about the earth, gathered into the bosom of the Lord. And may Israel dwell in 
quiet response, with none to make her afraid.”50
 The directives to be sent to rabbis throughout the country were: 
1. There are no doubts concerning the Judaism of the Bene Israel, 
from the earliest period they were bound closely to and main-
tained relationships with the seed of Israel. But because they 
were cut off for an extended period from the centres of Torah, 
there arose halachic concern over the manner and laws of their 
marriage and divorce practices that prevail among them.
2. The council had before it the response of the Chief Rabbis Ben 
Zion Meir Chai Uziel, z”l, and Itzhak Herzog, z”l, dealing with 
several specific cases of marriage among the community, and 
they permitted marriage in those cases.
3. On the basis of those responsa and as a result of basic and 
extensive halachic research recently conducted, the Council has 
decided that there is no basis for forbidding marriages of the 
Bene Israel, and therefore marriage with them is permitted. It is 
the responsibility of the rabbis registering the marriages to con-
duct proper investigations in each case in accordance with the 
instructions of the chief rabbinate. In each case where doubts 
arise they are to present the case to the district beit din, as it is 
customary in all cases concerning the registration of marriages.
4. Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Nissim will circulate the decision of the 
chief rabbinical council to the rabbis registering marriages and 
will enclose the attached explanations.
5. This decision of the Chief Rabbinical Council has no connec-
tion with the problems of the marriage of the Karaites, for that 
decision is totally different and is clearly explained in the Shul-
can Aruch, “Even Ha-ezer,” section 4.51 
On October 18, these directives were allegedly issued to rabbis across 
the country, and the matter was thought to be over. The Bene Israel com-
munity had been deemed halachically sound and its members could marry 
any other Jew in Israel. The action committee was pleased and brought 
the news back to their community. It seemed like a time of victory. On 
October 19, Samson met with Nissim again to make sure everything was 
in order, and the atmosphere was jovial. Nissim allegedly joked with Sam-
son, saying, “The Bene Israel are like all other Jews except that the Bene 
Israel attacked me, which makes them different from all other Jews.”52 It 
was said in a humorous way, but dark humor. It seemed that the two men 
had ended their dealings in a cordial manner and were unlikely to have 
any further contact. 
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On October 24, 1961, however, the newspaper Ma’ariv sent the reporter 
Raphael Bashan to meet the action committee for a follow-up story. He 
informed them that he had just had word that the ultra-Orthodox Agudat Yis-
rael Party had publicly rejected the Rabbinical Council’s decision to recognize 
the Bene Israel as legitimate Jews for marriage with other Israelis. 
While this came as a surprise to the action committee, who thought the mat-
ter had been closed, they were mobilized and ready to continue the struggle. On 
November 4, 1961, a new organization, the Bene Israel Association, was formed in 
Lod to address this as well as all other social issues.53 Before the marriage prohibi-
tion, the Bene Israel had been without political representation or leadership. It was 
felt that the action committee had been so successful that they should continue to 
fight for better housing, employment, and education opportunities until the end of 
1962,54 when the Bene Israel Association would assume those roles. Upon its cre-
ation, the association assumed that the marriage problem had been resolved, even 
if the Agudat Yisrael would not recognize the directives of the Rabbinical Council. 
THE STRUGGLE INTENSIFIES
Shortly after the creation of the Bene Israel Association, Samson received a 
phone call from a Rabbi Goldman (first name not given), who worked in the 
office of the chief rabbinate. Goldman said he had been upset that Nissim 
raised the marriage problem and that he was on the side of the Bene Israel. He 
went on to explain that a positive report on the Bene Israel had been received 
by the council six years earlier and suppressed and that Nissim had not sought 
the signatures of the Rabbinical Council for his new directive regarding the 
Bene Israel. News of the suppressed report, coupled with the fact that Nissim 
had not sought council endorsement, suggested to Samson that the matter 
might not be resolved. He wondered if the Agudat Yisrael stance was an indi-
cation of more going on and was grateful for Goldman’s inside information.55 
Sure enough, when Rabbi Nissim’s new directives were published on 
February 18, 1962, the wording was changed and additional text had been 
added. Previously, the concern had only been with those Bene Israel who 
seemed to have problematic backgrounds in that, when questioned, they could 
not prove Jewish ancestry. Now the wording made it clear that the entire Bene 
Israel community was suspect. In addition to what had been agreed upon by 
the action committee and the Rabbinical Council, the directives now read:
When a request is advanced to register a marriage between a member 
of the Bene Israel community and a person not belonging to that 
community, it is incumbent upon the registering rabbi:
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1. To search and investigate whether the mother or grandmother, 
and as far back as it is possible to trace the lineage, of the per-
spective bride or groom of the Bene Israel community was a 
Jewess and whether or not she came from a family into which 
intermingling with non-Jews or proselytes had occurred.
2. To search and investigate whether the parents or the grandpar-
ents, as far back as it is possible to trace the lineage, of the per-
son seeking marriage, were married after a divorce or whether 
there was in the family a kinship marriage such as is forbidden 
by Jewish law.
a. The rabbi registering marriages being certain that there 
are no doubts concerning the cautions listed above, he shall 
marry the couple.
b. There being an area of doubt from among the cautions 
listed above, the rabbi registering marriages is to refer the 
matter to the district beit din. The beit din will judge the 
case and determine whether the marriage is permitted or 
not and if permitted, if proselytization or immersions are 
required or not.56
At the publication of these additional directives alongside the others, 
the Bene Israel community was furious. They felt Rabbi Nissim had deceived 
them. Having come from India there was a tendency to interpret things as hav-
ing caste-like patterns, and according to these directives, the Bene Israel had 
been outcast and set as a people apart. The entire community would now be 
unable to marry their children to other Israeli families without encountering 
huge problems from the rabbinate. The new directives had made things worse 
than they were before. The community began to make accusations about 
the rabbinate and the government, shouting slogans that included the words 
“discrimination,” “apartheid,” and “Nuremberg laws.”57 They shouted these 
slogans, reported them to the media, and wrote letters to government offices. 
At this point, the vast majority of the Israeli population seemed to be on 
the side of the Bene Israel and opposed to the directives.58 The public became 
concerned that doubt might be cast on their own ethnicity and religious 
backgrounds. As one new immigrant put it, the case of the Bene Israel was 
everyone’s problem. By calling into question religious identity, national iden-
tity was also, by implication, called into question. As an immigrant, if one is 
not Jewish, what is one’s relationship to Israel? 
Samson’s official response to the media was that the government was at 
fault. He said, “A government that cannot protect its citizens is to blame.”59 
He further stated that Rabbi Nissim was also to blame and described the issue 
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as a matter of antisemitism. After receiving the open letter to the government 
and the articles that were emerging in the press, Warhaftig requested a meeting 
with the action committee. At the meeting, a furious Samson cornered him and 
demanded an explanation. He held nothing back, declaring, “Why didn’t you 
tell us before making aliyah? We wouldn’t have come!”60 It was a very legitimate 
question from the representative of a population that had never been perse-
cuted in India. Warhaftig had no response, or at least none that was satisfactory 
to the committee. His only explanation was the same as the official government 
line, which was to repeat and assure the Bene Israel community that there was 
no problem. “You are the minister and you are encouraging racism,”61 Samson 
told him. The meeting, like so many others, accomplished little.
While they tried to remain optimistic, 1962 proved to be a very difficult 
year for the Bene Israel community. Many marriage requests were denied by 
rabbis throughout the country. When a rabbi in Ashkelon refused to grant a 
marriage license to a young Bene Israel woman from Kiryat Gat that January, 
Samson made sure that the decision received plenty of publicity. This resulted 
in harassment of the rabbi by the press and the Bene Israel community, after 
which a license was issued but was granted with a clause stating that she was 
able to marry only a member of the Bene Israel community.62 On February 
15, a rabbi in Herzliya refused to officiate at a Bene Israel wedding on the 
grounds that he had not received instructions from the chief rabbinate permit-
ting mixed marriages.63 On March 16, a rabbi in Jerusalem refused to grant a 
marriage license to Mordecai Yehezkiel and S. Sassoon on the grounds that he 
had not received any instructions from the chief rabbi.64 In September, Rabbi 
Zalman Diskin refused to marry Mr. Aharon Sharpurkar of the Bene Israel 
community to Miss Ruhama Sassoon of the Indian Baghdadi community.65 
By mid-March, the marriage certificates for the Bene Israel in Israel were 
actually being changed. Marriage licenses in Israel normally specified the cat-
egory Levi, Cohen, or Israel. In the case of the Bene Israel, these words were 
being replaced with “Bene Israel, Indians.”66 The entire community, both in 
Israel and India, became increasingly outraged. The official statement from the 
action committee to the press reflected this anger and frustration:
The policy pursued by the Rabbinate of Israel smacks of South Africa’s 
apartheid. There have always been three groups of Jews, viz. Cohen, Levi, and 
Israel. Is it now necessary to make a fourth group, known as the Bene Israel 
Indian? And why is it necessary to mention the individual’s nationality before 
immigration, when this is not done for other immigrants? Are the Bene Israel 
not Israelis by nationality? The only answer is intentional discrimination of 
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the most absolute kind. Like the South African government, which does not 
bother about a negro marrying a negro, the Rabbinate could not care less when 
a Bene Israel marries another Bene Israel. The only difference between the two 
is that South Africa practices apartheid openly, whereas Israel practices it under 
the cloak of religion.67
On May 21, 1962, Rabbi Nissim suggested appointing a special mar-
riage registrar for the Bene Israel,68 which drew an outcry from the commu-
nity. Samson told the press that “we can no longer rest on the matter which 
affects our community’s honor—and I might add, the honor of Israel and 
the Jewish people.”69 Tensions increased, and the implications of the struggle 
reached further and further into the Jewish community worldwide. On May 
25, the annual meeting of the World Conference of Conservative Judaism 
publicly offered the Bene Israel their full backing. On May 31, the conference 
passed a resolution in support of the Bene Israel, under the leadership of B. B. 
Benjamin.70 But Benjamin suggested that the campaign of the Bene Israel be 
directed against the rabbinate, not the State of Israel. While happy for the sup-
port from the Conservative movement, Samson rejected this suggestion, how-
ever, maintaining that a government that fails to protect its people is at fault. 
On July 16, Samson met with Menachem Begin, leader of the Herut 
Party, who had given the Bene Israel his full support by saying that the com-
munity was 100 percent Jewish.71 He made clear that the Liberal, Mapam, and 
Communist Parties in the Knesset all supported the Bene Israel community 
and opposed the rabbinate’s directives.72 Despite this, however, Nissim said 
that instead of withdrawing the directives, the government was going to adopt 
the device of institutional regional registrars, to whom local registrars could 
refer if they had scruples against performing a marriage.73 The Bene Israel were 
horrified: if the registrars were to operate only in the case of the Bene Israel, it 
constituted yet another measure of discrimination. To confront this issue, 800 
members of the Bene Israel gathered in Be’er Sheva on July 21 to express their 
anger.74 The following resolutions were unanimously adopted:
1. The community strongly denounces the stand in parliament 
by the government in dealing with the Bene Israel problem. It 
demands the immediate cancellation of Rabbi Nissim’s infa-
mous directives which are an insult to the whole community 
and to India itself.
2. The community rejects the appointment of regional registrars 
and considers the arrangement a move to evade the issue.
3. The underhanded attempt made by the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs in trying to meet those who did not represent the com-
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munity with a view to causing a split in its ranks is very strongly 
condemned.
4. The community is deeply grateful to the Liberal, Herut, Mapam, 
and Communist Parties for their bold stand in supporting its 
struggle against tyranny and injustice when the question was 
taken up by the Knesset. It also conveys thanks to members of 
the Ahdut Ha Avoda who abstained on the vote in favour of 
regional rabbis.
5. It asks for the punishment of those rabbis refusing to grant mar-
riage licenses to members of the community. 
6. Secretaries of all centres are requested to prepare lists of persons 
willing to join in strikes and passive resistance demonstrations.
7. The action committee is requested to continue its struggle 
against the directives and regional registrars and is promised the 
wholehearted support of the community.75 
By this time, the community was becoming impatient and feeling para-
lyzed. Their children were unable to marry in Israel and were not sure they would 
ever be allowed to. A number of Bene Israel in Israel were giving serious thought 
to converting to Christianity, for the practical reason of having their children 
accepted within a community. Truth published an article, stating: “A number of 
Bene Israel families in Israel are on the verge of converting to Christianity, what 
a fate! That those who kept their religion for 2000 years without any outside 
guidance and help should even think of converting themselves to Christianity 
after coming to Israel is a tragedy of tragedies. We have stated and re-stated that 
conversion is no solution to our problem and that we must continue to fight to 
its bitter end.”76 Time was running out for the community, and the pressure on 
the action committee to resolve the issue was now overwhelming.
Without the ability to marry other Jews in the state of Israel, the com-
munity felt there could be no future there. This was a very painful issue as so 
many of the community members had made tremendous sacrifices to become 
Israeli. Most of the other community members had also given up their lives in 
a country that was not a place of persecution and had gone through difficult 
ordeals to come to Israel. They were proud of that. To be robbed of their future 
hopes and dreams was extremely painful. The Bene Israel began to organize 
peaceful protests and hunger strikes.
The first six months of 1964 brought all these things to a head, leading to 
a meeting between Samson and Gabriel Doron, the Israeli consul in India, on 
June 24. Doron suggested that the president meet the action committee, and 
he arranged a meeting for July 15. On that day the action committee met with 
President Zalman Shazar and Minister Warhaftig to discuss the directives.77
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On July 31, Samson was unexpectedly called to Gabriel Doron’s office. 
When he arrived, Doron informed him that he was to meet President Shazar, 
Chief Rabbi Nissim, Minister Warhaftig, and Chief Ashkenazi Rabbi Isser 
Yehuda Unterman, who would be joining the meeting over the telephone. Sam-
son was told that the meeting would be held later that day. This gave him the 
impression that they did not want him to have time to prepare for it. He was 
glad to have enough time to go home and change his clothes. He described the 
hours between leaving Doron’s office and returning as hours of tremendous anxi-
ety, saying that he was shaking like a leaf.78 This meeting would not be between 
the action committee and the officials, but with him alone. He would be made 
to stand as sole representative of the Bene Israel community. He recounted that 
he “felt unequipped in a way to stand up to these combined forces.”79 He was 
frightened that they would apply pressure on him to act or agree to something 
that he would later regret. Samson had, and still has, tremendous respect for the 
office of the president, and the meeting caught him so seriously off guard that 
his knees were shaking as he returned to Doron’s office.80
As the meeting began, Nissim confronted Samson about Bene Israel 
practices in India, implying that there were mamzerim in the community. 
Samson strongly refuted the attack and added that if the rabbi was concerned 
with mamzerim he needn’t look to the Bene Israel; every community had 
plenty of them. Samson then focused on the directives, saying: “It has been 
two years since the directives were issued and no cases have been found against 
the Bene Israel. Stop the directives.” Allegedly, Nissim retorted with “Stop the 
strike!” to which Samson reiterated the need to stop the directives, and Nis-
sim allegedly paused and quietly asked, “What do you want?” This is what 
Samson had been afraid of. He was without the support of the action com-
mittee and was being led down a road where he would become the fall guy for 
a government that could claim that he had made an agreement. He told them 
that he would have to ask the people. The president, who had barely spoken 
until then, said firmly: “But what do YOU want?”81 Clearly Nissim and the 
government believed he was in complete control of his community and the 
hunger strike, neither of which was true. And it appeared that the government 
wanted to cut a deal with him to put an end to the protests, strikes, contact-
ing of foreign governments, and media coverage. To their displeasure, Samson 
insisted that he could not act alone.
On August 2, because of the continued protests, hunger strikes, and 
failure to resolve the marriage issue, a press conference was called. When the 
press conference finished, an emergency meeting of Bene Israel members from 
The Bene Israel and the “Who Is a Jew” Controversy in Israel              187           
across the country was held. Samson suggested that they organize their own 
large protest. The community unanimously supported the idea and began to 
make arrangements for August 5. Immediately, members of the community 
began to complain that three days was not enough time to prepare, but Sam-
son insisted. He estimated that between 100 and 300 people would show up 
for the protest and that they would all be from the Bene Israel community. 
On August 5, between 2,000 and 3,000 people from across the spectrum 
of Israel’s population showed up.82 They arrived with huge placards, and a 
few of them had images and stuffed dolls of Nissim, which they wanted to 
burn in effigy. Samson discouraged them from doing this, and in most cases 
he was successful. In one case, Samson saw men urinating on Nissim’s effigy, 
which, although he did not condone, he did find slightly amusing.83 The 
demonstration went extremely well. Women were dressed in blue, green, and 
red saris, including some protesters who were not from the Indian community. 
Celebrities such as Yigal Yadin, the famous archaeologist, and Emma Talmi, 
an elected member of the Knesset from the Mapam party, attended, as well 
as official representatives of the Be’er Sheva Municipality and the chairman 
of the League for the Abolition of Religious Coercion.84 The demonstration 
marched to the headquarters of the chief rabbinate on King George Street. 
Many speeches were made, with Samson giving the concluding one. When he 
finished his speech, he called for the Israeli national anthem, Hatikvah, and 
everyone stood and sang in unison. Benjamin Israel, a scholar from the Bene 
Israel community, wrote, “The procession was one of the most impressive 
demonstrations held in Jerusalem since the birth of the State of Israel, and 
for the first time, Mapai, the largest party in Israel and the backbone of the 
government, came out in favour of the Bene Israel cause, as did the Histadrut, 
isolating the National Religious Party as the only supporter of the chief rab-
binate.”85 The members of the Bene Israel were quite pleased and felt they had 
the support of the Israeli people.
Eleven days later, on August 16, Samson presented himself for milluim 
[army reserve service] but was sent home. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol wanted 
him free because a special Knesset meeting was about to take place. Despite a 
recess of the Knesset, Eshkol called an emergency session to deal specifically 
with the Bene Israel matter.86 
The prime minister addressed the Knesset, stating that “The government 
repeatedly declares that it sees the Bene Israel community of India as Jews in 
all respects without qualification, not differing from all other Jews and having 
equal rights, including those of personal status.”87 He went on to say: 
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The complaint made by the representatives of the community, based 
on the closing phrases of the decisions, refers to the marriage direc-
tives issued by the Chief Rabbinate. It has been shown that the Bene 
Israel community and large segments of the Jewish population of 
Israel are opposed to the continued existence of the directives. A feel-
ing of discrimination has made the matter a question of acute public 
interest deserving our attention. After decisions in two cabinet meet-
ings, the government expresses the opinion that it is imperative that 
the rabbinate bow to public opinion and find a way to remove the 
factors causing a feeling of under privilege and discrimination.88
After clarifying the specific issues and the government demands, Eshkol 
moved to the broader subject of the Israeli people. 
He made it clear that he feared persecuting any single community as it 
could mean the eventual destruction of the entire Jewish people. He asserted: 
There is one people of Israel in the world. There are Jews who 
returned to their homeland and all are equals, and dear to us. Mem-
bers of the Knesset, for our generation the most important contem-
porary historical condition is the rebirth of Israel and the ingather-
ing of exiles. We look forward, and justly so, to a solution based 
on the love of Israel, a solution which, will enable us to gather the 
exiled unconditionally without obstacles. For reasons pertaining to 
Judaism as a whole, our laws have placed matters of personal status, 
in relations to the Jews, in the hands of the rabbis. But this grant has 
its conditions: The rabbinate must fulfil the greatest commandment 
of our generation, to enable the nation to live its life and gather all 
its exiles. The rabbis must take the burden of this commandment 
upon themselves, to foresee the future and avoid a conflict with seri-
ous consequences, between rabbinic law and the needs of a nation 
reborn, a conflict which may undermine their unique position and 
their authority, which we have appointed, to organise matters of the 
personal status of Jews.89
The prime minister asserted the authority of the state over the authority 
of the rabbis. By maintaining that the power of the rabbinate is conditional, 
he implied that its authority could be taken away, just as it had been granted 
by the government. This veiled threat asserted pressure on the rabbis to adhere 
to the government’s decision that the Bene Israel are equal and Jewish in every 
respect. Couching the threat in the context of the creation of the State of 
Israel and the ingathering of the exiles gave it particular weight. Having clearly 
asserted the government’s desire for the abolition of the directives and the pos-
sible consequences to the authority of the rabbinate if those wishes were not 
met, he spoke directly to the Bene Israel community. He stated, “And now a 
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few words from the podium of this house to the Bene Israel themselves. You 
are our brethren; to us you are the people of Israel. It is the strong desire of 
all of us to see you among the builders of our homeland, among all Jewry. 
Everything possible shall be done in order that every public body and every 
individual in the nation shall acknowledge such recognition. The Israeli public 
shall stand with you in this matter.”90 
 When Samson heard the speech, he was moved to request that the hun-
ger strikers and protesters return home, which they did.91 Between the prime 
minister’s speech and the thousands of people who had showed up to the 
protest, the political pressure on the rabbinate was overwhelming. On August 
31, the rabbinate made an official statement conceding that marriages to the 
Bene Israel should not be prohibited. It was decided that instead of the words 
“Bene Israel” in the above directives, the following would now be written, 
“Anyone concerning the ritual purity of whose family status any suspicion or 
doubt arises.”92 To the Bene Israel, the wording was not strong enough, but 
it was still seen as a victory. The community had taken on one of the most 
powerful institutions in the country and through nonviolent resistance had 
emerged victorious. 
 As of 2009, the Bene Israel community has intermarried with most 
communities in Israel and is Israeli and Jewish in every sense of the word. The 
chief rabbi, however, does not have jurisdiction over all the rabbis in the coun-
try, and they did not all follow the rabbinate when the directives were changed 
on August 31, 1964. As these words are being written, over forty years after 
the struggle for religious equality was supposed to be over, the chief rabbi of 
Petah Tikva, Rav Baruch Shimon Solomon, still refuses to perform marriages 
for the Bene Israel.93 
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Have We Ever Known What a Jew—or Judaean—Is? 
Ori Z. Soltes
The answer to the question “Who is a Jew?” or “What is a Jew?” is one with a 
very long history. Part of its problematic is that the criteria and conditions of 
definition have continued to shift over time, thus shifting the actual nature of 
the question, as well, therefore, as its answer.
In the centuries preceding the birth of Jesus of Nazareth, the term 
“Judaean” offered a good deal of complication to those interested in defining 
it. It could and often did refer to an individual claiming descent—in other 
words, bloodline ethnicity—from the tribe of Judah or, more likely, Judah 
or Benjamin, since these were the tribes that survived the Assyrian debacle 
of 722–21 BCE and the disappearance from history of the other ten Israelite 
tribes. It could also refer to someone who was ethnically other than Judaean, 
but worshipped the God of Israel, whose primary cult center was the Temple 
in Jerusalem. After all, late in the second pre-Christian century, the Hasmo-
naean-led Judaeans had force-converted Itureans as well as Idumaeans to the 
cult of YHVH.1 Herod himself, who extirpated the Hasmonaeans and became 
king of Judaea in 37 BCE, was Idumaean on his father’s side—and Nabataean 
on his mother’s side—but followed his father and grandfather in embracing 
the God of Israel that his grandfather, Antipater, had accepted under duress.2
Even more than the Hasmonaeans had been in their heyday, Herod was 
a successful conqueror of nearby territories. Thus many of the eventual inhab-
itants of a greater Judaea were pagan—most of the population of the coastal 
town of Straton’s Tower, which Herod transformed into the major port city 
of Caesarea, were pagan—and would thus be called “Judaean” for geographic 
reasons: it’s where they lived. Conversely, Judaeans by ethnicity/bloodline or 
by religion could live anywhere from Rome to Babylon and still be called 
“Judaean.” The complication in understanding the term would not be sim-
plified by the advent of Jesus of Nazareth, the Judaean revolt against Roman 
power that led to the destruction of the Temple five years later (70 CE), or 
the eventual bifurcation of the Judaeans into two groups: those who embraced 
Jesus as the “anointed” [mashiah/christos] and those who did not.
Both groups would initially be thought of by outsiders—and would 
think of themselves—as Judaeans. Both groups would consider themselves 
to be the True Israel [Verus Israel] and consider the other to be missing the 
spiritual boat and missing the proper connection to everything that the God 
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of Israel had come to represent as a universal, all-everything God. Both groups 
competed in the first few centuries after the time of Jesus for new adherents—
therefore adding ever-increasing numbers to their respective forms of the True 
Faith—who became Judaeans by religion regardless of their ethnicity or their 
nationality. The two groups competed, furthermore, for the particular status 
with regard to political legitimacy that Judaeanism had gained in 63 BCE 
from the Roman conqueror, Pompey, and that had been reaffirmed by his 
successors, from Julius Caesar to Marc Antony to Augustus and the rest of the 
Julio-Claudian line.3 
That religio licita status acknowledged and protected the Judaean 
religion and its concomitants—such as the sacred status of the annual half-
shekel contribution from around the Judaean world sent to Jerusalem for the 
upkeep of the Temple. It is a considerable irony to realize that, while Roman 
legionnaires were besieging the Temple Mount in their efforts to suppress 
the political revolt of the Judaeans, other legionnaires were protectively 
shepherding those sacred funds toward Jerusalem as a symptom of Judaea’s 
accepted religious status. 
The two Judaean groups asserting their legitimacy as automatic heirs to 
that status would eventually—perhaps by the early second century—come 
to be known as Jews and Christians. With the emergence of these two dis-
tinguishing terms a second layer of definitional complications asserts itself. 
On the one hand, the most obvious distinction between the two groups is a 
series of religion-based issues. Jews understand prophecy and with it, divinely 
inspired textuality, to have ended by the time of Ezra (444 BCE), and Chris-
tians understand it to have continued for many centuries after. As a conse-
quence, the eventual canon of the Jewish Bible (ca 140 CE) would include 
the Torah, Prophets, and Sacred Writings, whereas the earliest widely accepted 
Christian canon (ca 395 CE) would view those same texts as only the prelimi-
nary part—the Old Covenant—of the Bible, updated by the intertestamental 
material that includes books like First and Second Maccabees and Judith and 
both updated and significantly improved by the material in the New Testa-
ment: the Gospels, Acts, Epistles, and book of Revelation.
The second, even more fundamental difference is their embrace or 
rejection of Jesus of Nazareth. That distinction will become more acute 
by the early fourth century, when, at a council of several hundred bishops 
that took place at Nicaea in 325 CE, over which the Emperor Constantine 
presided, the perspective of Athanasius and Bishop Alexander was embraced 
over that of Bishop Arius. Arius asserted that Jesus, by then viewed by most 
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Christians as God’s Son, was born, grew up, and died—and was therefore 
not the same as the eternal, unchanging Father. Athanasius asserted that the 
two are of one substance: homoio-ousia. Thereafter, the simultaneous divinity 
and humanity of Jesus and, more fully, the triune nature of God, became the 
only acceptable (nonheretical) understanding of God for Christianity—an 
understanding antithetical to the Jewish view of God as never assuming any 
sort of physical form.
What this means for our discussion is that Judaism was coming to be 
understood during the first few centuries CE as a religion, as distinct from 
either Christianity or paganism as religions. It is thus definitionally distin-
guished both from Christianity and from the Judaeanism that preceded it, 
which is the parent of both Christianity and Judaism. Not only are the ethnic/
bloodline and the political/national issue theoretically eliminated by the active 
proselyzation in which Jews, like Christians, are engaged during this early 
period, but the very elements that will come to define the two faiths as distinct 
from each other—the concept of God and the concept of Bible—are taking 
shape only gradually. 
The same will be true of other defining aspects of the two emerging 
faiths. Thus, for instance, the oral tradition of interpretation of and commen-
tary on the Israelite-Judaean sacred texts begun during the last few pre-Chris-
tian centuries continued. That tradition would be embraced and furthered 
within the Jewish community as the rabbinic tradition—albeit not formally 
organized until the early third century CE by Judah the Prince. Eventually, 
a range of such literatures would evolve: aggadic and halachic, midrashic 
and Talmudic—the latter offering mishnaiot upon which separate groups of 
amoratic discussions would be visited in Judaea/Palestine and Babylonia.
Within the rabbinic tradition, in fact, there is a rather astonishing dis-
cussion that highlights how important the question of deciding and defining 
who is and who is not a Jew had already become—as well as suggesting how 
proselytism and conversion were common enough to warrant addressing the 
issue. The particular discussion that I have in mind is found in order Nashim 
[Women], tractate Yebamoth [Widows] 97b and focuses on the obligations 
associated with Levirate law: whether it applies to the case of two brothers 
whose mother converted to Judaism, when one of them was conceived before 
she converted but was born after she converted and the other was both con-
ceived and born after she converted. The heart of the issue pertains to what 
qualifies someone to be considered fully Jewish and therefore obligated by 
strictures that apply only to Jews.4
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Conversely, as Christianity took identifiable shape, it rejected rabbinic 
commentary in favor of its own, authored by a diverse range of patristic schol-
ars in the West and in the East, such as Origen (184/5–254/5) and Augustine 
(354–428). The two faiths looked at Jerusalem as the center of faith, but 
where Jews looked to it through a lens focused on the Temple Mount and its 
aggadic resonance back to Mount Moriah and the akedah [the binding of Isaac 
(Gen. 22)], the Christian lens focused on Mount Golgotha, the site of the 
crucifixion, and in the absence of certainty as to its location, the site of Jesus’ 
interment, over which the Church of the Holy Sepulcher would eventually 
be built. All of these defining issues would continue their developments and 
expansions as the centuries moved on.
Meanwhile, the emerging distinction between a definable Judaism and 
a definable Christianity offered an entirely different level of complication for 
the pagan Roman authorities. Most significant is that the word that I have 
rendered in English as “Judaean” and “Jew”—pointing to distinctions between 
these two that affect our understanding of and definition of both these terms 
as well as of “Christian”—cannot be distinguished in the languages that the 
Romans would have used or that the Judaeans and early Jews and Christians 
would have used. In Latin, iudaeus; in Greek, ioudaios; in Hebrew, yehoodi; and 
in Aramaic, yehouday—are all translatable as either “Judaean” or “Jew.” This 
means that, as time pushed forward and the Judaean community bifurcated, 
eventuating as Judaism and Christianity, not only would it take time for the 
community itself to make the distinction between its two parts with regard to 
terminology, but more to the point, the Romans would not only have the same 
difficulty, but, should they be in a position of choosing to which community 
to accord religio licita status, they would simply accord it to the Jews, not the 
Christians. The Jews would appear to be the simple continuation of Judae-
anism while the other, with its entirely new name (once that name became 
known), would appear to be something completely different.
The pagan Romans are not likely to have known much if anything about 
the theological differences between the two groups, but would have been 
limited to the name distinction. Even that awareness would be slow in arriv-
ing. This is clear from the brief, confused references to Christians and Jews 
made by the Roman historiographers Tacitus (ca 115 CE) and Suetonius (ca 
120 CE) in referring back to events during the reigns of Claudius and Nero.5
As a practical historical matter, then, it should not surprise us that the 
Romans continued to treat Judaism in a nonoppressive manner, with the 
exception of the aftermath of the Bar Kokhba Revolt (132–5 CE), when the 
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Emperor Hadrian determined that the most effective way to suppress Jewish 
political ambitions was to undercut Jewish religious sensibilities. During the 
reign of his successor, Antoninus Pius, however, that policy was abandoned. 
Meanwhile, Christianity was ignored for the most part until the third century 
and then endured intermittent persecution, the severity of which seemed to 
increase from the time of Septimius Severus (205 CE) to that of Maximinus 
Thrax (235–38 CE) and Decius (249–51 CE) to that, most notoriously, of 
Diocletian (284–305 CE).
It is important to keep in mind that the Roman motive for such perse-
cutions was not religious, but political. As a polytheistic pagan society well 
familiar with Greek culture and its stories of individuals suffering at the hands 
of one goddess or god while being favored by another, the Roman tendency 
was to embrace them all: better to embrace a powerless or even nonexistent 
deity than to eschew one that exists and has power. On that basis, there was a 
steady flow of new forms of worship making their way across the empire over 
the centuries, from mother goddesses to the Olympians, from Osiris and Isis 
from Egypt to Mithra from Persia. Thus the issue of tolerating or persecuting 
Judaism or Christianity was based solely on political or administrative con-
cerns, not on spiritual ideology.
This would change in the course of the fourth century. Constantine 
eliminated faith-directed persecution with his edict of Milan, in 313— 
Christianity was now placed on an even playing field with Judaism and pagan-
ism. For reasons beyond this discussion, by ca 380, Emperor Theodosius had 
made Christianity the official religion of the empire. In practical terms, this 
meant, first of all, that all other forms of faith, be they pagan or Jewish, were 
in effect outlawed. Second, it meant that the proselytic outreach of Judaism, to 
whatever extent it had continued since the first century, now came necessarily 
to an absolute halt.
What it also therefore meant was that, if on the one hand the definition 
of Judaism had been largely reduced to that of a religion (as opposed to an eth-
nicity or a nationality) during the previous few centuries—paralleling, in effect, 
the understanding of Christianity and reflecting the distinction both between 
the two of them and between them and the various pagan denominations 
with regard to their respective senses of divinity and the concomitants of those 
senses—the definition of Judaism, by paradox, experienced a slight expansion 
over the next few centuries. Because circumstances caused—forced—Judaism 
to assume an increasingly exclusive stance (“you couldn’t join us even if you 
wanted to”), over against the all-inclusive ambitions of Christianity (and a 
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few centuries later, Islam); because of its increasing place within Christendom 
(and to a lesser extent, the Muslim world) as a people apart; and because of 
its distinctly different customs (most obviously, male infant circumcision), a 
definitional understanding of Judaism gradually set in as somehow ethnically 
and not merely religiously based.
There is ambiguity in this, rather than clarity—from both inside and 
outside the increasingly dispersed Jewish community—and variation accord-
ing to time and place. Aside from endlessly diverse interpretations of rabbinic 
law, halachah, there were some communities, such as that in Ethiopia or even 
more emphatically that of the Karaites, that altogether ignored the rabbinic 
tradition. The religion of Judaism was far from monolithic. The story, most 
obviously, of the Khazars—both their mass conversion to Judaism in the 
eighth century and the eventual demise of their vast kingdom in the early 
eleventh century, together with their putative, substantial migration up into 
eastern Europe, where they would have sooner rather than later encountered 
and intermingled with Jews fleeing east from the Rhineland as the era of the 
Crusades set in—means that medieval ethnographic identity was, to say the 
least, mixed. Nonetheless, the image of Jews as a definable monolith not only 
persisted, but was also paradoxically and retroactively reasserted as Judaism 
entered the modern era.
We may time that entrance any number of ways. One way would be to 
begin with the so-called, popularly misunderstood, “heretical” Spinoza, in the 
mid-seventeenth century, but it’s probably simplest to take it from the late 
eighteenth century—the era of industrial, scientific, and political revolutions 
and of emancipation—since that would be the point at which definitional 
complications begin their new, widely felt expansion. Emancipation itself 
would assume divergent forms as it was articulated in diverse ways at differ-
ent times across parts of central and western Europe. Even the terminology of 
emancipation—and thus the external view of what Judaism and Jews are—was 
subtly different from this place to that. 
We can, for instance, examine the Edict of Tolerance issued by the Haps-
burg Emperor, Joseph II, on January 2, 1782. It refers to the Jews as a nation 
[in German: Nazion], whereas the decree of the Emancipation of the Jews of 
France, released by the French National Assembly on September 28, 1791, 
refers to “individuals of the Jewish persuasion.” This is an assertion that Juda-
ism is a religion and that therefore Jews in France “who take the civic oath” 
shall henceforth be defined as Frenchmen who happen to be Jews rather than 
Jews who happen to reside in France.
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Of course neither of these formulations came without complications. 
In “secular” France, for instance, where nonetheless schools and shops were 
closed on Sunday—the traditional Christian “Lord’s Day”—an emancipated 
French Jew would be in a quandary: having defined himself as a Jew by reli-
gion alone, whose children were now free to attend a public school and neither 
restricted to or desirous of attending a traditional Jewish cheder, he would need 
to decide what his children should do on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath. Not 
attend school? Attend but not write? Write only in the case of an exam? And 
what about his little shop on Main Street? It was closed by mandate on Sun-
day.  Should he keep it open on Saturday, thereby abrogating the Sabbath, or 
close it, losing one sixth of his business—and no doubt going out of business, 
thanks to his Christian shopkeeper colleagues’ six-day-a-week competition?
These complications became yet more complicated under Napoleon, 
who, pushed by the rather anti-Jewish Count Mole, directed an official query 
in 1806–07 to the Jewish communal leadership regarding self-definition. 
Napoleon’s educational and other reforms effectively tightened the strictures 
on how to be a Jew in France. Over in Prussia by about this time (1810–11) in 
a few communities such as Hamburg, Jewish leadership altogether reshaped—
reformed—Judaism, “modernizing” its religious parameters. Thus, travelling 
by vehicle to the synagogue on the Sabbath and relegating primary Sabbath 
observance to Friday night, for example, were practical changes designed to 
make it more possible for Jews to integrate themselves into Christian (mainly 
Lutheran) society. Prayer services were reorganized along lines that stylistically 
imitated the Lutheran model. Ideologically, the turn from calling synagogues 
“synagogues” to calling them “temples” reflected an assertion that “we are not 
in exile, awaiting the messianic advent and with it the ingathering of the exiles 
and the rebuilding of God’s Temple in Jerusalem.”
This reformation, too, is not without its definitional and other compli-
cations. Within the Jewish community of Prussia there was pushback from 
the traditionalists. They were soon called Orthodox, from the Greek words 
doxa, meaning “belief ” and orthe—meaning both “correct” and “narrow.” This 
second element proved doubly useful, then: to the Orthodox, theirs is correct 
belief; to the Reformers, the Orthodox practice offers overly narrow belief. 
Within another decade a still more stringent and “modern” reformist Judaism 
responded to Orthodoxy and, in a sense, to Reform Judaism. It called itself 
“the Science of Judaism” [Die Wissenschaft des Judentums].6 If its practitioners 
saw it as the consummately modern form of Judaism, stripped of its out-of-
date medievalist aspects, its critics understood it to have thrown the baby out 
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with the bathwater: they viewed the elimination of the spiritual aspects of 
Judaism as eliminating its heart and soul.
Nor was the issue any less problematic from the outside. In Prussia, 
emancipation rights were offered, taken back, offered, and taken back again 
several times in the first half of the century. One consequence of this was 
that, in 1824, six-year-old Karl Marx was converted to Protestantism by his 
upwardly mobile father, who was convinced that his son would have no future 
as a Jew in Prussia. Young Karl grew up as a nominal Protestant, but spent 
his summers with his very Orthodox grandparents—both grandfathers were 
rabbis, in fact. It is not unreasonable to suppose that Marx grew up rather 
confused as to his Jewish/non-Jewish identity, and it is perhaps no surprise, 
further, that, as a recent PhD, one of the first essays that he wrote in 1843–44 
was “On the Jewish Question.” The essay was in response to a pair of essays 
by his former mentor, Bruno Bauer, asserting that Jews should not complain 
that they did not possess full civic rights.
What is important for our purposes is that, on the one hand, Marx seemed 
to defend Judaism with regard to its demands for full emancipation—or at least 
to criticize Bauer for his inconsistent views, particularly with regard to separat-
ing politics from religion where Christianity is concerned but not where Juda-
ism is concerned. On the other hand, in the second part of the essay he speaks 
of how all of society must be emancipated—from Judaism, which he equates 
with huckstering and money worship. So he has clearly absorbed a long-held 
Christian prejudice regarding Jewish preoccupation, turning it into a definition 
of Judaism. Moreover, he makes a further definitional distinction between what 
he calls “Sabbath Jews” and “everyday Jews,” and it is the latter who are, in his 
words, “actual, secular” Jews, who are worshippers of money.7 So religious Jews 
are at least marginalized, if not altogether defined out of existence. 
Moreover—and this is rather ironic, given the issues delineated in the 
previous paragraph—Marx would be referred to by some of his own acolytes, 
later on (notably, Mikhail Bakunin, excoriatingly), as a Jew. In other words, 
he who had been nominally Christian by religion since the age of six and who 
both defended Jewish demands for full emancipation and criticized Judaism 
as a virtual business was still viewed (and perhaps viewed himself ) as a Jew 
by ethnicity/bloodline, decades later.8 By then the racialization of Judaism 
that had been expanding across the century had reached a new level. Spe-
cifically, in 1879, a Prussian political philosopher and pamphleteer, Wilhelm 
Marr (1819–1904), in his campaign to remarginalize Jews in the modern era, 
extracted a term from the century-old academic discipline of linguistics—a 
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term that had been applied to a group of languages that includes Hebrew, 
Arabic, Aramaic, Akkadian, and Ethiopic, among others—and applied it to 
the Jews: Semitic/Semites. Marr’s intention was to suggest that all Jews came 
ultimately from the Middle East and are not Europeans: they are eternal for-
eigners, who should not and cannot be integrated into the European world in 
any meaningful way.9
This sort of racial/ethnic/bloodline understanding of Judaism, which 
became increasingly popular with the expansion of anthropology as a disci-
pline and its intertwining with post-Christian, still-Christian prejudices, was 
recognized as fallacious by Jewish thinkers like Franz Rosenzweig.10 On the 
one hand, Rosenzweig observes in an October 22, 1905, letter to his parents 
that, in the Jewish fraternity that he was considering joining at the university, 
the members failed as a group to conform to a Jewish, other-than-German 
“type.”11 On the other hand, he turned back at the last moment from convert-
ing to Christianity—a conversion that would have been based not on spiritual 
conviction but on sociophilosophical considerations. 
His turning back was based, in fact, on his sense of spiritual uncertainty 
at least—and at most, outright rejection of the notion of a God such as Jews 
and Christians both embraced. In turning back he articulated an understanding 
of Judaism as a cultural (that is, neither religious nor racial/ethnic) phenome-
non—and why, he reasoned, would he abandon the cultural reality in which he 
grew up and with which he was so familiar in favor of one that was altogether 
foreign to him, unless he had been subject to a spiritual transformation? 
The question of defining Judaism as a religion or as an ethnicity, as it 
twisted toward a view of Jews as a group of immutable foreigners, contrib-
uted to yet another definitional direction: of Judaism as a nation. Moses Hess 
had first explored this systematically in his 1862 work, Rome and Jerusalem. 
Hess was inspired most obviously by the Italian nationalist Risorgimento and 
specifically by Giuseppe Mazzini’s articulation of the possibilities for Italian 
nationalism to lead a unified nation back to the sort of glorious role it had 
once played on the world stage as the center of a world-conquering imperium. 
Hess’s work offered an analogous ambition for Judaism. The most obvious 
difference between his vision and Mazzini’s was that the Israelite-Judaean past 
had played out back in the Middle East, not in the Europe in which most of 
Hess’s intended audience was living and had been living for centuries. 
Theodore Herzl—a highly assimilated and very secularized Austrian 
Jew with a strong sense of his own secular messianic potential, who had, like 
Rosenzweig, once joined a fraternity (it was a Christian fencing fraternity that 
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ultimately shocked him with its antisemitic outbursts during an 1888 fifth 
anniversary marking of Richard Wagner’s death)—would pick up the national-
ist thread more than a generation after Hess had written his book. Herzl’s 1896 
pamphlet, Der Judenstat, sought both to define the functional and not just theo-
retical parameters of a Jewish state and also to solve the problem of antisemitism 
as largely economically based by removing a critical mass of Jews from Europe 
and from economic competition with their Christian neighbors. In addition, 
Herzl sought to address Judaism as a nationality-based problem by making it 
clear to the larger Christian community that Jews who chose to remain in their 
European homes were emphatically French, German, Italian, or whatever, who 
just happened to attend synagogues on Saturday rather than churches on Sun-
day, for they had chosen France, Prussia, or Italy over the Jewish state.12 
The nascent Zionist movement that grew from Herzl’s efforts and those 
of others addressed the question of defining Jews and Judaism obliquely by 
addressing the question of what the movement’s ambitions should be. Should 
it be to establish an autonomous (or semi-autonomous) polity as a place of 
refuge from the antisemitism that was flourishing with devastating violent 
effect particularly in eastern Europe or to shape an idea that would resuscitate 
a Judaism that was seen to be spiritually floundering in the face of the frac-
tionization of Judaism as a religion across the nineteenth century? If Herzl’s 
obsession with saving Jews led him to accept almost any geographic option 
that he could negotiate in which to create a Jewish state—most famously, 
Uganda, briefly, in 1903—others, most notably Ahad Ha’am (the pen name of 
Asher Ginsberg), were focused on saving Judaism; for them, no place besides 
Eretz Yisrael could serve, regardless of whether it was governed by the Ottoman 
Turks or anybody else.13 
A quickly developing subset of spiritual Zionism was culturally focused. 
This attracted no less a figure than the not-yet-famous Martin Buber—an 
Austrian who had himself been a highly assimilated, secularized Jew—who 
became interested in Jewish spirituality by way of his academic study, first, of 
Hinduism and Buddhism, which led him to an interest in Chasidism, which 
led him to an interest in Zionism. He observed that a full sense of Jewish 
national identity could not be shaped without including (secular) literature, 
art, and music within its fabric. He was a lynchpin in promoting the idea of 
establishing an arts school in Jerusalem. When, under the directorship of the 
Lithuanian-born Jewish sculptor and painter Boris Schatz, the Bezalel School 
opened its doors in 1906, it had as a centerpiece of its mandate to define and 
shape Jewish national art forms.14 
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During this same period, hundreds of thousands of Jews were managing 
to migrate to the United States. On these shores the battle between Reform 
and Orthodox—with “parallel” definitional debates distinguishing Ashkenaz-
im from Sephardim—reached a head in the 1880s with the graduation of the 
first class of American-born rabbis from the nascent Hebrew Union College 
(HUC) in Cincinnati, the notorious trayfah banquet of 1883 that celebrated 
the ordination of those rabbis, and the Pittsburgh Platform of 1885. As both 
groups sought to attract constituents from the waves of incoming eastern 
European Jews, an alternative to both, which presented itself as a compromise 
between them, was shaped. The Conservative movement reflected the sort of 
pragmatism that the French philosopher, Alexis de Tocqueville, had, a genera-
tion earlier, associated in particular with Americans.15 
Two generations after the development of Conservative Judaism, an 
important rabbinic leader from that movement (he had grown up as an Ortho-
dox Jew and shifted away from his father’s overly traditional religious stance 
as he moved toward adulthood) would argue that all of these “movements” 
within Judaism were too narrowly conceived in that they all defined Judaism, 
one way or another, as a religion. Mordecai M. Kaplan, in his lengthy 1923 
work, Judaism as a Civilization: Toward a Reconstruction of American Jewish 
Life, sought to amplify the elements of Jewish life that might be called cultural 
(its arts and crafts, its language and literature). Also amplified were Judaism’s 
spiritual elements—but with the Torah viewed not as a revelation from God 
to be obeyed as such, but as the primary text of the millennia-long Jewish 
tradition, to be studied as such. Also recognized were national elements—but 
with the Diaspora world, particularly of America, as equally important as Eretz 
Yisrael (like the spokes of a wheel of which Israel is the hub; both hub and 
spokes are necessary for the wheel to function). In this way, Kaplan articulated 
the idea that Judaism is most effectively defined as a civilization analogous to 
Roman or Christian civilizations. 
The United States was becoming arguably the most active center of Jew-
ish life across the world by this time, and two obvious developments within the 
next generation would intensify the issue of defining what and who Jews are. 
The Holocaust presented a Nazi-articulated affirmation of Judaism as a race; 
all one required was one Jewish grandparent to qualify for a one-way ticket to 
Auschwitz, according to the “scientific” definition derived from the analysis of 
racial traits and qualities pioneered by Alfred Rosenberg, Hitler’s key ideologue 
in such matters. In the midst of this debacle, Joseph R.Soloveitchik’s signal 
work, Halakhic Man, was written (1944). His book—in which, oddly, not a 
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word of reference to the Holocaust is offered—argues, in effect, that the true 
Jew is one whose life is governed by an awareness of rabbinic laws and how 
those laws offer prescriptions with regard to every conceivable aspect of or 
event within nature.16 It is a kind of handbook for how to be both modern 
and Orthodox and thus furthers the religiocentric approach to the definition 
of Jews and Judaism. 
The second development during the middle of the century, the establish-
ment of the State of Israel as a “Jewish state,” raised the question of defining 
Jewishness at a different practical level from that presented by Hitler—and 
related obliquely to the implied definition by Soloveitchik: what sort of indi-
vidual is definable as fit to be accorded the automatic Israeli citizenship to 
which every Jew is entitled by the Israeli Constitution? This issue, over time, 
would offer diverse complications. In the 1970s and again the late 1980s and 
1990s, Jews in large numbers coming from the Soviet Union turned out, in 
many cases, to be half-Jewish. In such cases the question of which parent was 
Jewish and which one was Russian, say, or Ukrainian or Byelorussian became 
an issue for an Israel struggling between its self-definition as a secular democ-
racy akin to England and the United States and as a theocracy subject to the 
constraints of Jewish religious Orthodoxy. 
During the same period, more or less, there was an upsurge in immi-
grants to Israel from the United States (and to a lesser extent, Argentina, 
Canada, and elsewhere in the Americas and Europe), many of whom had 
refound a traditional religious Jewish identity—but a critical mass of whom 
came either from Reform or Conservative backgrounds or even from Christian 
backgrounds. Thus a point was reached where “proof” of one’s Judaism, and 
in the case of converts, of the fact that the conversion had been performed by 
an Orthodox rabbi, was required in order to be considered a Jew and thus to 
qualify for automatic citizenship rights. So, too, the advent of a large number 
of Ethiopian Jews, mostly through Operation Moses (1984) and Operation 
Solomon (1991) reinforced the issue. If the advent of the Ethiopians further 
undercut the notion that Jews may be defined by race, the fact that their 
Judaism had developed virtually without reference to the rabbinic tradition 
permitted the Israeli rabbinate to question whether or not they could even be 
considered Jews. This is apart from the question of how to define those who 
came from a mixed parentage or had become Jewish by conversion when the 
possibility of leaving Ethiopia for Israel began to present itself. 
This range of definitional possibilities and problems for Jews and Juda-
ism in varied contexts occasioned by emancipation, but with underpinnings 
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as old as Judaism itself, has remained unresolved during the past more than 
two centuries—and is perhaps unresolvable. The implications are as rich as 
the inherent question is complicated. Every noun to which one attaches the 
adjective “Jewish” becomes a definitional challenge, exponentially more chal-
lenging than that same noun without the adjective. Thus if we speak of “Jew-
ish thought,” we need not ask only whether we mean by that rubric “thought 
expressed by a Jew” or “thought that focuses on Jewish issues” but also what 
exactly we mean by “Jewish.” 
Surely Talmudic thought is “Jewish thought” by definition: it focuses on 
how to live one’s life as a Jew in a non-Jewish world and its authors are rabbis. 
And we may say the same of Soloveitchik’s Halakhic Man. But is Buber’s I and 
Thou a work of Jewish thought? He is a Jew, but his focus is broadly one of 
religious existentialism and not specifically Jewish. What of Marx’s “On the 
Jewish Question”? The subject seems to be by its very title, but the conclusions 
hardly seem to be those of a Jew—and what is Marx’s identity, after all? He was 
converted as a child from Judaism but a philosophical admirer would think of 
him, excoriatingly, as a Jew. 
What of the German Jew Hannah Arendt, forced to leave Nazi Berlin 
behind and to take up a new life in America? Most of her essays (like “What 
is Freedom?” written in the 1970s) are, like Buber’s I and Thou, broadly 
focused—but arguably her best-known work is Eichmann in Jerusalem: A 
Report on the Banality of Evil. Her reflections on the trial of the gray bureaucrat 
accused of authoring all the details of the Final Solution to the Jewish Problem 
for Hitler’s regime was criticized in many quarters for its failure to distinguish 
between victims and victimizers—for its lack of sympathy for the former and 
excessive sympathy for the latter—to the point that she has been referred to as 
a self-hating Jew. Does “Jewish thought” include thought by Jews who resent 
the fact that they are Jewish? How does one define such a Jew—as mired in her 
inescapable ethnicity or race regardless of how far she attempts to pull herself 
away from her religion or culture? 
We can in fact apply this problematic to all sorts of cultural expressions. 
The criteria for defining “Jewish music” or “Jewish visual art” offer the same 
double complications: are we referring to the content of the work—in which 
case, what aspects of it: style, purpose, symbolic language? Or to the identity 
of the artist? In the latter case—we have come full circle—how are we defining 
the artist as “Jewish”? And does the artist, musician, writer—creator in what-
ever medium—have to be consciously thinking of creating Jewish art, music, 
literature, or can it be an unconscious element in his or her work?
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Defining Jews, Jewish, and Judaism—if answering the question, “Who 
or what is a Jew?”—has a long history and a particular intensity in the modern 
era, but the process of defining—or trying to do so—is itself fundamentally 
“Jewish.” Asking questions that have difficult answers or no answers at all and 
that, moreover, produce further questions rather than producing answers or at 
least well before they produce them, this is an emphatically Jewish approach 
to the world. Certainly an important aspect of what it means to be Jewish is to 
ask what it means to be Jewish; one definition of “Jewish” across the ages, but 
particularly in the era since emancipation, is “the condition of being obsessed 
with the question of what ‘Jewish’ is.”
NOTES 
1 See Josephus, Antiquities of the Judaeans, 13.1.1 regarding the Ituraeans; 13.9.1 regard-
ing the Idumaeans.
2 John Hyrcanus (son of Simon, last of the five “Macabbee” Hasmoneans), having defeat-
ed the Idumaeans, gave them the choice of having themselves circumcised and embracing 
the Judaean religion—or exile or destruction. His son, Aristobolos, followed that model 
when he defeated the Ituraeans.
3 To make a long story short, Pompey arrived in Judaea, in part, to adjudicate the quarrel 
between John Hyrcanus II and his brother, Antigonus, regarding the Judaean throne. One 
of the outcomes of this, for reasons beyond this discussion, was his conferral of religio 
licita status on the Judaeans and their faith; this policy continued from one Roman leader 
to the next—even during the period when Rome was suppressing the Judaean political 
revolt in 65–73 CE. See Josephus, Antiquities 14.3.4 and 14.4.4; and Wars of the Judaeans, 
1.7.4–5; see also Dio 37.16 and Strabo 16.40.
4 The mishneh under discussion is, in part: “The sons of a female proselyte who become 
proselytes together with her neither participate in Halitzah nor contract Levirate mar-
riage, even if the one was not conceived in holiness [i.e., before the mother converted], 
but was born in holiness [i.e., after the mother converted], and the other was both con-
ceived and born in holiness.” 
Not only does there follow a lengthy amoraitic discussion of the mishneh, but also the 
larger context of the whole chapter—ultimately reflecting on the role of the mother in 
determining Jewish identity and other related issues—could hardly be richer.
5 See Suetonius, “Life of Claudius,” 25; Tacitus, Annales XV. 14.
6 The Verein für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden [Society for Jewish Culture and Sci-
ence] was founded in 1819 by Eduard Gans, a pupil of Hegel, together with Heinrich 
Heine, Leopold Zunz, Moses Moser, and Michael Beer. The society’s goal was to shape 
an understanding of Jews as a Volk [people] in their own right, independent of their 
religious traditions—and thus to validate secular cultural Jewish traditions as equal to 
those adduced by Johann Gottfried Herder and his followers for the German people. This 
would have underscored a national/ethnic distinction between Jews and Germans—virtu-
ally the opposite of what the Jews in France had achieved as a self-definition in the previ-
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ous generation. The Society more or less failed, but Zunz began a spin-off movement in 
that same year, Die Wissenschaft des Judentums, which stressed subjecting Jewish literature 
and culture to analysis that used the instruments of modern scholarship.
7 “The God of the Jews has been secularized and has become the god of the world. The 
bill of exchange is the Jew’s actual god.” Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat, Writings 
of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1967), 246. 
Interestingly, the translators chose to render “God” as “god”; all nouns in German are 
capitalized, so Marx’s view on this issue is not obvious. 
8 Writing in 1871, regarding a quarrel he was having with Marx, Bakunin observed: “a 
Jew himself, Marx is surrounded—in London and France, but especially in Germany—by 
a crowd of little Jews, more or less intelligent, stirring up intrigue, troublemakers, as is 
the case with Jews everywhere.” See Michel Bakounine, “Rapports personels avec Marx,” 
in Archives Bakounines (ed. and trans. Arthur Lehning; Leiden: Brill, 1963), 1:124–125.
9 In his pamphlet of that year, Der Weg zum Siege des Germanenthums über das Juden-
thum [The Way to Victory of Germanicism over Judaism], he introduced the idea 
that Germans and Jews were locked in a longstanding conflict, the origins of which he 
attributed to race. He argued that emancipation resulting from German liberalism had 
allowed the Jews to control German finance and industry and that, since conflict between 
Germans and Jews was based on the different qualities of the two races, it could not be 
resolved even by the total assimilation of the Jewish population. Marr renounced his anti-
Jewish views toward the end of his life, but the tenor of his pamphlet would have obvious 
far-reaching implications both for internal and external perspectives regarding the defini-
tion of Jews and specifically for Hitlerian ideology a few generations later.
10 For an excellent discussion of the combination of anthropological with prejudicial 
religious thinking, see Maurice Olender, The Languages of Paradise: Race, Religion, and 
Philology in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
11 “Very few typically Jewish-looking young men [were there], some of the handsome 
racial type, about half without marked traits. The prevailing tone exactly the same as 
among the Christian students. . . . After this test, racial anti-Semitism seems to me more 
senseless even than before. These people are, at least at their present age, as completely 
‘German students’ as can be imagined.” Nahum Glatzer, Franz Rosenzweig: His Life and 
Thought (New York: Schocken Books, 1953), 2–3.
12 See Der Judenstat (Vienna: M. Breitenstein, 1896). See also Herzl’s article of the same 
year in The Jewish Chronicle on “A Solution of the Jewish Question,” in which he antici-
pates by a few months most of the points made in his pamphlet.
13 See in particular Ahad Ha’am’s 1902 essay, “The Spiritual Revival,” most of which is 
reproduced in English translation in Leon Simon, trans. and ed., Selected Essays of Ahad 
Ha’Am (New York: Meridian Books and the Jewish Publication Society, 1962), particu-
larly 253–58.
14 There is a growing library of sources on early Bezalel, among them Nurit Shilo Cohen, 
“Hebrew Style of Bezalel, 1906–1929,” The Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts 
20 (1994): 140–63; and Dalia Manor, Art in Zion: The Genesis of National Art in Jewish 
Palestine (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005).
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15 At the “Trayfa Banquet,” shellfish and other nonkosher foods were served. Subsequently, 
the Pittsburgh Platform dismissed observance of both ritual commandments and Jew-
ish peoplehood (as opposed to religion) as “anachronistic.” In response, in 1886, the 
prominent Sephardic rabbis Sabato Morais and H. Pereira Mendes founded the Jewish 
Theological Seminary in New York City as a more traditional alternative to HUC. The 
seminary’s brief affiliation with the traditional congregations that established the Union 
of Orthodox Congregations in 1898 was eventually severed due to the Orthodox rejec-
tion of the seminary’s academic approach to Jewish learning. (The movement had a kind 
of proto-version in the 1840s–1850s in Germany, led by Rabbi Zecharias Frankel.) De 
Tocqueville’s comment appeared in his two-volume study of the United States, De la 
democratie en Amerique [On Democracy in America], published in 1835 and 1840.
16 Soloveitchik compares halakhic man with both cognitive man and homo religiosus. The 
first simply observes or tries to figure out how all of the universe is governed and ordered 
by intelligible laws; the second is awestruck by the unfathomable mystery [mysterium 
tremendum] of it all. Halakhic man approaches everything “with his Torah, given to him 
at Sinai, in hand,” which instructs him in how to apply halakhah to the phenomena that 
he or she encounters. 
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Will the “Real” Jew Please Stand Up!  
Karaites, Israelites, Kabbalists, Messianists,  
and the Politics of Identity  
Aaron J. Hahn Tapper
A Long-LoST JeWISH SecT . . . In SAn FRAncISco?
Truth be told, my Ashkenazi-centric perspective was coloring things before I 
had even left my house. When a friend asked me what time the community’s 
prayer service began, my instinct was to answer something along the lines 
of, “Shul starts at 9:30, but my contact told me there wouldn’t be a minyan 
until 10:00.” Though I caught myself from saying “shul,” a Yiddish term for 
synagogue, a word I had been raised with that this group undoubtedly did not 
use, I stumbled nonetheless in saying the latter half of the sentence. My friend 
gently hinted that they didn’t necessarily follow the rabbinic idea of a minyan, 
an edict found in the Talmud that requires a quorum of ten adult males (or, in 
many contemporary communities, males and females) in order to recite spe-
cific prayers. I planned to arrive a few minutes after 10:00 in an attempt to be 
inconspicuous. If I showed up a little late, I figured I could slip in unnoticed. 
But this turned out to be a silly plan. not only was the synagogue small, but 
there were no more than a dozen people there when I arrived. And everyone 
knew one another. It was clear that I was a stranger to the community. 
At first glance, congregation B’nai Israel seemed like any other syna-
gogue I’d ever been to, with such things as announcements about prayer 
services and communal gatherings and the word “Shalom” displayed outside 
the building’s main entrance. But as I entered the foyer this thought quickly 
dissipated. In the antechamber to the main prayer room were ten or so pairs 
of shoes in individually designated shelves. Having visited a number of Bud-
dhist, Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh houses of worship, the ritual of taking off 
one’s footwear prior to entering a prayer space was not unusual to me. But I 
had never seen this done in a space identified as Jewish. After putting my shoes 
on one of the shelves and grabbing a siddur [prayer book], I proceeded to walk 
into the building’s central room, where a group of practitioners were already 
engaged in prayer, standing shoeless on overlapping prayer rugs. Listening 
to the community’s prayers (mostly composed in Hebrew, almost exclusively 
taken directly from the Hebrew Bible)1 and watching them fully prostrate on 
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the ground when approaching the ark, the experience was oddly both familiar 
and strange.
When it came down to it, this group was extraordinary. They were Kara-
ite Jews. In existence for centuries, this now almost-extinct Jewish sect has 
commonly been described as surfacing in opposition to Jews who accepted 
the authority of “the rabbis.” Indeed, since their beginnings some Jews have 
rejected them as heretics. But here I was—in 2011—in a Karaite synagogue 
in Daly city, a small town just south of San Francisco more famous for being 
the inspiration of the renowned 1960s Pete Seeger Billboard hit “Little Boxes” 
than for housing some of the last descendants of an ancient Jewish community.
ARe THeRe BoUnDARIeS To THe JeWISH coMMUnITY?
This leads us to a critical question. If Jews are so diverse—culturally, ethnically, 
nationalistically, politically, racially, religiously—can anyone be Jewish? What 
are the community’s boundaries? Take, for example, the definition for “Jew” 
of the only Jewish-majority country in world, the only self-proclaimed “Jewish 
state,” Israel. on october 27, 1958, a little over a decade after the country’s 
establishment, Prime Minister David Ben-gurion sent a letter out to some 
forty-five preeminent Jewish communal leaders all over the world, asking them 
to answer one of the most loaded questions for any group: who should be 
counted as one of us and who should not? Specifically he wanted to know how 
the new self-proclaimed Jewish state should define a Jew.2 The Jewish state had 
been in existence for ten years; it permitted Jewish immigrants to become citi-
zens for ten years, but had not yet conclusively defined the identity of a Jew!
So, where does this leave us? Because Jews are so diverse, is it inaccurate 
to definitively say what a Jew is? In the postmodern era, can one be part of a 
group merely by proclaiming affiliation? Does the fact that in the twenty-first 
century there are so many characterizations of a Jew mean that anybody can be 
Jewish simply if she identifies as such?3 or does a person need to be perceived 
as part of a group by those in the group in order to lay claim to a particular 
identity? And what about those outside the group? Don’t they also need to see 
the person in the same light?4
“HALF JeWS”?
In 1990, many in the American Jewish community were shocked to learn that 
more than 50 percent of their number were marrying non-Jews, a phenomenon 
commonly referred to as intermarriage or out-marriage. In northern california 
this statistic was as high as 70 percent.5 Although the major denominations 
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reshaped their respective policies to deal with this growing pattern—Reform 
institutions choosing to embrace Jewish/non-Jewish couples, while orthodox 
ones generally did not (and conservative groups often encouraged the non-
Jew in the partnership to convert)—the trend of out-marriage wasn’t new, 
only the rate at which it was happening. For the Reform movement, which 
had changed its policy to defining a Jew as someone born to a Jewish mother 
or father and raised Jewish (or converted under Reform standards) in 1983, 
their open-arms outreach strategy made perfect sense; whether or not a child’s 
parents were a Jewish/non-Jewish couple or a Jewish/Jewish one made no dif-
ference in terms of the Reform understanding of Jewishness, because as long 
as one parent was Jewish the child was Jewish as well. 
But for conservative and orthodox institutions, aside from those who went 
through a ritual conversion, a person is defined as a Jew only if she is born to a 
Jewish mother. In other words, these latter two denominations saw people born 
to a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother as non-Jews. 
But most American Jews are not committed to full halachic observance. 
Most people do not know that patrilineal descent is the standard in the Torah, 
nor that it was the Mishnaic and Talmudic rabbis who changed the definition 
of a Jew to matrilineal descent sometime around the first centuries before or 
after the common era. Before they were called Jews this community was called 
Judeans and Israelites (and before that Hebrews). In terms of social identities 
many contemporary Americans refer to themselves as racially or ethnically 
“mixed” and for Jews this is no different.
But what about someone born into a Jewish family who later adopts 
another religion? Jewish Americans have a number of hybrid identities such as 
Jubus (Buddhist Jews) and Hinjus (Hindu Jews), and more. For a number of 
years, northern californians have been using the term Jubus, in part because 
some of the most renowned Buddhist Americans of the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries who have identified as Jews live in the golden State.6 Hinjus are 
somewhat less known than Jubus. (christian Jews are a different category alto-
gether—see below for more on this identity.) Many in these situations don’t 
see a contradiction between holding multiple identities, whether cultural, eth-
nic, or religious, at the same time. over the years, some people who fall into 
this category have referred to themselves as “half Jews,” despite there being 
nothing in halachah supporting the idea that someone can be 50 percent of a 
Jew. Jewish law adjudicates that you are either Jewish or not. A large number 
of them don’t see themselves as half this and half that, but 100 percent both. 
But what about those communities who fully identify with a single cultural-
religious identity that is linked to Jews? Where do they fall in this discussion?
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BoUnDARY cHARAcTeRISTIcS
one way to better understand a community’s dominant norm is to look at its 
margins. Although a group’s fringe does not necessarily define its narrative or 
vice versa, it also does not exist only in terms of binary opposition. Some com-
munities have multiple centers and margins simultaneously, which likewise 
inform one another. There is a deep relationship between a group’s norm and 
its outliers. In defining what they are, communities commonly include a self-
understanding of what they are not, implicitly and explicitly. Likewise, those 
on the margins, whether by choice or not, exist in a liminal space in relation to 
a community’s dominant truth. Sometimes communities are quite candid—
even rigidly so—about what they are not more than what they are. This is not 
a mere intellectual exercise. Definitions regarding social identity play a central 
role in shaping a people’s status in society, which in turn effects how people 
interact with one another every day. For minorities, such as Jews, discussions 
regarding definitions of identity have had life and death consequences in a 
number of historical instances.
In an effort to deepen our understanding of twenty-first century Jewish-
ness, including the seemingly porous nature of this community’s boundaries, 
this chapter examines three “boundary characteristics,” attributes found within 
particular groups linked to the mainstream Jewish community that distinguish 
them from it insofar as their Jewishness is either questioned, suspected, or even 
rejected outright. Through this endeavor we also further explore the question 
of whether or not there are any boundaries at all to being a Jew.
These three boundary traits are as follows: those claiming to be the authen-
tic descendants of the biblical Israelites those who reject rabbinic authority and 
those whom others say are Jews although they themselves deny it. each charac-
teristic is embodied in at least two communities in existence today. In an effort 
to better illustrate each characteristic, for each accompanying group I will offer a 
brief historical background, including a description of the boundary community’s 
dominant narrative and how it bumps up against that of the mainstream Jewish 
community; describe some of the scholarly opinions regarding the community’s 
connection to normative Jews; and exploration of how the group’s Jewishness is 
understood by the Israeli government. As the only nation-state that grants auto-
matic citizenship to those they deem to be Jews, Israel is also the only country 
where Jews adjudicate as to the legal Jewishness of others, something that often 
has serious ramifications. This will help us better understand some of the rea-
sons why these groups are connected to and shunned by the mainstream Jewish 
community. I also intend to shed light on ambiguities regarding social identity 
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generally and Jewish identity specifically, pointing to some of the ways in which 
Jewish identity is dependent on self-description as much as acceptance from 
nonmainstream Jews and non-Jews.
A final point before we begin. each one of these communities has its own 
belief system, its own dominant narrative. Likewise, scholars have proposed 
various theories as to the origins and other details surrounding each group. 
My goal is not to pass judgment on the factual nature of any group’s particular 
theology. Similarly, I do not intend to weigh in on which scholars’ hypotheses 
are more probable than others. In framing things this way, I potentially run 
the risk of presenting distinct theories about these communities equitably, 
thereby creating a moral relativity that puts communal convictions on the 
same ground as judicious academic scholarship and substandard research. For 
those scholars for whom the stakes over these matters involve professional 
loyalties of the highest regard, this is no doubt problematic. 
This chapter’s purpose is something else entirely. I am presenting bound-
ary characteristics to shed light on whether or not there is a line in the sand 
between the definitions of Jews and non-Jews. Further, dominant truths are 
more important to my research than dominant facts. I am not making an argu-
ment for what constitutes the authoritative definition of a Jew. Rather I intend 
to illustrate how boundary characteristics, de facto and in some cases de jure, 
play a role in separating us from them, showing ways that Jews distinguish 
themselves from the 99.8 percent of the world that it is not Jewish.
AUTHenTIcITY—WHo ARe THe ReAL ISRAeLITeS?
claims of authenticity are a common component of communal identity con-
struction. one way that people attempt to give their identity legitimacy is by 
laying out a familial connection, a so-called bloodline. For example, many in 
the contemporary Jewish community maintain that this group can trace itself 
some three millennia, all the way back to the biblical Israelites and Hebrews. A 
dominant Jewish narrative is that those referred to in the Torah as b’nei yisrael 
[the sons of Israel] are the ancestors of today’s Jews.7 We do not know definitively 
when Israelites shifted into Jews, nor do we know for sure if specific Israelite 
tribes are the antecedents of twenty-first century Jews. In fact, Jews aren’t the 
only community that claim to be the contemporary progeny of the Israelite 
tribes of the ancient Middle east. Aside from Jews, groups such as Afghani 
Pathans, British Israelites, the church of Latter Day Saints of Jesus christ (also 
known as adherents of Mormonism), and Rastafaris are but some of those claim-
ing to be the true descendants of the biblical Israelites. The Samaritans and the 
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African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem, both of whom live in Israel and Palestine, 
also make this assertion. Though none of these declarations can be proved one 
way or another, in declaring they are the real Israelites, Samaritans,8 and African 
Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem are simultaneously denying the authenticity, and 
even identity, of Jews, no small thing, in particular because they are doing so in 
the biblical land of Israel, the “homeland of the Jews.” 
AFRIcAn HeBReW ISRAeLITeS oF JeRUSALeM
Similar to Samaritans, African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem,9 also known as 
Black Hebrews, claim to be the real descendants of the ancient biblical Israel-
ites.10 Recently, this group has claimed to be the descendants of Judeans rather 
than Israelites. But unlike Samaritans, who scholars trace back to at least the 
fifth century Bce Middle east, African Hebrew Israelites are linked to the 
mid-twentieth century United States. According to their tradition, in the early 
1960s, a chicago-based leader named Ben carter, a charismatic individual 
steeped in Black nationalism,11 was visited by the angel gabriel. Following 
his prophetic vision, in an effort to reconnect with the community’s biblical 
roots, carter gathered together a group of African Americans to begin adopt-
ing ritual customs loosely similar to those observed in the normative Jewish 
community. Thereafter, carter, who later changed his name to Ben Ammi Ben 
Israel, and a few hundred of his devotees moved to Liberia, fleeing contempo-
rary Babylon (that is, the United States) for the Promised Land. In December 
1969, after a few years in West Africa, they relocated to the state of Israel.12
It is not that Ben Ammi and the African Hebrew Israelites say that they, 
and they alone, are the authentic descendants of the biblical Israelites. Rather, 
their belief is that all African Americans fall into this category. And they are 
not alone in making this claim.13 According to this tradition, following the 
destruction of the Second Temple (c. 70 ce) a group of Jews—who them-
selves were descendants of the biblical Israelites—fled to Africa. Some of them 
eventually made their way to the western part of the continent. centuries later, 
the progeny of this group were kidnapped and forced to travel to north Amer-
ica as slaves.14 Ben Ammi extends this conviction, contending that there are a 
number of communities in existence today that trace themselves back to the 
biblical Israelites, contemporary Jews among them.15 Some who promote this 
doctrine add that “caucasian Jews” first converted to Judaism in the eighth 
century ce, making black Jews—self-identified as African Hebrew Israelites 
to distinguish them from “white european Jews”—the only group that can 
trace their lineage directly back to the biblical Israelites.16
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Initially arriving in Israel on three-month tourist visas, Ben Ammi and 
his followers settled in the region of Dimona, a town located in southern 
Israel. currently there are about 2,000 African Hebrew Israelites living in the 
Village of Peace in Dimona, with communal members living in a few other 
Israeli cities as well. In addition, fifty or so African Hebrew Israelites reside in 
ghana, where they run a number of businesses.17 This community observes a 
set of rituals largely interpreted and authorized by Ben Ammi, some of which 
are based on laws described in the Hebrew Bible and the new Testament.18 
In minor ways, the foundation of their ritual practices are similar to those of 
other minority Jewish Israeli groups, such as Samaritans and Karaites, insofar 
as they only observe holidays described in the Hebrew Bible rather than those 
developed centuries later.19 They also have unique practices, such as a strict 
vegan diet, holistic health care, and allowing men in their community to have 
more than one wife (though polygyny is illegal in Israel).20 Like most, if not 
all, religious communities, they have had shifts in the components of their 
belief system over the last forty years.21
Unsurprisingly, they have never been accepted as Jews by the main-
stream Jewish community in Israel or the United States. It is likely that their 
early stance regarding their exclusive Jewish authenticity didn’t help in this 
process. When they first arrived in the Jewish state, African Hebrew Israelites 
attempted to become Israeli citizens under the Law of Return, something the 
government rejected outright. But they went further than claiming a Jewish 
identity, adding that Jewish Israelis are not legitimate descendants of the bibli-
cal Israelites. They said such things as, “The people of this land now are mostly 
european converts who adopted the ways of the ancient Israelites. There is no 
link between these people and the biblical Israelites, who were black.”22 Much 
of this rhetoric has been kept to a minimum since then.
For more than two decades their application for Israeli citizenship was 
denied. Finally, in 1990 they began a new strategy, to apply for permanent Israeli 
residency, a legal status not as strong as citizen but more stable than being a mere 
tourist.23 In July 2003, their residency application was finally approved, though 
not under the Law of Return (the Israeli law granting citizenship to “Jews”). 
The reasons behind the government’s change of heart are unclear. However, one 
speculation is that an event from January 17, 2002, created this opening, when 
the first Israeli-born member of the African Hebrew Israelites, Aharon Ben-Israel 
elis, a 32-year-old musician, was killed along with five others by a Palestinian gun-
man.24 In mourning elis, Jewish Israeli leaders and lay people publicly cham-
pioned the African Hebrew Israelite community, the first time such a public 
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outpouring of support had ever occurred. Among other notables who attended 
elis’s funeral were the mayor of Dimona, a member of the Israeli Parliament, 
and the two chief rabbis of Hadera. The chief Sephardi rabbi of Dimona also 
came, proclaiming, “You have just sealed one of the most difficult pacts with 
our Israeli society.”25 This sentiment was echoed by members of the African 
Hebrew Israelite community as well, including elis’s sister, Aviva,26 and Ben 
Ammi himself.27 During this time Dimona’s mayor also publicly said, “It’s time 
to grant the Black Hebrew community the full rights of the citizens of Israel.”
Since then, a number of other things have taken place that reflect gen-
eral acceptance of the group as Israelis, albeit not necessarily Jewish Israelis. 
In 2006, for example, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs began publicly 
posting information about the African Hebrew Israelite community on their 
website, depicting them in a positive light:
Today, [African Hebrew Israelite] community spokespersons are 
effective contributors to the national public relations effort, speaking 
to audiences on behalf of the State of Israel. . . . Presently, more than 
100 of their youth are serving in the Israeli Defense Forces in regular 
units; they operate a vegan eatery in Tel Aviv; their musicians per-
form across Israel and around the world, touring the United States, 
europe and Africa either solely with their own members or as a parts 
of other Israeli groups. They have created their own music genre 
which they call Songs of Deliverance producing cDs. In sports they 
have represented the nation at home and in europe in track and 
field and national softball events, including the Maccabiah games. 
Their students have represented Israel in international academic 
competitions. Twice they have represented Israel in eurovision, the 
international music competition.28
Two years later, Israeli President Shimon Peres visited the Village of Peace on 
the occasion of his eighty-fifth birthday.29 given the tumultuous experiences 
the community had in the 1970s, let alone their other residency issues that 
continued through the 1990s, the president’s visit was incredibly significant.30
AUTHoRITY—cAn YoU DenY RABBInIc AUTHoRITY?
All communities have at least one authoritative body, an individual or group 
who has the power to make decisions on behalf of the collective. It is com-
mon for groups to split into subgroups over disagreements regarding decision-
making. In the Jewish community, there have been numerous authorities for 
millennia. In fact, since the time of the Torah the Israelites have had multiple 
centers of power. As described in numbers 16:1–40, for example, a man 
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named Korah rebelled against Moses, his first cousin. Throughout the proph-
ets there are schisms within the Israelite community over authority, as when 
the northern Israelites reject King Solomon’s son, Rehoboam, as their new 
king, choosing instead a man named Jeroboam (1 Kings 12).
This pattern continued for centuries thereafter, such as in the first cen-
tury ce, when there were Jewish centers of authority in a handful of places in 
the Middle east, including Alexandria and Palestine.31 Among the subgroups 
jockeying for power during this time were the Pharisees and Sadducees, the 
former most often associated with being the rabbis described in the Mishnah 
and Talmud, and the latter usually called the priests. The historical accuracy of 
these groups’ identities aside,32 these were but two of the many Jewish groups 
fighting for power within the Jewish community at that time.
In the modern and postmodern periods this pattern has continued. Per-
haps the most important Jewish group that rejects rabbinic authority—insofar 
as they maintain that halachah is not obligatory and not because they reject 
the rabbinic canon of halachic opinion—has been the Reform movement. 
What began in nineteenth century germany in the form of minor attempts to 
reshape prayers and rituals to be more “modern” or “Western” soon developed 
into a distinct Jewish denomination with its own synagogues and rabbinical 
schools in europe and north America, offering a new approach to Jewish 
belief and practice. 
one of their innovations is to no longer require Jews to accept rabbinic 
authority as binding. Though Reform doctrine advises that Jews observe hal-
achah, to this day reform leaders do not argue that it is obligatory.33 Despite 
the point of view of many within the orthodox movement, the Jewishness of 
Reform Jews is widely accepted. Perhaps one reason this is the case is that more 
Jews affiliate with the Reform movement than any other. The Reform move-
ment is simply too large a group to ignore or marginalize. But what about 
smaller groups identifying as Jews that don’t fully accept rabbinic authority, 
such as Karaites and Messianic Jews? Why are these groups either suspect or 
rejected outright?
KARAITeS
In existence for centuries, this now almost-extinct sect of Jews is commonly 
described as surfacing in opposition to Jews who followed “the rabbis”—in 
Karaite parlance known as Rabbanites—whose traditions are primarily based 
in texts like the Mishnah and Talmud. Most contemporary Jews have never 
heard of Karaites; those who have usually assume they evaporated into history, 
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like other Jewish communities no longer around today. As in the case of the 
Samaritans, clear indications of their peak numbers have been lost to history. 
elevated estimates are that today there are 50,000 Karaites worldwide,34 most 
of whom are of egyptian descent and live in Israel, making them a minority 
within a minority. At best they are .003 percent of Jews worldwide (.00067 
percent of humanity).
Like Samaritans and, to some extent, African Hebrew Israelites, Kara-
ites believe their understanding of Judaism is authoritative. According to one 
Karaite source, “Karaism is the original form of Judaism commanded by god 
to the Jewish people in the Torah . . . around since god gave His laws to the 
Jewish people.”35 But Karaites don’t actually have a single tradition regarding 
their origins. Rather than dating themselves back to the biblical Hebrews, one 
of their theories links them to an unnamed sect of Jews who lived around 1 
ce, a group for whom the Dead Sea Scrolls may have been their central sacred 
text. other Karaite traditions connect them to the same era but without a tie 
to sacred texts found in the Qumran caves,36 claiming instead that they are 
either the descendents of the Sadducees or emerged in reaction to the Pharisees 
and Sadducees.37
contemporary scholars largely challenge these notions, arguing that the 
Karaite community began sometime between the eighth and tenth centuries 
in the area around today’s Iran and Iraq.38 Some add that Karaites developed a 
narrative of their origins retroactively, professing an unbroken lineage between 
them and Jewish communities from centuries past in an effort to challenge 
other Jewish authorities and give themselves more authenticity. As to why 
they appeared when they did, some contend that the Karaites surfaced due to 
a confluence of a number of trends within the Jewish community, including 
the public censuring of a Jew named Anan ben David by eighth century Iraqi 
rabbinic authorities; in reaction, Anan developed a new faction of Jews. 
others say that Anan established this group after being passed over to 
become leader of the Babylonian Jewish community. There are those who 
dismiss these claims, arguing that it is highly unlikely that a new Jewish sect 
began solely because of Anan’s public humiliation.39 Still others say that Kara-
ism did not really take off until the ninth century, when a Persian-born Jew, 
Daniel al-Kumisi, expanded the group’s membership with a missionary’s zeal, 
dismissing Anan’s importance along the way.40
origins aside, if twenty-first century Jews know anything about Karaites, 
they are likely aware that the primary contention with their Jewish adversar-
ies was over communal authority. This has led to the widely held notion that 
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Karaites have had ongoing feuds with other Jewish groups for centuries, espe-
cially those they call Rabbanites. However, according to documents dating 
back to the eleventh through thirteenth centuries that were unearthed from 
the cairo genizah, although there have been differences between Karaite and 
non-Karaite Jews in terms of juridical interpretations, there also have been a 
number of things the two groups have agreed upon.41 It was not uncommon 
for Jews to leave a so-called Rabbanite synagogue and join a Karaite one or 
vice versa, pointing to a lack of strict boundaries demarcating where one com-
munity ended and the other began. 
This said, there is also evidence to support the fact that it was not 
uncommon for there to be discord between Karaite and non-Karaite Jews. 
Sometimes these groups disagreed on fundamental components of ritual 
observance,42 which usually led to the prohibition of Karaite/non-Karaite Jew-
ish marriages.43 For some Karaites, non-Karaite Jews were the other, and, of 
course, there are examples of the converse.44 In short, there is evidence reflect-
ing how Karaites worked together with non-Karaites—as members of the same 
Jewish community (for example, even as recently as the early part of twentieth 
century egypt)45—and how they fought with one another, episodes that, as 
with the Samaritans, sometimes led to physical violence.46 
one major distinction between normative Jews and Karaites is in their 
distinct definitions of a Jew (interestingly enough, something not focused upon 
in most scholarship on the Karaites to date). Whereas orthodox and conser-
vative Jews define a Jew as someone birthed by a Jewish mother or converted 
to Judaism according to Jewish law, and Reform Jews widen this definition to 
include patrilineal descent, Karaite Jews have historically defined a Jew based 
on patrilineal descent alone, thereby excluding matrilineal descent.47 (Karaite 
practices regarding a ritual conversion are also much less stringent than those 
observed by orthodox or conservative Jews.)48 even today, the chief rabbi 
of the Karaite community in Israel maintains that a child’s Jewish identity is 
based solely upon whether the father is Jewish.49 Though some contend that 
patrilineal descent was the norm in defining a Jew in the period leading up to 
the destruction of the Second Temple, delineating a Jew via matrilineal descent 
has been the dominant position of non-Karaite Jews for centuries.
But identity also exists beyond the borders of a given community. 
Though it is critical for there to be intracommunal discussion regarding who 
is in and who is out, when considering the identity of historically marginalized 
and oft-times oppressed groups like Jews it is perhaps just as important to look 
at how non-Jews have weighed in on the issue of “who is a Jew.” This helps us 
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better understand the extent to which boundary characteristics play a role for 
and are defined by non-Jews. In eleventh century Palestine, for example, when 
the crusaders reached Jerusalem they slaughtered Karaite and non-Karaite 
Jews alike,50 which also happened in eleventh and twelfth century Byzantine-
controlled constantinople.51
During World War II, when one-third of the world’s Jewish population 
was wiped out through genocide, paradoxically enough, non-Jews determined 
the authenticity of Karaites’ Jewishness in ways that sometimes protected 
them. For example, when the nazis began their systematic mass murder, Kara-
ites were largely ignored. In places like german-controlled crimea,52 France, 
Poland, and Lithuania, the nazis allowed Karaites to live because they were 
not perceived as part of the “Jewish race.” In some of these situations, nazi 
authorities even asked non-Karaite Jews to determine the Jewishness of the 
Karaites.53 (The nazis developed a similar policy with other Jewish communi-
ties, such as the so-called Mountain Jews of the caucuses.) This said, nazis 
and their collaborators, such as Vichy France, did not have consistent policies. 
At times they also murdered Karaites for being Jewish.54 
Less than a decade later, in the 1950s, at the same time that the egyptian 
government was persecuting Karaites for being Jews and the Israeli government 
was involving Karaites in espionage operations on behalf of the new Jewish-
majority country,55 the Israeli rabbinic authorities rejected Karaite egyptians’ 
requests to immigrate under the Law of Return.56 Though this policy was 
sporadic and eventually the majority of Karaite egyptians were granted Israeli 
citizenship, these episodes of intracommunal opposition reflect the tensions 
that preceded the twentieth century. To this day, Karaite and non-Karaite Jews 
in Israel continue to have independent communities, particularly in terms of 
decisions related to religious law and court adjudication (that is, they have dif-
ferent battei din [religious courts of law]). And though the Israeli government 
now accepts Karaites as Jews under the Law of Return (not a marginal factor 
given the advantages Jews have in the Jewish-majority state), at the same time 
they are unable to legally marry non-Karaite Jews,57 thereby insuring a social 
separation. The situation for Karaite Americans is quite different.58
MeSSIAnIc JeWS
Without question, for normative Jews the Messianic Jewish community is 
the most controversial of the communities discussed in this essay. For start-
ers, perhaps the only thing that mainstream Jews can agree on with regard to 
Jewish identity and how to answer the question “who is a Jew”—regardless of 
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their affiliation (or lack thereof )—is that Messianic Jews are not real Jews.59 
Although orthodox, conservative, Reform, Renewal, and Reconstructionist 
Jews disagree on many aspects of Jewish belief and practice, both formally 
and informally these movements unanimously maintain that Messianic Jews 
should not be accepted into the mainstream Jewish community. Some Jews 
call them heretics, apostates, or even members of a cult, whereas others simply 
ignore their existence altogether. And unlike the policy with regard to other 
controversial groups, the Jewish institutional world has established a number 
of organizations with the sole intent to combat Messianic Jewish outreach 
toward mainstream Jews.60
But de jure, the issue of Messianic Jewish rejection of rabbinic authority 
is a bit more complicated. Take, for example, the idea found in mainstream 
Jewish tradition regarding a belief in the messiah. During the process of con-
ducting research on this group, one ultra-orthodox rabbi I approached did 
not understand the term Messianic Jew. “What’s a Messianic Jew?” he asked. 
“Isn’t it already part of the Jewish tradition to believe in the coming of the 
Messiah?”61 This was an especially poignant question given that it was coming 
from a rabbi who is part of the Lubavitch community of chasidic Jews, more 
commonly known by the name chabad. Aside from the fact that over the last 
half-century members of the Lubavitch community have vocalized the belief 
that their leader, Menachem Mendel Schneerson, was the messiah, belief in 
the coming of a messiah is a doctrine that can be found in Jewish tradition for 
at least two millennia. In fact, since the time of Jesus there have been a number 
of individuals that Jews have believed were the messiah.62
But the label Messianic Jews does not refer to normative Jews who believe in 
the idea of the messiah. Rather, Messianic Jews are individuals who identify as Jews 
and believe that Jesus63 is the Messiah (that is, he came and will return). Main-
stream Jews do not accept Jesus as the Messiah. Some of the reasons the majority 
of Jews reject Jesus include rabbinic arguments, such as: (a) Jesus did not fulfill the 
messianic prophecies found in the Prophets; (b) Jesus did not embody the personal 
qualifications of the messiah as described in the Talmud; (c) Biblical verses discuss-
ing the messiah that are said to refer to Jesus are misinterpretations; and (d) Jewish 
belief is based on national revelation rather than revelation to a few individuals 
only.64 Arguably, a belief in Jesus is the normative Jewish community’s red line, 
the virtual border that separates Jews from non-Jews, “us” versus “them.” In this 
sense, Jews who accept Jesus as the Messiah are maintaining a position contrary to 
rabbinic Judaism, as from the Talmud until today rabbinic authorities have 
rejected Jesus.
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A number of groups fall under the umbrella of Messianic Jews, including, 
but not limited to, Hebrew christians, Jewish christians, Messianic christians, 
and Jews for Jesus, perhaps the most well known within this tent.65 Some Mes-
sianic Jews identify as both Jews and christians, whereas others do not.66 They 
generally observe Jewish rituals, simultaneously maintaining that they are fol-
lowing the practices of Jesus’s disciples. For instance, it is common that they 
call their communal leaders “rabbi” and places of worship “synagogues”; they 
have an ark containing a Torah scroll in their main prayer space; many of their 
congregants wear kippot [head coverings] and ṭallitot [religious prayer shawls]; 
they attach mezuzot [small rectangular boxes containing parchments of biblical 
verses] to the doorways of their synagogues; six pointed stars are commonly 
found in their prayer spaces; and they do not celebrate christian holidays such 
as easter or christmas. All of these rituals are also the norm within Jewish 
communities. But in contrast to normative Jews, Messianic Jews accept the 
christian Bible in addition to the Hebrew Bible, and most Messianic Jewish 
prayer services include traditional Hebrew liturgy with the important difference 
of referring to Jesus, or Yeshua (his Hebrew name), as god.67
estimates regarding their worldwide population run the gamut. Some 
maintain that the two countries with most of the world’s practitioners, the Unit-
ed States and Israel, have close to 200,000 and 6,000-15,000 devotees, respec-
tively.68 (estimates for the number of worldwide Messianic Jewish congregations 
also vary. Some say there are 73,69 others 142.70) one of the problems in delin-
eating precise numbers comes back to our original question: how do we define 
the term Jew? Because Messianic Jews contend they are Jews, many within their 
community do not make a distinction between themselves and normative Jews. 
As a result, the process of solidifying such statistics becomes more difficult.71
As for the movement’s origins, their devotees commonly date their com-
munity back to the time of Jesus, contending that their practices are the true, 
pure, and original form of christian Judaism. Some add that their movement 
was marginalized during the first few generations after Jesus was crucified 
because of increased tensions between Jews who believed in Jesus, Jews who 
did not, and the larger non-Jewish community (more specifically, the larger 
non-Jewish Middle eastern Roman world), tensions that worsened after the 
destruction of the Second Temple.72
Though some scholars argue that the modern movement of Messianic 
Judaism emerged in the 1800s,73 most date the Messianic Jewish movement 
to twentieth century America, often describing them in this way: “Messianic 
Judaism is a Protestant movement that emerged in the last half of the twenti-
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eth century among believers who were ethnically Jewish but had adopted an 
evangelical christian faith. . . . By the 1960s, a new effort to create a culturally 
Jewish Protestant christianity [had] emerged.”74 (Jews for Jesus, for example, 
began in the early 1970s.75) Some point to Israel’s military success in the 1967 
war as a watershed moment in the rise of Messianic Jewry, an event some 
members of their community interpreted as a sign that the redemption of the 
biblical land of Israel was at hand.76
As for how they are understood by the Israeli government, in 1989 the 
Israeli Supreme court definitively rejected citizenship for Messianic Jews 
applying under the Law of Return. In their 100-page brief, the high court 
argued that the belief in Jesus as the Messiah is the definitive separation 
between a christian and a Jew. They added that this ruling applies to those 
who are born Jewish according to halachah yet believe in Jesus’ messiahship.77 
Interestingly, most Jewish Israelis have disagreed with the high court’s position 
as well as their definition of a Jew.78
Perhaps the two main reasons normative Jews are adamant in their rejec-
tion of Messianic Jews are that they are known for missionizing toward main-
stream Jews and Messianic Jewish doctrine is linked for many, if not most, 
Jews to christianity, historically a religious tradition that has had a precarious 
relationship with Jews. There is no doubt that the underlying dominant nar-
rative among Jews regarding historical proselytization toward and persecution 
of Jews by christians plays a role in this rejection.79 Adding to Messianic 
Jews’ challenges is the fact that they are also commonly rejected by normative 
christians, primarily because they identify as Jews. Whereas Jews label them 
christians, christians label them Jews.
oUTSIDeRS LooKIng In—We ARe noT JeWS  
(no MATTeR WHAT YoU THInK)!
In his renowned treatise, Anti-Semite and Jew, Jean-Paul Sarte famously wrote 
that “the Jew is one whom other men consider a Jew: that is the simple truth 
from which we must start.”80 Although Sartre’s thesis has its shortcomings, 
those outside a community play a role in a community’s identity. Identity is 
not limited to insiders alone. For instance, Jews are not the only ones who 
have the power to answer the question of who is a Jew. non-Jews also have this 
power, especially given the minute population of Jews worldwide, something 
that has sometimes had life and death consequences. In fact, if a dominant 
group deems a subordinate people a particular identity, such as the case of 
nazis and Karaites during World War II or West Bank Palestinians and Samar-
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itans, where the former perceive the latter to be Jews, it can often be difficult, if 
not altogether impossible, to dissuade dominant group members otherwise.81 
This holds true even if the subordinate group adamantly denies that they are 
Jewish, such as with West Bank Samaritans. But unlike the Samaritans, there 
are also cases of communities having clear connections to the Jewish collective, 
but claiming otherwise, such as the Kabbalah centre. 
THe KABBALAH cenTRe
In contrast to the Karaites, Samaritans, and African Hebrew Israelites, mem-
bers of the Kabbalah centre—publicly, at least—profess not to have a connec-
tion to the Israelite or Jewish communities. In fact, their leaders and some of 
their most famous devotees deny even the weakest of relationships between the 
centre and Judaism. Similarly, members of the normative Jewish community 
rarely, if ever, claim the centre to be part of the Jewish collective; this explicit 
contempt is more a reflection of their disdain for the centre than anything 
else. Mainstream Jews even charge the centre with manipulating authentic 
Jewish expressions in order to profit financially. Some label the centre’s prac-
tices a form of “deception”82 or describe their practices using such pejoratives 
as “charlatanism,” “superficiality,” “commercialism,” and even “brainwash-
ing.”83 Part of this aversion is due to the fact that the Kabbalah centre is one 
of the largest organizations in the world promoting Jewish mystical practices.
There are a number of obvious linkages between the centre and the Jew-
ish community. For starters, the centre’s core sacred text, the Zohar, composed 
by a number of Jews, including the thirteenth century córdoban Jew Moshe 
de Leon, is central to the Jewish mystical tradition; the centre’s founder, his 
wife, and two of his sons all identify as orthodox Jews; and many of the Kab-
balah centre’s communal rituals have been practiced in the Jewish community 
for centuries, such as the observance of Shabbat.84
First established as the national Institute for Research in Kabbalah, the 
Kabbalah centre was founded by Rabbi Philip Berg in 1965. Born Shraga 
Feival gruberger, Berg85 studied Jewish mysticism with a disciple of Yehudah 
Ashlag, a rabbi and kabbalist who spent most of his life trying to popularize 
the Zohar among Jews living in Palestine and Israel in the 1940s and 1950s.86 
Like his teachers before him, Berg received rabbinic ordination from an 
orthodox seminary. (Two of his sons, Michael and Yehuda, who play central 
roles in the centre’s leadership, also received orthodox rabbinic ordination.) 
But Berg modified Ashlag’s teachings,87 with his most influential innovation 
being his decision to bring the message of Kabbalah to non-Jews.
Will the “Real” Jew Please Stand Up!                 225           
From the 1980s onward, he and his wife, Karen, established Kabbalah 
centres across north America, simultaneously training their students to estab-
lish and direct the new centres. By the 1990s, they decided to make the Los 
Angeles centre their world headquarters.88 During this same period, Berg 
wrote numerous books on Kabbalah, gearing them toward a wider audience 
than the Jewish community alone. In this effort, he began removing the terms 
“Jew” and “Judaism” altogether from his writings, unfactually suggesting that 
kabbalistic texts such as the Zohar have historically existed independent of 
Jewish tradition. From that time through 2010 or so, when he stopped teach-
ing publicly on a regular basis, Berg presented the Zohar as a universal text 
without any connection to Judaism, despite historical evidence to the contrary.
Interestingly, Berg’s separation of Judaism from the Kabbalah centre 
actually began as early as the 1970s, albeit in much subtler ways. During this 
time he began presenting specific aspects of Judaism as spiritual practices and 
rituals that were for people of all backgrounds. For example, he taught that the 
mitzvot [biblical directives], understood within halachic circles as obligatory, 
were actually suggestions. Though this teaching is found in marginal Kab-
balistic texts predating the twentieth century,89 it also breaks from centuries 
of normative Jewish belief and practice. This led orthodox rabbis in north 
America and Israel to publicly censure and repudiate Berg, his teachings, and 
the Kabbalah centres.90 
Berg did not stop with merely separating the Zohar from its historical 
connection to the Jewish community. over time, he presented Kabbalah centre 
rituals such as traditional Jewish prayer services, in particular those coinciding 
with Jewish holidays—whether observed once a year, like Rosh Hashanah and 
Yom Kippur, or every week, like Shabbat—as times for meditation, as if the 
syncing of these particular prayer services with the Jewish religious calendar was 
coincidental.91 needless to say, this has only given his detractors more fodder.
At first glance, it might seem odd that the Kabbalah centre has claimed 
there are no connections between itself and the Jewish community. American 
music legend Madonna, for example, perhaps the most well-known centre 
devotee, has integrated Jewish and kabbalistic images into her videos and has 
had Hebrew letters tattooed on her body such as the biblical name esther, 
described in an important text called the Scroll of esther.92 Yet in her capac-
ity as an outspoken supporter and devotee of the centre, she has explicitly 
professed there is no link between Kabbalah centre practices and the Jewish 
tradition. In one instance, when asked by an interviewer if studying Kabbalah 
was a step on her way to becoming Jewish, she responded: 
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oh, no, please. Don’t make me sick! I’m never gonna be Jewish, and 
I hate that phrase. And I have not converted to Judaism and I am 
not a member of any religion. . . . [Kabbalah]’s not religion. It is, 
you know, it’s a belief system that has been around, a philosophy or 
body of wisdom that has been around for thousands of years, and it 
pre-dates religion. And in fact most, a lot of religious beliefs get their 
ideas from the Kabbalah. . . . It’s actually quite fascinating and amaz-
ing to realize how many people were actually studying Kabbalah 
over the last thousand years, or the last couple of thousand years.93 
Despite these comments, according to Karen Berg, “[Madonna] keeps a 
kosher home, she observes Shabbat, she circumcised her son and had her 
husband circumcised.”94 What may seem like an obvious case of cognitive dis-
sonance to those outside the centre works for Madonna and other Kabbalah 
centre devotees.
For the centre’s instructors, there is also a clear separation between what 
they teach and its relation to Judaism. They emphasize that it was not Jews 
or Jewish mystics who wrote kabbalistic texts like the Zohar, but rather “kab-
balists,” implying that these mystics were not Jewish. centre teachers also say 
that Judaism is a false construct that has been manipulated over the course of 
centuries, a “calcified or shallow religious belief and observance” that the cen-
tre leaders “believe wholeheartedly was also shared by [previous generations 
of ] kabbalists.” The centre’s dominant narrative scorns Jewish ethnicity. It is 
seen as a type of false pride in terms of ownership over kabbalistic texts and 
Jewish leaders who have historically attempted to suppress the dissemination 
of Jewish mystical thought.95
In this sense, the centre leadership has, to some degree, redefined a num-
ber of ideas and terms, including the signifiers Jew and Judaism. At the same 
time, they maintain a distinction between Jews and non-Jews in centre practic-
es, however minor. For example, there are a number of rituals conducted during 
Jewish prayer services that, according to Jewish law, can be carried out only by 
Jews, such as saying the blessings before and after one reads from the Torah; the 
centre follows this tradition. At the same time, they permit anyone to join the 
communal service itself, regardless of whether they are Jewish or not.96
Paradoxically, despite the centre’s disassociation from many aspects 
of traditional Judaism and Jewish ethnicity, many of the Kabbalah centre’s 
devotees are, in fact, Jews.97 Karen Berg has even said that the centre has been 
quite successful at re-engaging Jews with the Jewish tradition: “The people 
who come in are Jewish. 90-99 percent are from backgrounds where they have 
nothing, they never learned anything Jewish, they were so turned off. . . . now 
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they marry Jewish, observe Shabbat, the whole works.”98 Strangely, although 
the centre claims their practices have no connection to Judaism, statements 
like these imply that one of their goals is for their Jewish devotees to return 
to the practice of traditional Jewish rituals (as they understand them to be 
observed), a variant on the phenomenon of ba’alei teshuvah [understood by 
some to mean born-again Jews].
concLUSIon—WHo IS A JeW AnD WHo IS noT?
There are countless responses to the question, “Who is a Jew?” from those 
inside and outside of the Jewish community. This essay looks at three bound-
ary characteristics, traits found among communities linked to normative 
Jews in some capacity. The first of these characteristics, those who identify 
as Israelites, is found among Samaritans and African Hebrew Israelites of 
Jerusalem. Though African Hebrew Israelites have, at times, claimed to be 
Jews (for example, repeatedly applying for Israeli citizenship under the Law 
of Return), both of these communities maintain that they are the authentic 
Israelites. Samaritans continue to make this assertion today, whereas African 
Hebrew Israelites have been much less public in making such proclamations 
over the past decade, especially since the death of a member of their commu-
nity, Aharon Ben-Israel elis, and their subsequent permanent residency status 
in the Jewish state. 
A fascinating caveat to this category is that it seems one reason the latter 
group was accepted as Israeli (though not Jewish) was that a member of their 
community was killed in an action overtly linked to the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict. Perhaps only in death was this group finally embraced by the Jewish state. 
or perhaps Jews in Israel and elsewhere do not seem to be threatened by the 
claims of African Hebrew Israelites and Samaritans because they both have an 
infinitesimal population and because the latter group prohibits out-marriage, 
making them, by some accounts, the most inbred community in the world.99
The second boundary characteristic, those who identify as Jews but 
reject rabbinic authority, is found among Karaites and Messianic Jews. Maybe 
because there are so few Karaites left, the former group is not particularly con-
troversial. But for halachically observant Jews, especially those living in Israel, 
where the largest population of Karaites reside, their law prohibits them from 
marrying anyone in this nonmainstream Jewish sect. For non-Karaite Jews, 
especially Israeli citizens, this isn’t a problem in terms of communal continuity. 
But for Karaites, because of their dwindling numbers, this has serious potential 
health repercussions,100 also moving them toward potential extinction.
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Messianic Jews, on the other hand, continue to raise ire among nor-
mative Jews, orthodox or otherwise. This is due in part to their missionary 
efforts, as they engage in regular attempts to bring Jews who do not believe in 
Jesus into their community. Some Jewish leaders say that this negative com-
munal stance is connected to the Messianic Jewish belief in a messiah. Yet 
virtually no normative Jews publically opposed the Lubavitch community for 
believing their former leader, Menachem Mendel Schneerson, was the mes-
siah. And most normative Jewish communities include prayers about the mes-
siah (or messianic age). As such, the core point of contention seems to be not 
that Messianic Jews profess just anyone to be the messiah, but claim that Jesus 
is the Messiah. Perhaps this position is the boundary separating Jews from the 
largest religious community in the world, christians. Maybe this is the line in 
the sand demarcating what is Jewish from what is not. 
As for those born into the normative Jewish community who later join a 
Messianic Jewish community—by some accounts, a sizeable subgroup among 
Messianic Jews101—the normative Jewish community commonly tries to 
bring these individuals back into mainstream Judaism. In Israel though, the 
Supreme court has adjudicated that such individuals are, legally speaking, 
non-Jews, despite numerous halachic opinions otherwise. nonetheless, it is 
clear that many Israeli Jews consider them Jews regardless. 
The third boundary characteristic is those others identify as Jews, despite 
the fact that they don’t claim this identity. Two groups fall into this category, 
Samaritans and Kabbalah centre devotees. The former group may be the only 
community in the world that is called Jewish despite their own objections 
and historical data to the contrary. given the politics of identity in terms of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it may seem counterintuitive that West Bank 
Palestinians live in coexistence with a group perceived to be Jews. Regardless, 
Samaritans reject the term Jew, giving Jews no reason to challenge Samaritans 
as to their Jewishness.
As for Kabbalah centre devotees, some normative Jews have expressed 
dismay regarding the centre’s leaders’ claim that the community is not linked 
to the Jewish community in any way. But in general, despite the centre’s 
explicit distancing from Jews and Judaism, normative Jews do not get overly 
upset with the Kabbalah centre. Perhaps this is because the problem the 
Jewish institutional world has with them lies not in their being perceived as 
non-Jews calling themselves Jews, but rather Jews calling themselves non-Jews. 
or perhaps it is due to the fact that because of the centre’s outreach efforts, 
more unaffiliated Jews are coming back into the Jewish fold (that is, insofar 
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as the centre’s leaders are orthodox rabbis, the community’s main text is a 
definitive Jewish book), albeit in a roundabout way.
Looking at all three of these characteristics helps illuminate potential 
boundaries between Jews and non-Jews in the twenty-first century. Although 
all Jewish identity is a construct, the rubber meets the road when groups with 
these boundary characteristics interact with normative Jews, creating opportu-
nities for the issue of authenticity to emerge again and again. Ultimately, it is 
likely that the way one answers the question “Who is a Jew?” speaks more to 
one’s affiliation within the Jewish community than anything else. But because 
identity is so central to human existence, it is also likely that conflicts between 
groups with these boundary traits and the normative Jewish world will con-
tinue.102 As for the future, it is not uncommon for today’s fringe to become 
tomorrow’s center. only time will tell.
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German-Jewish Identity:  
Problematic Then, Problematic Now
Steven Leonard Jacobs 
The thousand year history of German Jewry has come to an end. 
—Rabbi Leo Baeck (1873–1956)
Society confronted with political, economic, and legal equality for 
the Jews, made it quite clear that none of its classes were prepared to 
grant them social equality, and that only exceptions from the Jewish 
people would be received.
—Hannah Arendt (1906–1975)
The duality of German and Jew—two souls within a single body—
would preoccupy and torment German Jews throughout the nine-
teenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century.
—Amos Elon (1926–2009)
The emancipation of the Jews meant above all their acceptance 
within the legal framework of European states, as citizens equal 
before the law; but, except in rare cases, it did not mean their undif-
ferentiated acceptance by society within those states.
—Saul Friedländer (b. 1932)
INTRODUCTION: THE PRESENT MOMENT
The past is always present, so much the more so when addressing the question of 
German-Jewish identity both historically and contemporarily. The brief period 
known as the Holocaust/Shoah, 1939–1945 (or, if one prefers, 1933–1945, begin-
ning with Adolf Hitler’s ascension to the chancellorship of Nazi Germany), has 
reframed the entire discussion of identity somewhat and caused a refocusing in 
some circles about die Judenfrage [the Jewish question] before the twentieth century 
but in the aftermath of the eighteenth century Enlightenment as well as in the years 
since 1945. For ease of analysis, I wish to periodicize this discussion as follows:
•	 Pre-Enlightenment (before the eighteenth century)
•	 Enlightenment and early modernity (eighteenth to twentieth 
centuries)
•	 The Holocaust years (1933/1939–1945)
•	 Post-Holocaust to the present (1945 and beyond)
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Before doing so, however, I want to interject four terms that seem to 
me critical to this discussion as well as to the larger question of Jewish iden-
tity whenever and wherever discussed. First is the Hebrew term galut [exile], 
the self- and communal perception that one individually and the group col-
lectively are living (at best temporarily) outside the land of origin and birth 
due to circumstances inflicted upon them and that a change of fortunes or 
circumstances will reverse this reality. Second is the Hebrew term t’futzah 
[dispersion], which, while perhaps initially the result of negative historical 
realities, quickly evolves into, again initially, making peace with one’s present 
residential location, quite quickly changes into a positive acceptance of this 
new reality and moves generationally forward so that one or two generations 
later the original negativities are all but forgotten. Third is the term “integra-
tion,” which, when viewed positively, applauds the successful interweaving of 
the minority into the larger society so that former obstacles such as places of 
residence, occupations or professions, or marital partners no longer present 
themselves as difficulties. Integration also presents the tantalizing possibility 
that one’s parochial identity need not be surrendered in the process of accep-
tance, but, under the right set of circumstances, might very well prove an addi-
tional, if somewhat exotic, “plus factor.”1 Finally, and fourth, is “assimilation,” 
which, while paralleling the same theoretical trajectory as integration, carries 
with it a loss of parochial identity and a surrendering of those distinctive ele-
ments of the individual and group that formerly set them apart as unique and 
that are now, for a whole host of reasons (for example, economic, social, politi-
cal) willingly or unwillingly surrendered but surrendered nonetheless. I would 
therefore suggest that these four terms—exile, dispersion, integration, and 
assimilation—have all been relevant to discussions regarding Jewish identities 
since the biblical period and remain every bit as current today as when they 
first surfaced more than two thousand years ago.
Finally, by way of introduction and before proceeding historically, two 
items of note, two assessments if you will, of the current situation. First, the 
fastest growing Jewish community on the European continent is that of Ger-
many, strongly affirmed by repeated defensive postures of the German govern-
ment and its population and institutions police protected. One measure of 
its continuing presence and success is the production of an English-language 
quarterly newspaper, Jewish Voices from Germany, with an initial print run of 
30,000 copies in 2012 and sent to readers in Germany, the United States, 
Canada, Great Britain, and Israel. Its publisher is the successful author and 
journalist Rafael Seligmann (b. 1947), who returned to Germany with his 
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parents from Israel in 1957 and is thoroughly committed to the rebirth of 
German-Jewish life. Interviewed by Ofer Aderet for Haaretz in January of this 
year, Seligmann stated:
If I only wrote about the Shoah and the Nazis, I would run out of 
readers. . . . The subject of the Shoah is, in a way, similar to drugs: 
it causes such strong emotions. But people are also interested in 
other parts of Jewish history, literature and culture. . . . The German 
press was very excited, but the Jewish press chose not to mention us. 
That’s all right. The public will decide whether to read us, notwith-
standing what they write or don’t write. . . . I have a dream. It is 
for a rebirth of German-Jewish life. Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann, 
the historian Theodor Mommsen and the painter Max Libermann 
all symbolized a unique flowering of the arts, culture and of the 
economy. . . . It [the newspaper] will connect Jews with Gentiles, 
Germany with the world. We want to communicate the long history 
that Jews and Germans share with each other. Here in Germany, we 
are witnessing the fastest growing Jewish community in the world.
We have Jewish artists, Jewish writers and Jewish businessmen. 
Berliners opened their hearts to Daniel Berenboim and Michael 
Blumenthal, the director of the Jewish Museum. Israelis and Jewish 
tourists flooded the capital.2 
Yet, despite his positivity and his optimism, as well as that of the Ger-
man Foreign Minsiter Guido Westerwelle also quoted in the inaugural issue 
(see note below), all is not as it would at first appear. Seligmann also chose 
to include a brief piece in that first issue by Professor Moshe Zimmermann, 
Director of the Richard Koebner Minerva Center for German History at the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, titled “German Jews or Jews in Germany? 
No Chance of Becoming a Decisive Factor Again.” He wrote: “The prognosis 
is clear but frustrating: There will be no re-birth of German Jews. Jews in 
Germany have no chance of becoming a decisive factor again in the develop-
ment of the Jewish religion or history. They cannot compete either with the 
largest Jewish diaspora, in the United States, or with Israel.”3
Statements such as these, by Seligmann, Westerwelle, and Zimmermann 
echo well those of Jews alive during the Enlightenment period who perceived 
themselves, at last, on the road to successful integration despite other more 
critically negative voices worried about that same future.
The second somewhat discordant note is a response to the current “cir-
cumcision crisis” initiated by the Cologne Regional Court this past June. This 
court ruled that doctors who perform such surgeries for religious reasons can 
be accused of committing bodily injury. (Irony of ironies, Jews, Muslims, 
244                                                   Who Is a Jew? Reflections on History, Religion, and Culture
and other Germans have joined together in protest!) This “event” provided 
the impetus for a six-part series in Der Spiegel, from July to September of this 
year, which included the former chairperson of the Central Council of Ger-
man Jews, Charlotte Knobloch, who has now questioned her own positivity 
in a recent editorial, titled “Do You Still Want Us Jews?”4 For Deidre Berger, 
executive director of the Berlin office of the American Jewish Committee, 
“Germany’s ability to give legal protection to circumcision [is] a litmus test for 
Jewish life in Germany.”5
Thus stated, an additional word now enters into the discussion of the 
first four, a word that resonates far back into German-Jewish history and car-
ries with it currency into the present moment and possibly into the future as 
well. And that is, “ambivalence” (the psychic dilemma of “yes and no,” or “yes 
. . . but”), and not only on the part of the Jews of Germany but German non-
Jews as well. And, therefore, it is appropriate to go back into history, into the 
periodization I suggested at the outset.
Before doing so, however, I want to bring to your attention one equally 
disturbing item of information:
In January 2012, the Bundestag [German Parliament] released its report, 
titled Antisemitismus in Deutschland [Antisemitism in Germany], which, 
according to the website www.holocausttaskforce.org, 
found that anti-Jewish feeling is “significantly” entrenched in German 
society, and that there is “a wider acceptance in mainstream society 
of day-to-day anti-Jewish tirades and actions.” The report identified 
latent antisemitic attitudes in 20 percent of the population, and indi-
cated that more than 90 percent of antisemitic crimes are committed 
by offenders who identity with the right-wing political spectrum. It 
was noted that the Internet played a key role in spreading Holocaust 
denial, far-right, and extreme Islamist views. . . . The experts stated 
that a comprehensive strategy for combating Antisemitism does not 
exist in Germany, and that such a strategy should invest in long-term 
and sustainable measures made in close cooperation between govern-
ment institutions and social organizations.6 
PRE-ENLIGHTENMENT (BEFORE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY)
Germany became a nation-state in the modern sense of the term only in 1871 
under the “Iron Chancellor,” Otto Eduard Leopold, Prince of Bismarck, Duke of 
Lauenburg (1815–1898). For ease of analysis and comment, we may, therefore, 
subcategorize this pre-Enlightenment first period, somewhat unevenly, as follows: 
(1) earliest history to the Crusades, and (2) Crusades to Moses Mendelssohn.
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The first authentic document regarding a “Jewish presence” in the area 
dates from 321 CE and references the town of Cologne on the Rhine River. 
The Jews of that earliest period appear to have enjoyed a reasonably tolerant 
relationship with their non-Jewish neighbors, mildly restricted politically and 
civilly (for example, they could not hold public office), but free to engage 
in the same occupations as their fellow citizens. The impact of the Roman 
Catholic Church during this same period seems to be one of “polite disregard.” 
Given the Jewish religious traditions of the time, we are on reasonably safe 
grounds to assume that they saw themselves in galut/exile—rather than in the 
t’futzah/dispersion—but more or less comfortably so; issues of both integra-
tion and assimilation were irrelevant during this first stage of settlement and 
encounter. At best in this context, Jews were “tolerated,” and thus thoughts of 
surrendering their Jewish identities in exchange for the Christian one of their 
neighbors were not part of their collective mindset.
This initially positive scenario would continue under the King of the 
Franks, Charlemagne (“Charles the Great,” 742–814) and what would later 
be called the Carolingian Empire. During his reign, Jews were not permitted 
to become part of the military, but were, otherwise, unrestricted in commerce 
and settled wherever they chose to do so. Cologne, Worms, and Mayence were 
their three primary cities of residence. Again, a religious sense of galut/exile 
more than t’futzah/dispersion appears to have been the norm, but storm clouds 
were slowly beginning to appear on the horizon as the church continued to 
flex its own muscles in the Germanic lands and the times of the various Cru-










Whatever we may say about the Crusades—and they continue to fas-
cinate both European and religious historians—these nine campaigns were 
a low water mark for Jews; from their very beginnings in 1095 until their 
conclusions in 1272, Jews would suffer collectively and unmercifully not only 
in Germanic lands but throughout the European continent as the Crusaders 
made their way toward the Holy Land in their attempts to wrest Jerusalem 
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from the Arab-Muslim “infidels.” The war cry Hierosolyma est perdita! [Jerusa-
lem is lost!] would bring fear and death to the Jews who heard it. A true and 
foreboding sense of galut/exile would dominate Jews: their vulnerability was 
self-evident; their fate lay in the hands of those far more powerful and unwill-
ing to now regard them as fellow citizens, but fully responsible for the death of 
their Christ. Deicide [god killers] as a reference to the Jews was the order of the 
day. The great German-Jewish historian Heinrich Graetz (1817–1891), whose 
multivolume Geschichte der Juden [History of the Jews] remains unsurpassed 
even today (with the possible exception of Salo Wittmayer Baron’s [1895–
1989] eighteen-volume A Social and Religious History of the Jews, 1952–1983), 
reminds us that one could map the path of the Crusaders by pinpointing the 
Jewish villages destroyed and the Jews massacred.7 
From the end of the Crusades onward, Jews would continue to remain 
vulnerable, and the charges against them would multiply: host desecration, 
ritual murder, treason, and well poisoning, including responsibility for the 
Black Death (1348–1350), all encouraged by the church itself. During the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, power over the Jews would pass from the 
emperor to the various lesser sovereigns. Jews would find themselves with three 
options: ghettoization, subject to violence but dependent on their rulers; flight 
if possible though more often than not an unrealistic option; and conversion 
into the arms of a willing church but reluctant population. Again, as before, 
galut/exile remained the norm. Questions of Jewish identity were externally 
imposed. Jews remained Jews with little opportunity to do otherwise. As cold 
as life was outside the ghetto walls, the dynamism of Judaism flourished inside 
the walls. Jewish holy days were celebrated, sacred Jewish texts were studied, 
and Jewish life-cycle moments were marked appropriately. For those Jews 
inside the ghettos, no matter what the future held in store for them, their Juda-
ism was their badge of nobility; their sacred covenant with God, their blessing.
Slowly, the sixteenth and early part of the seventeenth centuries would 
bring a slight amelioration of their plight as some of the Germanic king-
doms continued their negative ways, while others attempted to chart a new 
course. Under Emperor Leopold I (1640–1705), Jews were expelled from 
Vienna and Austria, at the same time that Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg 
(1620–1688), known as The Great Elector [Der Große Kurfürst] because of his 
military and political prowess, mandated a toleration of all religious communi-
ties within his realm.
An important sour note in this discussion was the role played by Martin 
Luther (1483–1546), who would later be recognized as both the founder of 
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Lutheranism and the “spark” that would set in motion the Protestant Refor-
mation. A Roman Catholic priest, Luther was originally committed to holding 
out the hand of friendship to open the church’s doors to the conversion of the 
Jews instead of having them forcibly detained and subject to lengthy sermonic 
harangues denigrating Judaism. When they rejected his overtures as well, he 
wrote not one but two scurrilous tracts, the more well-known Von den Juden 
und Ihren Lügen [On the Jews and Their Lies] and the lesser-known Vom 
Schem Hamphoras und vom Geschlecht Christi [On the Holy Name and the 
Lineage of Christ], both published in 1543. As he would write in the first text:
To save our souls from the Jews, that is, from the devil and from 
eternal death. My advice, as I said earlier, is:
First, that their synagogues be burned down, and that all who are 
able toss sulphur and pitch; it would be good if someone could also 
throw in some hellfire.
Second, that all their books—their prayer books, their Talmudic 
writings, also the entire Bible—be taken from them, not leaving 
them one leaf, and that these be preserved for those who may be 
converted.
Third, that they be forbidden on pain of death to praise God, 
to give thanks, to pray, and to teach publicly among us and in our 
country.
Fourth, that they be forbidden to utter the name of God within 
our hearing. For we cannot with a good conscience listen to this or 
tolerate it. 
Antisemites have been drawing inspiration from Martin Luther’s words ever since.
ENLIGHTENMENT TO EARLY MODERNITY  
(EIGHTEENTH TO TWENTIETH CENTURIES)
By the time of Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786), the plight of the Jews in 
Germany had begun to change course, in large measure due to the Protestant 
Reformation coupled with the Enlightenment, both of which overthrew the 
stranglehold of the Roman Catholic Church and elevated rational thought 
and scientific achievement to the forefront of Western consciousness, along 
with a begrudging awareness of similarities rather than differences among the 
various communities. France would grant its Jews citizenship between 1789 
and 1791 and the Germanic fiefdoms shortly but reluctantly thereafter. With 
citizenship came increasing economic success and university access, and Jews 
fled the ghettos throughout Germany, especially in and to Berlin, which they 
regarded as the seat of German culture. Christian religion, while very much in 
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evidence, was and remained part of the cultural identity not only of the masses 
but the elite as well, and conversion and marriage, even without sincere belief, 
was perceived by some as the road to equality. 
For the vast majority of Jews, however, Judaism remained central to their 
identity and conversion and marriage to non-Jews “beyond the pale.” But 
too many among the economic and cultural elites of the Jewish community 
were all to ready and willing to surrender their Jewish identity as the price 
of admission to the “New Germany,” and with it a rejection of a Jewish reli-
gious tradition that they equated with a sterile orthodoxy and that they had 
already forsaken. Deborah Hertz’s important text, How Jews Became Germans: 
The History of Conversion and Assimilation in Berlin, details the story of such 
conversions and inter-, mixed, or conversionary marriages during the period 
1645–1833.8 In so doing, she also biographically tells the individual stories of 
many of those who, while seemingly leaving the Jewish religious tradition and 
community, ultimately did not leave but remained tethered to it and disap-
pointed by their failure to successfully both integrate and assimilate into the 
larger German Christian society. 
Among the more well-known of them was Rahel Levin von Varnhagen 
(1771–1833), a littérateur who presided over her own salon and whose own 
distancing from her Jewish past and identity never accomplished what she 
had hoped—even after her late-in-life marriage to her lover Karl August Varn-
hagen von Ense (1785–1858). Composer Jacob Ludwig Felix Mendelssohn 
Bartholdy (1809–1847) was baptized a Lutheran, but nonetheless earned the 
ire of Richard Wagner (1818–1883), who regarded his creative work as little 
more than stolen and copied from German genius. Heinrich Heine (1797–
1856), master of German poetry, saw his regretful and unhappy conversion 
to Christianity as the “price of admission” to insure his literary success. For 
Ludwig Börne (1786–1837), journalist and unfulfilled academic, contempo-
rary and critic of Heine, conversion brought no peace. Then there was Eduard 
Gans (1797–1839), a brilliant jurist and one of the very few whose conversion 
resulted in a successful academic appointment. In addition, there were other 
members of prominent Jewish families (for example, Arnsteins, Beers, Itzigs, 
Liebmanns, Mendelssohns, Schlegels), ready and willing to convert—but their 
journeys out of Judaism remained problematic all their lives, as they were 
unable to fully break free from their past and from the perspective of others, 
and largely resented for attempting to do so. 
Thus, for these German Jews their galut/exile was from themselves, 
attempting to erase a past and present that they could not overcome despite all 
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their attempts to so. For any number of them, despite whatever economic suc-
cess their families achieved, despite the splendor of the mansions in which they 
lived, despite the parties they hosted (their invitations were, more often than 
not, not reciprocated), their Jewish identities would haunt (and stalk) them. 
Both assimilation and integration were impossible at that moment in history.9
THE HOLOCAUST YEARS (1933/1939–1945)
The economic and political upheavals towards the end of the eigtheenth and 
early part of the ninteenth centuries in Germany (and worldwide) and the 
trauma of World War I reveal an increasing vulnerability on the part of Ger-
many’s Jews. Legally very much a part of the nation-state, Jews continued to 
be discriminated against in public service, the military, and academia. Prior 
to the Nazis’ ascension to power, the Jewish population of Germany remained 
relative stable between 1871 and 1933, hovering around 500,000 persons.
Jewish participation in World War I was exploited and propagandized 
by the Nazis against Germany’s Jews. In fact, 100,000 Jews served in the Ger-
many army during the years 1914–1917; 12,000 fell in battle, many of them 
as well as the survivors earning awards for their bravery and courage.10 In its 
aftermath, in the shaky days of the ill-fated Weimar Republic (1919–1933), 
no Jew was more symbolic of Jewish involvement and hope for the future 
than Walther Rauthenau (1867–1922), a wealthy assimilated Jew, somewhat 
ambivalent about his distance from his Judaism, who would serve as foreign 
minister only to be assassinated by far rightists who saw him as ultimately 
responsible for the “selling out” of Germany in the aftermath of the Treaty of 
Versailles in 1919. (He insisted that Germany fulfill its obligations under the 
treaty.) Jewishly, Rathenau, a committed nationalist, was a strong advocate for 
Jewish assimilation and integration and an opponent of Zionism; his family 
believed such was the best way to overcome German antisemitism.11
With the coming of the National Socialist German Workers Party 
(NSDAP) into power, Nazism under Hitler charted a new direction in the 
Jewish identity question, and Germany’s Jews now found themselves bereft 
of other options. Formerly, we may characterize “the journey of antisemitism” 
in the following manner: initially a form of cultural and social antisemitism 
(“We do not like those who are different from us but will tolerate them if 
we must”), superseded in the West by religious and theological antisemitism 
(“We reject those responsible for the murder and death of our Lord and Savior, 
and will exile, ghettoize, and, if warranted, murder them”), to its newest 
manifestation, racial and biological antisemitism (“Our enemies are physically 
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different from us and cannot change who they are; it is their very Judaism that 
infuses their physicality and it and they must be destroyed”). Translating that 
weltanschauung (world perspective) into reality would result in the infamous 
Nuremberg Racial Laws of 1935 and close the doors to escape for the vast 
majority of Jews, at the same time rendering problematic those persons of 
mixed identity with no connection to the Jewish community, the so-called 
mischlinge [literally “mixed lines,” though contextually better understand 
pejoratively as “mixed-” or “half-breeds”]. Such attitudes would be reflected, 
for example, in the following two sections of the “Law for the Protection of 
German Blood and Honor,” of September 15, 1935:
1.1: Marriages between Jews and citizens of German or kindred 
blood are forbidden.
1.2: Sexual relations between Jews and nationals of German or kin-
dred blood are forbidden (emphasis added).
Jews were thus to be defined as follows:
Full or three-quarter Jews: Those having all four or three of four 
grandparents as Jews and/or connected to the Jewish community.
Half-Jews: Those having two grandparents as Jews but discon-
nected to the Jewish community (that is, Protestants or Roman 
Catholics). (Mischling 1st degree)
One-quarter Jew: Those having one grandparent as a Jew but 
disconnected to the Jewish community (that is, Protestants or Roman 
Catholics). (Mischling 2nd degree).12 
With the start of World War II and the invasion of Poland on September 
1, 1939, as the vise-like grip of the Nazis expanded, those who thought they, 
too, were fleeing to safety did so only to cruelly learn such was not the case 
(for example, those who fled to France, Belgium, and the Netherlands). The 
first group of those who fled did so between 1933/34 and 1939; among them 
were such intellectual luminaries as political thinker Hannah Arendt (1906–
1975), scientist Albert Einstein (1879–1955), scholar of mysticism Gershom 
Scholem (1897–1982), critical theorist Theodor Adorno (1903–1969), and 
philosophers Martin Buber (1878–1965) and Leo Strauss (1899–1973).13
As the noose continued to tighten and death became the new normal, 
escape lessened and some Jews would now find themselves in a place never 
visited before: those who went to their deaths affirming their Jewishness (that 
is, those who were murdered al k’dushat ha-Shem, those who died for the 
sanctification of God’s Holy Name), though unwilling martyrs to be sure; 
and those shocked into a terrible new reality of identifying with a people with 
whom they had no connection, either the result of their own attempted escape 
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or one chosen for them by parents or grandparents in previous generations. 
By war’s end—May 8, 1945—more than six million Jewish children, women, 
and men would lose their lives for no other reason than that of their Jewish 
identities and what fate had apparently cruelly decreed for them. For the Jews 
of Germany and Western Europe, the continent had become a sprawling 
graveyard, and those who could would flee to Palestine, the United States, 
Canada, South America, Australia, wherever doors were opened to them. Not 
all, however, would leave.
POST-HOLOCAUST TO THE PRESENT (1945 AND BEYOND)14
It has now been estimated that as many as 16,000 Jews may have survived the 
war years in hiding throughout Germany, hidden by non-Jewish family mem-
bers or friends and colleagues.15 After the war itself, some would return, hav-
ing nowhere else to go, and settle in both West Germany and East Germany. 
Today, after the reunification of Germany in 1990, the Jews of Germany con-
sist of three interrelated and interconnected communities, at times relatively 
harmonious, at other times relatively discordant: the children of those who 
survived the Holocaust/Shoah, whose parents have died or are dying; Russian 
Jews who fled after the downfall of the former Soviet Union in 1991; and, 
somewhat surprisingly, Israelis who have opted for a safer and seemingly more 
prosperous standard and style of living away from the stirred-up cauldron of 
the Middle East for themselves and their children. 
The Jewish communities of Germany number today about 200,000 
and are largely resident in the major cities (for example, Berlin and Potsdam). 
Both Orthodox and Liberal/Reform seminaries ordain graduates to serve the 
communities; as in the past, however, tensions between these two religious 
communities of Jews remain, and some regard healing this division as among 
the most pressing of intracommunity issues. Holocaust denial is a punishable 
offense. The Jewish Museum of Berlin continues to attract visitors as does the 
Shoah Memorial itself. Judaic studies are an important part of many university 
curricula. Founded in 1950, the Central Council of Jews in Germany contin-
ues to serve all Jews.
In 2006, Israeli Ambassador Shimon Stein warned that Jews in Germany 
feel increasingly unsafe; they “are not able to live a normal Jewish life,” and 
security of persons and institutions, especially synagogues and community 
centers, is all too apparent.16 Thus the question of German-Jewish identity 
remains a complex one, not only for those who are Jews but for their neigh-
bors as well. Terms such as galut [exile], t’futzah [dispersion], assimilation, 
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integration, and ambivalence remain part of this unresolved equation not only 
of “what it means to be a Jew in Germany today,” but also what it means to 
carry the historic label of German-Jewish identity on into the future. Only 
time will tell.
CONCLUSIONS
What, then, is to be learned from this German-Jewish journey and the ques-
tion of Jewish identity of an historic Jewish community that all but disap-
peared and is today becoming somewhat resurrected? I suggest that there are 
four possible lessons to be derived from the telling of this story.
First, that the larger societies in which Jews find themselves through-
out history and even currently have yet to make their own peace with the 
minorities within their midst. Jews remain, for better or for worse, though 
all-too-often for worse, the bellwethers of the health and vitality of their host 
societies, the proverbial canaries in the mineshaft, fated to live or die. How 
a nation-state treats its Jews and how the Jews resident in those nation-states 
regard themselves and their identities (safe? vulnerable? successful? threat-
ened?) remain the key questions.
Second, for Jews, given the Christian history of the past 2,000 years for 
these same Western nation-states, attempts to shed one’s birth and rearing 
identities may be largely illusory in the minds of those who attempt to do so. 
Integration and assimilation of those initially outside the group but later brought 
into the group remain sociologically difficult, and the story of the Jews is a case 
in point. Insiders do not automatically welcome outsiders even if they provide 
the vehicles for doing so (that is, conversion). All of the markers of identity (lan-
guage, culture, legal status, even birth itself ) remain problematic when focus-
ing on group dynamics. Converts are not automatically members of their new 
religious communities. Naturalized citizens or citizens by governmental fiat are 
not automatically embraced by the larger society. Even those who significantly 
contribute to the larger society’s cultural endeavors are not automatically wel-
comed for their gifts; indeed, they may even be initially perceived as threatening 
and akin to thieves stealing from those same societies, as was the case in German 
Jewry’s past during the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment periods.
Third, antisemitism seemingly remains always at the periphery but some-
times at the center in such societies. Transforming outsiders into insiders and 
welcoming them are parts of a slow process of acculturation whereby parties to 
the relationship each fully understand they have something to gain and are fully 
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committed to doing so. The German-Jewish case with hindsight at best appears 
one-sided: for the Jews, social and economic benefits; for others, far less so.
Fourth and finally, the Jewish solution to the question of identity within 
the context of the larger society appears to suggest not to rid oneself of it, but, 
rather to embrace that identity and its diversity of perspectives and options 
(religious, secular, Zionist) and to use it as the very “launching pad” into 
societies willing to overcome their own past. The American community is 
one such example, Jews having been part of the journey and the story since 
1654, despite a history of antisemitism though somewhat more muted and less 
violent than Europe.17 The Roman Catholic Church and the “sea change” in 
Jewish-Christian relations in the aftermath of Nostre Aetate in 1965, despite 
two thousand years of Jewish vulnerability and worse, is a second such exam-
ple. Taken together, they may yet prove to be beacons of light in what for Jews 
focusing on the past must appear to be one long dark night. 
The past is no guarantor of the present nor predictor of the future. What 
was once the German-Jewish story told with alacrity and framed by sadness 
and horror mandates neither that present nor that future. The unpredictability 
of both suggests that human beings in their infinite plasticity are fully capable 
of redirecting their energies away from what was towards what could poten-
tially be. For Jews, I would suggest, it is this very possibility of an unheralded 
new beginning, despite all the evidence to the contrary, that continues both to 
nourish and to sustain Jews and Judaism in Germany and elsewhere as well.18 
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“I Sometimes Think That I Grew Up on a  
Different Planet”: The Assimilated Jewish  
Community of the Warsaw Ghetto in the Letters 
of Wanda Lubelska and Hala Szwambaum
Katarzyna Person
In my paper I will discuss the story of assimilated, acculturated, and baptized 
Jews, a small group among the numerous political, cultural, and national iden-
tities that formed the population of the Warsaw Ghetto. Unwilling to integrate 
into the Jewish community and unable to merge with the Polish one, they 
formed a group of their own, remaining throughout the interwar period in a 
state of suspension, on the border of national and cultural identities. In 1940, 
with the closure of the Jewish Residential Quarter in Warsaw, their identity 
was chosen for them. 
Whether assimilation, understood by Todd Endelman as a process 
encompassing acculturation, integration, emancipation, and secularization, 
could ever take place in interwar Poland is still far from resolved in the schol-
arship. Undoubtedly, the influence of the very strong traditional Polish Jewish 
community and the rise of antisemitism throughout central eastern Europe 
did hinder this process to the extent that it could never take the shape that it 
did in western Europe. It would be farfetched to say, however, that the process 
of assimilation taking place in Polish lands throughout the nineteenth century 
was utterly stopped in its tracks. On the contrary, as will be demonstrated, 
the interwar Polish Jewish community included a group that, while retaining 
an awareness of their Jewish origin, increasingly identified with their Polish 
rather than Jewish environment. Yet, as they never could merge with the out-
side community to the extent to which it took place in the West, the historian 
Aleksander Hertz famously referred to them as the “caste” of assimilated Jews: 
a group suspended between the Polish and Jewish communities.1 
For the purpose of this paper this group will be defined as predomi-
nantly identifying with Polish culture and language, even though some of 
them also cultivated certain aspects of their Jewish identity.2 It will therefore 
include people already born into assimilated families, in some cases baptized 
at birth, as well as those who as adults made a conscious decision to break 
their ties with the traditional Jewish community for various reasons, includ-
ing career advancement or intermarriage. There were also those for whom 
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assimilation or acculturation was a lifelong process, a result of their education 
in Polish schools and immersion in a mixed Polish-Jewish environment. It can 
be claimed that the only way to define “Jewish Polishness” in the turbulent 
surroundings of interwar and wartime Poland is to see it as an expression of 
constant changes in various components of self-identity. My paper will show 
this journey through the example of two young women, inhabitants of the 
Warsaw ghetto, who both described their experiences in their letters sent to 
the “Aryan” side of Warsaw between 1940 and 1942.
The first young woman was Wanda Lubelska. She was born in 1923 and 
came from a well-to-do family living in the modern, middle-class district of 
Żoliborz. Her mother was a violinist, her father was a high-level bank employ-
ee. She attended a Polish high school, where she excelled in mathematics and 
art and was an active member of the Polish scouting movement.3 The second 
young woman’s name was Hala Szwambaum. We do not know much about 
her prewar life. Only that she was born in 1921, so was two years older than 
Wanda, and also lived in Żoliborz. As is evident through her letters, she came 
from a similar background.4 
 Both young women were representative of a new generation of Warsaw 
Jews. They were educated in elite Polish schools, studying a syllabus imbued 
with patriotism, they spoke Polish as their first language, and in their letters 
did not exhibit any familiarity with the traditional life of the Polish-Jewish 
community. Writing about the Warsaw environment of assimilated Jews, Todd 
Endelman described it as a heterogonous mix of converted and unconverted 
(but indifferent) Jews, with a sprinkling of unconventional Poles.5 Recipients of 
letters on which I base my paper support this claim. Halina Grabowska, whom 
Wanda corresponded with, was an activist in the scouts movement and member 
of the Polish underground. Hala Szwambaum on the other hand wrote to her 
former school teacher, Stefania Lillental, who, also of Jewish origin, remained 
with her young son in hiding on the “Aryan” side. The two women would 
first exchange letters when meeting at the ghetto walls and later passed them 
through acquaintances who were able to enter and leave the ghetto. 
What did it mean for assimilated Jews to leave their prewar neighbor-
hoods, understood as both a physical environment and also a mixed Polish-
Jewish community, and enter the new, Jewish one? As we meet both women 
when they are already in the ghetto, we do not know how and why their 
families made the decision to move there and whether they had any opportu-
nity of staying on the “Aryan” side or even leaving Warsaw. Most likely, as was 
the case with those assimilated families who did leave their recollections, the 
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sheer speed of events between the announcement of the ghettoization decree 
on October 12 and the end of resettlement on November 15, 1940 did not 
give them much time for reflection. As a result, only a small number of Jews, 
mainly from intellectual or artistic circles, decided at that stage to risk an ille-
gal existence with forged papers bearing “Aryan” names: live “on the surface,” 
go into hiding in Warsaw, or leave the city. These were mainly people who 
were very strongly linked to the Polish environment, most often by marriage. 
The rest, irrespective of their national and cultural identity, began their lives 
as citizens of the “closed quarter.” 
As the surviving correspondence between Hala and Stefania dates from 
1941, the first reflections of the ghetto reach us through the eyes of Wanda. 
In December 1940, two weeks after the closure of the ghetto, Wanda wrote to 
her friend: “You cannot have any idea of what is happening here. It has to be 
seen to be understood. There is nothing left out of me. I don’t know how long 
it will last, for now I have lost all hope and the will to do anything. Only now 
do I see and understand what someone feels who is torn out of their environ-
ment and thrown into an alien, unknown one.”6 
Shocked reactions to life in the ghetto—its noise, overcrowding, sur-
rounding poverty, and enclosure—appear in almost all diaries irrespective of 
their authors’ backgrounds, yet the girls’ letters exhibit other problems that 
were specific to their community. One of them is a lack of familiarity with 
their new surroundings. If Wanda’s family was similar to others from the same 
background, we can assume that she had very little knowledge of the topog-
raphy of the traditional, rather impoverished Jewish part of Warsaw, where 
the ghetto was established. It is not unlikely that her parents made a point 
of keeping her away from it, immersing her instead in the Polish or assimi-
lated Jewish environment. Another clear issue was language. As comes across 
clearly from the letters, both girls spoke Polish as their first language and were 
studying a number of foreign languages. However, at the moment the Jewish 
quarter was closed, Yiddish was the language most often heard on the ghetto 
streets, despite the fact that a growing number of Warsaw’s Jews possessed a 
good knowledge of Polish. 
Prewar Warsaw represented the largest Yiddish-speaking community 
in Europe, and the everyday life of the ghetto reflected this. Yiddish was the 
language “of the street” as well as of a group of intelligentsia gathered around 
the Aleynhilf [self-help in Yiddish] and most famously members of the Under-
ground Archive of the Warsaw Ghetto.7 The latter group used Yiddish as 
part of a new secular culture created in the ghetto, which they hoped would 
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form the basis a postwar Jewish society in either the Diaspora or in Palestine. 
According to activists, Yiddish, as the true language of the ghetto, had every 
right to replace Polish, a language associated with the snobbery of the assimi-
lated classes and identified with “ignorance, disdain and ill-will towards the 
common man and his needs, and with a lack of understanding, in the literal 
sense of the word, of the Yiddish-speaking masses.”8 
However, assimilated Jews were often brought up in an environment that 
equated Yiddish with a low status and lack of culture, in which the language 
was little more than unintelligible jargon. Being the “official” language of the 
ghetto, Yiddish came to symbolize the alienation assimilated Jews felt in the 
new society that they were plunged into. Polish was therefore sentimentally 
regarded as one of the few links to a prewar life, and they sought to preserve it 
wherever possible. Unsurprisingly, in one of her first letters sent from the ghet-
to, Wanda described “keeping her accent intact” as something of the uttermost 
importance for her family, and she complained about the manner in which the 
ghetto society spoke Polish. She wrote: “I wanted so much to see a familiar 
face from Żoliborz and speak to someone in a humane way, that you can’t even 
imagine. Here as you know (because I already told you) everyone is ‘singing’ 
in a horrible manner, and myself, and in particular my mother, want to keep 
my Polish accent intact. Now, as they are locking us in, it may be difficult.”9
The issue of speaking Polish correctly is just one example of how, despite 
physical separation, Poles and the “Aryan” side of Warsaw were omnipresent in 
the life of the ghetto-assimilated community. Describing her emotional state 
in the ghetto, one of its assimilated inhabitants wrote: “I was never ‘Here’ [in 
the ghetto], I was always ‘There’ [on the “Aryan” side].”10 Similar sentiments 
are expressed by both women. In February 1941, three months after the clo-
sure of the ghetto, Wanda wrote: “You ask me if I am curious as to what is 
happening ‘there.’ You’d better not ask me, because I think about your life 
‘there’ all the time, what you’re doing, what you’re discussing, what our friends 
do. Life here is so dark in its everyday grayness, that you have to keep your 
thoughts away from it to cope with it.”11 
For many of the inhabitants of the ghetto, both assimilated and not, pre-
war Warsaw became the symbol of their lost life, presented in clear contrast to 
the reality of the ghetto. Talking about her wish to go to the “Aryan” side, Hala 
wrote: “During recent months I have been thinking of you the way prisoners 
or emigrants think of their close ones who stayed behind in their native land. 
I wish I could walk out of here and go to you, to Warsaw.”12 In another letter 
she explained how “Krakowskie Przedmieście [a Warsaw street] is as far away 
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as the Champs Elysees or the Piazza San Marco.”13 Even though for the vast 
majority of ghetto inhabitants the sentiment toward prewar Warsaw did not 
extend to “Aryan” Warsaw under Nazi occupation, seen as an increasingly dan-
gerous place, Wanda, who ventured to the “Aryan” side to meet up with her 
school friends, still referred to her brief escapes as “time spent in paradise.”14
Among assimilated and acculturated ghetto inhabitants, in particular 
those coming from families who at least partially recognized their Jewish roots, 
were those whose Jewish identity was strengthened or even reestablished in 
the ghetto. This kind of development can be for instance witnessed in Hala’s 
letters. Even though she was brought up in a clearly assimilated community, 
her letters hint at the antisemitism that she might have encountered when at 
school. At the end of 1941, Hala reflected in a letter to a former teacher on 
the lack of contact with her former school friends: “I sometimes think that 
I grew up on a different planet—that’s how differently our lives developed 
and made different people out of us. And it’s not even five years since we left 
the same nest, from the care of the same people and the same ideas. We had 
much in common, even similar marks in the final exams. We have the same 
mother tongue; we were shaped by the same books, the same school bench, 
the same city. Now, each of us thinks differently as if we grew up in different 
hemispheres and there is even some enmity between us. I can’t help feeling that 
they are all happy with the fate that has befallen us.”15 
In the ghetto, even though she remained socially linked to her prewar 
acquaintances, she also made a number of new friends from varied back-
grounds, one of whom she began dating. In her letters we witness a gradual, 
yet perceptible, integration with the wider Jewish society based on a shared 
common fate. With passing time, she increasingly referred to herself in her 
letters as Jewish, calling herself in October 1941 a “woman on a reservation of 
the vanishing Semitic tribe in Central Europe.”16 
We do not come across such reflections in the letters of Wanda, perhaps 
because she was born into a family that was more fully assimilated into the 
Polish culture and national identity. Even in the ghetto, the group Wanda’s 
family belonged to remained within a closed circle comprised of those of a 
similar background. The testimony of many of them offers proof that the 
division between the two parts of society remained as deep as before the war. 
When in her letters Wanda complained about the Jewish youth in the ghetto, 
comparing them unfavorably to her Polish friends,17 her negative feelings were 
no doubt to a large degree reciprocated. It can be safely stated that the vast 
majority of the ghetto population had a decisively negative attitude toward 
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assimilated Jews and in particular the 2000-strong baptized community, 
whose members, among them prominent intellectuals, scholars, lawyers, phy-
sicians, and top-ranking officials,18 almost immediately reached the top layers 
of ghetto life, creating the feeling of a mutually supportive Catholic “clique.” 
In many documents preserved in the Underground Archive of the 
Warsaw Ghetto, converted, assimilated, and highly acculturated Jews are put 
in one category, viewing assimilation as an apostasy and the last step before 
baptism. In the eyes of many of the ghetto inhabitants the vast majority of the 
assimilated community remained in the “grey zone” of moral responsibility, as 
their prewar professional standing, financial situation, and especially contacts 
on the “Aryan” side created the impression that they were in a much more 
fortunate position than others around them. In many cases there were grounds 
for such a view. In the best situation were those members of the assimilated 
community who were well-off before the war and were not cut off from their 
prewar assets, which could be adequate to sustain them through two years of 
living in the ghetto and which in some cases even allowed them to keep up the 
pretence of the prewar way of living. 
Among this group were the most prominent members of the assimilated 
and acculturated community, members and employees of the Jewish Council, 
the Judenrat, described by its enemies as a “nest of disgusting assimilation.”19 
As a result of its overblown bureaucratic structure, the Judenrat became a cru-
cial job provider for the educated, assimilated strata of the ghetto, though those 
with adequate contacts were also able to find employment in other branches of 
the ghetto administration. Members of the assimilated intelligentsia, officers 
from the Polish Army, and lawyers were also definitely overrepresented among 
recruits to the ghetto police—the Jewish Order Service, led by a convert and 
prewar Polish State Police officer Józef Szeryński. 
However, the two sets of letters demonstrate to the contrary that the vast 
majority of assimilated and acculturated ghetto inhabitants fully shared the gen-
eral fate of the impoverished intelligentsia, especially as the comparatively good 
living situation of even the most fortunate members of the assimilated commu-
nity started to change from mid-1941. The girls’ fate confirms the view of his-
torian Israel Gutman, himself a Warsaw Ghetto survivor, that from that point 
there was no longer a class system in the ghetto, only an overall slide towards 
poverty.20 In March 1941, Wanda’s father died of typhus. Her mother fell ill in 
the autumn of 1941 and though she recovered, her health remained very frag-
ile. Care for the family was left to the children. Her younger brother took on 
the responsibility of the main provider for the family by becoming a rickshaw 
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driver—an occupation that was extremely taxing physically and provided only 
a meager income, which could barely keep the family fed. Wanda earned addi-
tional income by tutoring, cleaning apartments, and selling stockings. 
Just as for the majority of the assimilated intelligentsia, an important 
source of money for assimilated families was their contacts outside the ghetto. 
While some of them may not have had significant assets that were left on the 
“Aryan” side, they were helped financially by their Polish friends and former 
colleagues. Through her contacts with friends outside the ghetto, Wanda 
became the driving force in selling the family’s belongings, ranging from her 
mother’s concert dresses to the library. Selling books proved particularly diffi-
cult for her to bear. In a letter to a friend she wrote: “All I ask of you is to please 
start from foreign language books, and in any case leave the encyclopedia for 
the end. Maybe by then the tables will have turned.” 
Hala’s situation was marginally better, yet she too had given up paying 
for private French lessons in June 1941, though her teacher continued to give 
them to her for free. At that point she began working as a librarian, a job that 
required carrying heavy suitcases full of books between private apartments. 
Even though she admitted in her letters to physical exhaustion, she also wrote 
that since she could afford soups in the communal kitchens, she ate “almost 
adequately.” It was also most likely this job that allowed her to widen her 
social circles and that affected her view of the community surrounding her. 
Moreover, both young women were strongly affected by the general impover-
ishment around them. In the winter of 1942, Hala wrote of barefooted chil-
dren on the ghetto streets, while Wanda described the fate of hopeless refugees 
wandering aimlessly through the closed quarter.
There is nothing in the letters of either of the young women that hints 
at their being affected by the changes in the perception of Poles taking place 
among the general ghetto population in 1942 as the situation in the ghetto 
worsened and contact with the “Aryan” side declined. For the vast majority 
of the ghetto population, whose relationship with Poles, unlike that of both 
young women, was restricted to economic relations, with no physical contact 
being possible, the principal source of information about the “other side” was 
tales and rumors, and these were mainly concerned with the spread of szmal-
cownictwo [blackmailing].21 Only those of the ghetto inhabitants who had 
enough money and contacts on the “Aryan” side to leave the ghetto were to 
face the reality of living in wartime Warsaw. As the young underground activ-
ist Vladka Meed noted, the painfully high cost of remaining in hiding and 
constant fear of denunciation meant that “the assimilated Jewish intelligentsia, 
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the erstwhile merchants and social figures, were transformed into distressed, 
bewildered paupers.”22 
For many members of the assimilated community it was the experience 
of hiding on the “Aryan” side that made them reconsider their affiliations to 
Poles. Fear of denunciations became a unifying factor shared between all of 
those in hiding, irrespective of their prewar status, background, or financial 
situation. Jundenrat clerk Stefan Ernest, commenting on the experience of 
thousands of mainly assimilated Jews living on the “Aryan” side of Warsaw, 
noted that “the only thing they share is a fear of informers, an anxious antici-
pation of the end—and the fact that they are Jewish.”23 
Wanda never became Jewish. Together with her mother and brother and 
with no money left, she was among the first to be sent to Treblinka. Her letters 
indicate that despite the growing persecution and increasingly threatening news 
reaching the quarter from other Jewish communities, the Gross-Aktion, the 
deportation of the Warsaw Ghetto inhabitants to Treblinka, caught her family, 
like countless others, unaware. We do not know how Hala survived the deporta-
tions, but we can surmise that she was helped by the young man whom she began 
dating in the ghetto. As she complained in one of the letters, she did not have 
enough money to get out of the ghetto and did not know anyone who would take 
her in. As her letters stop at the onset of the deportations, we can only guess that, 
like the majority of politically active young people who found themselves in the 
ghetto, she joined one of many Zionist pioneering youth groups. 
As underground organizations conducted outreach activities aimed at the 
middle-class acculturated group in an effort to counteract their Polonization, 
she would not have been alone. As the memoirs of two Zionist youth leaders, 
Zivia Lubetkin and Yitzhak Zuckerman, demonstrate, the ghetto kibbutzim 
became a home not only for activists from around the country but also for 
people very far from the ideology, and indeed even for those who had never 
heard of it.24 Yet as the objectives of the youth organizations changed and 
military training supplanted the cultural activities, the few assimilated boys 
and girls who cooperated with the armed underground worked mainly as 
messengers—a task that required flawless Polish and “good” looks. We do not 
know if this was also Hala’s path. The only information we have is that she 
stayed in the ghetto until its last days and died alongside her boyfriend in the 
Warsaw Ghetto Uprising.
The great educator Janusz Korczak wrote in his Warsaw Ghetto diary: 
“Long after the war, men will not be able to look each other in the eyes with-
out posing the question: How did it happen that you survived? How did you 
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do it?”25 These questions were especially difficult for the so-called “victims 
of privilege,” as the stories told by the assimilated ghetto inhabitants could 
not match those of the underground fighters. They were more likely to be 
tried for collaboration than regarded as heroes. They were remembered as 
the members of the Judenrat, members of the Jewish police, the crowds in 
cafes and ghetto theatres. As a result, those assimilated Jews who published 
their testimonies shortly after the war often chose to underline the Jewish 
aspect of their ghetto experience, writing as “Jewish Holocaust victims.”26 
Others decided to remain Polish and only many years after the war, if at all, 
recounted their ghetto experiences. 
The experience of the assimilated community, a community in exile, 
with their memory of various aspects of Polishness serving as a way of escapism 
and to some extent even spiritual resistance, became very much lost. It is only 
through documentation written then and there, such as the letters of Wanda 
Lubelska and Hala Szwambaum, that its voice and the complexity of their 
experience can be recovered.
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Creating a Community:  
Who Can Belong to the Reform Synagogue? 
Mara W. Cohen Ioannides
I endorse the approach that says, “Do what you think is best for the 
Jewish people” and stop worrying about the rest. For me, welcom-
ing interfaith families in any way possible is the best thing for the 
Jewish people.
—Rabbi Edwin C. Goldberg1
It is far more important to have a strong commitment from a smaller 
group than a vague commitment from a large number who are at 
the very periphery. 
—Rabbi Walter Jacob et al.2 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Who is a Jew, who is a member of the community, is a question that dates back 
to the early biblical period. A description or law is usually set in place because 
of a need. Hence this community must have had problems with membership. 
In Genesis and Exodus, the Israelites are described as descendants of certain 
people: Jacob in Genesis 35:9–12 and the descendants of Jacob’s sons in Exo-
dus 3:10, 3:16. Thus, Jews were then defined genetically or through heredity. 
However, there were non-Jews who were members of the community. The 
Exodus story tells of a “mixed multitude” who left Egypt with the Israelites 
(Exod. 12:38). There are times when these members were counted in the 
community and times when these people were differentiated from the Jews. 
For example, the son of Shelomith bat Dibri is pointed out as the son of an 
Israelite and an Egyptian (Lev. 24:10–12). The point here is that Shelomit’s 
son’s father was not an Israelite, yet Shelomit’s son is counted as one; thus, one 
could conclude that matriliny was the standard of the day. Thus, even in this 
period one could be a member of the community without necessarily being 
an Israelite, which at this time was more a tribal or ethnic indicator than a 
religious one. In fact, Leviticus 19:33–34 commands that “the stranger who 
resides with you shall be to you as one of your citizens; you shall love him as 
yourself.” Numbers 1:2, many rabbis believe, points out the patrilineal nature 
of Judaism by requiring that the “census of the whole Israelite community” 
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should be listed by “names, every male, head by head.” If this is the case, then 
Shelomit’s son is not an Israelite, but is a member of the community. 
Later during the postexilic period, Ezra is clear on what defines the com-
munity. He laments that “the holy seed has become intermingled with the 
peoples of the land” (Ezra 9:2). However, the book of Ruth presents us with 
the first convert, after Abraham and Sarah; the first person to change their belief 
system and customs to someone else’s. Ruth declares: “Your people shall be my 
people, and your God my God” (Ruth 1:16). This shows that by this time, 
being an Israelite or Jew was not necessarily hereditary, now it could be a belief 
system. In fact, Isaiah 56:7 reminds us that “my house [the synagogue] shall be 
called a house of prayer for all peoples” regardless of their belief system.
In the Middle Ages, a different concept of membership developed. Mai-
monides presents the Thirteen Principles of Judaism and declares, “When a 
man believes in all these fundamental principles . . . he is then part of that 
‘Israel.’”3 Thus, the concept of genetics had morphed into one of faith. How-
ever, Maimonides is also clear that “any gentile who joins us unconditionally 
shares our good fortune, without, however, being quite equal to us.”4 Thus, 
there is still a hereditary factor. This isn’t surprising. While converts are 
accepted by the Talmudic rabbis, they were definitely given a different place 
in the Jewish hierarchy—as Jews, but not the same as Jews by birth. This is a 
carryover from the biblical period. Even Ruth, who is so highly respected by 
the rabbis as a convert, calls herself “a foreigner” (Ruth 2:10). Then again, one 
has to wonder about the rabbis who question a convert’s place in the hierarchy 
when Ruth, the quintessential convert, was the great-grandmother of King 
David (Ruth 4:17). 
While the definition of who is a Jew didn’t really change in the Middle 
Ages, one’s membership in a congregation was tied to the communities from 
which one’s ancestors came. Thus, synagogues followed the Italian, Polish, 
Spanish, or other rite. Rabbis, like Moses di Trani, were asked to determine 
membership in synagogues from communities far away5 just as they would 
issues of kashrut. Thus, congregational membership was not open to just any 
Jew, but to specific Jews.
MODERN PERIOD
In the modern period, the definition of Jewishness changed from religion to 
nationhood and back again. Jacob Klatzkin explains this clearly: “in the past 
. . . Judaism resets on a subjective basis, on the acceptance of a creed . . . the 
Jewish people [are] a denomination . . . and a community of individuals . . . 
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a third has now arisen. . . . To be a Jew means the acceptance of neither a 
religious nor ethical creed,” rather it is a common history.6 One of the keys to 
unlocking the question of acceptance as a Jew, membership into “the club,” 
has to do with the Emancipation. As Jews were accepted into the larger gentile 
community, self-definition became more important. Until the Emancipation, 
Jews were often defined by the external community rather than internally. 
For example, the first law in the Castilian Seven-Part Code defines a Jew as “a 
party who believes in, and adheres to the law of Moses . . . as well as one who 
is circumcised, and observes the other precepts commended by his religion.”7 
There were also laws all over Europe forcing Jews to wear certain clothes, 
declare themselves members of a synagogue, live in specific neighborhoods, 
work in defined careers, and so on. However, other than the ability to prove 
one’s ancestors’ lineage or seeking a rabbi’s guidance for conversion, a rare 
occurrence, there were no definitions of Jew instituted. 
In the late 1700s, with the growth of assimilation and emancipation, 
Jews and gentiles started to blend. Theodor Herzl remarked in the 1890s that 
intermarriage was the greatest impetus towards assimilation.8 Additionally, 
the leaders of the early Reform movement realized that there had to be some 
delineation between themselves and the gentiles, who in many respects they 
sought to emulate; otherwise, Jews would disappear. Being Jewish had become 
a private matter, rather than a public or communal one. Some argue that the 
longer Jews were in contact with Americans, the more they lost touch with 
Judaism.9 Jonathan Sarna calls this “the cult of synthesis,” where Jews inter-
mix their Judaism and their Americanism.10 Therefore, in 1885 the American 
Reform movement under the auspices of the Central Conference of American 
Rabbis (CCAR) created a code of self-description: “We consider ourselves 
no longer a nation, but a religious community.”11 This redefinition allowed 
political nationalists to include Jews as citizens with a different religion rather 
than as resident aliens (the movement towards emancipation). However, only a 
decade or so later Theodore Herzl viewed the conflict between the assimilated 
and unassimilated Jew as a question of nationhood: is the Diasporic Jew part 
of the nation in which they live or the nation of Judaism?12 Therefore, despite 
the statement of the CCAR, the question was still being debated. 
Klatzkin, only a quarter of a century later, made an entirely different 
statement that Jews do not have to have a shared belief system, rather a com-
mon history, to make the Jewish community.13 Jacob Rader Marcus saw the 
American Jew as a new Jew. He saw Jews as a “religioethnic community” 
where by the end of the twentieth century most of the ethnic differences had 
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disappeared and the community had created its own American ethnic Juda-
ism.14 This in itself is controversial, since in the last decade there has been a 
remarkable growth in the study of the Mizrahi communities of the United 
States; however, there is something to be said for an icing of commonality over 
the multilayered cake of American Judaism. 
POST-HOLOCAUST PERIOD
In the latter half of the twentieth century, post-Holocaust, Jews around the 
world came to this realization: even though they had been a minority before, 
with the majority of the Jewish communities in Europe erased Judaism could 
disappear entirely. Hindsight proves most interesting here because 1940 
was the highpoint of American Judaism; American Jews were at their high-
est percentage of the American population ever, at 3.68 percent. After that, 
even though the actual population grew slightly and then leveled off between 
5,300,000 and 6,000,000, the percentage of Jews that made up the American 
population dropped every decade until it returned to the turn of the twentieth 
century levels of 2.2 percent.15 (The problem of defining who is a Jew is not 
particular to North America.16 However, as North America has the largest 
Jewish community in the world, it is the leader in creating tradition.) Some 
of this may be due to the dropping fertility and high intermarriage rates of 
American Jews.17 
Interestingly, the 1950s saw “the highest rate of synagogue membership 
in the twentieth century.”18 The modern American Jew was less concerned 
with the denomination or theology than with the location of the commu-
nity. Samuel Heilman suggests that membership in a synagogue, regardless 
of the denomination, has much to do with the strict separation of church 
and state in the United States. Without the defining term of “Jew,” people 
lost their sense of community and so returned to the synagogue for a sense 
of self-definition.19 In fact, modern “Americans choose a synagogue because 
it is convenient or because they like the rabbi; because they want a cantor or 
they don’t; because they want more singing or less; because they want two 
days of religious school or three. They rarely ask about the belief system to 
which the synagogue subscribes or the philosophy to which it adheres.”20 
After all, the Union for Reform Judaism (URJ) reminds its member con-
gregations that “a synagogue is a community’s precious possession, the most 
influential institution for the preservation of Judaism. It must be nurtured 
by the present generation so that it survives, strengthens, flourishes, and 
provides sustenance to the next.”21 
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The religioethnic concept of Judaism was expanded upon by the CCAR 
in the 1976 document “A Centenary Perspective,” which emphasized diversity 
and that individuals can be Jews either by birth or choice; it “spoke of the need 
to secure the survival of the Jewish people,” which was most poignant after 
the Holocaust.22 Around this time, the redefinition of a Jewish family began 
to take place in the Reform movement, one where both parents did not need 
to be Jewish.23 In the 1997 document, “Reform Judaism and Zionism,” the 
Reform movement switched its emphasis to Jewish continuity. However, the 
CCAR is very clear that “by calling ourselves a Jewish community, we neces-
sarily draw lines and establish boundaries that flow from and reinforce our 
identity as Jews.”24 As a side note, it is interesting here that the word used is 
“community.” Jews are not defined by the CCAR as a nation or a religioethnic 
group. “Community” is a softer term. This leads us to the heart of this paper: 
What role can non-Jews play in the synagogue—or even what is a non-Jew? 
As the twentieth century drew to a close, the Reform movement, the 
largest Jewish denomination in North America, addressed the question Jews 
had asked since early biblical times, but the new century required new ques-
tions as well. Not only did they answer who is a Jew (from all over the world, 
any person born into or who chooses the faith and with any way of express-
ing their faith25), but they also had to ask who could be a member of the 
community, just as did the Hebrews who left Egypt. They are not alone in 
their inquiry. All of mainstream Judaism is addressing this issue, as the recent 
Bechol Lashon Conference highlights.26 Klatzkin, by taking away the impor-
tance of faith, only opened this question at the beginning of the twentieth 
century.27 The latest iteration of Reform theology, “A Statement of Principles 
for Reform Judaism,” addressed these questions,28 but did not avoid contro-
versy. In fact, it was so controversial that the organization’s journal, The CCAR 
Journal, devoted a whole issue to the topic of trying to define who belongs to 
the Jewish community. 
INTERFAITH MARRIAGES 
The Reform movement recognized the high rate of interfaith marriages among 
their adherents as a serious problem. The 1909 CCAR stand on intermarriage 
is “that mixed marriage is contrary to the Jewish tradition and should be dis-
couraged,”29 and this was supported by the rabbinic community because only 
a minority of American Reform rabbis officiated at mixed marriages in the 
late nineteenth century.30 This issue was revisited in 1947, the late 1950s,31 
and 1973, when rabbis were strongly encouraged to perform interfaith 
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weddings,32 because “this concern became particularly acute after the popu-
larization of the concept of the ‘vanishing American Jew’ in the 1960s, based 
on evidence from community studies of increasing rates of intermarriage.”33 
In 1970, the North American Jewish Data Bank announced that intermarried 
couples were 9.2 percent of American Jewish married couples, that the rate 
of intermarriage between 1966 and 1972 had risen to 31.7 percent, and that, 
significantly, more Jewish men marry out than Jewish women. The rate of the 
non-Jewish wife converting to Judaism is higher than that of the non-Jewish 
husband.34 However, the 1973 statement, while admitting that rabbis can 
make their own decisions regarding this practice, suggests that it “include a 
requirement to raise children exclusively within the Jewish faith.”35 Marc Lee 
Raphael noted in a small study he conducted that “intermarriage jumped dra-
matically between 1985 and 1995 [and] this trend . . . continued in the years 
1995-1998.”36 While intermarriage is discouraged by the CCAR, the raising 
of children of such marriages within Judaism is highly encouraged.37 
JEWISH DESCENT
By encouraging children of intermarriage to be raised Jewishly, the CCAR had 
to reevaluate how Jewishness was passed through the generations. The 1947 
proposal on Mixed Marriage and Intermarriage states that “the declaration of 
the parents to raise them [their children] as Jews shall be deemed sufficient 
for conversion.”38 Therefore, in 1983 the CCAR Committee on Patrilineal 
Descent declared: 
the child of one Jewish parent is under the presumption of Jewish 
descent. This presumption of the Jewish status of the offspring of 
any mixed marriage is to be established through appropriate and 
timely public and formal acts of identification with the Jewish faith 
and people. The performance of these mitzvot [commandments] 
serves to commit those who participate in them, both parent and 
child, to Jewish life.39 
Rabbi David Polish believed that patrilineality was already “the common law 
of our conference.”40 One could go even further and return to the Bible and 
say that patriliny has always been the Jewish way. These two factors could have 
contributed to the latest iteration on community definition.
As Rabbi Daniel Alexander pointed out, the language of the CCAR’s 
1999 statement is vague. He highlights the importance of the statement’s 
“saying ‘opening doors,’ rather than opening all doors, one is left with the 
opportunity to leave some doors shut.”41 These “doors” are under discussion 
here, as is the “Jewish communal integrity” that Alexander also believes is 
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controversial in “The Statement of Principle.”42 Thus each congregation had 
to figure out what “inclusive” means to its non-Jewish members “who strive 
to create a Jewish home.”43 This is particularly difficult for small communities 
who continuously struggle to survive. In fact, more than half of the member-
ship congregations to the Union for Reform Judaism (URJ) are small (with 
fewer than 250 member units).44 Many of the congregations serve large geo-
graphic areas that are underpopulated. Thus, even though the congregation is 
aligned with the URJ, their members do not necessarily align themselves with 
the URJ.45 Most small Jewish communities fall in the Midwest, South, and 
West of the United States and so include almost 70 percent of the American 
Jewish population and most of the interfaith couples reside in these regions. 
Most small Jewish communities, in fact most American Jews, are Reform and 
most Jews by choice choose Reform Judaism.46 
The latest CCAR statement has a very broad definition of both Jews and 
membership in the community. Rabbi Howard Greenstein notes the original 
Pittsburgh Platform “was unquestionably a statement of exclusivity” while “the 
present statement rests upon almost an unqualified reverence for . . . inclusiv-
ity.”47 What was presented in the CCAR’s 1999 Statement is in direct con-
flict with a number of CCAR responsa written in 1983, when the Responsa 
Committee wrote “that non-Jews should not become formal members of a 
congregation . . . the membership and the voting rights should be limited to the 
Jewish spouse” and non-Jews’ leadership on committees should be limited.”48 
The committee is very clear in this matter that “a non-Jewish partner is welcome 
to the fellowship of the congregation and is encouraged to participate in all of 
its activities; however, the non-Jewish spouse may not serve on the board, hold 
office, become chairman of any committee or have the privilege of voting at 
congregational or committee meetings.”49 However, by 1990 the Commission 
on Reform Jewish Outreach admitted that it had to readdress the issue of the 
gentile in the synagogue. Especially because it realized what Goldstein pointed 
out, that by the mid-1980s 45 percent of Jewish weddings were interfaith.50 
To the CCAR, Jews are a “religious[ly] and cultural[ly]” pluralistic group that 
is “an inclusive community opening doors to Jewish life to people . . . including 
the intermarried, who strive to create a Jewish home.”51 Rabbi Eric Yoffie strongly 
believes that drawing boundaries around the Jewish community is “a waste” 
because it only “keep[s] the maximum number of people out.”52 After all, “the 
rise in mixed marriage and the embrace of Jews of patrilineal descent (children of 
one Jewish parent who were raised as Jews) had changed the demographics of the 
Reform Movement” as the world entered the twenty-first century.53 This is quite 
true. The CCAR Committee on Patrilineal Descent believed that “one of the most 
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pressing human issues for the North American Jewish community is mixed mar-
riage.”54 Goldstein points out that in 1990, of the 210,000 persons born Jewish, 
but currently following another religion, “a majority are offspring of intermarriag-
es.”55 In 1990 the Union of American Hebrew Congregations (UAHC), the new 
iteration of the URJ, published Defining the Role of the Non-Jew in the Synagogue, 
in which Rabbi Alexander Schindler, then president of the UAHC, admitted that 
“intermarriage will remain a reality of American Jewish life,” so the Jewish com-
munity needs to “involve them [the couple] in Jewish life.”56 
NON-JEWS IN THE SYNAGOGUE
At the 1994 CCAR 150th convention, Rabbi Joan S. Friedman spoke on 
exactly this topic: “The Role of the Non-Jew in the Synagogue: Challenges 
and Choices.” She makes two important comments: 
1. In a synagogue it matters whether you are a Jew or not. The 
question is: when does it matter, how does it matter, and why 
does it matter?
2. We . . . cannot define the role of the non-Jew in the synagogue 
until we define the role of the Jew in the synagogue.57 
I will address the first point and present how others address the second. 
For the Sake of Heaven: Committees in Congregational Life outlines the 
roles of the various committees that congregations should have; included in 
the description of the outreach committee: “Welcome non-Jewish partners of 
members and interfaith households; plan programs to educate and support 
outreach issues for interfaith couples, Jews-by-choice and their families, and 
parents of children who have intermarried,”58 thereby showing that congrega-
tions will have interfaith families.
The URJ has a support network for its member congregations; since it 
has many small congregations, in 1999 it began a discussion board KolKa-
tan,59 which later became SmallTalk, where they “share ideas, solve or try to 
solve problems and find common ground.”60 In fact, the question of non-Jews 
being members of congregations and their role in the congregations they 
belong to was addressed numerous times under various guises.61 
The discussions covered three distinct, but related topics: (1) Can non-
Jews be members of a synagogue? (2) If they can, what role do they play in 
the governance of the community? (3) If they can, what role do they play in 
the religious practices of the community? These three questions are of a crucial 
nature to the continuity of the Jewish community, especially in the United 
States. Some communities address these issues only at a crisis moment; others 
as a continuous part of their membership discussions. 
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NON-JEWISH MEMBERSHIP 
The question of membership has become so profound for the movement that 
Rabbi Eric Yoffie, then president of the URJ, discussed it at the 2005 Biennial 
in his sermon. He labels non-Jewish spouses who are active members in their 
synagogues as “heroes . . . of Jewish life.”62 They are often the parent that partici-
pates more in synagogue activities and has a stronger influence on the children. 
Yoffie sees the outreach to non-Jewish spouses as “strengthen[ing] our destiny as 
a holy people.”63 Thus, the question of membership of the non-Jewish spouse is 
supported by the umbrella organizations and the rabbis. In a sense, they must 
support non-Jewish spousal membership because almost every congregation has 
non-Jewish members.64 Judy Alexander, Director of Congregational Education 
at Temple Sinai in Burlington, Vermont, cautions that by being so accommodat-
ing “the line is so blurry . . . we don’t know where to draw it any more” when 
deciding who is a Jew and what non-Jews may do.65 However, this decision 
ultimately rests with the governing board of the individual congregation.
One of the early leaders of the American Reform movement, Rabbi 
Kaufmann Kohler, refused interfaith couples membership in his congrega-
tion, and he would not allow the Jewish party in such a marriage to belong. 
He could never get the CCAR to agree to his stance.66 Rabbi Samuel Cohon 
(chair of Theology at Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, from 1923–1963) 
in 1945 warned against allowing synagogues to become social clubs; a fear 
he had that the Indianapolis Hebrew Congregation was headed towards by 
allowing non-Jews to become members.67 The Hebrew Congregation defined 
membership as persons who uphold “the principles and purposes” of Judaism, 
which allowed the congregation to grow to large proportions by 2008.68 
Some congregations currently decree that a household membership includes 
non-Jewish spouses,69 while others do not allow non-Jewish spouses to be mem-
bers.70 The occasional ones “have always allowed non-Jews to become members 
[even] where neither partner is Jewish.”71 Mandy Van Ostran of Temple Israel in 
Springfield, Missouri, finds the idea of non-Jews as members “uncomfortable” 
because “it is like putting the cart before the horse . . . membership implies 
a public commitment to joining the Jewish people not the building.”72 Geri 
Copitch of Temple Beth Israel in Redding, California, suggests that perhaps 
her congregation is more lenient about membership because they are so small.73 
Some congregations felt that being welcoming and encouraging was sufficient; 
membership wasn’t necessary.74 Other congregations waited until 2005 to really 
address this issue. West End Temple in Neponsit, New York, decided to target 
interfaith families because of falling membership.75 
276                                                   Who Is a Jew? Reflections on History, Religion, and Culture
NON-JEWISH MEMBERS’ ROLES 
For those congregations who accept non-Jews as members of the congrega-
tion, the question of what roles they can play in the governance and religious 
practice of the congregation has to be addressed. Such issues as voting at 
congregational meetings, sitting on the board, teaching, or directing activities 
were each considered separately, as was participating in any portion of the 
religious service. This was never an easy discussion. Those who participated in 
the online discussion called the process of writing the policy very emotional76 
because of the multisectarian nature of these small synagogues. One even 
explained that trying to make policy about non-Jewish roles in the congrega-
tion caused a splinter group to “form its own congregation [and] their move 
[did] reduce conflict.”77 Another noted that “tempers flared and feelings were 
hurt”; once the policies were created, “a few of the more conservative (small 
‘c’) members have not rejoined” and some more liberal members were turned 
off by the “non-inclusiveness” of the policies.78 
A few congregations do not allow their non-Jewish members any formal 
role in governance, though they “are extremely active” in other ways.79 Some 
congregations provide each household with two votes at the congregational 
meeting, regardless of the religion of the adults in the household.80 There are 
some congregations that restrict what non-Jews can do. For example, some 
allow non-Jewish members all roles except sitting on the board.81 Some extend 
that to any role other than leading the board or other committee.82 Some allow 
non-Jews to sit on the board and chair committees, but not have a position on 
the board.83 Others put no restrictions at all on what role the non-Jews may 
play84 because their “congregation has a large number of interfaith couples 
and if we didn’t allow this, we would definitely be the losers.”85 However, the 
majority of UAHC congregations that allow non-Jews to be members do not 
permit them to hold positions that regulate religious practice86 because they 
understand what Rabbi Joseph Glaser, executive vice president of the CCAR, 
means about non-Jews making policy on religious practice.87 Rabbi Harvey 
Fields feels that this makes the service a “playtime.”88 
NON-JEWISH MEMBERS’ RELIGIOUS ROLES
This is a separate issue from participation in the religious side of the commu-
nity. Religious practice is a touchy issue because of tradition, law, and family 
desires. The URJ does have a set of guidelines that some congregations use 
without alteration.89 The CCAR responsa for the issue of a non-Jew partici-
pating in a service, especially b’nai mitzvah, are clear. The non-Jewish parent 
Creating a Community: Who Can Belong to the Reform Synagogue?              277           
cannot participate in most of the service, they cannot recite any prayer that 
includes the idea of being part of Judaism, and they cannot pass the Torah 
when it is taken from the ark.90 The argument for this is based on the idea 
that the Torah is “a powerful symbol of the divine covenant with Israel” and 
allowing a non-Jew to handle the Torah in any way breaks this covenant.91 
However, the responsa are also clear that a non-Jewish parent should partici-
pate in some way.92 Rabbi Lawrence Hoffman is very supportive of non-Jews 
participating in religious services. He sees it as “a sign of how far we have come 
in the grand experiment of pluralism.”93 Additionally, he makes the point that 
people interpret liturgy in different ways. 
For some congregations this was a multifaceted discussion where mem-
bers, the ritual committee or board, and finally the rabbi had some say. Some 
congregations give their rabbis the final say, having almost no real policy in 
place.94 For others, the rabbi chose not to be the final say for the community.95 
Communities have been most creative in creating peace among the vari-
ous factions. Some congregations will not allow non-Jews to lead the service.96 
Beth El Congregation “extend[s] all of the privileges of membership to him/
her except ‘recitation alone and aloud from the bimah of prayers that contain 
language declaring that the speaker is a member of the Jewish people.’”97 Some 
will not allow the non-Jewish parent of b’nai mitzvah [Jewish children who 
have reached adulthood] to participate in the Torah service in any way.98 Rabbi 
Raquel Kosovske of Bet Ahavah of Northampton, Massachusetts, commented 
that allowing the non-Jewish spouse to hold the Torah “is often transformative 
for the families . . . it can be a powerful affirmation of the prior 13+ years or so 
in which the non-Jewish parent has been dedicated . . . to raising a Jewish child 
or having a Jewish home.”99 Others will allow the non-Jewish parent to stand 
on the bimah [raised platform where the Torah is read] behind the Jewish par-
ent when they are participating in the Torah service during the b’nai mitzvah 
service.100 During the new ritual of LaDor V’Dor [passing the Torah from 
generation to generation] some congregations will allow only Jewish family 
members to participate; others, like Temple Beth El in Riverside, California, 
allow both Jewish and non-Jewish family members, but instead of passing the 
Torah, the rabbi taps each person in line with the Holy Scroll and gives it to 
the last person, who must be a Jew, who then gives it to the b’nai mitzah.101 
Still others have no restrictions.102 Alexander adds another note of caution: if 
non-Jews are given aliyot [a blessing to say over the Torah], then Jews by choice 
will start to question their need to convert.103 Rabbi Friedman is concerned 
that the whole idea of what is Judaism and who is a Jew will change. Already, 
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she notes, congregants rate each other on Jewishness through the definition 
of practice.104 Each congregation has chosen according to what it believes the 
significance of the religious text is, which is what Hoffman suggests.105 
Victoria Romero of Temple Beth Or in Everett, Washington, believes that 
acceptance of non-Jewish members has much to do with who was involved in 
the formation of the congregation. The congregation to which she belongs had 
non-Jewish founders, among them herself, and so they have always been an 
important part of the community.106 Rabbi Friedman is concerned that such 
a large number of non-Jews would influence, purposely or not, the language 
of the service—what is to be done with the prayers that refer to “the Jewish 
people,” for example.107 There is a feeling in some congregations that if one 
limits the role non-Jews can play, then they will not participate as fully as they 
might otherwise.108 Others suggest that “we only damage our communities 
if we reject those who would otherwise help to raise the next generation of 
Jews.”109 
CONCLUSIONS
Rabbi Victor S. Appell, the small congregations specialist at the URJ, was 
very pleased by the discussion taking place on line (part of the purpose of the 
discussion group). He supports “each synagogue[’s] . . . endeavor to create 
guidelines that are uniquely well-suited to its community” and reminds the 
group that “the Union for Reform Judaism respects the autonomy of each 
congregation in matters of governance.”110 Thus, these congregations were 
approaching the problems appropriately, as best needed by their community, 
and working through the process, which Appell and Hoffman believe to be 
equally as important. The process of acceptance must be working because 
American Jews still rate Jewishness as important in their lives.111 Rabbi David 
Frank notes that “how to balance perpetuation of Judaism with perpetuation 
of the Jewish people themselves” is a serious dilemma that Reform Jews must 
be aware of.112 Van Ostran raises interesting questions about defining Jewry: 
“What about someone born of a Jewish mother or father but who has prac-
ticed another religion and now want to be Jewish? And, what about someone 
born of a parent who was not raised Jewish but is a descended from a Jewish 
grandparent?”113 We know that Jewish law stipulates that in the first case the 
child is a returning Jew; this was addressed in the early 1500s by leading rabbis 
when dealing with the expelled crypto-Jews. The second is murkier. 
Heilman warns that non-Jews in Jewish families are “not going to dis-
appear” and that somehow Jews must find a place for them in the Jewish 
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community.114 The Reform movement has addressed this issue over time; as 
its constituents’ attitudes have changed, so has the philosophy of the move-
ment. What seems most evident is exactly what Marcus suggests: “synthesis is 
the essence of Jewish history.”115 The American Reform movement is a prime 
example of this, redefining how one may belong to the community in order 
for the community to continue to exist. The CCAR has been careful to main-
tain the essence of Judaism (the idea of community and the religious practic-
es), while making sure that most people can be a part of the community in an 
effort to encourage continuity. That each community enforces these guidelines 
according to its wishes is very Jewish and encouraged by the movement. That 
the Jewish community continues to exist flies in the face of the naysayers of 
the early to mid-twentieth century. That this is controversial is not surprising.
When we restrict Torah we only lower ourselves.
—Rabbi Irwin Huberman116
We may be a small part-time congregation, but we are full-time Jews. 
—Rabbi Ellen Jay Lewis117
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Jewish identity is complex and multifaceted, and there are multiple views of 
what it means to be Jewish. Although Jewish life has always been characterized 
by a diversity of perspectives, the rapid pace of social change exacerbates this 
state of affairs, particularly for young adults. The focus of this chapter is on the 
nature of Jewish identity for contemporary American young adults and how, 
for many, it has been altered by an educational experience in Israel. 
To frame this discussion, we would like to situate Jewish identity theo-
retically. Following the dictum of Kurt Lewin, one of founders of the disci-
pline of social psychology, that “nothing is so practical as a good theory,”1 it is 
important to understand how and why Jews develop their identity. One frame-
work, devised by Hebert C. Kelman, explains the development of identity as 
a process that moves from compliance, to identification, to internalization.2 
There are other ways to describe identity formation, but Kelman’s model is a 
useful heuristic. We use it in this chapter as a means of explaining how the 
Taglit-Birthright Israel program has affected the Jewish identity of a genera-
tion of Jewish young adults.
KELMAN’S STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT
Just as there are many theoretical frames that can be used to explain identity 
formation, there are also many explanations for Taglit’s impact. However, 
Kelman’s three processes by which attitude and identity change can occur are 
particularly helpful. Kelman referred to the first of these processes as “compli-
ance.” A compliant person is one who accepts the influence of another person 
who is important to him or her out of a desire to please that person. This 
adoption takes place under circumstances in which the important other person 
is observing the compliant individual; otherwise there is no motivation for the 
individual to act. Thus, for example, a Jewish young adult who is influenced 
via compliance may attend services on the High Holy Days with his or her 
parents or friends not out of any deeply held conviction but simply because 
doing so will make these important others happy.
The second process is called “identification.” A person who is affected 
by identification accepts the influence of others who are important to him or 
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her in order to maintain a satisfying relationship with them. The content of 
the influence may not be important to the person being influenced; the key 
feature is that the content is important to the significant others. Therefore, one 
accepts their influence because of the satisfaction derived from being classified 
as similar to them in some particularly salient way. Although the influencers 
do not necessarily need to be watching for the person affected by identifica-
tion to accept their influence, the conditions must be salient to the individual’s 
relationship with the influential party or parties. Thus, a Jewish young adult 
who is influenced via identification may attend services on the high holy days 
in order to be with or near other people who are important to him or her and 
for whom attendance is significant.
The third process is called “internalization.” A person who is affected by 
internalization accepts the influence of others primarily because the content 
of the influence is congruent with the individual’s deeply held values, regard-
less of whether he or she is being observed by important others or whether 
accepting the influence will solidify group ties. Thus, a Jewish young adult 
who is influenced via internalization may attend High Holy Day services, not 
because doing so will please others or to solidify ties to his or her community, 
but rather he or she truly feels that doing so is an authentic expression of his 
or her innermost self.
JEWISHNESS AS AN ACHIEVED OR ASCRIBED ROLE
Kelman’s model evolves from an analysis of roles, the expected behaviors or 
sets of behaviors associated with a given status or social position.3 Being Jew-
ish, or the role of being a Jew, used to be considered an ascribed role. An 
ascribed role is assigned to an individual as a result of traits he or she possesses 
that are beyond his or her control, regardless of merit. Race and gender are 
classic examples of ascribed roles—we are born with them, we live our entire 
lives being classified by them, and we cannot easily drop the labels once they 
have been attached to us. For much of modern Jewish history, this is exactly 
how it was to be a Jew—you were born a Jew, you lived as a Jew, and even if 
you wanted to divest yourself of your Jewish identity, it was not easy to do so.
This is no longer the case. Our world is one in which Jews can be as 
assimilated or acculturated as they want to be. In the United States, as in 
many Diaspora communities, Jews blend in with everyone else so well that 
they cannot be easily identified as members of their own separate and distinct 
ethnic group. In the parlance of contemporary American ethno-racial classifi-
cation, American Jews, particularly third- or fourth-generation American Jews, 
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have become generic “white folks.”4 As a result, being a Jew is increasingly an 
achieved role, one that individuals must choose for themselves.
One of the fundamental goals of Jewish educational programming, par-
ticularly for children and young adults, is to strengthen participants’ Jewish 
identities. In the context of role theory, it encourages them to “achieve Jewish-
ness”—to choose to identify more strongly as Jews and seek closer personal 
connections with the Jewish community by progressing through Kelman’s 
stages of development, from compliance to identification to internalization. 
The organized Jewish community’s concern with continuity has resulted in 
many new programs over the past twenty years that seek to encourage young 
adults to choose to identify more strongly as Jews. Such programs provide 
natural grounds in which to evaluate the content of Jewish identity; indeed, 
following the words of Lewin, “if you want truly to understand something, 
try to change it.”5
TAGLIT-BIRTHRIGHT ISRAEL:  
A LARGE-SCALE EXPERIMENT IN JEWISH IDENTITY
One such program is Taglit-Birthright Israel.6 Taglit7 was established out of 
concern about the assimilation of Jewish young adults. It provides free, ten-
day, informal, educational trips to Israel for Jewish young adults aged 18–26 
who have not already had a peer-group experience in Israel. Since its inception 
in December 1999, approximately 350,000 Jewish young adults from over 
fifty countries have participated, with about 240,000 of them from North 
America (mostly the United States). Taglit’s large scale makes it an ideal set-
ting in which to study the processes by which Jewish education can affect 
individual Jewish identity across a diverse young adult population and, further, 
how such an intervention can affect the entire Jewish community.
Taglit dramatically changed the scope and character of educational tour-
ism to Israel in three key ways. First, instead of focusing on adolescents, as 
most prior programs did, Taglit brought young adults to Israel. This was a 
critical programmatic decision; the ages of 18–26, sometimes referred to as 
“emerging adulthood,” are a period of personal development in which indi-
viduals explore their life options and make decisions about personal values that 
typically influence the rest of their lives.8 Accordingly, this age range was ideal 
for affecting participants’ Jewish identities in lasting ways.
Second, where previous educational tours of Israel were predominantly run 
by sectarian groups and attracted primarily participants who were already highly 
engaged in Jewish life, Taglit’s tour organizers were predominantly nonsectarian, 
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including tour companies and not limited to not-for-profit organizations. They 
recruited large numbers of secular participants, the population about which the 
organized Jewish community was most concerned and the one for which there 
were few attractive options for peer-group educational tours of Israel.
Third, whereas previous programs were paid for by participants or their 
families, Taglit was made available as a gift. Given the expense of flights to and 
from Israel, accommodations and transportation, food, and admission to sites, 
the cost of an educational tour of Israel could be prohibitive to some families 
and many young adults. The willingness of philanthropists, supported by the 
government of Israel and communal organizations, to make the trip free for 
participants removed a significant obstacle to participation for applicants who 
otherwise could not afford to participate in such a program.
THE JEWISH FUTURES STUDY:  
LONG-TERM IMPACT OF TAGLIT PARTICIPATION
Since Taglit’s launch, the Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies at Brandeis Uni-
versity has been collecting data about both participants in the program and people 
who applied but ultimately were not able to go on a Taglit trip. We have extensive 
documentation on the impact of the trip in the short-, medium-, and long-term. In 
this chapter, we present data from the third wave of the Jewish Futures Study,9 our 
long-term follow-up study of Taglit participants and applicants.
From the database of Taglit applicants, we selected a stratified random 
sample of 3,503 people, 2,119 of whom went on a Taglit winter trip between 
the winter of 2000–2001 and the winter of 2005–2006 and 1,384 of whom 
applied for a trip but ultimately did not go. Between December 2011 and April 
2012, six to eleven years after the participants went on their Taglit trips, our 
research team sent invitations to these individuals to complete a survey that 
included questions about Jewish educational and family background; attitudes 
toward Israel, Judaism, and the Jewish community; involvement with Jewish 
organizations and associated activities; and dating, marriage, and children. An 
in-depth module on travel to Israel was also included. The survey was conducted 
via telephone and over the Internet. Ultimately, 1,990 respondents completed 
the survey for a response rate of 57 percent (approximately 64 percent among 
Taglit participants and 46 percent among nonparticipants).10 Because there were 
no statistically significant differences at the time of application to Taglit between 
eventual participants and nonparticipants, any observed differences between 
participants and nonparticipants can be attributed to Taglit participation.
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Below, we focus on the kind of data that can be collected from a long-
term panel such as this one, tracking respondents as they form families, join 
communities, and become adult members of the Jewish community; in doing 
so, we can gauge the long-term impact of the Taglit-Birthright Israel program.
CONNECTION TO ISRAEL
One element of the current discussion of Jewish identity is debate over Jewish 
young adults’ connection to Israel. The role of Israel in Jewish young adults’ 
lives has been at the forefront of recent scholarly and communal discourse.11 
Some have promoted the “distancing hypothesis,” which posits that young 
adult American Jews are losing their connection to Israel as a result of a 
confluence of factors, one of the most important of which is the mismatch 
between the predominantly liberal politics of young American Jews and 
the policies of an increasingly right-wing Israeli government, particularly in 
regard to the conflict with the Palestinians and matters of religion and state.12 
This phenomenon is described as a “birth cohort effect,” that is, the degree of 
attachment survey respondents feel toward Israel is a function of when they 
were born in that successive generations of American Jews have developed 
progressively weaker ties to Israel. Other scholars, including ourselves, have 
argued that examination of multiple data sets collected over time reveals that 
young adults have always reported lesser connection to Israel than their elders 
on surveys and that connection to Israel appears to be subject to a “life-cycle 
effect”;13 that is, connection to Israel strengthens over time as a function of 
life experiences.
Regardless of how one views the attachment debate, one of the goals 
of Taglit is to promote greater affinity for Israel among participants. And, 
indeed, the program has a profound effect on participants’ connection to 
Israel. As figure 1 illustrates, Taglit participants are 42 percent more likely 
than nonparticipants to report feeling “very much” connected to Israel and 
about half as likely to report feeling “not at all” connected. Participants 
are also 22 percent more likely to feel “somewhat” or “very confident” in 
explaining the situation in Israel. Their greater connection to Israel and 
understanding of contemporary circumstances appear to be associated with 
having developed a greater personal connection to the Land of Israel and to 
Israeli people, as well as to the resultant development of greater interest in 
following current events that affect Israel.
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INMARRIAGE
Along with attitudes to Israel, the Jewish community has also been centrally 
concerned with the intermarriage rate. Some scholars have argued that inter-
marriage is a threat to the cohesiveness of the Jewish community, if not its 
very survival.14 Although we believe the focus on intermarriage is misplaced 
and that, instead, the concern should be on Jewish education,15 marriage to a 
Jew is a leading indicator of one’s commitment to remain part of the Jewish 
community as an adult. Previous findings indicated that Taglit participation 
had a significant effect on participants’ attitudes toward inmarriage and rais-
ing Jewish children,16 but the third wave of the Jewish Futures Study provided 
sufficient data for a more in-depth examination.
Taglit participants were less likely to be married than nonparticipants (35 
percent vs. 43 percent), a finding that we can report preliminarily has been 
Fig. 1. Feeling connected to Israel by Taglit participation (predicted probabilities). 
Note: “To what extent do you feel a connection to Israel?” Respondents not raised 
Orthodox. Predicted probabilities from an ordinal logistic regression model control-
ling for Taglit participation and parental inmarriage. Odds ratio = 1.72, t(1, 727) = 
4.12, p < .001.
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replicated in the fourth wave of the study.17 This finding seems to be related 
to seeking a Jewish partner and the greater importance Taglit participants place 
on being part of a Jewish family. And among those respondents who were mar-
ried and were not raised Orthodox,18 Taglit participants were 45 percent more 
likely than nonparticipants to be married to another Jew.
Fig. 2. Inmarriage by Taglit participation (predicted probabilities). Note: Respon-
dents not raised Orthodox and married after Taglit application. Predicted probabili-
ties from a logistic regression model controlling for Taglit participation and parental 
inmarriage. Odds ratio = 2.52, t(742) = 4.02, p < .001.
The impact of Taglit participation appears at all levels of experience in 
formal Jewish educational settings. Figure 3 shows the rates of inmarriage for 
both participants and nonparticipants at different levels of Jewish education, as 
measured by hours of formal Jewish education in grades 1–12.19 The bars at the 
bottom of the chart represent the proportion of (non-Orthodox raised) respon-
dents in the sample with a given amount of formal Jewish educational exposure. 
Thus, 22 percent had no formal Jewish education, 18 percent had some formal 
Jewish education but no more than 500 hours, and so on. Very few had more 
than 2,000 hours. The dashed lines represent likelihood of inmarriage for Taglit 
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participants and nonparticipants. Although the gap between participants and 
nonparticipants appears to narrow slightly at higher levels of formal Jewish 
education, the difference is not significant. Indeed, at all levels of formal Jewish 
education, Taglit participation made respondents more likely to be married to a 
Jew. This represents a significant Taglit effect on choice of spouse.
Fig. 3. Inmarriage by hours of Jewish education and Taglit participation (predicted 
probabilities). Note: Respondents not raised Orthodox and married after Taglit 
application. Predicted probabilities from a logistic regression model controlling for 
Taglit participation, parental inmarriage, and hours of formal Jewish education in 
grades 1-12. Odds ratio = 2.51, t(738) = -3.98, p < .001.
IMPORTANCE OF RAISING JEWISH CHILDREN
The impact of Taglit participation on family formation is not limited to inmar-
riage. Study respondents are beginning to form their families, and we now have 
enough data to begin to describe the impact of Taglit participation on parenting 
choices. As more time passes and additional Taglit participants and nonpartici-
pants begin raising children, we expect these findings to become more robust.
Of the respondents who were not raised Orthodox, Taglit participants 
were less likely than nonparticipants to have at least one child (17 percent vs. 31 
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percent). This difference is explained primarily by three factors: first, nonpartici-
pants are slightly older than participants; second, among married respondents, 
nonparticipants had been married slightly longer than participants (about 4 
years compared with about 3.6 years); and third, as was previously mentioned, 
participants were less likely to be married. About 40 percent of parents had more 
than one child. Of all parents, 82 percent reported at the time they completed 
their surveys that their oldest child was younger than five years old.
Virtually all endogamous respondents reported that they were raising 
their oldest child Jewish. Intermarried Taglit participants and nonparticipants 
were about equally likely to be raising their oldest child Jewish; however, 
because Taglit participants were far less likely to be intermarried, overall Taglit 
participants were more likely to be raising their oldest child Jewish. And 
among respondents who did not have children at the time of the survey, Taglit 
participants were 23 percent more likely than nonparticipants to view raising 
their children Jewish as “very important.”
Fig. 4. Importance of raising children Jewish by Taglit participation (predicted prob-
abilities). Note: “Thinking about the future, how important is it to you to raise your 
children Jewish?” Respondents not raised Orthodox and with no children. Predicted 
probabilities from an ordinal logistic regression model controlling for Taglit participa-
tion and parental inmarriage. Odds ratio = 1.57, t(1,193) = 2.83, p < .01.
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SYNAGOGUE MEMBERSHIP
Membership in a synagogue, temple, minyan, chavurah, or other Jewish con-
gregation has long been used as a measure of Jewish identity.20 Whether or 
not one has children is strongly predictive of joining a synagogue;21 accord-
ingly, because Taglit participants are less likely to have children thus far, 
our analysis controls for having a child. As illustrated by figure 5, for both 
parents and childless respondents, Taglit participation predicted membership 
in a synagogue, temple, minyan, chavurah, or other Jewish congregation. 
Among parents, 52 percent of Taglit participants had joined a congregation, 
compared with 41 percent of nonparticipants. For nonparents, 22 percent of 
Taglit participants and 16 percent of nonparticipants had joined. Although 
the difference was small, Taglit participation was also predictive of increased 
frequency of attending Jewish religious services. However, Taglit did not have 
a statistically significant effect on participants’ confidence in their ability to 
follow along in services.
Fig. 5. Jewish congregational membership by Taglit participation and having children 
(predicted probabilities). Note: Respondents not raised Orthodox. Predicted prob-
abilities from a logistic regression model controlling for Taglit participation, parental 
inmarriage, and having children. Odd ratio = 1.56, t(1, 720) = 2.62, p < .01.
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JEWISH HOLIDAY CELEBRATION
Finally, we examined whether Taglit participation resulted in differences in celebra-
tion of Jewish holidays and Shabbat. Overall, participants are more likely than non-
participants to observe Jewish holidays in some way, as well as to have a special meal 
on Shabbat. It is interesting, however, that celebration of Hanukkah and Passover 
are nearly universal among both Taglit participants and nonparticipants, and the 
vast majority of both participants and nonparticipants also celebrate Rosh Hashanah.
Fig. 6. Jewish holiday celebration by Taglit participation (predicted probabilities). 
Note: Respondents not raised Orthodox. Mokken scale cumulative percentages. Pre-
dicted probabilities from an ordinal logistic regression controlling for Taglit participa-
tion and parental inmarriage. Odd ratio = 1.48, t(1, 730) = 3.14, p < .01.
KELMAN’S PROCESSES OF INFLUENCE  
EXPLAIN WHY TAGLIT WORKS
Following Lewin’s maxim that a phenomenon can be truly understood only 
by trying to change it, it is apparent that Taglit, which profoundly affects the 
Jewish identities of its participants, provides an excellent window to under-
standing the content and character of Jewish identity. 
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Taglit affects participants’ Jewish identities by punctuated equilibrium, 
by fundamentally changing the way they think about Jewish life and their 
connection to Israel over the course of a ten-day trip. In Kelman’s terms, 
Taglit tends to alter the way participants identify as Jews, taking them from 
“compliance” or “identification” with Judaism and shifting them into “inter-
nalization.” As a result, Judaism becomes more salient to participants in nearly 
every aspect of their lives.
The literature on emerging adulthood makes it clear that the time from 
the late teens through the mid- to late 20s is critical for solidifying young Jews’ 
sense of themselves as members of the Jewish collective and their attachment 
to it. That Taglit participants tend to feel more connected to Israel, are more 
likely to marry Jews and be concerned with raising Jewish children, join syna-
gogues, and celebrate Jewish holidays than nonparticipants, even years down 
the road, confirms that their participation in Taglit made their Jewish identi-
ties more salient to them and that the effects are likely to be lasting.
For Judaism to flourish in the twenty-first century, it is necessary to 
educate Jews—especially young adults—about their heritage and the ways in 
which engagement in Jewish life as part of a community can give their lives 
meaning. As the data suggest, the question of assimilation and intermarriage 
leading to the inevitable decline of Jewish civilization should be turned on its 
head—how can the Jewish community engage all Jews, including the highly 
assimilated and the children of intermarriage, in authentic ways that drive 
interest in Jewish life and can revitalize the Jewish community? What are the 
educational and lived experiences that lead people to internalize their Jewish 
identities and accept themselves as citizens of the Jewish world? By looking 
to Taglit, perhaps the largest experiment ever attempted to influence Jewish 
identity, the Jewish community can find some answers to these questions that 
will enable it to continue to help its members explore the boundaries of Jewish 
life and internalize their Jewish identities.
NOTES
1 Kurt Lewin, “The Research Center for Group Dynamics at Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology,” Sociolmetry 8 (1945): 126–35.
2 See Herbert C. Kelman, “Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Pro-
cesses of Attitude Change,” Conflict Resolution 2 (1958): 51–60; Herbert C. Kelman, 
“The Place of Ethnic Identity in the Development of Personal Identity: A Challenge for 
the Jewish Family,” in Studies in Contemporary Jewry, Volume 14 (ed. Peter Y. Medding; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
The Birthright Israel Generation: Being a Jewish Young Adult in Contemporary America             297           
3 For a complete review of role theory, see Bruce J. Biddle, “Recent Developments in Role 
Theory,” Annual Review of Sociology 12 (1986): 67–92.
4 Several scholars have written on this subject. See, for example, Karen Brodkin, How 
Jews Became White Folks and What That Says about Race in America (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1998); Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
5 Attributed to Lewin. See Charles W. Tolman, Problems of Theoretical Psychology 
(Toronto: Captus Press, 1996).
6 For full details about the program’s inception and impact, see Leonard Saxe and Barry 
Chazan, Ten Days of Birthright Israel (Lebanon: Brandeis University Press, 2008), or the 
Taglit Publications page on the website of the Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies at 
Brandeis University, http://www.brandeis.edu/cmjs/researchareas/taglit-publications.html.
7 Taglit is the Hebrew name of the organization, meaning “discovery.” In the United 
States, the program is generally known as “Birthright Israel.”
8 Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, “Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late 
Teens through the Twenties,” American Psychologist 55 (2000): 469–80.
9 At the time this is being written, we are closing in on the end of data collection for the 
fourth wave of the study. Although we have preliminary data from the fourth wave, we 
will not report specific findings from it in this chapter.
10 For full details on the methodology of the survey, see Leonard Saxe, et al., Jewish 
Futures Project: The Impact of Taglit-Birthright Israel: 2012 Update (Waltham: Maurice and 
Marilyn Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies, Brandeis University, 2012). 
11 The October 2010 issue of Contemporary Jewry was devoted to debating the “distancing 
hypothesis.”
12 See, for example, Peter Beinart, “The Failure of the American Jewish Establishment,” 
The New York Review of Books (May 12, 2010); Steven M. Cohen and Ari Y. Kelman, 
“Thinking About Distancing from Israel,” Contemporary Jewry 30 (2010): 287–96.
13 See, for example, Theodore Sasson, Charles Kadushin, and Leonard Saxe, “Trends in 
American Jewish Attachment to Israel: An Assessment of the ‘Distancing’ Hypothesis,” 
Contemporary Jewry 30 (2010): 297–319; Leonard Saxe and Matthew Boxer, “Loyalty and 
Love of Israel by Diasporan Jews,” Israel Studies 17 (2012): 92–101.
14 See, for example, Steven M. Cohen, A Tale of Two Jewries: The “Inconvenient Truth” for 
American Jews (New York: Jewish Life Network/Steinhardt Foundation, 1996); Jack Wert-
heimer and Steven Bayme, “Real Realism about Mixed Marriage,” Forward (September 
9, 2005).
15 Fern Chertok, Benjamin Phillips, and Leonard Saxe, It’s Not Just Who Stands Under the 
Chuppah: Intermarriage and Engagement (Waltham: Maurice and Marilyn Cohen Center 
for Modern Jewish Studies, Brandeis University, 2008).
16 See Leonard Saxe, et al., Generation Birthright Israel: The Impact of an Israel Experience 
on Jewish Identity and Choice (Waltham: Maurice and Marilyn Cohen Center for Modern 
Jewish Studies, Brandeis University, 2009); Leonard Saxe, et al., Jewish Futures Project: The 
Impact of Taglit-Birthright Israel: 2010 Update (Waltham: Maurice and Marilyn Cohen 
Center for Modern Jewish Studies, Brandeis University, 2011).
298                                                   Who Is a Jew? Reflections on History, Religion, and Culture
17 Leonard Saxe et al., Jewish Futures Project: The Impact of Taglit-Birthright Israel: 2013 
Update (Waltham: Maurice and Marilyn Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies, 
Brandeis University, forthcoming).
18 Nearly all respondents who are married and were raised Orthodox are married to 
another Jew, regardless of Taglit participation.
19 Respondents indicated for how many years they had attended Jewish day schools and 
Hebrew schools. Day schools were equated to 600 hours of Jewish instruction, while 
Hebrew schools were equated to 100 hours. These figures are modifications of Harold 
Himmelfarb’s formula, which has been used by dozens of researchers in statistical models 
assessing the impact of various aspects of Jewish background on Jewish identity. See Har-
old Himmelfarb, “The Non-Linear Impact of Schooling: Comparing Different Types and 
Amounts of Jewish Education,” Sociology of Education 50 (1977): 114–32.
20 See Marshall Sklare, America’s Jews (New York: Random House, 1971). Questions 
about synagogue membership have been staples of Jewish demographic surveys on the 
national and community level since at least 1945; see National Jewish Welfare Board, A 
Study of the Jewish Population: Atlanta, Georgia (Atlanta: Jewish Community Council of 
Atlanta, 1947).
21 Ira M. Sheskin and Lawrence Kotler-Berkowitz, “Synagogues, Jewish Community 
Centers, and Other Jewish Organizations: Who Joins, Who Doesn’t?,” Journal of Jewish 
Communal Service 82 (2007): 271–85.
